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N all Socialist discussions on militarism a distinction has been adopted between wars of aggression and wars of defense. Gustave Hervé and his friends started a paper in France-"La Guerre Sociale "_ to oppose war without any such distinction. He signed his articles from prison "A Man Without a Country." And in his principal book, "Leur Patrie" (Their Country), he developed a theory which he called "AntiPatriotism." He maintained that the proletariat have no interest in the nationality of their oppressors. The French workingman does not own any of France. La Patrie belongs to those who hold title to its fields and factories. If the patrons are attacked by the German capitalists-well, let them defend their country. Why, forsooth, should the landless, penniless French workingmen risk their lives to defend the property of those who have not been especially kind to them?

Logicians have found it very hard to develop any argument for patriotism which would hold water. But, in spite of very active propaganda, the Hervé group was never able to swing more than a small majority of the French workingmen. It makes no difference. whether you call patriotism a congenital instinct, a noble sentiment, or an insane tradition-there is no use arguing with it. It is a condition, not a theory. No one denies that Imperial Germany has done more to protect its workingmen than Republican France. But the French Socialist party refused to be anti-patriotic. And Hervé himself had to admit at last that most of the French work

ingmen would rather be shot while on strike by their own soldiers than be insured against sickness and old age by German officials.

However, although the French Socialists were not willing to go all the way with Hervé, they certainly hated militarism. The standing army is an immense economic tax. Since 1870 the French army has seen no active service except against half-armed natives in the colonies and as strike-breakers at home. Militarism stands square in the way of social aspirations. The rank and file of the French workers hated the army and in the same breath loved their country. Their party had to take some stand.

Some one invented this distinction between offensive and defensive war. The party Congress, undoubtedly expressing the will of its constituents, announced that the workers would defend the Republic in case of attack, but against a war of aggression, in the colonies or in Europe, they would use their whole strength, "even to a general strike and armed insurrection."

Hervé, at the time, insisted that the distinction between offensive and defensive warfare was fallacious. But he was voted down. This stand against aggressive warfare was as revolutionary as the spirit of the rank and file warranted.

The French took this anti-military resolution to the International Congress at Stuttgart. The German comrades did not accept it willingly. This was partly because they were above all preoccupied with the fight for equal suffrage in Prussia and were reluctant to divert any energy to what seemed to them a

But in the face of the overwhelming sentiment of the Congress, the German delegates finally accepted this distinction between offensive and defensive warfare. And the International, while asserting the right of self-defense for all nationalities, unanimously pledged itself to go to the utmost extremegeneral strike and armed insurrection-to prevent aggressive wars.

Bebel took an early opportunity to make this distinction in the Reichstag. He eloquently attacked the evils of militarism and colonial adventure, but assured the Government that, in case Germany was wantonly attacked, the patriotism of the Socialists could be relied upon. He said that, in spite of his age, he would shoulder a musket himself and go to the frontier to defend Teutonic culture from any aggression by Russian despotism. And many of the German comrades, led by Dr. Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg, have carried on an active propaganda against war.

According to this generally accepted distinction between offensive and defensive warfare, Vandervelde was justified in supporting the Belgian Government. There could be no two opinions about that-Belgium was attacked.

And the news from Paris does not allow any doubt about the general feeling there. The French believe they have been attacked. It does not matter whether they are right about this or wrong. If they believe that this is a defensive war, they are free, according to the wording of the Stuttgart resolution, to rally beside their Government.

But very general surprise is expressed that the German comrades have done the same.

As a matter of fact, we know as yet very little about their attitude. The Imperial censor has allowed the news to come out that Haase made a speech in the Reichstag in which he said that, as Germany was attacked, it was the duty of Socialists to defend the Fatherland, and, above all, to do what they could to relieve the inevitable misery of the crisis. We do not know how generally he has been upheld by the other comrades. We have, for instance, no authentic word from Liebknecht. We do know that all the Socialist newspapers opposed the war to the last, and that some were promptly suppressed-certainly not for advocating war. While it is possible that some of our comrades may have decided that this war was aggressive, and therefore to be resisted to the extreme (such news, of course, no censor would pass), it seems probable that most of the German Socialists are supporting the Govern

ment.

