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action adopted American appeared appointed arms army attack attempt attended body British called camp carry cause character circumstances citizens Colonel Commander in Chief communicated conduct confidence Congress consequence Constitution danger detachment determined directed duty effect enemy engaged establish event execution exertions expected expressed favourable feelings field force formed France French friends give ground honour hope House hundred immediately important influence interest Island land letter liberty manner means measures ment military militia mind nature necessary never New-York object observed occasion officers operations opinion orders party passed peace period person possession present President provisions publick reason received rendered resolution respect river secure Senate situation soldiers soon spirit success taken thing thousand tion treaty troops United WASHINGTON whole wish
第 187 頁 - It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it ; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend...
第 184 頁 - Can it be that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impossible by its vices?
第 183 頁 - As a very important source of strength and security, cherish public credit. One method of preserving it is to use it as sparingly as possible ; avoiding occasions of expense by cultivating peace, but remembering also that timely disbursements to prepare for danger, frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it...
第 178 頁 - The very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish government, presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the established government. All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency.
第 187 頁 - Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation ? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground ? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?
第 186 頁 - The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible.
第 190 頁 - I anticipate, with pleasing expectation, that retreat in which I promise myself to realize, without alloy, the sweet enjoyment. of partaking, in the midst of my fellow-citizens, the benign influence of good laws under a free government — the ever favourite object of my heart — and the happy reward, as I trust, of our mutual cares, labours, and dangers.
第 180 頁 - Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party, generally. THIS spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed ; but in those of the popular form, it is seen in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy.
第 182 頁 - If in the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation, for though this in one instance may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time...