you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

"I may be on the brink of eternity, and, as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity toward you and from love for my country.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

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GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, "Major-General, Commanding"

MORE OFFICIAL DESPATCHES.

During the period that the army was encamped at Harrison's Landing, the following despatches among others passed between the Commanding General and the Washington authorities:

FROM GENERAL MCCLELLAN.

"BERKELEY, July 11th, 1862.-3 P.M.-We are very strong here now so far as defensive is concerned. Hope you will soon make us strong enough to advance and try it again."

SAME, July 12th-Men resting well, but begining to be impatient for another fight. I am more and more convinced that this army ought not to be withdrawn from here, but promptly reinforced and thrown again upon Richmond. If we have a little more than half a chance, we can take it. I dread the effects of any retreat upon the morale of the men."

“SAME, July 17th.—It appears, manifestly, to be our policy to concentrate here every thing we can possibly spare from less important points, to make sure of crushing the enemy at Richmond, which seems clearly to be the most important point in Rebeldom. Nothing should be left to chance here. I would recommend that General Burnside, with all his troops, be ordered to this army, to enable it to assume the offensive as soon as possible."

SAME, July 18th.-Am anxious to have determination of Government that no time may be lost in preparing for it. Hours are very precious now, and perfect unity of action necessary."

"SAME, July 28th.-Reinforcements reaching Richmond from South. My opinion is more and more firm that here is the defence of Washington, and that I should be at once reinforced by all available troops, to enable me to advance. Retreat would be disastrous to the army and the cause. I am confident of that."

'SAME, July 30th.-I hope that it may soon be decided what is to be done by this army, and that the decision may be to reinforce it at once. We are losing much valuable time, and that at a moment when energy and decision are sadly needed."

After giving an account of the affair at Coggin's Point, where the enemy planted light batteries and annoyed our right flank by firing across the river, a telegram to General Halleck, dated August 2d, says:

"Sent party across river yesterday to the Coles house, destroyed it and cut down the timber; will complete work to-day, and also send party to Coggin's Point, which I will probably occupy. I will attend to your telegraph about pressing at once; will send Hooker out. Give me Burnside and I will stir these people up. I need more cavalry."

"SAME, August 3d.-A few thousand more men would place us in condition at least to annoy and disconcert the enemy very much."

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL MCCLELLAN.

"WASHINGTON, July 30th.-A despatch just received from General Pope says that deserters report that the enemy is moving south of James river, and that the force in Richmond is very small. I suggest he be pressed in that direction, so as to ascertain the facts of the case."

"SAME, July 30th.-In order to enable you to move in any direction, it is necessary to relieve you of your sick. The Surgeon-General has therefore been directed to make arrangements for them at other places, and the Quartermaster-General to provide transportation. I hope you will send them away as quickly as possible, and advise me of their removal."

To carry out General Halleck's first order, of July 30th, it was necessary first to gain possession of Malvern Hill, which was occupied by the enemy, apparently in some little force, and controlled the direct approach to Richmond. Its temporary occupation, at least, was equally necessary in the event of a movement upon Petersburg, or even the abandonment of the Peninsula. It appears that Hooker failed in the first movement on Malvern Hill, in consequence of the incompetency of guides, but that on August 5th he succeeded.

At an early hour of the morning of August 1st, the rebels opened upon our encampments at Harrison's Landing with batteries in position on the other side of the river, but after a brisk fire from our land batteries and the guns of the fleet, the enemy's cannon were silenced.

On the second, General Halleck telegraphed to General McClellan as follows:

"August 2.-You have not answered my telegram of July 30th, about the removal of your sick. Remove them as rapidly as posBible, and telegraph me when they will be out of your way. The President wishes an answer as early as possible."

GENERAL MCCLELLAN TO GENERAL HALLECK.

