Then taking up the rehabilitation law, the court said:

The attack upon this law is formulated in this manner: The whole chapter (the rehabilitation law) is built around section 1210. This is void, because based on the acceptance of the Federal statute, and the whole act falls with section 1210.

This position is untenable. In the sections of the chapter prior to section 1210 funds in this State are provided. The uses to which these funds are put are defined, and a board is appointed for administering these funds, in compliance with the instructions in the statute. Here is a complete act, entirely separable from section 1210, maintainable and operative without it, and I can conceive no reason why the legislature would not have wished the statute to be enforced with section 1210 rejected.

We conclude that chapter 760, Laws of 1920, without section 1210 thereof, provides a complete and valid law for raising a rehabilitation fund in this State and administering that fund for the purpose therein declared; that section 1210 provides for acceptance and administration of the Federal fund only, in accordance with the act of Congress; and that such provision does not offend against our constitution and is valid.

The award should be affirmed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DECEDENT WITHOUT BENEFICIARIESPAYMENT TO SECOND INJURY FUND-CONSTITUTIONALITY-Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Supreme Court of Utah (June 11, 1921), 199 Pacific Reporter, page 152.-Proceedings were brought under the workmen's compensation law by the father and mother of Asa H. Hancock, who was accidentally killed in the course of his employment as a member of the fire department of Salt Lake City. The industrial commission found that Salt Lake City was an employer and self-insurer, and that the deceased left no dependents. The commission ordered that the city pay into the State treasury the sum of $750, and reasonable funeral expenses not exceeding the sum of $150. The case was brought to the supreme court, which affirmed the action taken by the commission and held the following provision of law constitutional:

If there be no dependents, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased, as provided herein, and shall pay into the State treasury the sum of $750, unless the employer is insured in the State insurance fund. Such payments shall be held in a special fund for the purposes provided in subdivision 6 of this section. The State treasury shall be the custodian of this special fund and the commission shall direct the distribution thereof.

The act provides that the purpose of these payments is to provide a fund to compensate employees suffering a second injury, for the combined consequences of the two injuries.

The court decided that the statute was not a denial of the equal protection of the laws as discriminating in favor of the State insurance fund and the employers insured thereby as against other insurance carriers and employers within the act, that it was not a taking of property without due process of law, and that inasmuch as the State had the power to require all employers to insure in the State insurance fund and not leave it optional, as under the workmen's compensation law, an employer exercising the option of private insurance can not complain of the conditions upon which the option is granted as being unconstitutional because discriminatory.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DEPENDENCY-CHILD LIVING APART FROM DIVORCED FATHER-Stephens v. Stephens et al., Appellate Court of Indiana (November 29, 1921), 132 Northeastern Reporter, page 747.-Shirley Stephens married the mother of Edith Stephens on May 22, 1909. Edith was born in 1910. The parents of Edith were divorced in 1911, and she was placed in the custody of her mother. The mother was granted $100 as alimony and for the support and maintenance of the child, which was paid. For five years after the divorce was granted, Shirley Stephens made no contribution for the support of the child. From 1916 to 1921 he contributed to the support of Edith, but not exceeding $50 per year. While employed by the Essenbee Mines Co., he met his death. Following an application there for an award to Edith Stephens was denied, and she appealed, contending that she must be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon her deceased father. The workmen's compensation act provides:

The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee:

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(c) A child under the age of eighteen years upon the parent with whom he or she is living at the time of the death of such parent.

(d) A child under eighteen years upon the parent with whom he or she may not be living at the time of the death of such parent, but upon whom, at such time, the laws of the State impose the obligation to support such child. (Acts 1919, p. 165.)

The appellate court affirmed the decision of the industrial board denying the claim, using in part the following language:

Appellant contends that there are a number of statutes in this State which impose a legal obligation upon a father to support his minor child, and therefore she was entitled to share in the award of compensation made in this case by reason of the death of her father, as stated in the finding of facts, by virtue of said subdivision (d). We can not agree that the mere fact of the existence of the statutes to which appellant refers imposes an obligation upon a parent to support his child, so as to bring said subdivision (d) into operation

in every instance, where such parent meets his death under such circumstances as to warrant an award of compensation against his employer. If such were the case, there would be no occasion for the limitations found in said subdivisions (c) and (d), but a general provision that every child under the age of 18 years shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon his or her parent, would have sufficed, and no doubt would have been employed. We therefore conclude that the limitations found in said subdivisions are significant.

While it is true, as appellant contends, that the several statutes of our State impose a legal obligation on a father to support his minor child, the existing facts may be such as to so far suspend such obligation that a failure to support such child will create neither a legal nor a criminal liability against him. In such event said subdivision (d) would have no application.

