16 , The action was tried before Erle, C. J., at the Sittings | the trial should not be set aside, and a new trial be at Guildhall after Hilary Term, and the following facts appeared in evidence : The plaintiff carried on business at No. 6, St. James'sstreet, and the defendant was the executor of the late John Furze. In 1838 John Furze (the testator) granted to the plaintiff a lease of the premises in St. James'sstreet for twenty-seven years, wanting twenty-one days, from the 25th December, 1837; the rent was 1407. per annum, and the lease expired on the 4th December, 1864. The premises in question had been conveyed to such uses as the testator should by deed appoint, with remainder to him in fee; and in November, 1864, the testator made his appointent to trustees, to the use of himself for life, with remainder to the use of his wife for life, with remainder to the use of his daughter for life, with remainder to the use of her husband for life. This settlement only empowered the testator to grant a new lease on the expiration of an old one; and it conferred a power of leasing on his daughters. The testator, on the 14th February, 1860, made the lease now declared on, and died on the 16th May, 1863, having, by his will, appointed the defendant his exe cutor. The testator's wife having also died, her interest rested in the daughter, who intermarried with one Vickers; and in November, 1864, Mrs. Vickers repuhated the lease made on the 14th February, 1860. she, however, gave the plaintiff a lease for seven years rom the 25th December, 1864, at a rent of 3001. In the particulars of demand under the second count, he plaintiff claimed 4007. paid to the testator for the ease granted in 1860, and 177., the expense of prearing it. The cost of preparing the new lease was 10, with certain other charges. The defendant paid 4007. into court. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for 15221. beyond the amount paid into court, and they stated that the amount was made up in the following man A rule was subsequently obtained, pursuant to leave eserved, calling on the plaintiff to shew cause why the verdict found for the plaintiff on the second and fourth pleas should not be set aside, and instead thereof a verdict entered for the defendant, on the ground that upon the facts proved at the trial the verdict should be so entered; and why the damages found upon the said trial should not be reduced to nominal | damages, or to such sum as the Court might direct, on the ground, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover more than the sum of 400%., which he had paid, and the 177. expenses, which two sums the defendant had paid into court, and that he lost nothing but what he had paid: that he was not entitled to the 651. costs, &c. of the second lease, or any part of it: that the plaintiff must have paid the costs of one lease, and that he was not entitled to throw those costs, or any of them, on the defendant: that the plaintiff was not entitled to the 107. per cent. which the jury gave, as upon a compulsory sale. Or why the verdict found at | had between the said parties, on the ground that the judge misdirected the jury in directing that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the difference in value between the lease that was avoided and the new lease that was granted, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the 657., and in directing them that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the 107. per cent. claimed as upon a compulsory sale; and that the judge ought to have directed the jury that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover those several matters respectively. It was agreed that the demurrer and the rule should be argued together. Lush, Q. C., Brown, Q. C., and Archibald now shewed cause.-The plaintiff is entitled to retain the verdict. There can be no difference in the plaintiff's right, whether the title was discovered to be bad before the term began to run or afterwards. If the reversion had been sold with a covenant for title, and the title had proved bad, the purchaser might have recovered. On a contract for sale of realty, if the title turns out bad the vendor must pay all the costs. It cannot be said that an entry was necessary to perfect the plaintiff's title. The plea is a bad plea; it shews no defence to the action. Whether there was an actual entry or not is altogether immaterial. [They cited Williams v. Burrell (1 C. B. 402); Shep. Touch. 267; Hopkins v. Grazebrook (6 B. & Cr. 31); Doe v. Walker (5 B. & Cr. 111); Williams v. Bosanquet (1 B. & B. 238); Eaton v. Jaques (2 Doug. 455); Walker v. Reeves (Id. 461); Bickford v. Page (2 MSS. 455); Mayne on Damages, 96; Platt on Covenants, 326; Took v. Glasscock (1 Wms. Saund. 250); Baker v. Harris (9 Ad. & El. 532); Robinson v. Harman (1 Exch. 850); Sikes v. Wild (4 B. & S. 421); Flureau v. Thornhill (2 W. Bl. 1078); and Pownsett v. Fuller (17 C. B 660).] Bovill, Q. C., and Garth, in support of the rule.