August 3.-Answer already sent. It is impossible for me to decide what cases to send off, unless I know what is to be done with this army. Were the disastrous measures of retreat adopted, all the sick who cannot march and fight should be despatched by water. Should the army advance, many of the sick could be of service at the depot. If it is to remain here any length of time, the question assumes still a different phase. If I am kept longer in ignorance of what is to be effected, I cannot be expected to accomplish the object in view. In the meantime I will do all in my power to carry out what I conceive to be your wishes."

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL MCCLELLAN.

“August 3.—It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Acquia Creek. You will take immediate measures to effect this, covering the movement the best you can. Its real object and withdrawal should be concealed even from your own officers. The entire execution of the movement is left to your discretion and judgment. You will leave such forces as you may deem proper at Fortress Monroe, Norfolk, and other places, which we must occupy."

GENERAL MCCLELLAN PROTESTS AGAINST

LEAVING THE PENINSULA.

Although firmly impressed with the conviction that the withdrawal of the army from Harrison's Landing, where its communications had been made secure by the co-operation of the gunboats, would have at that time the most disastrous effect upon the cause, he proceeded to obey the order. He however on the fourth addressed the following to General Halleck :

"HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, BERKELEY, August 4, 1862.-12 м. "Your telegram of last evening is received. I must confess that it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Acquia creek will prove disastrous to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movemer. as this, and while they are in

progress, I beg that careful consideration may be given to my

statements.

"This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a debouche on both banks of the James river, so that we are free to act in any direction; and with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider our communications as now secure.

"We are twenty-five (25) miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have marched fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) miles, which brings us practically within ten (10) miles of Richmond. Our longest line of land transportation would be from this point twenty-five (25) miles, but with the aid of the gunboats we can supply the army by water during its advance, certainly to within twelve (12) miles of Richmond.

“At Acquia creek we would be seventy-five (75) miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the way.

"From here to Fortress Monroe is a march of about seventy (70) miles, for I regard it as impracticable to withdraw this army and its material, except by land.

The result of the movement would thus be a march of one hundred and forty-five (145) miles, to reach a point now only twenty-five (25) miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aid of the gunboats and water transportation.

"Add to this the certain demoralization of this army which would ensue, the terrible depressing effect upon the people of the north, and the strong probability that it would influence foreign powers to recognize our adversaries; and these appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge in the strongest terms afforded by our language, that this order may be rescinded, and that far from recalling this army, it may be promptly reinforced to enable it to resume the offensive.

"It may be said that there are no reinforcements available. I point to Burnside's force; to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry; to those portions of the army of the west not required for a strict defensive there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion; it is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation.

"All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here; a decided victory here, and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere; here is the true defence of Washington; it is here, on the banks of the James, that the fate of the Union should be decided.

"Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that I hae ever been, and still am, actuated solely by the love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives

have influenced me from the commencement of this war, I do now, what I never did in my life before, I entreat that this order may be rescinded.

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If my counsel does not prevail, I will with a sad heart obey your orders to the utmost of my power, directing to the movement, which I clearly foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess. Whatever the result may be and may God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings-I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to avert disaster from my country.

"GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, "Major-General Commanding.

"Major-General H. W. HALLECK,

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Commanding United States Army.”

This produced the following despatch and letter from General Halleck :

"WASHINGTON, August 5th, 1862—12 M. "You cannot regret the order of the withdrawal more than I did the necessity of giving it. It will not be rescinded, and you will be expected to execute it with all possible promptness. It is believed that it can be done now without serious danger. This may not be so, if there should be any delay. I will write you my views more fully by mail. "H. W. HALLECK, Major General, Commanding United States Army. "Major-General G. B. MCCLELLAN."

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LETTER FROM GENERAL HALLECK.

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HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, August 5th, 1862.

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"GENERAL :-Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I immediately telegraphed a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail.

"You, General, certainly could not have been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here, but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal interview. And even after that interview, I tried every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it.

"I assure you, General, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but one that caused me more anxious thoughts than any other of my life. But after full and mature consideration of all the pros and cons, I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion

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