to General Franklin as to the route he was to follow. General Barnard then received full instructions for posting the troops as they arrived. I then returned to Haxall's, and again left for Malvern soon after daybreak. Accompanied by several general officers, I once more made the entire circuit of the position and then returned to Haxall's, whence I went with Captain Rodgers to select the final location for the army and its depots. I returned to Malvern before the serious fighting commenced, and after riding along the lines, and seeing most cause to feel anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity."

BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL.

"The position selected for resisting the further advance of the enemy on the first of July, was with the left and centre of our lines resting on Malvern Hill, while the right curved backward through a wooded country towards a point below Haxall's, on James river. Malvern Hill is an elevated plateau, about a mile and a half by three-fourths of a mile in area, wèll cleared of timber, and with several converging roads running over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, and the ground slopes gradually toward the north and east to the woodland, giving clear ranges for artillery in those directions. Towards the northwest the plateau falls off more abruptly into a ravine which extends to James river. From the position of the enemy, his most obvious lines of attack would come from the direction of Richmond and White Oak swamp, and would almost of necessity strike us upon our left wing. Here, therefore, the lines were strengthened by massing the troops and collecting the principal part of the artillery. Porter's corps held the left of the line-Sykes' division on the left, Morrell's on the right, with the artillery of his two divisions advantageously posted, and the artillery of the reserve so disposed on the high ground that a concentrated fire of some sixty guns could be brought to bear on any point in his front or left. Colonel Tyler also had, with great exertion, succeeded in getting ten of his siege-guns in position on the highest point of the hill. Couch's division was placed on the right of Porter; next came Kearney and Hooker; next Sedgwick and Richardson; next Smith and Slocum, then the remainder of Keyes' corps, extending by a backwood curve nearly to the river. The Pennsylvania Reserve corps was held in reserve, and stationed behind Porter's and Couch's position. One brigade of Porter's was thrown to the left, on the low ground, to protect that flank from any movement direct from the Richmond road. The line was very strong along the whole front of the open plateau, but from thence to the extreme right, the troops were more deployed. This formation was imperative, as an attack would probably be made upon our left. The right was rendered as secure as possible by slashing the timber, and by barricading the roads. Commodore Rodgers, commanding

the flotilla on James river, placed his gunboats so as to protect our flank and to command the approaches from Richmond. Between 9 and 10 A.M., the enemy commenced feeling along our whole left wing with his artillery and skirmishers, as far to the right as Hooker's division. About two o'clock a column of the enemy was observed moving towards our right, within the skirt of woods in front of Heintzelman's corps, but beyond the range of our artillery. Arrangements were at once made to meet the anticipated attack in that quarter; but though the column was long, occupying more than two hours in passing, it disappeared and was not again heard of. The presumption is, that it retired by the rear and participated in the attack afterwards made on our left. About 3 P.M., a heavy fire of artillery opened on Kearney's left and Couch's division, speedily followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on Couch's front. The artillery was replied to with good effect by our own, and the infantry of Couch's division remained lying on the ground until the advancing column was within short musket-range, when they sprang to their feet and poured in a deadly volley, which entirely broke the attacking force, and drove them in disorder back over their own ground. This advantage was followed up until we had advanced the right of our lines some seven or eight hundred yards, and rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving us a stronger position and a better fire. Shortly after 4 o'clock, the firing ceased along the whole front, but no disposition was evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw from the field. Caldwell's brigade, having been detached from Richardson's division, was stationed upon Couch's right by General Porter, to whom he had been ordered to report. The whole line was surveyed by the General, and every thing held in readiness to meet the coming attack. At 6 o'clock the enemy suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter with the whole strength of his artillery, and at once began pushing forward his columns of attack, to carry the hill. Brigade after brigade formed under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open space and charge our batteries, but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, in every case sent them reeling back to shelter, and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. In several instances our, infantry withheld their fire, until the attacking column, which rushed through the storm of cannister and shell from our artillery, had reached within a few yards of our lines. They then poured in a single volley, and dashed forward with the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, and driving the routed columns in confusion from the field. About 7 o'clock, as fresh troops were accumulating in front of Porter and Couch, Meagher and Sickels were sent with their brigades as soon as it was considered prudent to withdraw any portion of Sumner's and Heintzelman's troops, to reinforce that part of the line, and

hold the position. These brigades relieved such regiments of Porter's Corps and Couch's division, as had expended their ammunition, and batteries from the reserve were pushed forward to replace those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the enemy persisted in his efforts to take the position so tenaciously defended, but despite his vastly superior numbers, his repeated and desperate attacks were repulsed with fearful loss, and darkuess ended the battle of Malvern Hill, though it was not until after nine o'clock that the artillery ceased its fire. During the whole battle, Commodore Rodgers added greatly to the discomfiture of the enemy, by throwing shell among his reserves and advancing columns. As the army, in its movement from the Chickahominy to Harrison's Landing, was continually occupied in marching by night and fighting by day, its commanders found no time or opportunity for collecting data which would enable them to give exact returns of casualties in each engagement. The aggregate of our entire losses from the 26th of June to the 1st of July, inclusive, was ascertained after arriving at Harrison's Landing, to be as follows:

List of killed, wounded and missing in the Army of the Potomac, from the 26th of June to the 1st of July, 1862, inclusive. Killed. Wounded. Missing.

