We must keep in mind the fact that the act does not give compensation for loss of a member, such as the loss of a limb, but for the loss of earning capacity actually caused by the loss of the limb [citing cases from various States].

That compensation must be based upon a diminution of earning power was clearly recognized by this court in the Denton case, 117 N. E. 520 [Bul. 216, p. 289], wherein it was held that section 31 dealt with injuries from "the standpoint of the consequent permanent disability, and resulting diminution in earning power extending through life."

There was no evidence that the removal of the particular organ mentioned had or would in the slightest degree impair the future usefulness or opportunity of appellee, or that it had or would produce any disability for work, or to work, or a loss of any physical function. Notwithstanding the injury and operation, his earning capacity and every physical function remained unimpaired.

The award of the board is reversed, with directions to modify its findings and award in accordance with this opinion.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITYPARTIAL LOSS OF USE OF HAND-State ex rel. Broderick Co. v. District Court of Ramsey County et al., Supreme Court of Minnesota (Nov. 21, 1919), 174 Northwestern Reporter, page 826.-An employee of the Broderick Co. was injured while at her work. It seems that while feeding a press she in some way got her hand caught in the machinery and mangled so that parts of her little and ring fingers had to be amputated. Infections and poor knittings of the bones served to reduce the usefulness of the hand to the extent of onehalf. Judgment was awarded to the employee for compensation for permanent partial disability and the employer appealed, claiming that the award should have been only for the loss of the two fingers. In affirming the judgment of the court below the following opinion was rendered:

The only question presented by the record is whether the findings of the court to the effect that plaintiff suffered a permanent partial disability are sustained by the evidence. Our examination of the record discloses ample evidence to support the findings. A discussion thereof would serve no useful purpose, and we refrain. While the compensation act makes express provision for the loss of fingers, from the thumb down, it does not necessarily follow therefrom that an injury of the character here disclosed should be treated as a matter of law as the loss of the little and ring fingers only. If the nature of the injury in such a case, taken as a whole, shows by relation a reduction in the power and usefulness of the hand, as well as the injury to and loss of the fingers, the court may, and properly should, find the fact accordingly, for the intent and purpose of the compensation act secures to the injured employee compensation for the disability actually sustained. (State ex rel. Kennedy v. District Court Clay County, 129 Minn. 91, 151 N. W. 530.)

Within the rule guiding us in cases of this character the evidence sustains the findings, and the judgment must be and is affirmed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITYSECOND INJURY-LOSS OF THREE-FOURTHS OF VISION-State ex rel. Melrose Granite Co. et al. v. District Court, Seventh Judicial District et al., Supreme Court of Minnesota (Aug. 8, 1919), 173 Northwestern Reporter, page 857.-Zinken was employed by the Melrose Granite Co. as a stone mason. Previous to this employment Zinken had suffered an injury to his left eye, which had reduced its vision one-half. While working at his occupation for the granite company some mortar was negligently splashed into his face and eyes, burning the latter so badly that the right eye had to be removed and the left eye was so injured that he could no longer work at any occupation. Compensation was awarded to Zinken on the basis of permanent partial disability at the rate of $11 per week for 300 weeks. The employer and its insurer appealed, claiming that compensation should be awarded on the basis of the loss of one eye ($11 for 100 weeks) and the loss of half the other eye ($11 for 50 weeks). In affirming the decision of the lower court in favor of Zinken the court rendered in part the following decision:

The amount of compensation to which Zinken was entitled must be ascertained by referring to the following provisions of the compensation act:

G. S., 1913, page 8209, reading as follows:

"If an employee receive an injury which of itself would only cause permanent partial disability but which, combined with a previous disability, does in fact cause permanent total disability, the employer shall only be liable for the permanent partial disability caused by the subsequent injury."

It was contended in Zinken's behalf, and the court found, that his is a case of permanent partial disability, entitling him to compensation at the rate of $11 per week for 100 weeks for the loss of his right eye and to $5.50 per week for the same period for the injury to his left eye. We are now asked to construe the statute to mean that a workman's eyes are to be valued separately-a good eye, in the case of a man earning the wage of Zinken, at $1,100, and an eye which is only 50 per cent efficient at $550. It would be both narrow and illiberal so to construe it. whereas we have consistently held that it is to be liberally construed in favor of workmen.

His employer is liable for compensation for the permanent partial disability suffered by Zinken, and the court so finds. It is also found that the extent of such disability is equivalent to "75 per cent of the loss of both eyes."

Such loss must of necessity be occasioned by an injury to both eyes which may not wholly destroy either of them or may destroy one and reduce the sight of the other one-half as was the case here.

We conclude, therefore, that compensation in such a case as we have here is not to be made on the basis suggested, but rather under

that clause of the schedule which governs in all cases of permanent partial disability not specifically enumerated in the schedule. Zinken is entitled to 50 per cent of the difference between his wages when injured and the wages he is able to earn in his partially disabled condition, subject to a maximum of $11 per week for not more than 300 weeks.