— In order to make the case of Hopkins v. Grazebrook (6 B. & Cr. 31) applicable, it ought to be shewn that the testator knew of his defect of title, or that there was fraud; but these points are not raised on the pleadings, and they were not made at the trial. The plaintiff had no possession here; all he had was an interesse termini. Where the plaintiff has never got into possession of the land, and in consequence of the title never can, it is laid down in Mr. Mayne's work on Damages (p. 96), that no land passes by the defendant's deed to the plaintiff; he has lost no land by the breach of covenant; he has lost only the consideration he paid for it. This, it is added, he is entitled to recover back, with interest to the time of action brought. In Sykes v. Wild (32 L. J., Q. B., 375; 4 B. & S. 421), Erle, C. J., states it as established, that on the breach of a contract for sale of land, the measure of damages is different from that upon breach of contract for sale of chattels. (Sedgwick on Damages, 160, 161, 168, 169, 180; Ireland v. Bircham, 2 Bing. N. C. 90). Then the jury had no right to add 107. per cent. as on a compulsory sale. This was not a compulsory proceeding at all; it was a voluntary transaction. There is no right on the part of the plaintiff to more than is due for the breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment; there is no more right to the 107. per cent. here than there would be on the non-delivery of goods bargained and sold. As to the costs of the two leases, the defendant is clearly not liable for both; we are only bound to pay the costs of the lease which has proved fruitless. ERLE, C. J.-This was an action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for a breach of covenant. The covenant on which he relies is a covenant that he should have quiet enjoyment of the premises during twenty-one years, without trouble, denial, in ordinary principles, and according to the case of W7- pay the damages proximately arising from the breach of contract. That rule appears to me to apply to the present case just as much as it does to the case of a lessee of an existing term. terruption, molestation, or disturbance on the part of the lessor, or any one claiming under him; and the breach of the covenant is, that one Francis Vickers, claiming under the lessor, and having a good title, claimed and demanded the demised premises from the plaintiff, and threatened to oust him from the possession thereof, whereby the plaintiff could not quietly and peaceably enjoy the premises. The breach was proved, and the deed was proved to be the deed of the lessor. The second plea is, that the plaintiff never had or entered into possession of the demised premises, under or by virtue of the lease. The lease was granted in the year 1860, and the plaintiff had possession of the premises down to 1864, under a prior lease; therefore, the lease in respect of which the action was brought was a reversionary lease, conveying an interesse termini to the plaintiff; and he did not, in the sense of having conferred to him possession of the land or house to which the lease related, have possession under the reversionary lease. The time for the reversionary lease vesting in possession has not arrived. The land was to vest in possession in 1864, and he was turned out by the claim of Mr. Vickers in 1863. The allegation is, that the covenant was broken by reason of the demand on the part of Vickers, who had a title to claim the premises. Now, the plea, in the sense contended for by the plaintiff, we think, is entirely irrelevant to the declaration, and is therefore bad on demurrer. The claim is in respect of an interesse ter-nary rule is, that a party who breaks his contract mast mini, and there is no allegation in the declaration, either express or implied, that the plaintiff had entered into possession of the demised premises under the reversionary lease. It appears to me, therefore, that, upon the demurrer to that plea, the judgment ought to be for the plaintiff. The fourth plea to the same count alleges, that Francis Vickers did not claim or demand the premises, or threaten to oust the plaintiff from the possession or enjoyment thereof, as alleged. The facts are clear, that Vickers had a title under Mr. Furze, the lessor, and that he had a right to say that the lease was a nullity; that he did say so; and that the plaintiff did, by reason of that demand, lose the interesse termini which had been conveyed to him. It is, therefore, quite clear that the verdict on that plea should stand for the plaintiff. Then comes the question upon the remaining issue. The defendant has paid 4177. into court, and the question is, whether that was the total amount of the damages which the plaintiff was entitled to recover? It was contended that the covenant for quiet enjoyment of the term was to be dealt with as if it had been a contract for sale, with a contract to make a good title to the premises sold, and subject to the rule, that when a contract to sell goes off for defect of title, the vendor is bound to pay back the sum he has received, and to, pay the