OPULAR imagination demands for every great historical event a hero or a villain. So it has tried to fix the responsibility for the present cruel war upon one man; and, in view of a particular sequence of events, the German Emperor has been singled out as the scapegoat. No student of history or of politics, however, believes that any one man nowadays could cause such a clashing of forces as is going on at present in Europe, or that such a war could be due to anything but deep underlying causes, altogether beyond the control of ordinary statesmanship. The real causes of the war are three: France's desire to win back her military prestige and the provinces lost to Germany in 1870; Russia's desire to eliminate Germany as the ally of Austria, her opponent on the way to Constantinople; England's jealousy of Germany's growth as a commercial and naval power. Let us consider these three causes in the order indicated.

FRANCE AND GERMANY

In 1870 France, in order to prevent the further unification and internal strengthening of Germany, used a slight pretext to declare war against the North German Federation, hoping thereby to extend her own territory by the conquest of the left bank of the Rhine. France was defeated, the new German Empire established, and Alsace and a part of Lorraine annexed. France has never forgiven Germany for this defeat. American sympathy has generally been with Germany in this matter; only Germany's annexation of Alsace and Lorraine is often criticised in this country, and, in view of certain wrong impressions concerning it, requires explanation. These provinces belonged to Germany from the time of the division of Charlemagne's Empire in 843 to 1648, when Germany, exhausted by the Thirty Years' War and torn by internal dissensions, was forced to cede the greater part of them to France; Strassburg and the surrounding territory was seized by Louis XIV in time of peace in 1681. The people of Alsace are almost entirely of German stock, belonging to the Alemannian tribe, from the name of which the French name for Germany, Allemagne,

is derived. That their native speech is German will appear even to the uninitiated from such names as Mülhausen, Breisach, Strassburg, Weissenburg, Saarburg, etc. Similarly the population of Lorraine is for the most part closely related to that of the adjoining part of Prussia. For a hundred years after their forcible annexation to France the population, especially of Alsace, remained essentially German in character, speech, customs, and intellectual sympathies. No proof of this is needed for any one who is familiar with the story of Goethe's student time in Strassburg in 1770 to 1771, and of his love for Friederike, the parson's daughter, of Sesenheim near Strassburg, with whom he sang the old German folk-songs of the neighborhood. Politically the provinces then were under the rule of France; in every other respect they were a part of Germany. Political sense and national feeling, however, were insignificant among the population, as they then were all over Germany. Not until the French Revolution, more than a hundred years after their annexation to France, did Alsace and Lorraine become French in feeling to any considerable extent; then the great wave of national enthusiasm proceeding from Paris swept over the two provinces and separated them from Germany, where the national spirit was not aroused till much later.

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Germany had not forgotten her just claims to these provinces; but even after the terrible effort of shaking off the Napoleonic dominion in 1813-15 she was still too disunited and weak to win them back. they remained with France until 1870, and during this long period their political attachment to France became very strong, while nevertheless the great mass of the population retained its old German speech. France during this period looked upon the provinces with the superiority of the conqueror; the Alsatian speaking his German patois was regarded as far inferior to the genuine Frenchman.

After her victory in 1870 Germany exacted the return of the lost provinces. She did this partly for military reasons, in order to erect a bulwark between herself and France, which had for centuries taken every opportunity to

