purpose. Tilly, as we have already remarked, was a general of routine; he took the art of war as he found it, but he carried the system that he adopted, to the greatest possible perfection. Wallenstein, borrowing from Mansfeldt the principle of making war support war, ruined the morale of his army, by permitting every species of military licentiousness, and vainly endeavoured to supply the absence of discipline by the accumulation of numbers. The ultimate failure of Tilly was owing partly to the faults of his subordinate officers, but chiefly to the ascendency of the greater genius who opposed him. The fall of Wallenstein was, from the outset, inevitable. He had no chance whatever of success in his contest with Gustavus ; and even if that accomplished soldier had never encountered him, his own folly and weakness must have wrought his destruction. With such antagonists as these, Christiern was wholly unable to contend. After a miserably conducted campaign or two, he was routed in every direction, and compelled to sue for peace, which he obtained, at the expense of dishonourable concessions, on tolerably easy terms.

Professor Mallet, in his excellent Histoire de Dannemarc, takes extraordinary pains to elevate the character of Christiern to an equality with that of Gustavus Adolphus. A more absurd attempt, we take upon ourselves to assert, was never yet made, and the positive dogmatic clumsiness with which it is made, is, if possible, yet more absurd than the hypothesis itself. As a specimen of the excess to which prejudice may carry even estimable and accomplished men, we shall quote from the first, and we believe the best edition of his Histoire, a part of the passage to which we have referred.

It is known that Christian IV. failed under the efforts of an enemy over whom Gustavus triumphed. But it is not less certain that Christian IV. exhibited both in the course of this war, and in the other circumstances of his life, the same virtues which were crowned with success in the person of Gustavus; valour, activity, constancy, zeal for his country and his religion, relish for true glory, temperance, sufferance, military science, love of his soldiers, vigilance in the maintenance of order and discipline. That Gustavus possessed these qualities in a higher degree, can never be proved but by the event. Circumstances which were uniformly adverse to Christian IV. almost always favoured Gustavus Adolphus. What success and what glory would have crowned the exertions of the King of Denmark, if, beside being as cordially supported ❝ by his own subjects and his nobility, as Gustavus was by his, he had been also seconded by allies as cordial as those which that Prince found in Germany and in France? If the subsidies which were promised him had been as considerable and as re

gularly paid; if as effectual: diversions had been made in his favour; if the Protestant States of Germany had felt that zeal for their liberties and religion which was afterwards gradually awakened, that indignation against the despotism of Austria, that conviction that it was time to make a final effort to break the yoke, which they testified when Gustavus charged himself "with their defence?'-Hist. de Dannemare, Tom. 3, page 223, 4to. 1777.10

This sort of reasoning, ex hypothese, even when specious, is always unworthy of the historian, who should be only conversant with facts and close deductions from undeniable events; but when, as in the present instance, it is nothing more than a mere torrent of words without force or meaning, it deserves the severest reprehension. Who would not imagine from these bold affirmations, that Gustavus possessed throughout the whole of his career, all the advantages enumerated in the preceding extract? While, so far from this being the real state of things, the complete reverse was very nearly the fact. Gustavus had no advantages but those he gained, no confidence but what he conquered, no assistance before his successes had proved him an ally worthy of trust, and a leader who knew the way to victory. Christiern, on the contrary, completely threw away a game which seemed to be in his hands. Seconded by such men, as Mansfeldt and Brunswick, he yet, from the outset of his enterprize to its disgraceful, close, was unable to gain a single lasting advantage, or to establish, by a single plan, conceived with skill and executed with ability, a well-founded claim to the reputation of a general. Two or three instances of merited success, would have vindicated the military character of Christiern, far more effectually than all the pomp and positiveness. of M. Mallet's eulogy.

1

The sun was rapidly sinking beneath the horizon', June 24th, 1630, when the Swedish fleet entered the harbour of Pennemond, in the Isle of Usedom. After superintending the preparations, for disembarking his troops in flat-bottomed boats, each capable of containing two hundred men, and two small pieces of artillery, the king leaped on shore, and falling upon his knees, implored the God of Hosts to favour an enterprise, undertaken in defence of religion and liberty. This pious duty being fulfilled, he seized a pickaxe, and, with the activity of a pioneer, began to throw up an intrenchment. The example of their sovereign kindling the emulation of all his officers, stimulated them to labour with such indefatigable zeal, that, before the dawn of day, a breast-work was completed, affording security against any sudden attack.' pp. 405-406.

The measures of Gustavus were marked with the utmost promptitude and prudence. He lost no time, he neglected no advantage. Stralsund was, in the first instance, his only point

of support; but he speedily compelled the Duke of Pomerania to sign a treaty of alliance; and by a series of measures, planned and executed with consummate ability, secured fortresses and positions which enabled him to manœuvre on a more extended and enterprising scale. Alarmed at the progress of the Swedish monarch, his antagonists, while they endeavoured to stay his course by military opposition, were dastardly and base enough to direct against him the arm of the assassin.

