chine Co. v. Toohey. (p. 188), in which the Supreme Court of New York annulled an injunction against a strike to compel the reinstatement of a discharged member. There was picketing, but no acts of violence or threats were indulged in, and the court held that under the law as construed in that State a union may rightfully strike to secure the reemployment of a member whom they regard as having been improperly discharged. It may be noted that in this case the court emphasizes the supposed protection of the right of picketing by the Clayton Act, a position that is not borne out by the construction of that act by Chief Justice Taft in American Steel Foundries v. TriCity Central Trades Council (p. 181). A third case based on reinstatement was also passed upon by the Supreme Court of New York, involving the right of workmen to demand the reinstatement of their entire force, when the employer required the services of but a minor fraction. (Benito Rovira Co. (Inc.) v. Yampolsky, p. 190.) The attempt to interfere with the general conduct of business in this manner was held to be illegal, and an injunction was awarded. No right exists on the part of employees or former employees, or of an association with which they may be affiliated to compel the continuance of a business against the proprietor's wish. (Welinsky v. Hillman, p. 196.)

Conflicting interpretations of the Clayton Act led to the refusal and subsequent issue of an injunction by a United States district court and a circuit court of appeals, respectively. Telephone companies operating under a contract with their employees which established an open-shop basis were called upon during the life of the contract to adopt the check-off system, by which the dues of their employees who were members of unions should be turned over to the union by the employer. The district court regarded the resultant strike as properly subject to an injunction, except for the presumed prohibitions of the Clayton Act. Upon appeal, however, the circuit court of appeals found the dispute not one between the employees proper and the companies, and directed the issue of an injunction, basing its action on decisions of the Supreme Court. (Kinloch Telephone Co. v. Local Union, p. 171.)

Perhaps the most important decision in this field for some years is one by the Supreme Court of the United States construing the socalled Clayton Act in its application to the issue of injunctions. (American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, p. 181.) The case was one of long standing, the difficulty dating from April, 1914, when, owing to depressed business conditions, the mill resumed employment after a shutdown with a reduced working force and reduced wages. Violence characterized the acts of picketers who undertook to make effective the strike that ensued, and an injunction was issued by the district court. The circuit court of appeals modi

fied this in certain respects, and the case was taken to the Supreme Court. Here the modification was again modified, and picketing was restricted to a form that would permit only the securing of information and acts of persuasion by a single representative at each point of ingress or egress, without abuse or threats or the following of any unwilling listener. It was pointed out in this case that Congress had "carefully refrained" from the use of the term "picketing" in the Clayton Act.

The right of employees under individual contracts, and of their employers, to be free from interference in their relations and a continuance of their employment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. (United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. Fitzgerald, p. 177.) There was no dispute as to the general conditions of labor, including wages and hours, but a demand for a "collective bargain." The court pointed out that a coerced bargain was not a bargain at law, and that mass picketing and the use of intimidating language were illegal, as was the strike itself, so that the State statute allowing peaceful persuasion had no application, and the issue of an injunction was affirmed.

Emphasizing the doctrine that the right to continue his business is a property right under the Clayton Act, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals sustained a permanent injunction forbidding all picketing in a case of long-standing interference by unlawful means with the business of the plaintiff. (Quinlivan v. Dial-Overland Co., p. 176.) It was pointed out that the strike proper had long ceased to exist, the places of strikers having been filled, and the disturbers being without status entitling them to consideration as in any way related to the industry. This latter point was held to be decisive in a case before the United States District Court, in which railroad employees had broken the employment relation, and subsequently claimed the right to be held as employees. The court ruled that this could not be done, as when the contract was abandoned all rights under it were likewise abandoned. (Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Atlanta, B. & A. R. Co., p. 166.) The strike was orderly, and without bitterness, but the right of reemployment was held to be nonexistent so far as any demand or preference over empolyees taken in to fill the deserted places was concerned.

Involving the same principles as the foregoing is a case decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia (McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., p. 173) in which striking employees had been superseded by nonunion workers who had made individual contracts to the effect that their employment would cease if they became members of the union. An injunction issued by the court below was affirmed, the court holding that the persuasion attempted had gone beyond the proper limits,

and further that there was an attempt to interfere with existing contracts. In Densten Hair Co. v. United Leather Workers' International Union (p. 174), it was found that a substantial working force had come into existence at the termination of a brief shutdown which anticipated a strike that had been decided upon by the former employees. Under the circumstances all picketing was held enjoinable, the evidence showing that acts of violence and intimidation had been indulged in following the resumption of work.

In view of the foregoing decisions it would follow as a matter of course that where strikers employed outside agents to conduct a campaign of violence they would be subject to liability. Thus in People v. Raymond (p. 147), the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed a conviction for conspiracy where officers and members of a barbers' union were found to have employed bomb throwers and window smashers in an endeavor to compel the renewal of a working agreement with the employers' union.

