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with another because that person is distasteful to him, or for any other reason. (Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011.)

While the individual employee may refuse for any cause to continue in the plaintiff's service, the defendants could not conspire and combine to quit and enforce a strike because the plaintiff refused employment to a fellow workman. The plaintiff had the right in law to do what he did, and the combination of employees to bring about a strike for the cause alleged is unlawful in the end it sought, even if no illegal means were used to carry it into effect. (Pickett v. Walsh, supra; Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 69 N. E. 1085.) A strike because a fellow workman is discharged stands on the same ground and is governed by the same principle, and while a body of men may lawfully strike to better their conditions, the mere refusal to continue the employment of one of their number is not such a condition as to justify them in combining to enforce a strike. When Lynch was discharged there was no dispute about wages or hours of labor, the dispute concerning working conditions had been settled to the satisfaction of all the parties; and the only reason for the strike was the discharge of Lynch and the refusal to employ him. As the strike was for an unlawful purpose, it was properly restrained.

Decree affirmed.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS STRIKES RESTRICTION CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-People, by Keyes, Att. Gen. v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 15, et al., Supreme Court of Colorado (April 4, 1921), 201 Pacific Reporter, page 54.—This suit was brought by the people to enjoin coal miners from going out on strike before or during the consideration of their grievances by the industrial commission. The bill was based upon section 30 of chapter 180 of the Acts of 1915, which provides:

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It shall be unlawful for any employer to declare or cause a lockout, or for any employee to go on strike, on account of any dispute prior to or during an investigation, hearing, or arbitration of such dispute by the commission or the board, under the provisions of this act. Provided, that nothing in this act shall prohibit the suspension or discontinuance * any industry or of the working of any persons therein which industry is not affected with a public interest. The defense set up by the miners was that the act violated the provisions of the constitutions of the State of Colorado and the United States. The lower court dismissed the bill, for the reason that coal mining was not an industry "affected with a public interest," and therefore was not within the terms of the act. The people brought the matter before the supreme court, where the judgment of the district court was reversed. Judge Denison in the course of his decision said:

Unless coal mining may be said to be affected with a public interest, its regulation by statutes to the extent attempted by said chapter is unconstitutional. The words "affected with a public interest

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no doubt used by the general assembly to keep the statute within constitutional limits. It becomes necessary, then, not only in order to construe the statute, but to decide whether it is constitutional, to determine whether coal mining is so affected, and it seems self-evident that it is. We must take judicial notice of what has taken place in this and other States, and that the coal industry is vitally related not only to all other industries, but to the health and even the life of the people. Food, shelter, and heat, before all others, are the great necessities of life, and, in modern life, heat means coal.

There is no involuntary servitude under this act. Any individual workman may quit at will for any reason or no reason. There is not even prohibition of strike. The only thing forbidden is a strike before or during the commission's action.

It is objected that section 33 of the act in question, forbidding incitement to lockout or strike, violates article 2, sec. 10, of the State constitution, concerning freedom of speech; but, if the legislature has power to forbid anything, it has power to forbid incitement thereto. See R. S. 1908, sec. 1620, on accessories. The judgment should be reversed.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS-STRIKES-STREET MEETINGS-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCE-PERMITS-City of Duquesne v. Fincke, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (December 31, 1920), 112 Atlantic Reporter, page 130.-A strike was in progress in the city of Duquesne, Pa., and various factions within the ranks of the employees were unable to agree. It was desired to hold a public meeting in the streets to address the workmen in an effort to influence their actions. An ordinance of the city required that before a meeting such as this could be held a permit must first be obtained from the mayor. A permit was applied for, but the mayor, for reasons of his own, refused to take action one way or another, neither refusing nor granting the permit. Fincke accordingly proceeded to hold the meeting notwithstanding the fact he had no permit. He was arrested, charged with a violation of the ordinance, and convicted. From this conviction he appealed, declaring that under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and section 7 of the bill of rights of Pennsylvania he had full legal right to hold the meeting. The conviction was affirmed. The opinion is, in part, as follows:

A strike was on which divided even the workingmen into opposing factions and thus gave to those agitators who are the enemies of all government the opportunity, which they eagerly seized, to stir up strife and disorder by distributing anonymous and seditious pamphlets throughout the city; and hence, as the mayor was responsible for the maintenance of peace and good order, he was justified, if he believed the public good required it, as he says he did, to refuse an open-air meeting at this particular time. This being so, a courteous reply so stating would have removed all just cause of complaint, for

it would have sent the applicant to the courts for redress if he still thought he was being discriminated against. Though not so designed, the failure to reply tended to bring the administration of the law in the city of Duquesne, and through it our entire system of government by law, into disfavor. In all matters our public officials, from the highest to the lowest, but especially the executives of our municipalities with whom the citizens most frequently come in contact, should carefully avoid even the appearance of favoritism lest a semblance of justification should be given to the untrue statement, now too often heard in the centers of population, that our Government (as well as those of the Old World) is being administered for the advantage of the few and not for the benefit of all.

So far as the fourteenth amendment is concerned the Supreme Court of the United States-whose judgments are final in the interpretation of the Federal Constitution-has expressly ruled against the claim now made by appellant, in Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U. S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct. 731.

Our bill of rights no more prevents regulation in the use of the streets than does the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and as these questions were the only ones argued before us we might well close our opinion at this point.

