1876 LEWIS v. GRAY. of the enactment is, that if, from all the circumstances reported to them, the Board shall be of opinion that the ship is in such a state of disrepair that she cannot proceed to sea without serious danger to human life, they are impowered to stop her from so proceeding. The report of the surveyors of the 12th of November, 1873, states that the decks of the Mary Ann are quite worn out, the deck-beams and knees defective, and all her timbers rotten; and the ship, be it remembered, was forty-two years old. Could any one doubt that the Board were well warranted in concluding from this that she could not proceed to sea without serious danger to human life? I do not forget that those words do occur in s. 13: but I say that the same reasonable construction must be applied to that section as to subs. 5 of s. 12. I therefore come to the conclusion, on this part of the section, that the Board had on the 12th of November, 1873, received a report that the ship could not proceed to sea without danger to human life. Much argument has been addressed to us as to the effect of the letter of the 15th of November. My impression is that that was an "order" within the meaning of the statute. The ship was already under detention. The owner had been informed that a copy of the report of the surveyors would be sent to him, and he had permission to take the vessel to Sunderland to be repaired in accordance with that report. It seems to me that an answer saying that the ship might be taken to Sunderland to be repaired was inferentially an order to do the repairs at that place, provided the conditions imposed by the Board were complied with. If it were necessary, I incline to think that that letter was an order. But, at all events, the letter of the 7th of January, 1874, was undoubtedly an order. The report of the surveyors was sufficient to warrant the board in concluding that the ship could not proceed to sea without serious danger to human life; and they ordered that she should be detained at Hull until further surveyed and repaired. As at present advised, though I confess I feel a little difficulty by reason of some words of subs. 4 of s. 12,-I do not assent to the argument of the Attorney General, that the Board had power to order an indefinite detention of the ship. But, for the reasons I have given, I think they acted in this case substantially within the scope of their authority, and that this action cannot be maintained. DENMAN, J. I also think there should be judgment for the defendant in this case; and I base my opinion upon a very narrow ground. I think that by the letter of the 7th of January, 1874, an order was made which was a perfectly legal order, and which was the order under which the vessel in question was detained. The 12th section of the statute enacts that, where the Board of Trade have received a complaint or have reason to believe that any British ship is, by reason of the defective condition of her hull, &c., or by reason of overloading, &c., unfit to proceed to sea without serious danger to human life, they may appoint a competent person or persons to survey her and to report to the Board; and they may, if they think fit, order her to be detained for the purpose of being surveyed; and thereupon any officer of customs may detain such ship until her release be ordered either by the Board or by any Court to which an appeal is given under the Act. The section then goes on to enact in clause 5, that, upon the receipt of the report of the person making such survey, the Board may, if in their opinion the ship cannot proceed to sea without serious danger to human life, make such further order as they may think requisite as to the detention of the ship or as to her release, either absolutely or upon the performance of such conditions with respect to the execution of repairs, &c., as the Board may impose. I agree with my Lord in thinking that the letter of Spear, the chief officer of Customs at Hull, amply justified the board in believing that the Mary Ann was unfit to proceed to sea without serious danger to human life, and that they did honestly hold that opinion; for, on the following day, they wrote to the collector of Customs at Hull informing him that they have reason to believe the vessel to be unseaworthy, and desiring him to detain her for the purpose of survey, and to communicate with the owner or master. Then, on the 12th of November, the vessel is surveyed by Messrs. Stewart and M'Kenzie, two Customs surveyors, who reported that a thorough repair would be required to render her seaworthy, and that her decks were quite worn out, the deck-beams and knees defective, and the timbers rotten. It is said that that report was insufficient to warrant the course pursued by the board. But I think it would be putting far too narrow a construction upon that report to hold that it did not substantially mean to convey to the 1876 LEWIS บ. GRAY. 1876 LEWIS v. GRAY. Board an intimation that in the opinion of the surveyors the vessel was unfit to proceed to sea without serious danger to human life. Having put that construction upon the report, the Board, on the 15th of November, send the plaintiff a copy of it inclosed in a letter which has been assumed to be an "order." I do not, however, think that letter of itself amounts to an order: it rather seems to contemplate that, on certain things being done, a further order shall be made. Eventually, on the 7th of January, 1874, the Board, in answer to a letter from the plaintiff's solicitors, send them a document which, after recapitulating all the facts, concludes thus,-"The Board of Trade now withdraw the modification of their order by which she (the Mary Ann) would have been allowed to proceed to Sunderland; and, under the powers given by the Act, they vary their order, as follows, viz. that, as in their opinion the ship cannot proceed to sea without serious danger to human life, she shall be detained at Hull