He has been wholly unable to earn any wages since he was injured, hence he is entitled to $3,300, less $1,100 already paid.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-RAILROAD COMPANIES-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-WATCHMAN-Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission et al., Supreme Court of Illinois (Dec. 17, 1919), 125 Northeastern Reporter, page 378.—Joseph P. Lambert was employed as a watchman by the railroad company. His duties were to guard the property of the company and the property of shippers while it was in the company's yards. Some of his duties were in connection with interstate commerce and some of them were not. Merchandise had been stolen off train No. 98, which was an interstate train, on several occasions, and in an effort to catch the thieves Lambert was sent ahead of the train as it was leaving the company's yards. He hid himself behind a pile of ties to await the arrival of the train. While he was so waiting and before the train arrived he saw two men approaching him carrying sacks filled with coal When he called to them to stop they opened fire on him and killed him. Lambert's widow was awarded compensation under the workmen's compensation act and the employer appealed, claiming that Lambert when killed was engaged in interstate commerce and that recovery must be had, if at all, under the Federal employers' liability act. The court held that the workmen's compensation act applied, rendering a decision from which the following is quoted:

Some of the duties of the deceased had no connection with interstate commerce or its movement and transportation. His duties were to protect his employer's yards and property from thieves, and to catch thieves found in the yards. Not every employee of an interstate carrier is engaged in interstate commerce. The work of the employee must constitute a real and substantial part of the interstate commerce in which the carrier is engaged. (Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Behrens, 233 U. S., 473, 34 Sup. Ct. 646 [Bul. No. 169, p. 91].) Under the stipulation of facts and the decisions referred to deceased was not at the time of his injury engaged in interstate commerce, and the workmen's compensation act applied.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-RECOVERY OF COMPENSATION-RELEASES-PREEXISTING DISEASE-Hines, Director General of Railroads, v. Industrial Accident Commission of California et al., Supreme Court of California (Mar. 4, 1920), 188 Pacific Reporter, page 277.—

Desiderio Dell 'Era applied to the Southern Pacific Co. for employment, and was given a physical examination, where it was discovered that he suffered from a condition which made him extremely susceptible to hernia. Before employing him the company required him to sign a release of his rights under the workmen's compensation act for any disability he might sustain from hernia. This release was in the following form:

"Having submitted myself to an examination by an examining physician of the Southern Pacific Co., with a view of entering the service of that company, it has been found that I have a congenital defect-viz, lax inguinal rings. I have been fully advised and informed concerning such condition, and it has been explained to me that because of such congenital defect a protrusion of the abdominal contents, commonly known as rupture or hernia, may take place at any time, and due wholly to said congenital defect. Realizing this and in consideration of my employment by the Southern Pacific Co. I hereby agree to hold the said company blameless in event of said rupture or hernia so appearing and that I will not apply to said company or its hospital department during my term of service for any operation or treatment therefor, and for the consideration hereinabove expressed I do hereby release the Southern Pacific Co. from any and all claims that may arise on account of rupture or hernia so appearing while in its service.

"It is further understood and agreed that I am not entitled to hospital benefits for the following further disability from which I am now suffering, to wit, chronic affection of tonsils.

"It is further understood and agreed that I am entitled to and will be given hospital benefits for all other disabilities than those I am now subject to, in accordance with the rules and regulations of the hospital department of the said company."

It was held that this release was of no effect under the compensation act, which forbids all contracts waiving rights thereunder. The decision of the court is as follows:

We are satisfied that in view of the provisions of section 27a of the workmen's compensation, insurance, and safety act of 1917 (St. 1917, p. 855) petitioner can not avail himself of the agreement relied on.

The application for a writ of review is denied.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-SECOND INJURY-LOSS OF USE OF HAND-Mark Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, Supreme Court of Illinois (Feb. 20, 1919), 122 Northeastern Reporter, page 84.— Frank P. Criner had his left hand crushed while in the employ of the plaintiff company, resulting in the loss of the use of his hand. Prior to this injury he had sustained an injury to the second finger of his left hand, which necessitated part of it being amputated. The employer has now raised the question whether it must be held

liable for compensation for the loss of the use of the hand or for the loss of the index, third, and fourth fingers. In affirming the judgment of the lower court in allowing an award for the loss of the use of the hand, the court said in part:

Though the defendant in error had previously lost a part of one finger, he had the use of his hand, with a capacity somewhat reduced by reason of the defect. The fact that his hand was not perfect did not render its loss any less complete. As the result of his injury he has totally lost the use of the hand, which he previously had, and under the statute he is entitled to compensation for that loss. (Wabash Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 286 Ill. 194, 121 N. E. 569; In re Branconnier, 223 Mass. 273, 111 N. E. 792 [Bul. No. 224, p. 228]; Schwab v. Emporium Forestry Co., 216 N. Y. 712, 111 N. E. 1099 [Bul. No. 189, p. 288]. The fact that he might have recovered for the first injury did not reduce the amount of compensation to which he is entitled for the loss of the use of his hand.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-SECOND INJURY-PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY-LOSS OF LEG-Wabash Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commission, Supreme Court of Illinois (Dec. 18, 1918), 121 Northeastern Reporter, page 569.-Claude Williams was employed by the Wabash Railway Co. as a watchman for its locomotive shops. Prior to his employment in this capacity he had lost his left arm by amputation near the shoulder. The watchman of the blacksmith shop was not on duty on one occasion and Williams's duties took him to that shop. While returning to the locomotive shop he stumbled over some scrap iron and injured his knee, which became so painful that he had to surrender his keys to another employee and go to the hospital, where he remained over two months. The employee surrendered his keys to the foreman the following morning and informed him of Williams's injury. On June 20, 1916, on the supposition and belief that the injury was cured, Williams signed a release and went back to work. In October his old injury recurred and he was again sent to the hospital, where it was discovered that tuberculosis of the bone had developed and his leg was amputated 6 inches from the hip joint. Williams applied to the industrial commission to have the release agreement reviewed and compensation allowed. The commission granted an award, which on appeal the circuit court modified, allowing $2,400 for total permanent disability and after the payment of that sum a pension of $16 per month for life. The railroad appealed and the court, in affirming the judgment of the circuit court, said in part:

The evidence clearly discloses that the disability of Williams was the result of an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The fact that Williams may have been predisposed to tu