interfere in Germany's affairs and to disrupt Germany's unity; partly for the sentimental reason that these provinces belonged originally to Germany, that their population was of German stock, and that, even though the sympathies of the people at the time were largely with the French, it was hoped to win them back to Germany, to which they naturally belonged. In this last endeavor, it is admitted, Germany has only partially succeeded; but, if it be remembered that it took over a hundred years and the French Revolution to Gallicize the provinces, Germany has no reason to be ashamed of what she accomplished in forty-three years. The jingo press of Paris and London inveighs against the so-called German tyranny in Alsace-Lorraine; but what are the facts? The regrettable Zabern incident, greatly exaggerated as it was by a sensation-loving press, has been absolutely unique during an occupation of more than four decades; compared with what has occurred in Ireland in the way of murders, land riots, evictions, etc., during this period, all the clashes between the authorities and the people in Alsace Lorraine fade into insignificance. Under a really tyrannical government the people generally emigrate as fast as they can, as they did from Ireland for many years; in Alsace-Lorraine the annexation was immediately followed by an increase in emigration, but this increase ceased in a few years, when the rate of emigration fell below that of the neighboring states. It is true that a good many Alsatians might be found in Paris, but so there might be in Berlin, as everywhere in the world the population from agricultural and mountain districts has flocked to the large cities. Between 1875 and 1905 the population of the provinces increased from 1,531,000 to 1,814,000, or 18.4 per cent, while during the same period that of France increased by only 6.4 per cent; from 1885 to 1905 the population of the industrial city of Mülhausen increased from 69,759 to 94,488-that is, 35 per cent. The growth in material wealth has been similar; and what the German Government has done in the provinces for education may be inferred from the fact that after the definite annexation of the provinces almost the first thing was the re-establishment of the famous old University of Strassburg, which has since taken its place among the prominent centers of learning in the world, and to which numerous American students have

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resorted. resorted. Furthermore, Germany has allowed the provinces an amount of autonomy which Ireland even now does not enjoy; for several years their affairs have been administered by a Governor-General appointed by the Emperor, and a Diet elected by universal suffrage; for years many of the civil offices, including some of the highest, have been filled by natives of the provinces, who thus showed their willingness to co-operate with the new government. A large part of the population was content to abide by the results of 1870, and the sentiment was overwhelmingly against another war over the possession of the provinces, from which these would naturally be the worst sufferers. If it had not been for the continuous agitation by the Paris jingo press we should probably have heard little about German tyranny in Alsace, for there was no substantial basis for the assertion.

But France was not content to abide by the decision of 1870, and not only the jingo press, but the most influential public men, with few exceptions, have more or less frankly encouraged the popular demand for another trial of strength with Germany. For this purpose the armaments were carried to an extent in proportion far beyond those of Germany, and in 1912 the time of active compulsory service was raised from two to three years, while at the same time the recruits of the following year were called to the colors, thus practically doubling the army at one stroke. For this same purpose the

alliance with Russia was more and more firmly cemented, France lending Russia billions of money to reorganize and vastly increase her army after her defeat by Japan. It was only a question of time when France and Russia would find an opportunity to strike at Germany, and it was an open secret in military and diplomatic circles that such an opportunity would occur in 1914 or 1915, when both French and Russian armaments would be complete.

RUSSIA AND GERMANY

Germany has long recognized Russia as a most powerful neighbor with whom she had to be on good terms for her own sake. The two nations have not seriously clashed for a hundred and fifty years, for Prussia's participation in Napoleon's campaign of 1812 was compulsory, and the very next year Prussia and Russia fought side by side against Napoleon at Leipzig. Since then Germany has

made every effort, especially in recent years, by commercial sacrifices to retain Russia's good will, and the two nations might be at peace now if it were not for Russia's hostility to Germany's friend and ally, Austria. Russia's ambition for more than a century has been to extend her dominion over the Balkans and to win Constantinople. She might probably have done so long ago had this been in accordance with the designs of England and France. In order to win Constantinople, Russia must first dominate the southern Slavic states, Servia and Bulgaria, and she has for a long time arrogated to herself the part of their patron and protector. That Russia has a prior right to this position Austria does not admit, for she too is a great Slavic power, and her commercial interests demand an open route to the sea and to the Orient as much as Russia's. Indirectly Germany's commercial interests are at stake, for through Austria lies Germany's land route to the Orient, and it is an imperative necessity for her to keep this route open; neither Austria nor Germany can afford to have it blocked by an unfriendly Power. This is so clear that prominent Russian writers have stated in recent years that Russia's way to Constantinople lies through Germany. As it cannot be to England's or France's interest to have Russia in possession of Constantinople, except under conditions to which Russia would never submit, it seems as if the present alliance between these Powers could only serve the immediate purpose of eliminating Germany from European affairs.

