ย. GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY Co. 1876 necessary to have a new trial, for if there were any evidence of RICHARDSON negligence fit to be submitted to a jury we could not properly enter a verdict for the defendants. I am now satisfied, however, there was no sufficient evidence of negligence on the defendants' part. The only sensible construction of the answer to the third question appears to me to be that the jury intended to negative the duty as to which the question was asked, but they added to that negative a finding that the defendants ought to have inquired of the company. It seems obvious that that must have been their meaning, for the two duties, the duty to examine for themselves and the duty to inquire, could hardly co-exist. It seems to me that the third question was unnecessary. If, on the whole of the evidence, it had appeared that there was any connection, or probability of connection, between the defects discovered, i.e. the defects in the spring and the side and the defects in the axle, the case would have been different, and the question might have been material. It appears to me impossible to impose on the defendants the duty of making a minute examination of the whole truck because defects have been discovered in some part of the truck which have no connection with the probable existence of defects in any other part of the truck. For these reasons, I also think the judgment should be reversed. Judgment reversed. Solicitors for plaintiff: Freeman & Bothomley, for Kelsey & Son. BRANTOM v. GRIFFITS AND OTHERS. Bill of Sale, what amounts to-Bills of Sale Act, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, ss. 1, 7— Growing crops are not personal chattels within the Bills of Sale Act. A contract in writing for the sale of personal chattels, if the property passes by the contract, is a transfer or assurance of personal chattels within the Bills of Sale Act. INTERPLEADER issue, in which the plaintiff claimed as against the defendants, execution creditors, certain horses and growing crops seized upon the farm occupied by the execution debtors. The case was heard before Lindley, J., at the last spring assizes for Buckinghamshire, when the facts were as follows: A farm was occupied by three sisters named Miles, but Adelaide, one of the sisters, appeared to have had the management of the business. On the 13th of January, 1875, the execution debtors being in want of money, the plaintiff agreed to advance the amount required in consideration of a sale to him of certain growing crops. The following document was executed in pursuance of such arrangement :— "Miss A. Miles, of, &c., hereby agrees to sell to William Brantom, of, &c., five acres of wheat, now standing in the Beeches, adjoing to Mr. Smith's, Drayton side, at the sum of 67. per acre, the said William Brantom to cut and carry the corn any time he may require; and the said William Brantom doth hereby agree to purchase the said five acres of corn as mentioned above on the above conditions. "Adelaide Miles. On the 5th of March, 1875, a similar transaction took place, and a document was executed in the following terms: "Miss A. Miles, of, &c., hereby agrees to assign to William Brantom, of, &c., three acres of wheat now standing in the Beeches, adjoining the piece bought before [here followed further description], at the sum of 67. per acre, the said William Brantom to cut and carry the corn any time he may require; and the VOL. I 2 D 3 1876 May 17. 1876 BRANTOM v. GRIFFITS. said William Brantom doth hereby agree to purchase the aforesaid three acres of corn mentioned above on the aforesaid conditions. "Adelaide Miles. Subsequent sales of growing crops under similar circumstances, and in respect of which similar documents were executed, took place between the parties. On the 28th of June, 1875, the execution debtors were distrained upon for rent, and applied to the plaintiff for further sums of money. It was arranged that the plaintiff should pay out the distress, and in return for the advance a further sale of growing crops took place, and it was also arranged that some horses should be transferred to the plaintiff. The document executed as to the crops was similar to those above set out. With regard to the horses the following document was executed : "Memorandum of agreement between William Brantom, of, &c., and Miss Miles, of, &c. I, William Brantom, hereby agree to take to the gray mare and two colts, and nag mare, and the black mare, now belonging to Miss A. Miles, for the amount of 807.; the said William Brantom to take possession, and the said Miss Miles to authorize the said William Brantom to do the same. I, Miss Miles, hereby agree to assign