expenses to which the vendee has been put and is not liable further; and the vendee cannot recover for the value of the premises. I am of opinion that that contention cannot be maintained. In respect of contracts for sale, this, no doubt, is a known The value of the term and the expenses that the rule of law; there are several decided cases upon it; plaintiff had been put to were given as damages by and if it were necessary to go into the question, I the jury, and we think that there ought to be a s believe the convenience of mankind might well jus- stantial deduction made from the amount given ly tify the rule. Very few vendors are able to affirm the jury. Mr. Garth's argument has convinced me t with certainty that they have a good title. The rule this. The jury found the value of the term by the is, however, confined to contracts for sale, and a line 67. per cent. tables, and they have said that they addel must be drawn between covenants in a lease and con- 10l. per cent. for compulsory sale; thereby making a tracts for the sale and conveyance of an estate. If addition of 1371. From what was said at the time. 1 there is a conveyance and a lease, for instance, of land is an incontestible fact that the jury did arrive at th in possession, and the lessee enters in pursuance of amount of the damages in that manner. After lis that lease, and is afterwards ousted by any one claim-tening to the argument of Mr. Garth, I think that ing under the lessor, and there is a covenant such as this, it is perfectly clear that the lessee is entitled to the value of the term he has lost, in accordance with The dicta that have been cited from the American courts are really of a neutral quality. There are just as many judges on one side as on the other; and so far as I have read the two learned text-writers, whose treatises have been referred to, they do not sustain the contention of the defendant, that the mere restoration of the price paid, and the expenses, are all the da mages that can be recovered. Mayne particularly limits his statement of the rule, by saying that it ap plies to cases where nothing has passed under the Estrument containing the covenant. Here an interesa termini clearly passed the reversionary interest after the expiration of the existing lease, at the end of three years from the time of the grant. Sedgwick on Damages does in fact contain a statement, that in many of the courts in America the rule is as cotended for by the defendant; but, on the whole the impression on the writer's mind is against ther being such a rule. Clearly, as to the judgment I am giving, there is no authority against it; and ther is an authority close up to it, supporting it, and there is almost the universal rule that a party who makes a contract and breaks it, ought to pay to the opposite party the damages proximately connected with the breach of the contract on his part. The plaintiffs entitled, therefore, to the value of the term. that was so, I cannot say that the jury were righ 16. should really arrive at the same amount. We think the plaintiff ought to have the full amount; but as the learned judge ventured to ask the jury what they meant by their verdict, instead of taking the verdict as given, and as it was expressly stated how they arrived at the amount, it has enabled the defendant to found his motion upon what then passed; and it is impossible for us to say that they did not give 10l. per cent. for a compulsory sale. If they did give 107. per cent. for compulsory sale, and did take the value of the term at 61. per cent., we think that the plaintiff must lose the 1377. Then there was given 651. for the expenses. It is argued that 251. should come off for counsel's fees, and for the surveyor, and for letters. That leaves 401. The expenses of the new lease were 401; the expenses of the old lease were 177. I think Mr. Garth has convinced me that the plaintiff is not entitled to have the expenses of both leases. The plaintiff wanted to obtain a lease, and was bound to for one lease. I cannot very clearly see for certain which is the lease that he is entitled to charge to the defendant under this breach of covenant. I am inclined to think that he is entitled to charge him for the expense of the new lease. He will, therefore, be entitled to 40%, minus the 177. paid into court, which leaves 231. pay ever presided on this bench, says, not only that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of the term, but that it was too clear for argument; and the two learned counsel (Sir J. Wilde and Mr. Serjeant Channell) who appeared for the defendant in that case did not contest that that was the true rule as to the damages. That being so, the law, so far as the authorities are concerned, is clear. I agree with what my Lord has said as to the American authorities. I will not repeat it, but it is sufficient to say that they throw no preponderating weight into either scale. The only remaining question upon this portion of the case is, it being plain that in this case the plaintiff had no more than an interesse termini, will that take him out of the rule of law relating to a contract for the sale of land, and bring him within the rule relating to a common contract, as if the lessee had entered into actual possession? Now, I conceive that an interesse termini is a valuable interest, assignable at law. There is no substantial difference between a man who has a reversionary lease and a man who has a lease of the reversion. Both of them may for some years be valueless. It seems to me than an interesse termini falls within the same consideration as a term upon which a man has entered. There is another point in this case on which possibly BYLES, J.