It follows that defendant and those associated with him had no right, upon any ground, to hold a meeting in the streets without a permit. If they thought the city had power to authorize the meeting, but the mayor was acting arbitrarily in refusing the permit, their remedy was not by violating the ordinance, but by mandamus to compel a proper obedience to it, in which proceeding the courts would have overturned "arbitrary and intentional unfair discrimination in the administration of the ordinance."

What has been said covers all the questions within the line of appellant's claim and we only need add, in order to avoid any misunderstanding as to the scope of the opinion, that it is limited to the negation of the contention that he had any constitutional, inherent, or statutory right to hold a meeting in the streets of the city; all other matters which may arise under the statute and ordinance are beside this inquiry and will be determined when, if ever, they reach us on appeal.

LICENSING OF OCCUPATIONS-BARBERS-SYSTEM OF EXAMINATION— CONSTITUTIONALITY-Timmons v. Morris, Sheriff, United States District Court, Western District of Washington (February 14, 1921), 271 Federal Reporter, page 721.-Frank Timmons, who had practiced his trade as barber for 17 years, was imprisoned for practicing without a license. Habeas corpus proceedings were brought against the sheriff to obtain his discharge from such imprisonment. The petition attacked the constitutionality of the law of Washington requiring a person to obtain a license. The law had been upheld in previous cases in the Supreme Court of the State of Washington on the ground that it was a health measure. The board of examiners acting under the statute had made the following system of grading

in examination: Haircut, 24; shaving, 24; cleanliness, 8; razor honing, 12; condition of tools, 8; deportment, 6; time, 10; written examination, 8. Of this system of marking the court said:

If it be conceded that, in this method of examination and scale of rating upon such examination, the written examination provided for has solely to do with matters affecting the public health, and that such regulation was made under that subdivision of section 10 requiring the board to examine and determine whether the applicant had sufficient knowledge concerning the common diseases of the skin to avoid the aggravation and spreading thereof in the practice of his trade, it comes to this: That, in the ratings provided for, only 24 points out of 100 have to do with the public health.

It is possible, under this scale, for a man to pass and be licensed, though he has only got 4 points out of the 24 in those subjects affecting the public health, provided he is excellent in the nonessentials, in so far as health is concerned; while the applicant who is perfect in so far as matters affecting health are concerned, and yet "poor" in deportment, razor honing, and time taken in work-matters that can in no sense be held to touch the public health or safety-would be deprived of the right to practice barbering.

The court held the regulations unconstitutional in the following language:

The effect of the foregoing is not only to aver the unconstitutionality of the statute, but the arbitrary exercise by the board of barber examiners_created by it of the power conferred upon them under the act. Regulations and examinations of the board must be restricted within the limits of that having to do with health and safety; it can not be and it has not been contended that the public morals are affected by such trade.

The court is convinced that, in so far as the practice of barbering is concerned, the public welfare and comfort-outside of, and beyond what is included in its health and safety-are so insignificant as not to lend color to any right claimed under the police power of the State.

It is therefore palpably clear that these regulations have no real or substantial relation to the public health, but are rather designed to defeat those statutory provisions in the barber law for the protection of the public health, to subordinate essentials to nonessentials, and to allow the board scope for purely arbitrary action. Under these regulations, any purpose to protect the public health, manifestly, has become so highly attenuated "that nothing lives 'twixt it and perfect silence."

MINE

REGULATIONS-WASH HOUSE EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR CLOTHING DESTROYED THEREIN-Prince v. King Coal Co., Supreme Court of Oklahoma (February 8, 1921), 198 Pacific Reporter, page 293.-Section 1 of chapter 125 of the Session Laws of Oklahoma for 1913 made it mandatory upon any corporation or company owning or operating or operating as lessee any mine wherein 10 or more min

ers were employed to provide a washhouse. Section 2 of this act provided a penalty for failure to comply with the provisions of section 1. The defendant company supplied a washhouse, but it was destroyed by fire which was negligently permitted to be communicated from a waste dump near by while the miners were in the mine. Clothes to the value of $1,246.42 were destroyed, and by agreement Prince made his case a test of the right to recover. The court below had held that no right of recovery was shown, but the supreme court held that the plaintiff had a good cause of action.

Section 2 of chapter 125 reads:

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No person, corporation or company, its agents, officers or representatives, maintaining such a bathhouse at its mines as required in section 1 hereof, shall be legally liable for the loss or destruction of any property left at or in said bathhouse.

But this provision was held subject to construction in connection with sections 998 and 2845 of the Revised Laws, which respectively provide that:

Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.

Any person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another, may recover from the person in fault a compensation therefor in money, which is called damages.

Judge Johnson in his opinion said that section 2 of chapter 125 "was only intended to grant relief from liability for the loss or destruction of any property left at or in such bathhouse not occasioned through the act or omission of such firm, association, corporation, person, or parties required to perform the duties of maintaining such bathhouse," and did not operate to relieve the company where it had negligently permitted a fire that "destroyed the plaintiff's property situated where it had a right to be.”

STATE ENGAGING IN BUSINESS-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE CEMENT MANUFACTURE-" PUBLIC PURPOSE "-In re Opinion of the Judges, Supreme Court of South Dakota (December 29, 1920), 180 Northwestern Reporter, page 957.-The Legislature of South Dakota passed a law, chapter 324, Acts of 1919, relating to the manufacture, distribution, and sale of cement and cement products by the State. The law authorized the issuance and sale of $250,000 bonds to provide funds for the enterprise. The governor, Peter Norbeck, being in doubt as to the constitutionality of the act and desiring to have this point settled before he issued the bonds, called upon the judges of the

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