the above-mentioned stock to William Brantom on the above conditions. "William Brantom. "Adelaide Miles." The crops and horses which formed the subject of the above transactions remained on the farm premises, and were seized there. The defendants having obtained a judgment against the Misses Miles, issued a fi. fa. on the 30th of July, and the seizure was made shortly afterwards. Upon these facts it was objected by the defendants' counsel (inter alia) that the documents above mentioned were bills of sale, and void under the Bills of Sale Act for want of registration. The verdict was entered for the defendants, leave being reserved to the plaintiff to move to enter it for the plaintiff for the sum that had been paid into Court under the interpleader order as the value of the goods. Merewether and Young Clare moved in pursuance of the leave reserved, and to enter judgment for the plaintiff. These documents are not bills of sale. They are not transfers or assurances of personal chattels. They are merely memoranda of agreements of sale, evidence of the contract of sale, but not constituting the contract itself. If it be otherwise, in every case where there is a sale within the Statute of Frauds, and a memorandum of the bargain is given to satisfy the statute, if such memorandum is not registered as a bill of sale, and the goods are left in the possession of the vendor more than twenty-one days, the Act applies, and the execution creditor of the vendor can seize the goods. An instrument, to be within the section, must be an instrument by which the property purports to pass. The property in such a case passes by the previous contract itself, not by the memorandum, which is not the contract, but merely evidence of it. Secondly, with regard to the growing crops, they are not personal chattels, and so are not "goods" at all within the Act. And if they could be considered as "goods," they are not goods capable of complete transfer by delivery within the meaning of the 7th section. [They cited Allsop v. Day (1); Byerley v. Prevost (2); Wake v. Harrop (3): Sheridan v. McCartney (4); and Gough v. Everard. (5)] Metcalfe, Q.C., and Collyer shewed cause. These documents are assurances of personal property within the Bills of Sale Act. It is clear that sales may be within the Act, because sales in the ordinary way of business, which this was not, are expressly excepted. The writing here is the contract, and by such contract the property passed. With regard to the growing crops, it is contended that they are goods capable of complete transfer by delivery within the 7th sec (1) 7 H. &N. 457; 31 L.J. (Ex.) 105. (4) 11 Ir. C. L. 506. (5) 2 H. & C. 1; 32 L. J. (Ex.) 210. 1876 BRANTOM v. GRIFFITS. 1876 BRANTOM v. GRIFFITS. tion. Growing crops are goods and chattels as between the heir and executor and the executor and remainderman. They may be taken in execution and as a distress, and a sale of them is within the 17th, and not within the 4th, section of the Statute of Frauds. [BRETT, J., referred to Williams on Executors, 7th ed. p. 709, where growing crops are said, in a note, to be for "most" purposes personal property.] They are capable of complete transfer by delivery. There may be a symbolical delivery of them: a man might be put in possession in respect of them whilst they were growing, and until they arrived at maturity. They are clearly within the mischief of the Act, for the occupier of the land appears to be in possession of them whilst they remain on the land. The case of Sheridan v. McCartney (1) is a distinct authority that growing crops are within the Act. [They also cited Jones v. Flint (2); Newman v. Cardinal (3); Marshall v. Green (4); Dalton's Executor, p. 556; Peacock v. Purvis (5); Comyns, Digest, tit. Biens, A. 2.] Merewether, in reply. The definition of "apparent possession clearly shews that growing crops are not within the statute. That taken with the words "capable of complete transfer by delivery," shews that what was contemplated was the case where goods that might be delivered were left in the use and enjoyment of the transferor, notwithstanding that formal possession had been given. Growing crops cannot be delivered, and cannot be used and enjoyed. The term "formal possession" has no application to them. BRETT, J. The argument for the defendants is, admitting that there was no fraud, and a bonâ fide sale was intended of the articles now in question, that the documents which have been laid before us amount to bills of sale within the meaning of the Bills of Sale Act, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36; and as they were not registered, (1) 11 Ir. C. L. (N.S.) 506. (3) 2 F. & F. 840. (4) 1 C. P. D. 35. (5) 2 B. & B. 362. |