-I agree with all that my Lord has said the plaintiff might be entitled to recover—that is, upon in this case. It is certainly a very important point the doctrine laid down in the case of Hopkins v. Grazeas to the main question, namely, how the damages for brook. It has been said that, even in the case of an the breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment are to ordinary contract for the sale of land, if the vendor be computed. Now, it is quite plain that, in an ordi- knew beforehand that he had no title, the ordinary nary contract for the sale of land by a written agree-rule as to damages is to be applied. But there are two ment, where the contract is silent as to title, the law, observations to be made upon that. In the first place, as I conceive, implies a contract for title; but that Hopkins v. Grazebrook is spoken of with some degree would operate to the greatest possible hardship in of dissatisfaction by the highest legal authority on this many cases. Suppose, for example, that a man had subject, Lord St. Leonards; and, even if it be law, it contracted to sell 1000 acres of land in Northampton- may possibly apply only to cases of fraud, for omnia shire some years ago, and it was found out that he præsumuntur contra spoliatorem. In this case there had no title to it, but that it belonged to some one is no question whatever that both the plaintiff and else, and the purchaser were to say, "I demand of you the defendant have acted with the most perfect bona not merely the money I paid, and my expenses, but I fides. Upon the other branches of the case, I entirely demand of you compensation at the rate of 1000l. an agree with what has fallen from my Lord. acre, because the land you sold me is of that value now, and I ought to be put, not in the same position in which I should have been if I had never made the contract, but in the same position that I should have been in if you had performed the contract." That leads to such an enormous hardship that it seems to me that, on very good reason, the law is now firmly established, that in cases of ordinary contracts for the sale of land, the purchaser is to be put, not in the same position as if the vendor had performed his contract, but in the same position as if the contract never had been made. He is entitled, the contract being broken, to a verdict for nominal damages, and he is, over and above that, entitled to the expenses that he has been put to, and nothing more. No one can consider that state of things without seeing that this is an anomalous rule. In all other cases where a man gets damages for a breach of contract, he is to have damages, not to put him in the same position as if the contract had never been made, but to put him in the same position as if the contract had been performed. It is sought to introduce this anomaly when there is not the implied contract which the law raises in the case of an ordinary sale of land, but an express contract running with the land, and going to the end of the term-a contract for quiet enjoyment. As it seems to me, the same rule does not apply. In this country the authorities are plain; there is, indeed, but one, Williams v. Burrell. The question appears never to have arisen before, except in the case of Williams V. Burrell. There the Lord Chief Justice of this court, himself one of the most eminent legal authorities that KEATING, J.-I am of the same opinion. There is no doubt that our judgment upon the main point that has been raised, is a judgment on a point of very great importance; because, so far as disclosed by the argument, this point never has arisen before in any court in Westminster Hall. The case nearest to it is the case which has been alluded to it by my Lord and my Brother Byles, of Williams v. Burrell; and the distinction, no doubt, between that case and the present is, that in that case there was an actual entry on the premises, whereas here, the interest of which the plaintiff has been deprived was an interesse termini only. But an interesse termini is a well-defined interest, as described by Mr. Brown, and as pointed out in the note to Took v. Glasscock, being described in pleading as an interest, of which a party becomes possessed by virtue of the conveyance to him, and which is assignable, and which, therefore, seems to me to be very different indeed from a mere contract to sell land, not carried into execution by anything