A press despatch says that Guesde, when he entered the French Cabinet, explained that he did so because the German party had proved traitors-a grave charge which has been echoed on this side of the water. There are only two alternatives. Either Guesde's charge of treason is true and the German party has repudiated its pledges, or they do not consider this an aggressive war on the part of Germany. Personally, I believe the latter alternative more probable. Burke's statement that you cannot indict a whole nation applies here. Guesde is reported to have indicted the whole working class of Germany. But we had best reserve judgment till the evidence is available.

If the German workingmen as organized in the Socialist party believe that the Vaterland-which they love just as unreasoningly as the French love La Patrie-is suffering from wanton aggression, they are exactly as far justified in supporting their Government as is Guesde.

Who is the aggressor in this war? On the one hand, we have the diplomatic correspondence published in the British "White Paper." It is evident that a very large part of the editorial opinion in America on this question is based on this and similar documents. Even if we forget the traditions of European diplomacy—falsified telegrams, public treaties with secret clauses; even if we forget Sir Edward Grey's repeated assurances to the House of Commons that England was not bound to give military support

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to France, although the French and English General Staffs had arranged for the British Expeditionary Force, to the exact number of men, as far back as 1911-even if we accept this "White Paper " at its face value, it does not prove anything except that England did not want to go to war at this moment.

And, after all, it does not matter who the historians-to-come will decide started this war. The verdict on the action of the German Socialists must depend on what they thought about it in the midst of the crisis.

There is no country in Europe in which the machinery for controlling public opinion is as highly developed as in Germany. Francesco Crispi tells of an interview of his with Bismarck. The Iron Chancellor was "peeved" because Crispi was not sure whether Italian public opinion would approve of the proposed alliance with Austria. He scolded Crispi about it. A government, he said, was criminally weak that permitted public opinion to oppose it. The business of statesmanship consisted in preparing and controlling public opinion. He gave Crispi a number of hints on how to do it. Von Bülow, in his book on

"Imperial Germany," assumes, without any argument, that the Government can control practically all sources of publicity-church, school, and press. The evidence of this control is patent to any one who follows the German newspapers. Germans frequently make the statement that Maximilian Harden is the only independent journalist in the Empire. And it is very nearly true.

Now the German Government, with this carefully developed system, its subservient and well-trained pastors, professors, and press, had an unusually easy problem in this case. The Allies had given them abundant material on which to build the belief that Germany was the victim of aggression.

There are many things to warrant the belief that the English King, the French President, and the Czar-acting for the commercial gentlemen who pay their salaries—have for many years, in spite of their oily-mouthed diplomatic palaver about peace, been plotting the overthrow of German political and economic development. This has certainly been believed by all classes of Germans, irrespective of their social position or political creed. Not only the jingoist of the Navy League, but also timid burghers, have felt the menace to the Fatherland.

The last year has seen a very venomous anti-Russian campaign in the German press.

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Day after day disturbing news has been published from the eastern frontier. The puppet Duma voted to accept a gigantic loan from France for the reorganization of the army. Russia is the least threatened country in Europe. She has no more need of an immense army to defend her frontiers than we have. The increase was senseless-or threatening. Then General Joffre, of the French army, visited Russia and inspected the German frontier; immediately, on his advice, three Russian army corps were moved nearer the border. Next, although no country in Europe is more sorely in need of commercial railways, the Duma voted funds for a network of strategical lines in Poland, by means of which troops could be moved into Germany three days quicker. And Russia, under English advice, was, at immense expense, reorganizing her navy. She has no oversea colonies, no large merchant marine to protect. Once again the increase was senseless-or threatening.

That the German Government had its hireling press put the worst possible interpretation on these Russian military developments shows how well the machinery for controlling public opinion was oiled. Whenever any prominent Russian made a bellicose speech against Germany, whenever "Novoe Vremya" had an anti-German article, it was reprinted in full in the German press. Nothing which the Russian peace party had to say was ever repeated in the Berlin papers.

The same thing-a little more clumsily— was going on in Russia. The Czar also was accustoming his people to believe in the threat of aggression from Germany. Both sides were not only polishing their arms for this war, but were preparing public opinion.