"

Quintio Aligheri (or del Ponte, as he is more frequently called), under pretext of having received a signal affront, went over to Gustavus, with a determination to destroy him by poison, or assassination, in case he should fail in his infamous plan of delivering him a prisoner into the hands of Torquato. A mind equally depraved having desig nated a captain in the Swedish service as a fit accomplice, it was resolved between them that the most probable means of effecting their purpose would be, for Quintio to endeavour to acquire the confidence of his master. Being gifted by nature with a quick understanding, an undaunted courage, and a constitution equal to the severest fatigue, he soon attracted the notice of a monarch, who was never backward to recompense merit; and, being rapidly promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, was consulted by Gustavus upon various occasions. The king being desirous of reconnoitring in person the Austrian lines, selected the Italian as a companion: because he naturally concluded from his former situation that he must, be thoroughly acquainted with the adjacent country. Quitting the camp in the evening, with an escort of only seventy horse, he left part of them at the entrance of a defile, in order to secure a retreat. Aligheri, having undertaken to explore the environs, rode full speed to the imperial camp, and informed the general that the fortunate moment was at length arrived; and, that if he would entrust him with the command of five hundred horse, it would be impossible for Gustavus to escape. Unsuspicious of treachery, and attributing to accident the protracted absence of his friend, the king was surrounded on his return. Notwithstanding the immense disparity of numbers, he disdained to yield; so that the perfidious Italian, despairing of being able to take him alive, resolved to effect his hellish purpose by murder He is said, however, to have confessed in the sequel, that at the moment he pointed his pistol against the Swedish hero, he was impressed with a kind of supernatural awe, which prevented his drawing the trigger. Falling at length with his wounded horse, the king was seized by the enemy, who were conducting him a prisoner to the imperial camp, when the party which had been left behind arrived unexpectedly to his succour. The officer who commanded it, alarmed for the safety of a beloved sovereign, advanced to meet him; and hearing the report of fire-arms, hastened to the spot from whence it proceeded. A violent charge overturned the Austrian horse, and gave liberty to the illustrious captive. The intimacy which had prevailed between Aligheri and the man whom he had chosen for his confederate, having rendered the latter an object of suspicion, his papers were examined,

and proofs being found to substantiate his guilt, he was condemned to the gallows by a military tribunal.' pp. 422-424.

It contributed materially to the successes of Gustavus, that he was opposed in the first instance by an officer of inferior talents; and the conduct of Austria in making such a selection, seems unaccountable. Had Tilly, instead of wasting himself in a war of detail in the interior of Germany, marched at once to encounter the king of Sweden, it appears not improbable that a different result might have taken place. The time and opportunities thus lost, were never afterwards recovered. Gustavus increased his army, concluded a treaty of subsidy with France, January 23, 1631, and on the 14th April, carried Frankfort on the Oder by assault. The Protestant States began to put themselves in motion; they assembled at Leipsic under the auspices of the Elector of Saxony, who seems to have aimed at the establishment of an independent party, over which he should himself preside. Their first step was to negotiate with the Emperor; but as this was ineffectual, they resolved to arm. In the mean time, Gustavus was advancing slowly, but surely. He determined the elector of Brandenburg to put him in possession of Spandau; and was preparing to move forward to the relief of Magdeburg, when he was met by the intelligence of its fall. This city had been the first to declare for Gustavus; and, soon after the storming of Frankfort, was invested by Tilly, who now gratified his remorseless and revengeful character, by letting loose upon the miserable inhabitants all the plagues of military visitation. This calamitous event placed the King of Sweden in a situation of great difficulty, from which he extricated himself by firmness and decision. The impolitic imperiousness of Ferdinand, forced the Elector of Saxony to make common cause with Gustavus, and the result of their union was the battle of Leipsic, gained by the genius of the Swedish monarch, and the valour of his soldiers, over the ablest tactician of the age. Tilly, notwithstanding the insinuations to the contrary, seems to us to have displayed great ability; but his antagonist had new-modelled his system, and the heavy movements and unmanageable masses of Alva and Spinola, failed before the more rapid manœuvres and the more correct science of the Swedish tactics. Gustavus, like Hannibal in Italy, has been reproached for not advancing immediately on his enemy's capital. It would seem, however, that he acted wisely in declining so hazardous an enterprise: double or quit, is the hazard of the losing, not the winning side. A more injurious error was committell by the King, in rejecting the overtures of Wallenstein, who offered, on certain conditions, to join the Swedes against Austria; and, on the rejection of those conditions, raised an army for the service of Ferdinand. During these transactions, Gustavus did not relax his efforts in

the field; he directed his march towards Bavaria, routed the Imperialists at the celebrated passage of the Lech, where Tilly was mortally wounded, and entered Munich in triumph. Wallenstein at length entered upon action, drove the Saxons out of Bohemia, joined the Bavarians, came in contact with Gustavus at Nuremberg, and finally engaged him at Lutzen. Of this illustrious battle and its attendant circumstances, a distinct narrative is given by Mr. Naylor. Its gain was dearly purchased by the Swedes at the expense of the life of their gallant monarch, who fell, as it appears, not in the fair hazard of battle, but by the hand, or at least by the machinations, of an assassin.

The following passage contains Mr. N.'s summary of his character.

He was eminently pious without bigotry or fanaticism; humane without weakness; firm without obstinacy; and far more careful of the lives of his soldiers than attentive to his own preservation. In the moment of victory he was just and compassionate, never forgetting the weakness and imperfection of man's brightest endowments, and most extensive power, when compared with the wisdom and omnipotence of the Almighty. And, though he unquestionably ranks high among the most enlightened statesmen of modern Europe, he enjoys the singular, and perhaps unexampled glory, of having never subjected his unblemished reputation to the suspicion of treachery or deceit.' p. 773.

In common times, and under common circumstances, the loss of its accomplished chief must have been fatal to the Protestant Confederacy; but Gustavus had trained up a race of officers scarcely inferior to himself in military science, and his Chancellor, Oxenstiern, was a man fully capable of following up the political plans of his master to a successful termination. It is impossible for us to enter at large into the various detail of the succeeding scenes. The intrigues of France, the conspiracy and assassination of Wallenstein, the brilliant valour of the Swedes, the changing fortunes of the campaigns, are all narrated with sufficient clearness on the whole, though, towards the close, with somewhat too much brevity.

However heavily the calamitous, effects of the thirty years', war might fall on Germany, it terminated in a treaty which settled her liberties on a sure foundation. The purchase was dreadful, but it was amply repaid by the result.

(To be continued.)