calculation of force! Shortly after the battle, some of the Constitution's officers published a card, stating that the Guerriere was pierced for 54 guns. This is some of the testimony to which Mr. Cooper alludes, and we will now inquire how far the English authorities sustain the supposition. The reviewer admits 48 broadside guns-James owns 1 shifting gun, which must have had 2 ports, and the 2 bow guns are acknowledged. Add to these Captain Skene's 2 ports, in which no guns were found, and the account stands thus, viz. :—

Broadside guns

Bow guns
Shifting guns

Vacant ports

48

222

54

It is worthy of remark, also, that the reviewer says his facts. stand uncontradicted twenty years, when Mr. Cooper mentions the authority of the officers above named to the contrary!

The reviewer next adverts to the old question of the actual weight of the shot. On the part of the Americans it is known that a 32-pound shot frequently weighed but 30 lbs. ; 24s, 21, -2, or -3 lbs. ; as the case might be, and the other shot in proportion. Defective castings were supposed to be one cause of these deficiencies in weight; though irregularity in moulds may have been another. On the other hand, some of the English ships were said to have had shot of over weight; the variation being ascribed to their French guns. Mr. Cooper distinctly says that he weighed many shot; and, that while he found that the American fell short, he found the English surprisingly accurate. Speaking of the Java, however, in a note, he says that it was affirmed her 18s weighed 19 lbs. In opposition to this, the reviewer derides the idea that shot of French weight should be found in English ships, even though the latter were French built. On this point he adds: "Does he (Mr. Cooper) think it probable that whenever they (the French-built ships) want a new supply, French shot were cast or procured expressly for their use?" Why not? An Englishman can cast a shot weighing 19 lbs. as well as a Frenchman, and if he has a gun that requires such a shot, why should he not cast it? He can and does imitate the stamps of the American heavy cottons, where he finds it to his interest; why not imitate the French shot? In 1812, there must have been in the British navy some forty or fifty French-built vessels, all of which had their armaments when taken. Now which is the most probable—that all these guns were thrown aside, or that shot was made for them? Besides, the shot captured with them all, would last a few ships VOL. X., No. XLVIII.—66

a long time ; and this plan may have been adopted, in preference to the cost of new castings. The fact that the Java's shots were over-weight, is distinctly asserted, not by Mr. Cooper, but by some of the Constitution's officers; and, as the Java was a Frenchbuilt ship, we see nothing half so extravagant in the proposition, as in the reviewer's opinion that the old shot were all thrown away, or melted down. The only party that professes to know anything in the premises, is the officer who affirms that he actually weighed the shot.

But the most remarkable of the reviewer's theories on this head remains to be shown. He says: "We believe it is admitted by all persons skilled in gunnery, that in shot of the same diameter, a slight difference in mere weight will neither increase nor diminish the effect on the object aimed at." And again: “The alleged variation must have been merely in specific gravity, and therefore of little or no importance." This is advanced as a principle, and, if it prove nothing else, it proves that our Scottish contemporary is not Professor Playfair. "Slight differences" may not produce important results, certainly; but, as a principle, the slightest difference will produce some effect. Two or three pounds are not a slight difference in the weight of a shot, however, when applied to its effect. A shot obtains its power altogether from its momentum; and this proceeds from the double principle of weight and velocity. A heavy shot, lying motionless against a wall, does no harm; it has its weight, but it wants its velocity. A hollow sheet-iron ball, of the same diameter, flying with the rapidity of a shot thrown from a gun, against a wall, would only crush itself; it has the velocity, but wants the weight. Momentum is calculated by multiplying velocity into weight. Thus if a shot has a velocity of 100, and a weight of 30, it has a momentum of 3000; or, if a velocity of 100, and a weight of 32, it has a momentum of 3200. This is a difference of 1%-no immaterial odds when applied to effects on the sides, spars, anchors, and defences of a heavy ship. In addition to this, the bad castings of the American shot caused them to break on striking, and frequently destroyed their usefulness in this manner. The same was true of the guns, which often burst.

16

It was the habit of the English to say that the American vessels of war sailed with picked crews of able seamen, and, in this manner, to account for their own defeats. Mr. Cooper exposes this fallacy, by saying it was extraordinary that a nation which practised impressment, should use such an argument against a people who did not. This reasoning the reviewer derides, with his usual success. He says that "at the commencement of the war with

America, England had 584 cruising vessels in commission, 102 of which were ships of the line." As opposed to this, he gives Mr. Cooper's own authority for saying that America, exclusively of gun-boats, had only 17 cruisers,-none larger than frigates. "Now, assuming the practice of impressment to be a powerful agent in manning a navy," he adds, "we imagine that Mr. Cooper will scarcely assert, that to man 584 vessels, with its aid, is as easy as to man 17 without it." This is exceedingly narrow logic, were the premises fair. But the premises are obviously unfair. Everything would depend on the stock of mariners in each country, to begin with; and England, a country overflowing with people, had long maintained her common navy, in addition to a mercantile tonnage nearly double that of America at that time. This, of course, gave her a vast supply of men, and the power to impress gave her an arbitrary choice of all she could lay her hands on. So unscrupulous were her agents in the exercise of this power, that they often seized foreigners, and thousands of Americans among them. On the other hand, the American navy did not get its best seamen until near the close of the war. The best and most enterprising men preferred the privateers, in which nothing but gain was the object; in which they were not liable to drafts for the lakes a service without prize-money, and in all respects out of favor; and in which all the money made went to the owners and crew; the government unwisely taking half, in the cases of their own captures. If the American navy had but 17 cruisers at the commencement of the war, it had 50 soon after, and the privateers amounted to hundreds. On the other hand, England made peace in Europe early in 1814, and had thousands of men to spare. But the question is a matter of fact; and the Americans were compelled, in 1814, to lay up many vessels on the ocean, in order to get crews for the lakes. By this time, very many of her seamen were in the English prisons, the privateers having been captured; and so far from choosing men, as is done by impressing, she was glad to get any. Some of the American crews were good, certainly; but many were exceedingly bad. Those on Lakes Erie and Champlain, in particular, are known to have been worse than common. By keeping the British marine up to its number in 1812, keeping the American down to its 17 sail, and by keeping the countless privateers altogether out of view, the Edinburgh makes a proposition quite to its own satisfaction! As a matter of course, too, every American crew was broken up once in two years; that being the term of enlistment.