Corps.

1. McCall's division..

Agg.

3,074

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WHY HARRISON'S LANDING WAS SELECTED. Although the result of the battle of Malvern was a complete victory, it was nevertheless necessary to fall back still further, in order to reach a point where our supplies could be brought to us with certainty. As before stated, in the opinion of Captain Rodgers, commanding the gunboat flotilla, this could only be done below City Point. Concurring in his opinion, I selected Harrison's bar as the new position of the army. The exhaustion of our supplies of food, forage and ammunition, made it imperative to reach the transports immediately. The greater portion of the transportation of the army having been started for Harrison's Landing during the night of the 30th of June and the 1st of July, the order for the movement of the troops wa at once issued upon the final repulse of the enemy at Malvern Hill. The order prescribed a movement by the left and rear,

General Keyes's corps to cover the manœuvre. It was not carried out in detail as regards the divisions on the left, the roads being somewhat blocked by the rear of our trains. Porter and Couch were not able to move out as early as had been anticipated, and Porter found it necessary to place a rear-guard between his command and the enemy. Colonel Averill, of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, was entrusted with this delicate duty. He had under his command his own regiment, and Licutenant-Colonel Buchanan's brigade of regular infantry and one battery. By a judicious use of the resources at his command, he deceived the enemy, so as to cover the withdrawal of the left wing without being attacked, remaining himself on the previous day's battle-field until about seven o'clock of the 2d of July. Meantime General Keyes, having received his orders, commenced vigorous preparations for covering the movement of the entire ariny and protecting the trains. It being evident that the immense number of wagons and artillery-carriages pertaining to the army could not move with celerity along a single road, General Keyes took advantage of every accident of the ground to open new avenues and to facilitate the movement. He made preparations for obstructing the roads after the army had passed, so as to prevent any rapid pursuit, destroying effectually Turkey Bridge on the main road, and rendering other roads and approaches temporarily impassible by felling trees across them. He kept the trains well closed-up and directed the march so that the troops could move on each side of the roads, not obstructing the passage, but being in good position to repel an attack from any quarter. His dispositions were so successful that, to use his own words: 'I do not think more vehicles or more public property were abandoned on the march from Turkey Bridge than would have been left in the same state of the roads, if the army had been moving toward the enemy instead of away from him. And when it is understood that the carriages and teams belonging to this army, stretched out in one line, would extend not far from forty miles, the energy and caution necessary for their safe withdrawal from the presence of an enemy vastly superior in numbers will be appreciated.' The last of the wagons did not reach the site selected at Harrison's bar until after dark on the 3d of July, and the rear-guard did not move into their camp until every thing was secure. The enemy followed up with a small force, and on the 3d threw a few shells at the rear-guard, but were quickly dispersed by our batteries and the fire of the gunboats. Great credit must be awarded to General Keyes for the skill and energy which characterized his performance of the important and delicate duties entrusted to his charge. High praise is also due to the officers and men of the First Connecticut Artilery, Colonel Tyler, for the manner in which they withdrew all the heavy guns during the seven days, and from Malvern Hill. Owing to the crowded state of the roads, the teams could not be brought within a couple of miles of the position; but these

energetic soldiers removed the guns by hand for that distance, leaving nothing behind.

"On the 1st of July I received the following from the Presi dent:

"WASHINGTON, July 1st, 1862-3.30 P.M.

"Major-General GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN :

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"It is impossible to reinforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men, we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security; and wait, rest and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fortress Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it out. "A. LINCOLN."

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"In the despatch from the President to me, on the 2d of July, he says:

"If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to. Try just now to save the army material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The Governors of eighteen (18) States offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which I accept.'"

"On the 3d of July, the following kind despatch was received from the President:

"WASHINGTON, July 3d, 1862-3 P.M. "Major-General GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN:

"Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just received. I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it. "A. LINCOLN.'"

HIS ADDRESS TO THE ARMY.

On the fourth of July the following address was issued to the troops:

"HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR "HARRISON'S LANDING, July 4th, 1862.

"SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC:-Your achieve ments of the last ten days have illustrated the valor and en. durance of the American soldier. Attacked by superior forces, and without hope of reinforcements, you have succeeded in changing your base of operations by a flank movement, always regarded as the most hazardous of military expedients. You have saved all your material, all your trains and all your guns,