for further survey and repairs. A shipwright surveyor will be sent from London at once to complete the survey." In my judgment, they had a perfect right then to make the order, which in reality was the first order upon the subject that was made. The ship is accordingly further surveyed. There is nothing in the Act to prevent such further survey: and I think the Board had a perfect right to order the detention of the ship for that purpose. As to whether or not the plaintiff's remedy was limited to an appeal under s. 14, I do not dissent from the opinion thrown out by my Lord, though I give no opinion myself upon it. LINDLEY, J. I concur with my Lord and my Brother Denman in thinking that the defendant is entitled to judgment. Upon the true construction of s. 12 of the Act, the Board of Trade has jurisdiction only to prevent a ship from going to sea where they have reason to believe that she cannot do so without serious danger to human life they have nothing to do with the safety of the ship or her cargo. But with the rest of Mr. Lanyon's argument I cannot agree. The information or complaint as to the condition of the ship may come from any one, and need not contain the words "unfit to proceed to sea without serious danger to human life;" neither need the report of the person or persons appointed to survey the ship; it is enough if it is shewn substantially that the ship is in such a state as reasonably to satisfy the Board that she cannot safely proceed to sea without serious danger to human life. The only other question is whether the Board exceeded their power. I am unable to see that they did. I do not think the letter of the 15th of November, 1873, amounted to an order: but that of the 7th of January, 1874, clearly did. And, looking at the correspondence, I cannot see that the Board were guilty of any unreasonable delay. As to whether the plaintiff's remedy was limited to an appeal under s. 14, I give no opinion; though, if there was any excess of jurisdiction, I incline to think the common-law remedy would not be taken away. Solicitors for plaintiff: Oliver & Botterell. Rule absolute. Solicitor for defendant: F. J. Hamel, Solicitor for the Customs. 1876 LEWIS บ. GRAY. M'CORQUODALE AND ANOTHER v. BELL AND ANOTHER. Inspection of Documents-Privileged Communications-Letters written with a View to anticipated Litigation. The mere fact that letters are written to the plaintiff's solicitor "in confidence" and under a pledge not to disclose their contents to any one but the plaintiff and his legal advisers, affords no defence to an application for an order to inspect them. But, if they are not merely confidential communications, but are written in answer to inquiries by the plaintiff's solicitor with a view to and in contemplation of anticipated litigation, they are privileged. Cossey v. London, Brighton, and South Coast Ry. Co. (Law Rep. 5 C. P. 146) and Skinner v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (Law Rep. 9 Ex. 298) followed. Fenner v. London and South Eastern Ry. Co. (Law Rep. 7 Q. B. 767) observed upon and explained. THE plaintiffs carry on business in co-partnership in London and elsewhere as printers and wholesale stationers, and had for some years contracted to supply the Great Western Railway Company with printing and stationery required by them for the purposes of their establishments. In September, 1874, the plaintiffs delivered a tender to the company for the supply of printing and stationery, in pursuance of public advertisements inviting Jan. 28. 1876 M'CORQUO DALE V. BELL. tenders for that purpose. The defendants also delivered a tender for the supply of such printing and stationery, and their tender was accepted by the company. The plaintiffs having reason to believe that the tenders had been tampered with by the defendants and some persons in the employ of the company, brought an action against the defendants; and in their statement of claim they alleged that the defendants and two other persons therein mentioned unlawfully and maliciously confederated and agreed together to prevent the company from continuing to contract with the plaintiffs, and to induce them to contract with the defendants, and in pursuance of such confederacy and agreement they alleged that, after both the plaintiffs and the defendants had sent in tenders, the defendants and the other persons mentioned induced a servant of the company to allow the defendants to inspect the said tenders, and that the defendants in a certain room therein described, at the office of the company, improperly opened the tender of the plaintiffs, and inspected the prices therein set forth; that the defendants then altered some of the prices in their tender to prices lower than those in the plaintiffs' tender; and that by reason of what had so occurred the company were induced to enter into a contract with the defendants and to refuse to enter into a contract with the plaintiffs. The defendants appeared separately and delivered separate statements of defence. An order for discovery was obtained by the defendant Bell, in obedience to which the plaintiffs made the usual affidavit that they had in their possession or power the documents relating to the matters in question in this action set forth in the first and second parts of the schedule thereto, consisting chiefly of letters and copies of letters. The second paragraph of this affidavit was as follows: We object to produce the documents in the second part of the said schedule, on the ground that such letters as were written and sent by ourselves or one of us, or by James Wighton, the manager of our business in Southwark, and David Davidson, the accountant in our business at Newton-le-Willows, Lancashire, to Messrs. Baker & Nairne or Mr. Percival A. Nairne, were written to the said Messrs. Baker & Nairne or the said P. A. Nairne as solicitors for us or for one of us in this action or in the matters to which such letters refer, and that |