What I want to emphasize is that the German Government had plenty of material on which to base its brief. Over against the fine diplomatic phrases of the "White Papers" are a dozen military facts which the war has disclosed. Before we in America heard the first rumble of the approaching storm Great Britain had mobilized her fleet as never before-under pretext of a naval review. The Chauvinist element in France, of which President Poincaré is the acknowledged head, suddenly came out on top in the political mêlée. For reasons which are still obscure, the opposition of the Radicals to the three years' military service suddenly stopped. It has been affirmed, and not denied, that Poincaré sum

moned the leaders of the opposition and told them that war was inevitable within a few months. The unexpected speed of the Russian advance in force into East Prussia and Galicia has convinced all military observers that the Czar had begun to mobilize his army before Austria sent her ultimatum to Servia. In the face of such things, it is evident that a German is not an idiot if he believes the Kaiser's statement that the existence of the Fatherland was threatened.

Personally, I believe that the Powers of the Entente were planning some move this fall. Perhaps it was their intention to pull off a "peaceful diplomatic" coup-backed by a demonstration of overwhelming force. And I believe that the German Government, foreseeing the threatened aggression, decided to strike first, and did so with the nation practically unanimous in the conviction that it was a defensive war.

However, my personal beliefs do not mat

ter. The point I want to emphasize is that, even if the Kaiser from lust of blood or the Crown Prince's party in a frenzied desire for glory wantonly precipitated an aggressive war, still the Government bureau of public opinion had ample material at hand from which to argue convincingly-even to the Socialists-that this is a war in defense of the Fatherland.

There is a large body of Englishmen, from the Laborites on the Left, even as far towards the Right as Lord Morley, who would subscribe, in part at least, to my contention that British diplomacy towards Germany had been wantonly provocative, and that the Government had not done all it might with honor and decency do to prevent this war.

There is little use in discussing whether our German comrades are right or wrong in considering the Kaiser's Declaration of War defensive. In spite of Guesde's sweeping denunciation, we have no reason to believe that they have gone with blithe cynicism into what they felt was an aggressive war.

A very interesting contrast is presented by the situation in England. It is the one country involved in which the representatives of the workers have refused to co-operate with the Government. John Burns, who certainly is not a Revolutionary Socialist, has given up his political career because he believes that the war is unjustified. Keir Hardie in Trafalgar Square and Ramsay MacDonald in Parliament and the Lahe press have protested.

The reason is not far to seek. Public opinion is not so easily controlled in England as on the Continent. The real Liberals and sincere peace advocates have for years used the freedom of the press to attack the aggressive diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey-as would have been impossible in Russia, Germany, or France. But, in spite of the relative weakness of the British Government in controlling public opinion, the moment the crisis arose they were able to get away with it. The most effective protest which the opponents of war could devise was silent withdrawal from the Cabinet. The London "Times," for instance, has not printed any statement from Lord Morley as to why he resigned. From German sources we hear that John Burns explained his action in a public speech. But the English papers which I have been following have not even alluded to it. In time of stress even the English Government-the most Liberal in Europecan silence all opposition.

In so far as the facts have reached us, we can deduce one thing from the present situation. The distinction between offensive and defensive warfare has no practical value.

Public opinion can be carefully prepared or suddenly inflamed. There is no doubt that almost every man with a gun in his hands to-day in Europe believes that his country's cause is just and that he is defending its cherished institutions from an aggressor.

A tourist just returned from Bermuda tells me that every able-bodied man in that minute island has" volunteered" to defend the Empire. It is certain that the few hundred Germans scattered over the Pacific islandsin Samoa and the Ladrones-are just as wildly inspired with the desire to defend their Empire. It would be laughable if it were not so appallingly sad.

We must accept the fact that all men who go out to battle-with the exception of a few maniacs and vestigial desperadoes who were born a couple of centuries too late-believe that they are doing so to protect their homes from arson, their mothers and sisters and wives from rape, or to defend their country from unwarranted aggression. It may be false historically, but it is a psychological fact.

If we Socialists are going to declare la guerre à la guerre, we must decide to fight war-the Ding an sich-without any qualify. ing adjectives.