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for the words "see back," which did not appear on the face of the ticket in that case. But the findings here make that distinction immaterial. After the conclusions of fact which the jury have drawn, it is, upon the authority of that case, quite immaterial whether the special terms relied on were on the front or on the back of the ticket.

Solicitor for plaintiff: G. W. Digby.
Solicitor for defendants: W. R. Stevens.

Order discharged.

1876

PARKER

บ.

SOUTH EASTERN RAILWAY Co.

BRIDGE v. BRANCH.

Mayor's Court of London Procedure Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. clvii), s. 48— Setting aside a Judgment removed into a Superior Court-Want of Jurisdiction-Prohibition-Motion by Defendant.

Sect. 48 of the Mayor's Court of London Procedure Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. clvii), enacts that a judgment removed from that court to a superior Court shall have the same force and effect as a judgment recovered in the superior Court:

Held, that it is competent to the Court to which such judgment is so removed to set it aside, if satisfied that it was obtained in a matter over which the inferior court had no jurisdiction.

A prohibition may be moved for by the defendant himself, where the Court is satisfied that the inferior court is proceeding without jurisdiction.

Baker v. Clark (Law Rep. 8 C. P. 121) explained.

A JUDGMENT having been obtained against the defendant in the Mayor's Court, London, and removed into this Court pursuant to s. 48 of the Mayor's Court of London Procedure Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. clvii (1),

(1) Which enacts that, "In every case where final judgment shall have been obtained in the Mayor's Court, and also in every case where any rule or order shall have been made by the court whereby any sum of money, or any costs, charges, or expenses shall be payable to any person, any writ of execution upon such judgment, or any rule or order so made by the court, shall be sealed by the sealer of the writs of any of the superior Courts, VOL. I.

2 Z

upon a præcipe of the same being
lodged with him, together with an affi-
davit verifying the judgment or order,
and that the same remains unreversed
and unsatisfied; and immediately there-
upon such writ of execution and such
judgment, rule, or order shall become
and be of the same force, charge, and
effect as a writ of execution or judg-
ment recovered in or a rule or order
made by such superior Court, and all
the reasonable costs and charges atten-

3

May 20.

1876 BRIDGE

v.

BRANCH.

E. Pollock, on behalf of the defendant, obtained an order to shew cause why the judgment should not be set aside, and why a writ of prohibition should not issue to that court to prohibit further proceedings therein against the defendant, on the ground of want of jurisdiction.

Kemp shewed cause. It may be conceded that originally there was no jurisdiction in the Mayor's Court to entertain this action, and the defendant might have obtained a prohibition. But this Court has no power to set aside a judgment of the Mayor's Court; it can only prohibit further proceedings upon it. If after the removal it is to be treated as a judgment of this Court, the irregularity is in the inferior court, and the remedy should be sought there: Williams v. Bolland. (1) The decision in that case proceeded upon a judgment of Coleridge, J., in Sims v. Count de Wints. (2) The question there arose upon a judgment removed into the Queen's Bench under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 22, the language of which is almost identical with that of the section now under consideration; and the learned judge said: "I think it must be taken that into all irregularities in the course of the proceedings the court below is the proper and exclusive tribunal of inquiry; that, where there is error in the judgment itself, a different recourse may be had in the regular way to the superior Court; but that, when the judgment alone is removed into the superior Court under this section, it is removed for the purpose of execution only; and that we have nothing to do with it but to enforce it."

[BRETT, J. Here, the defect is want of jurisdiction, not mere irregularity.]

There is a further answer to this rule: it is moved on behalf of the defendant himself, whereas, according to the uniform practice

dant upon such sealing shall be re-
covered in like manner as if the same
were part of such judgment or rule or
order: Provided always that no such
judgment or rule or order when so re-
moved as aforesaid shall affect any
lands, tenements, or hereditaments, as
to purchasers, mortgagees, or creditors,
any further than the same would have

done if the same had been a judgment, rule, or order of the Mayor's Court, unless and until a writ of execution thereon shall be actually put into the hands of the sheriff or other officer appointed to execute the same."

(1) Ante, p. 227.
(2) 8 Dowl. 646.

of this Court since Cox v. Mayor of London (1), it ought to have been moved at the instance of a stranger: see Baker v. Clark. (2) [BRETT, J. That notion was dispelled by the unanimous opinion of this Court in Worthington v. Jeffries (3), and by the decision of Jessel, M.R., in Jacobs v. Brett (4), where the Master of the Rolls, speaking of Baker v. Clark (2), observes, "There was merely an intimation by the Court that the prohibition had better be taken out in the name of a stranger, which was accordingly done the next day:" and he adds,-" One of the judges who decided that case has since expressed an opinion anything but favourable to Manning v. Farquharson." (5)]

Edward Pollock in support of the order was stopped.