The facts fail to show that the laws of this State imposed any obligation upon said Shirley Stephens to support said appellant, within the meaning of said subdivision (d), at the time he met his death. Circumstances may have existed, notwithstanding such decree and the absence of any modification thereof, under which the law would have imposed such an obligation, but the evidence is not in the record, and its sufficiency to sustain the finding is not challenged.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DEPENDENCY - MEMBER OF HOUSEHOLD ASSUMPTION OF GUARDIANSHIP IN GOOD FAITH-Moore Shipbuilding Corporation et al. v. Industrial Accident Commission et al., Supreme Court of California (February 25, 1921), 196 Pacific Reporter, page 257.-The husband of Lola Miller deserted her shortly before the birth of his child, Ida Miller. Albert Bauer, as a friend, undertook to support the child and sent remittances to her for one year, when Lola Miller came to live with him. They lived in adulterous cohabitation as man and wife. The daughter, Ida Miller, was part of the household and was looked after by Bauer as his own child. In the course of his employment with the Moore Shipbuilding Corporation, Bauer was killed and Lola Miller brought proceedings for compensation for Ida Miller as the total dependent of Bauer. The industrial accident commission granted an award of $3,400, whereupon the employer and its insurer brought a writ of certiorari to the State Supreme Court. In affirming the award of compensation and dismissing the petition, the court said in part:

The power of the legislature to extend the benefits of industrial accident insurance beyond the wage earner himself being recognized it is left to reasonable legislative discretion in the light of the general purposes of these laws to determine what dependents shall become the distributees of the indemnity assessed against the industry, and we do not think we are compelled to look to analogies of the common law, or to the limitations of compensation acts in force at the time our constitutional provision was adopted, to fix the measure of the legislative power thus conferred.

It only remains to determine whether Ida Miller, the claimant here, comes within the terms of the California statute. Section 9, subdivision 11 (1) and (2) of the workmen's compensation act provides that "in case a deceased employee leaves a person or persons wholly dependent upon him for support" such dependents shall be allowed certain indemnity benefits. Section 14 (a) provides that the wife and children under certain conditions are conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent. Section 14 (b) provides that in all other cases the questions of entire or partial dependency and questions as to who constitute dependents, and the extent of their dependency, shall be determined in accordance with the fact, "as the fact may be at the time of the injury to the employee "; 14 (c) provides, that "no person shall be considered a dependent of such employee unless in good faith a member of the family or household of such employee, or unless such person bears to such employee the relation of husband or wife, posthumous child, adopted child, or stepchild, father or mother, father-in-law, mother-in-law, grandfather or grandmother, brother or sister, uncle or aunt, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law, nephew or niece."

The two classifications here, one of persons who are in good faith members of the employee's family or household, and the other of persons having specific relations of kinship, are clearly used in the alternative, and are to be separately considered. As Ida Miller belongs to none of these degrees of relationship, either by birth, marriage, or adoption, we are only concerned with the first division.

There are three vital conditions required to establish dependency in this case under the compensation act: First, was Ida Miller actually dependent upon the decedent for her support; second, was she a member of his family or household; third, was the relation or connection sustained in good faith.

It is true the child was too young to entertain either good or bad faith, but if that is a legal obstacle it would apply as well if she had been taken into the household as a homeless and abandoned waif. We think that Ida Miller was a member in good faith of Bauer's household. The courts should not be called upon to visit the iniquities of the parents upon the children, beyond the penalties inherent under natural law.

The petition is denied.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DEPENDENCY-METHOD OF MEASUREMENT-Harris et ux. v. Calcasieu Long Leaf Lumber Co., Supreme Court of Louisiana (October 31, 1921), 89 Southern Reporter, page 885.-A compensation award was made in favor of the parents of one Harris, who was killed while in the employ of the defendant lumber company. He was under 21 years of age and was the eldest of plaintiff's seven children. His average weekly wages were $26.14, but his contribution to the support of the family was approximately $44 a month. The compensation allowed amounted to 55 per cent of the weekly wages for 300 weeks. The lumber company appealed from the award on the ground that the amount was excessive, as the cost

of maintenance was $22 a month for each of the family of nine, and only one-half of the $44 contributed went to the support of the other members of the family. The supreme court held that the statute arbitrarily fixed the liability at 53 per cent of the weekly wages for 300 weeks if the parents "were actually dependent on the deceased employee to any extent for support.' For this reason the award was affirmed, the extent to which the parents were dependent being held immaterial.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DEPENDENCY-WHEN DETERMINED Employers' Mutual Insurance Co. et al. v. Industrial Commission of Colorado et al., Supreme Court of Colorado (July 5, 1921), 199 Pacific Reporter, page 483.—James A. Powell was killed January 28, 1920, by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. He left minor children, among whom was Beverly L. Powell, who was legally adopted on April 10, 1920, by one Galley, and is now known as Beverly L. Galley. An award was made to all the minor children, including Beverly. The district court affirmed the award. The Employers' Mutual Insurance Co. took the decision to the supreme court for review, claiming that Beverly was not a dependent child, but it was again affirmed, Judge Denison giving a brief decision, in part as follows:

"The question as to who constitute dependents and the extent of the dependency shall be determined as of the date of the accident to the insured employee and the right to death benefits shall become fixed as of said date irrespective of any subsequent change in conditions." [S. L. 1919, c. 210, sec. 57.]

Section 58 prescribes the conditions on which the right to death benefit shall lapse, but the adoption of a minor dependent is not among them.

The arguments that the adopted child has ceased to be dependent, and that he would collect two death benefits at the same time if his adopted father should be killed by accident in the course of employment, would be forceful if addressed to the legislature, but the statute is explicit, and we can not add to or take from it.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DEPENDENCY OF PARENTS-TESTHancock et al. v. Industrial Commission, Supreme Court of Utah (May 5, 1921), 198 Pacific Reporter, page 169.-R. J. Hancock and wife brought proceedings under the workmen's compensation act to obtain compensation for the death of their son. There was an award denying compensation because the facts showed that the deceased was 45 years of age, unmarried, and had boarded away from his parents' home for 10 years; that the parents owned their own home; that he gave them provisions and gifts of money often but not at regular