like a conveyance. That appears to me to establish at once a very distinct line upon which we can safely act in the present case. It appears to me that there is no sound distinction between the case of an interesse termini and the case of an estate where there has been an entry for a single day. We can scarcely say there would be a substantial distinction between the two cases. The judgment of the Court, therefore, proceeds on that ground, and on that ground only. I may say, as I made a remark in the course of the argument, with reference to the distinction supposed to have been established by the case of Hopkins v. Grazebrook, that I do not in any way found my judg-enjoy the premises for the whole of this term, without ment upon the present occasion, on anything sup- any let or molestation arising from any act of the posed to have been established by that case. That covenantor, or those claiming under him. The lessee case, as has been observed by my Brother Byles, has been remarked upon with dissatisfaction by a very great authority; and also, upon consideration, it seems to me, the facts do not here raise the principle upon which I think originally the case of Hopkins v. Grazebrook must have proceeded, namely, a suppression or a misleading, amounting to something like legal, if not moral, fraud. Upon these grounds, I entirely agree with the rest of the Court. I also agree in the reduction that has been alluded to by my Lord, and which, it appears to me, the jury ought to have made in this case. SMITH, J.-I agree with the rest of the Court upon all the points. In regard to the main question, it is not intended by this decision to throw the slightest doubt on the case of Flureau v. Thornhill, and all those which follow it, which decide that the vendee, where a contract goes off for want of title, is not entitled to recover more than the amount which he has paid, and his expenses. That depends on considerations which seem to me to have no weight in the present case. It was said by Parke, B., in the case of Robinson v. Harman, "The rule of the common law is, that when a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation with respect to damages as if the contract had been performed. The case of Flureau v. Thornhill qualified that rule of the common law. It was there held, that "contracts for the sale of real estate are merely on condition that the vendor has a good title; so that when a person contracts to sell real property, there is an implied undertaking, that if he fail to make a good title, the only damages recoverable are the expenses which the vendee may be put to in investigating the title." But here the conveyance is not on condition that the vendor has a good title. The conveyance has taken place, the lease has been made, and has passed the estate, as far as the lessor has a right and title to it. There is nothing more to be done on the part of the lessor. The lessee may turn his right and interest into an estate at any timo by taking possession. Again: in a contract for the sale of a real estate, the Courts have defined what the contract is; that it is in respect of making a good title, and have annexed to it the consequences of a breach of that condition. Here we are not only dealing with the case of a conveyance, and grant of an interest and title in land, but with an express covenant that the lessee should have and enjoy the messuage for and during the term of years. Now, the first is an executory contract, to which the Courts have annexed certain implied conditions. This is a case where the contract is fully executed, where the lessor has nothing more to do, and where he has entered into an express covenant. It seems to me, therefore, that the cases are entirely different, and that in a covenant of this description the covenantee, when the covenant is broken, is entitled, as in all other cases of breach of contract, to full compensation for the loss he has sustained. It is admitted, that if the lessor had lived until the 5th December, and the lessee had entered, this case would be precisely the case of Williams v. Burrell, in which it was held that the value of the term was recoverable. It has been said, that the consequences would be very serious if we came to the decision which the Court has arrived at; but it is well known that covenants for quiet enjoyment are limited to acts which parties are able to guard against; and in this case, as in most others, the covenant is limited to the acts of the lessor himself. Here there is an express covenant that the lessee shall hold and is molested in consequence of an act of the covenantor, namely, his having made this marriage settlement. I agree with the rest of the Court, that the facts do not seem to bring this case within the rule in Hopkins v. Grazebrook, and the other cases. It seems to me, that here a right and title to the land has passed. There is an express covenant that the plaintiff here should have the land for the whole of the term; it is broken, and he is entitled to full compensation. With regard to the other point-the 10. pe cent. for compulsory sale, upon looking at the evi dence on the trial, it is plain that the jury first considered what was the saleable value, and then gave 10l. per cent. as for a compulsory sale. It does not seem to me that this can be likened to a compulsory sale. It is not a wilful or voluntary act on the part of the defendant. He is in equal misfortune with the plaintiff. In the case of a railway company, they comme in for their own interests, and voluntarily interfere to take possession of the property. I agree with the rest of the Court that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed on the demurrer to the second plea.