ENGLAND AND GERMANY

Until the Franco-German War the relations between Germany and England were generally friendly. The two nations had never seriously clashed, and on the field of Waterloo the English and Prussian armies fought side by side. The English view of the German people, as it crops out in the literature before 1870, is that of a people given largely to sentimentalism, philosophy, music, and beer-drinking; beyond that, the Germans might be useful in keeping France in check, which England then still regarded as her chief enemy, but otherwise they were a negligible quantity. Germany's inferiority to England in engineering, manufacturing, and commercial enterprise was so great that as late as 1880 water works, gas works, and street railways in many German cities were constructed and run by English engineering

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skill and English capital, while the steamships of the two feeble German transatlantic lines were built in England and Scotland. But now a rapid change took place. In 1876 the German Commissioner to the Centennial Exhibition at Philadelphia reported to his Government as his verdict concerning the products of German industries there exhibited, Cheap and inferior;" twelve years later, "Made in Germany" had become a badge of excellence for a great variety of industrial products; a few years later again, Germany built ships which for size, swiftness, and comfort surpassed those of the great English transatlantic lines, and which carried German products to all parts of the globe. Then England suddenly recognized Germany as a dangerous competitor for the world's trade, and her feeling toward her changed from friendly condescension to jealousy and hate.

The matter was aggravated when Germany began to strengthen her navy in order to protect her coasts, trade routes. and outlying possessions. Other nations likewise greatly strengthened their navies-the United States, France, Russia, Italy, Japan-but only Germany's efforts in this direction were frowned down by England, although Germany never attempted to build a fleet anywhere near the size of the English fleet, while even if she had done so England's superior geographical position and her dominions and naval bases all over the globe would always have assured her an incomparable advantage over Germany. The reason for this was that England had begun to look upon Germany, of all countries, as her chief rival in trade; and her policy from the time of her own rise as a commercial and maritime power had always been to concentrate all her efforts on the elimination of her foremost commercial rival-a policy which had resulted successively in the destruction of the maritime power of Spain, Holland, and France.

Germany had before her the example of these countries; she remembered the bombardment of Copenhagen, in which the British destroyed the Danish fleet; and she also remembered that when, in 1849, a single warship was built in Germany by popular subscription, Lord Palmerston, then Prime Minister of England, declared that if such a ship dared to show on the high seas the German flag he would order it to be treated as a pirate ship. Under these circumstances modern Germany had to choose between

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leaving its growing maritime trade to the tender mercies of England till the latter should take an opportunity to wipe it off the globe, and arming herself to protect it; and Germany chose the latter course. Since then England has taken every opportunity to thwart the efforts of Germany at legitimate growth and extension of her influence, and she has done this with an air as if she were fighting for a moral principle. She herself might conquer the Transvaal and sacrifice in the effort the lives of myriads of brave Boer farmers and of her own soldiers; she might enter into an arrangement with France according to which England retained Egypt and France took Morocco; she might enter into an arrangement with Russia, dividing Persia into spheres of English and Russian influence, to the utter disregard of the rights of Persia; Italy might grab Tripoli; Japan and Russia might quarrel about Manchuria, and settle the matter between them; all this was legitimate and in the interests of civilization. But let Germany say as much as that she too had commercial interests in Morocco, or that she would like to purchase a coaling station within a certain sphere where England and her allies had a dozen, then a howl went up about "intolerable German aggression" and "unwarrantable encroachment on English interests." Even such a strictly non-political commercial enterprise as the building by German capital of the Bagdad Railway was not permitted except after years of negotiations, and after English capital had been allowed to participate and the terminals arranged to suit English interests. Germany has submitted to this injustice for a number of years, but it is clear that a nation of 65,000,000 people needing employment and means of support could not forever endure such a thwarting of its legitimate aspirations.

COULD THE WAR HAVE BEEN AVOIDED? So it appears that each one of these three great Powers now making war on Germany had her own reasons for wishing to crush her; Germany, on the other hand, had no corresponding designs against them. She wanted no French territory, knowing well that it could not be Germanized for a long period, and would only weaken her. Nor was she so foolish as to think that she could wrest anything from the Russian colossus.