Likewise going outside the field of employment relation was the situation that arose in the case of City of Duquesne v. Fincke (p. 201), decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The point in issue was the right of strikers to assemble in street meetings for a discussion of their grievances. An ordinance of the city of Duquesne directed that a permit be procured before any street meeting could be held, and on the failure of the mayor to respond to a request, a meeting was held, the leaders claiming a right so to act as a constitutional privilege. The supreme court rejected this contention.

MONOPOLY.

The prolonged struggle to secure the unionization of West Virginia mines gave rise to a case passed upon by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, in which charges of conspiracy and monopoly were brought. (Gasaway v. Border Line Coal Corp., p. 141.) The case involved the legality of a check-off system, so called, by which funds were procured for the maintenance of the campaign for unionizing the coal-mine area of West Virginia. A broad injunction was issued by the district court, but on appeal this was recast so as to limit the effect of the injunction to the actual parties to the proceeding and to the immediate acts set forth in the bill and affidavits. A request that the United Mine Workers be dissolved as a seditious organization was rejected by both the district and circuit courts.

Two cases under this head relate to an association of bill posters. In one of these the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York found that the plaintiffs had no cause of action in the circumstances set forth because there was no clear showing of injury to them, though the plan of the association

was such as would constitute a violation of the Federal antitrust law. (Sullivan v. Associated Bill Posters and Distributors, p. 146.) Likewise unsuccessful was the plaintiff in Chas. A. Ramsey Co. v. Associated Bill Posters (p. 144) in a case before the Circuit Court of Appeals. It was shown that the association was not itself engaged in business, but was made up of members who conduct their business according to the rules adopted. There was no direct effect upon interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman Act, and no combination alleged that would be unlawful at common law.

The situation is otherwise when interstate commerce is directly affected by the refusal of unions to handle nonunion goods. A combination of longshoremen and steamship companies interfering with the transportation of export lumber was held to violate both the shipping act and the Criminal Code of the United States. (Burgess Bros. Co. (Inc.) v. Stewart, p. 139.)

Another case involving interstate commerce, but in another aspect, was one in which it was held that the prevention of the manufacture of goods customarily shipped, for the most part, in interstate commerce, was a restraint of trade condemned by the Federal antitrust law. (Herket & Meisel Trunk Co. v. United Leather Workers, p. 154.) A local monopoly was condemned in Brescia Construction Co. v. Stone Masons' Contractors' Association (p. 138), the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, granting an injunction where a contractor has been cut off from his labor supply as a result of an agreement between the unions and an employers' association.

RULES OF UNIONS.

As a general proposition the rights of members are determined by the rules adopted by the unions. However, in Burke v. Monumental Division, No. 52, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (p. 160), the United States District Court for Maryland granted a mandatory injunction restoring to membership the plaintiff who had been expelled for the exercise of a constitutional right. A similar result followed the appeal to the courts of Pennsylvania for reinstatement where the expulsion of a member followed his exercise of the right of petition with regard to legislation. (Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge No. 665, p. 162.) It was claimed that the right to petition was controlled by the union of which Spayd was a member, but the court disallowed this contention. It was also pointed out that the plaintiff had substantial property rights which they could not compel him to forfeit without due procedure and substantial grounds of action.

The relation of a local union and a federation of unions was considered by the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, in

Kunze v. Weber (p. 152). In this case a local union preferred charges against its president and suspended him, giving notice of a hearing. He then appealed to the president of the federation, who undertook to take charge of the situation, forbidding the local officials to act. The local officials then sought and obtained an injunction against such interference on the ground that the local had acted in accordance with its by-laws, and that no arbitrary interference by the officers of the federation could supersede the procedure provided for by the constitution and by-laws of the union.

The protection of the rights of members of unions by statute has been attempted in a number of States, by laws proposing to secure members of unions against discharge by reason of their membership. These laws have with great uniformity been declared unconstitutional, and such was the finding of the Supreme Court of Colorado in People v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (p. 160) in passing upon the socalled anticoercion act of the State (ch. 5, Laws of 1911).

PICKETING.

Many of the cases above noted discuss picketing as a feature of strike activities. In the two cases here noted there was no strike, but picketing was engaged in for the purpose of interfering with the conduct of business by nonunion employees. In Cyrus Currier & Sons v. International Molders (p. 156) there had been a strike in 1917, but an injunction had stopped picketing, and work had been resumed on the open-shop plan, employees being under contract not to join the union. The Court of Chancery of New Jersey granted an injunction to prevent picketing engaged in for the purpose of securing the defection of workers and violation of their contracts, threats of violence and actual violence being indulged in. The court in this case pointed out the reciprocal rights and privileges of employers and employees, and although granting the injunction, suggested that the employers' movement against organized labor was extending an invitation to the unions to ask for legal protection such as the employers themselves were seeking in the present case.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had before it a case involving much the same principles, with the additional feature of a secondary boycott. (Parker Paint & Wall Paper Co. v. Local Union No. 813, p. 158.) The company named had been a member of an employers' association, which had formerly been in contract relations with the union. This had been disrupted and nonunion workers had been employed. Picketing establishments employing the master painters, and boycotting their business, were held to be enjoinable on two counts, one an attempt to procure a breach of contract, and the other a secondary boycott.