-Judgment for the plaintiff on demurrer to second plea. Rule dischargel, except as to the 1371. as for a compulsory sale, and the 651. expense of new lease, from which expense of old has; to be deducted. TRINITY TERM. [Before ERLE, C. J., WILLES, BYLES, and SMITH, JJ.] HURST v. THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMFANY, -June 9 and 10. Railway company-Passenger over several railways h one ticket-Delay on one line of railway, whereby bes of trains on another-Time bills not put in evidenceUnreasonable delay. The plaintiff took a ticket at C. on defendants' raïlory for N., via Midland Railway, having been told the by a train about to start he could travel on to N. lạ that route; on arriving at G. the train was late, aw! the corresponding train from G. to N. had started. The plaintiff was compelled to stay at G. for the night, and was put to various expenses. In an acto for these expenses, the plaintiff declined to put in the time bills of the company, but relied on the ticket,n which was printed in the ordinary form, “From C. › N., viâ Midland Railway," and also on certain in formation given by the officers of the company:-Hes that no contract or duty was proved, whereby the con pany were bound to have their train at C. in time t enable the plaintiff to travel by G. train to N. The first count of the declaration stated, that the defendants were carriers of passengers by railway from Cardiff to Newcastle-on-Tyne, for reward in th behalf, and the plaintiff became and was received by the defendants as such carriers, at their request, as passenger to be carried by them on the said railway from Cardiff to Newcastle, by a certain train, or ser of trains, and within a reasonable time, and withor. any unreasonable delay; and laid as breach, that t defendants did not carry him from Cardiff to New castle by the said train, or series of trains, nor with a reasonable time, nor without unreasonable delay but acted so carelessly in carrying him from Card to Newcastle, and in and about the management the said railway, that the plaintiff was thereby kej and detained at Gloucester for twenty-four hours, and the defendants did not carry him to Newcastle twenty-four hours over and above the reasonable tik for so carrying him. 1 16 The second count stated, that the defendants were carriers of passengers by railway, from Cardiff to Gloucester, and that they received the plaintiff as a passenger, to be carried in a certain train fron Cardiff to Gloucester within a reasonable time, and on the terms, amongst others, that the defendants would use all reasonable care to carry him to Gloucester by a ertain fixed time, and in time for the plaintiff to go rom Gloucester to Newcastle by a certain other train bout to start from Gloucester to Newcastle within a easonable time, after the said certain fixed time; ut the defendants did not carry him within a easonable time, but acted so carelessly in carrying im that he arrived at Gloucester long after the said xed time, and after the said train from Gloucester to ewcastle had started, although except for such caressness and negligence on the part of the defendants, e plaintiff would have been in time to go on from loucester to Newcastle by the said train, as he always tended to do, as the defendants always well knew. Pleas of not guilty, and traversing the averments of e declaration, and issue thereon. The cause was tried before Mellor, J., at the last ring assizes for Northumberland, when the jury and a verdict for the plaintiff for his loss of time, tel expenses, and the cost of telegraphing. The facts proved at the trial were as follows:-On turday, the 17th December, 1864, the plaintiff about m. went to the defendants' station at Cardiff, and, inquiring, was told by their servants that he could on to Newcastle by the train then about to start. accordingly took a ticket, upon which were printed following words only: "Great Western Railway. Cardiff to Newcastle, viâ Midland Railway. 1st Class. Dec. 17. 