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Her geographical position, the relative weakness of her navy, and her lack of naval bases and coaling stations made it inconceivable that she could inflict very serious damage upon England's fleet or her world-wide dominion. Nothing is more absurd than the assertion that Germany aimed to rule Europe as France did in the time of Napoleon. The only thing Germany desired was to be treated by the other nations on an equal footing, and not to be constantly shut out by their combinations from newly arising opportunities for expansion and for the extension of her commercial influence-opportunities such as the other nations have seized in recent years time and again. This was not only her right, but a physical necessity in view of her rapidly growing population. She has submitted to many a slight and has suffered one setback after another. If she has struck now, it is because she felt sure that she could not later defend herself against the mighty combination of her opponents with the slightest chance of success. When the Kaiser, in order to preserve the peace of Europe, offered to mediate between Austria and Servia, and Russia nevertheless ordered the mobilization of her giant army, the whole German people realized what was in store for them. Germany was in the position of a man who sees a deadly enemy reach for his pistol, and whose only possible salvation lies in shooting first.

The war could have been avoided if France had foregone her desire for revenge and for the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine, which she did not need in view of her almost stationary population and her own wealth and that of her extensive colonies. The war could have been avoided if Russia had been content with her vast and undeveloped empire, and had curbed her desire to strike down Austria as an obstacle on her route to Constantinople. The war could have been avoided if England had been more generous to Germany and had allowed her the same share as the other nations in new opportunities for colonization and for extension and protection of commerce. Finally, the war could have been avoided if Germany had been willing to sit back and let these three great Powers divide up Europe, Asia, and Africa between them, and content herself with the crumbs from their table.

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LITTLE over one hundred years ago Poland figured as an item of considerable magnitude in the farreaching military and political calculations of Napoleon. After his fall the representatives of the nations of Europe assembled at the Congress of Vienna could not, for reasons of balance of power, agree to a complete obliteration of the once powerful nation, extending in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries "from sea to sea," from the Baltic to the Black. The shadow of the Corsican once more appearing on the Continent of Europe hastened their final decision. Poland ceased to exist as a free nation, with the exception of the city of Cracow, which was proclaimed an independent republic.

The three nations abutting on Poland, which, by their unholy alliance and a long series of shameless acts of perfidy, treachery, and bad faith, brought about her complete annihilation, agreed at the Congress (1) to retain the fundamental national institutions of the Poles and guarantee them a political representation, and (2) not to restrict by tariffs or special regulations the free com mercial intercourse among the Poles of the three sections.

At the end of May, 1815, the Polish eagles were substituted by a coat of arms of the Great Duchy of Posen, a collective name of all the province that fell to Prussia's share, King Friedrich Wilhelm in his manifesto to the people said: "Though incorporated into Prussia, you need not renounce your nationality. You shall preserve your rights under the constitution which I intend to grant to

my loyal subjects, and in addition you will receive, like the other provinces of my kingdom, a separate provincial constitution."

How none of the three Powers kept their agreements and what a woeful succession of events Polish political history of the last hundred years presents is, in a general way, known to all who have even a most cursory knowledge of history. All of the constitutional guarantees were disregarded, all the vestiges of the old republican organizations were trampled under the militaristic foot of the plunderers, systematic and severe economic and social oppression was instituted, and the pernicious work of crushing the language and traditions of the people began. In addition, divide et impera became the internal policy of Austria and Russia. To grow the seed of hatred between the landowner and the peasant, Austria made the former responsible for the taxes and military conscription of the latter. By these indirect as well as direct means she succeeded in bringing about the outrageous slaughter of the landed gentry by the peasants in 1846. To crush the revolution of 1863 Russia, stealing the wind out of the sails of the revolutionaries, emancipated the Polish serfs, and, securing thereby their sympathies, drenched in blood the almost successful attempt of the Poles to free themselves from the most barbarous Russian oppression, which began towards the end of the reign of Alexander I, and which has not ceased for a moment to this day. In the year 1914 A.D. an attempt to teach an illiterate adult to read and write or instruct free of charge a child of poor