Table 20 COMPLICATION RATES IN PATIENTS WHO UNDERWENT SECOND TRIMESTER ABORTIONS INDUCED BY SUPER COILS VERSUS SALINE-AMNIOTIC FLUID EXCHANGE *Assumes no complications following discharge from clinic for 2 Source: Center for Disease Control: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly *Spontaneous delivery or indicated removal of placenta. **These rates are falaciously lowered by removal from the "elective" group of women who hemorrhaged and then had "indicated" removal. 1 In Abele v. Markle, 342 F Supp 800 (D. Conn. 1972), U. S. District Court struck down the Connecticut law as an unconstitutional violation of privacy. Five weeks later a new law was enacted which was similar to the first, except that it contained a preamble declaring the intent of the legislature to protect human life from the moment of conception. This law was also struck down by a decision of the same U. S. District Court, 351 F Supp 224 (D. Conn. 1972). That order was stayed, however, by the United States Supreme Court, 93 S. Ct. 212 (1972) thus restoring the Connecticut law until the Supreme Court could rule. 2. A federal District Court decision, Doe v. Scott, 321 F Supp. 1385 (N.D. III., Jan. 29, 1971), holding the Illinois Abortion Statute unconstitutional has been stayed pending appeal in the United States Supreme Court. 3. In State v. Dunkleberger, the lows statute which is couched in terms of saving the life of the woman, has been interpreted to suggest that preservation of health is sufficient. 221 N.W. 592 (lowa, 1928). 4. Although the Louisiana Abortion Statute does not contain an express exception to the "crime of abortion," the Louisiana Medical Practice Act authorizes the Medical Board to suspend or institute court proceedings to revoke a doctor's certificate to practice medicine in the state when the doctor has procured or aided or abeted in the procuring of an abortion "unless done for the relief of a woman whose life appears imperiled after due consultation with another licensed physician." Lo. Rev State, Ann. 37:1261. 5. The statutory terms have been interpreted to permit abortion to save the woman's life or to prevent serious impairment of physical or mental health. (Com.v Wheeler, 53 N.E. 2d 4 (Mass. 1944). 6. On February 29, 1972, a U.S. District Court ruled in the case of Young Women's Christian Association of Princeton, N.J. v. Kugler, 342 F Supp 1048 (D.N.J. 1972) that the New Jersey Statute was in violation of the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the state appealed the ruling, and the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ruled that the District Court Decision applies only to the physicians who brought the original suit. (Per Curiam, June 14, 1972) 7. On January 14 and February 8, 1972, the Vermont Supreme Court in the case of Beecham v. Leahy, 287 A 2d 836(1972) ruled that the Vermont law which prohibited abortion except to save the life of the mother, was discriminatory in that it denied abortion where threats to health, short of threat to life, were involved. The Vermont Attorney General then issued guidelines in which he stated his opinion that the law had been broadened to permit abortion within the first trimester in case of threat to a women's physical or mental health. 8. A U.S. District Court in Kansas ruled unconstitutional those provisions of the state abortion law requiring that hospitals performing abortion be accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals and that abortion be approved by 3 physicians. (Poe v. Menghini 39 F Supp. 986 (D. Kan. 1972). FIGURE 1 RATIOS OF REPORTED LEGAL ABORTIONS TO LIVE BIRTHS, |