As is not unusual with English writers, the reviewer evidently would gladly compress all the battles of the war into the single

action between the Chesapeake and Shannon, if he could. He aims at facetiousness on this subject, and untruly imputes to Mr. Cooper the allegation that the day was lost principally by the cowardice of a bugleman. "Were none of the Chesapeake's officers or men enabled to sound the bugle of the fugitive? or, if so, were their powers deranged by the advance of the English boarders? How came the men on the Chesapeake's main-deck not to know that the ships were foul, and that a scuffle was going on over their heads ?" This being the only occasion on which he can indulge in mirth, our Scottish contemporary indulges to indiscretion.

The circumstances are simply as follows: The Chesapeake had closed on the weather quarter of the Shannon, and in passing ahead, having most way on her, some of her head sheets and the foretop-sail tie were shot away, at a moment when her spankerbrails loosened. The vessel came into the wind, and got foul of her antagonist about the latter's fore-chains. In this situation, she lay exposed to a raking fire, especially of some of the quarter-deck guns of the Englishman. By this fire, and a singular fatality, every officer on the upper deck of the American, above the rank of a midshipman, including captain, first lieutenant, master, and marine officer, was either killed or wounded. To this circumstance, Mr. Cooper ascribes the loss of the ship. It is true that when the ships were coming foul, Captain Lawrence ordered the bugle to call the boarders; but the bugleman, a negro, had deserted his quarters, and was not to be found. All that the reviewer says about officers sounding the bugle is a puerility that is unworthy of an answer. That the boarders were not called, as ordered, is proved on oath,—a favorite mode of establishing facts with the reviewer; and as for the idea of the men's below hearing a scuffle on deck, it is quite of a piece with the rest of the witticism. There was no scuffle to hear, until the English had got well in possession; for, finding themselves raked with canister, and without officers, all the men ran from aft forward. This was what Captain Broke termed "flinching from their guns" when he gave orders orders "to to prepare for boarding." The enemy met no resistance on entering the Chesapeake, though a short but confused struggle occurred forward of the mainmast afterward, the boarders who came from below being without their arms.

But the reviewer disputes Mr. Cooper's statement that all the officers of the upper deck of the Chesapeake, the midshipmen excepted, were wounded before the boarding. On this head he says: “Now, we have the authority of the official letter for disputing this statement. By that account, Mr. Ludlow, the Chesa

!

peake's first lieutenant, and one of the officers stated by Mr. Cooper to have been disabled as above, was wounded in attempting to repel the boarders. And yet Mr. Cooper enumerates this officer's name among those who fell before the enemy boarded."

Mr. Budd's statement that Mr. Ludlow was wounded in attempting to repel the boarders, or by the boarders, is true. It was not a fact for him to inquire into closely, at the moment of writing; and as he did not see what passed, he may very well have supposed, at the time, that Mr. Ludlow was hurt in this manner, and in no other. But the evidence on the court-martial brought out all the circumstances, and the finding on this point is in these words, as Mr. James himself might have told the reviewer, viz.: "It appears also to the court, that, when the Shannon got foul of the Chesapeake, Captain Lawrence, his first lieutenant, the sailing master, and lieutenant of marines, were all killed, or mortally wounded, and thereby the upper deck of the Chesapeake was left without any commanding officer, and with only one or two young midshipmen."-Occ. App. p. lx.

A mistake in reference to Mr. Ludlow might very well occur. We understand that he was twice wounded; once by a small missile, before the boarding, and afterwards by a sword. The account we have heard states that he was seated on a gun slide, as the English came in, and that naturally raising his sword, he got a blow on the head. It was said, at the time, he might have got well of the first injury, but that the last proved fatal. But this was probably no more than one of the additions that grew out of the excitement of the affair, the court, out of question, coming at the real facts. We presume that even the reviewer will admit that Mr. Cooper's statement is justified by the finding of the court.

The reviewer has been misled by a misprint in the English edition, where he sneers at the supposed assertion of Mr. Cooper, that the battle of Lake Erie "has long been considered" by the American "navy," one of its proudest achievements on the water. The word is "nation," in the original, and the fact is unquestionably true as regards them. We believe the navy look's upon the battle of Plattsburg Bay, (Perry's game out of the question,) as much the most brilliant victory. It is in this sense that Mr. Cooper makes the remark he does, concerning those two affairs. It is the battle of Plattsburg Bay that the navy most appreciates according to Mr. Cooper.

All that the reviewer says about the vagueness of Mr. Cooper's comparison of the forces of the respective parties on Lake Erie, and his own explanation, is as hollow as most of his reasoning.