LORD COLERIDGE, C.J. Here, an attempt has been made to enforce in this Court a judgment obtained in the Mayor's Court, London, in a matter over which that court had no jurisdiction; and the contention before us has been that, though that court might have had no jurisdiction, and might therefore have been prohibited from proceeding, yet that the plaintiff having recovered a judgment, and that judgment having been removed into this Court under s. 48 of 20 & 21 Vict. c. clvii, we are bound to give effect to that judgment. All that that section enacts is, that a judgment of the Mayor's Court, when removed into this Court, shall have the same force and effect as a judgment recovered in the superior Court. The Court will deal with a judgment so removed as with any other judgment. That it is the result of a proceeding in a court which has no jurisdiction is a perfectly good ground for setting aside a judgment so improperly obtained: it is not mere irregularity. To hold otherwise would be construing the enactment in a manner contrary to common sense and reason. In the case cited, Williams v. Bolland (6), which arose upon the words of a statute which are in terms very similar to the enactment in question, this Court refused to set aside a judgment which had been removed hither from the Passage Court at Liverpool, on the ground that the objection, which was of a mere irregularity, See per

(1) Law Rep. 2 H. L. 239.
(2) Law Rep. 8 C. P. 121.
(3) Law Rep. 10 C. P. 379, 380.
(4) Law Rep. 20 Eq. 1, 11.

(5) 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 22.
Keating, J., in Quartly v. Timmins,
Law Rep. 9 C. P. 416.

(6) Ante, p. 227.

1876

BRIDGE

v.

BRANCH.

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1876 BRIDGE

บ.

BRANCH.

might and ought to have been taken in that court. That case, therefore, is no authority for the proposition contended for by Mr. Kemp, viz. that we are bound to enforce a judgment of the Mayor's Court which is admitted to have been obtained in a matter over which that court had no jurisdiction. As to the other part of the rule, I think the true answer has been given by my Brother Brett to the case of Baker v. Clark (1), which was relied on to shew that a writ of prohibition to the Mayor's Court cannot be granted upon the application of the defendant himself. That case really arose in this way. It being suggested that s. 15 of the Mayor's Court of London Procedure Act, 1857, precluded the defendant from objecting to the jurisdiction of the court otherwise than by plea, the applicant was recommended, in order to obviate the supposed difficulty, to renew the motion in the name of a stranger. The Master of the Rolls, in Jacobs v. Brett (2), in a deliberate judgment, clearly demonstrates that that section relates only to the procedure in the Mayor's Court. I entirely agree with that very learned judge, and so I believe do all the judges with whom I have had an opportunity of speaking on the subject. I therefore come to the conclusion that Mr. Kemp's argument fails upon both grounds, and that the order should be made absolute in its terms.

BRETT, J. I am of the same opinion. In this case a judgment has been obtained against the defendant in the Mayor's Court, London, and has been removed into this Court under 20 & 21 Vict. c. clvii, s. 48, for the purpose of enforcing it. A rule has been obtained to set aside the judgment so removed, and then to prohibit the inferior court from further proceeding to enforce the judgment there, on the ground that it was obtained in a matter over which that court had no jurisdiction. If Mr. Kemp's argument, that s. 48 compels us to give effect to the judgment, be correct, the consequence would be this, that, if an action were brought upon the judgment, want of jurisdiction would afford a defence, but that, by removing the judgment to a superior Court, that consequence is avoided, and the superior Court is bound to enforce a bad judgment. I see nothing in the Act to prevent our dealing with (1) Law Rep. 8 C. P. 121. (2) Law Rep. 20 Eq. 1, 7.

it here; and then, the judgment here being set aside, there is nothing to prevent us from prohibiting the inferior court from proceeding further to enforce the judgment so improperly obtained there. In the case of Williams v. Bolland (1), cited by Mr. Kemp, the court below had jurisdiction. There was an irregularity in the proceedings, which might have been set right by motion there. The judgment, being a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, and removed into this Court for the mere purpose of obtaining execution, the Court was quite right in declining to interfere. Here, however, the thing complained of is not matter of mere irregularity or of appeal, but of prohibition. As to Baker v. Clark (2), it was never intended by this Court as a matter of law to decide that the defendant himself could not move. All that was meant was, that, as some argument might be raised as to s. 15 of the Mayor's Court of London Procedure Act, it was better not to raise the question, when all doubt might be obviated by moving in the name of a stranger, as suggested in the judgment in Cox v. Mayor of London. (3) The decision of this Court in Worthington v. Jeffries (4) does not seem to me at all to conflict with that of the Master of the Rolls in Jacobs v. Brett. (5) None of the provisions of the Mayor's Court of London Procedure Act have any effect outside the Mayor's Court.

ARCHIBALD, J. Mr. Kemp's argument would make a judgment obtained without jurisdiction in the Mayor's Court available here without opportunity of questioning it. That would lead to a very undesirable state of things. If this had been a judgment of our own Court, we might examine it. When we examine it, we find that its foundation is a matter over which the Mayor's Court had no jurisdiction. We are bound to set it aside. I think the correct explanation of Williams v. Bolland (1) has been given by my Brother Brett. As to the other point, I agree with what has been said by my Lord and my Brother Brett. Sect. 15 of the Mayor's Court Act only meant to prohibit the defendant from questioning the jurisdiction of the court otherwise than by plea in that court.

(1) Ante, p. 227.

(2) Law Rep. 8 C. P. 121.

(3) Law Rep. 2 H. L. 239.
(4) Law Rep. 10 C. P. 379.

(5) Law Rep. 20 Eq. 1.

1876

BRIDGE

v.

BRANCH.

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