0026." The railway from Cardiff as far as Gloucester, beged to and was worked by the defendants. The between Gloucester and Newcastle belonged to erent railway companies, and principally to the Hand Railway Company, with which the defendhad made arrangements for the issue of through ets from Cardiff to Newcastle. The plaintiff's et was put in evidence, and he stated that he had uently before travelled by the train for which he it, which, coming from Haverfordwest, was due ardiff at 4.34, and at Gloucester at 7.30; and that had been punctual at Gloucester he could have gone rom there by the night mail at 8.17, and reached castle at 5.58 the next (Sunday) morning. The vay time tables were not put in evidence. On the December, however, the train in question did not to Cardiff till 6 o'clock, owing to the engine ng broken down at Swansea, and did not reach icester till 8.45, a quarter of an hour after the 1 on to Newcastle, which had waited in vain a ter of an hour for the Cardiff train, had started. plaintiff was then told he would have to stay a at Gloucester, as there was no train which would him on from thence to Newcastle till 8.17 the folag (Sunday) night, and that that train would g him to Newcastle by 5.58 on the Monday mornThe plaintiff then went to Cheltenham, which is ation on the line between Gloucester and Newle, and spent the Sunday there, going on from ce on the Sunday evening by the train leaving cester at 8.17, and duly arrived at Newcastle at on the Monday morning. also appeared that soon after 4.34 p. m. on the the plaintiff was informed by the station master Cardiff of the cause of delay, and thereupon reded him to telegraph to Newport for an engine to take on the passengers for the 8.17 train from Gloucester. This the station master refused to do, as the wires were engaged; but if he had done so, and if the engine had been sent accordingly, the plaintiff would have caught the train at Gloucester. Although, as before stated, the defendants' timo tables were not in evidence, some letters which had passed between the respective attorneys were put in, and from them it appeared, that if the time tables had been put in, they would have shewn that the defendants did not warrant the punctuality of their trains. Edward James, Q. C., obtained a rule to set aside this verdict, and enter a nonsuit, on the ground that there was no evidence of any cause of action. Temple, Q. C., and Crompton shewed cause.-It is not contended by the plaintiff that the train ought to have arrived at Cardiff at 4.34; but the contention is, that the plaintiff ought to have been carried to Newcastle within the time specified. The contract was to carry the plaintiff through to Newcastle, and, at any rate, the journey should have been made without unreasonable delay; but the delay was unreasonable. The company gave no explanation of it. There was evidence for the jury, therefore, that the delay was unreasonable. If so, there was a breach of contract, for which the plaintiff was entitled to recover. [They referred to Denton v. The Great Northern Railway Company (5 El. & Bl. 860) and Hamlin v. The Great Northern Railway Company (1 H. & Norm. 408).] E. James, Q. C., for the defendants, was not called upon. ERLE, C. J.-I am of opinion that this rule should be made absolute. I think there was no evidence of a breach of contract, or of a breach of duty, on the part of the company. The whole of the plaintiff's grievance consists in this-that, having taken a ticket from Cardiff through to Newcastle, the train did not arrive at Cardiff till 6 o'clock, instead of 4.34, and consequently that he could not travel by the corresponding train on the Midland Railway. The substance of the claim is, that the defendants were guilty of a breach of contract or duty in the train not arriving at the proper time. I think, however, that the mere taking out of a ticket does not prove a contract or duty that the train will arrive at the station at the time the passengers expect it. The plaintiff must shew that there is a contract or a duty on the part of the company, and if there is any foundation for either, it will appear on the time bills of the company. No bills are put in, but if they had been, we should then have seen what was said. Since the case of Denton v. The Great Northern Railway Company, railway companies have been held bound by what appears in their time bills. I am also of opinion that there was nothing in what the officials on the platform said; they are mere officers to do particular duties; it may be only to shut the doors of the carriages, and casual talk with them is no evidence of a contract by which the company can be bound; but there is, in fact, no evidence of the kind. It is consistent with the whole of this case that the company may have done their duty in every respect, and for the plaintiff to recover, he must shew that they have not done so. WILLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. The reason why the plaintiff suffered damage is, because the train did not leave Cardiff in such time as allowed of his being forwarded by another train. The question, therefore, is, whether the company entered into any contract, or were subject to any duty to have this train at Cardiff in time to catch the other train. That depends on the effect to be given to two facts-first, the obtaining of the ticket; and, secondly, that the train ought to have started at 4.34. Now, the ticket does not |