of a statute, and an action for injuries to such child, based upon the common-law.liability of the employer, may be maintained.

All decided cases which we have examined hold that employment when referred to in the workmen's compensation laws means lawful employment. We think that a fair construction of the Indiana workmen's compensation act requires us to hold that in enacting the law with reference to the rights and remedies of employers and employees the legislature referred to legal employment.

In the instant case the appellee was employed in direct violation of sections 8022 and 8022-e of the statutes (Burns, 1914), and, such being the case, the employment was illegal, and he is not embraced within the provisions of the workmen's compensation act, and his action was properly brought.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-MINOR ILLEGALLY EMPLOYED-INSURANCE Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, Supreme Court of California (Feb. 11, 1919), 178 Pacific Reporter, page 858.-This action is a writ of review brought by the Maryland Casualty Co., which was the insurrer of Bronstein & Le Blanc, employers of Frank T. Sharon, a minor of the age of 15 years and 2 months, who was killed while in their employ, against the industrial accident commission to have an award by that body annulled. An agent of the casualty company induced Sharon's employers to agree to insure their workmen's compensation liabilities after calling their attention to the liabilities incurred in employing such young men as Sharon. The policy of insurance which was delivered after but with full knowledge of Sharon's injury and death contained a provision stating that it would cover "such injuries, including death, sustained by an employee legally employed." Bronstein & Le Blanc employed Sharon without his having issued to him and presented to them an age and schooling certificate as required by the childlabor law. The court in annulling the award of the commission in favor of the mother said in part:

Among other places in which employment is prohibited by the provisions of section 1 so referred to is "any manufacturing establishment or workshop," which would include the employment in which the decedent was engaged at the time of his death. It is therefore argued that even though the employment during the hours the schools were in session was illegal without an age and school certificate it was not illegal at the hour in question, for although the schools of the city were in session November 14 they had adjourned before 4.30, and that therefore the decedent was not working" during the hours that the public schools are in session." But the contract of employment was an entirety and required the decedent to work six days in a week during the whole day and while school was in session. The contract was therefore one prohibited by law, and the fact that decedent might have been legally employed after school

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hours on the day in question does not alter the fact that the contract of employment in question was illegal and in violation of the plain terms of the law.

Respondents, however, claim that in construing the child-labor law the court should look to its purposes, and that as the main purpose is to secure the education of the child that purpose had been fully accomplished in the case of Frank T. Sharon by reason of the fact that he had entered a public night school on November 13 and was intending there to continue his education. No consideration of the general purposes of the law would justify a departure from the plain provisions of the law, nor is it true that education was the main consideration entering into the child-labor law. The compulsory school law (Stats. 1905, p. 388, and its amendments, 1907, p. 95; 1911, p. 949; 1915, p. 762) provides for the attendance of all children between 8 and 15 years, with certain exceptions. The age and schooling certificate required by the child-labor law is also required by the compulsory school law, but the main purpose of the child-labor law is, as therein stated, to prohibit children under certain ages from engaging in certain forms of labor. Considerations of public health and safety enter into the general plan as well as matters of education.

There is no significance in the issuance of the policy after the death of the employee, and the cases of fire insurance in which such issuance after a loss have been held to waive certain conditions do not apply to this character of insurance where the policy is a continuing liability even after an accident, nor for the same reason does the acceptance or retention of the premium under the circumstances operate as a waiver.

On the whole, therefore, the contract of employment in violation. of the child-labor law was illegal and not included in the policy of insurance, and there being no waiver or estoppel the petitioner is not liable under the policy for the accident in question.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-MINOR ILLEGALLY EMPLOYED TREBLE COMPENSATION-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-Brenner v. Heruben, Supreme Court of Wisconsin (Feb. 10, 1920), 176 Northwestern Reporter, page 228.-Peter Heruben, a minor under 17 years of age, was employed by Brenner in his restaurant as a helper. While grinding some meat for a Hamburg steak Heruben was injured, and he instituted proceedings for compensation under the workmen's compensation law. He was awarded treble compensation under subsection 6 of section 2394-9 of the statutes, which provides that if a minor under 17 years of age be employed without an employment certificate and is injured his employer shall be held liable to pay compensation under the workmen's compensation act at treble the regular rate. When Heruben was employed he was over 16 years of age and did not need, as the law then stood, an employment certifi cate, but by an amendment (ch. 674, Laws of 1917) the age of minors for whom work certificates must be issued was raised from 14 to 17

years, and Brenner failed to demand the necessary work certificate. He appealed from the award, declaring that the provision of the act allowing treble damages to injured minors without work certificates was unconstitutional and void; but the court affirmed the award and upheld the constitutionality of the provision, although Judge Eschweiler rendered a lengthy dissenting opinion. The decision of the majority of the court is in part as follows:

The argument against its constitutionality runs, in substance, like this: Treble compensation is a penalty and its exaction is in fact the enforcement of a penal or criminal statute, namely, that of the childlabor law, which is not in any way germane to the subject of compensation for industrial accidents. The right to a jury trial for the enforcement of a penalty has never been waived by employers in electing to come in under the workmen's compensation act.

The argument is not without force, and were we to justify the amendment upon common-law principles alone, without reference to the wide departure therefrom made by the workmen's compensation act, the task would not be an easy one. But the question is not whether it is a justifiable common-law scheme, but whether it is fairly germane to, and within the limits of the general scheme of, the workmen's compensation act. If it is, then it is constitutional, for an employer in coming under the act waived his common-law remedies and agreed to be bound by the remedies afforded by the act and all lawful amendments thereto. (Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 169 Wis. 106, 170 N. W. 275, 171 N. W. 935.)

It was not until the enactment of chapter 624, Laws of 1917, that section 2394-7 (4) was amended so as to include a minor of permit age, employed without a permit to become an employee under the act. Previous to that amendment injuries to such minors were not compensable thereunder because not employees within the meaning of the law. When this feature of chapter 624 came up for legislative consideration it presented this question: If injuries to minors of permit age employed without a permit are to be compensable under the workmen's compensation act, under what conditions shall they be made compensable so as not to emasculate one of the purposes of the child labor law? If no civil liability was attached to a violation of section 1728a by employers under the workmen's compensation act, who constitute the great bulk of employers of minors of permit age in this State, then a part at least of the purpose of the child labor law would miscarry.

It was no doubt a consideration of those facts that induced the legislature to permit injuries to minors of permit age employed without a permit in direct violation of the law, to be compensated under the workmen's compensation act upon conditions that treble compensation should be paid. It was within the legislative field to prescribe reasonable conditions for permitting injuries under such employments to be so compensated. Conditions thus prescribed can not be set aside by courts unless so severe as to be confiscatory, or to amount to a denial of due process of law. The condition in question does not come within either class, and must be held lawful.

The classification made by the legislature, if any, is one of employers, not one of minors. It divides them into those who obey the

law and those who violate it. Obviously this clear-cut cleavage is one of substance, and furnishes a good basis for classification. (Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209.)

As before stated, delicts of both employer and employee are recognized by the act, and are made the basis of difference in the amount of compensation granted. No violation of rights is perceived by so doing. A public policy can be effectuated through the workmen's compensation act in connection with other public laws, and especially so where the laws involved are of a cognate nature. We therefore conclude that the amendment is constitutional, and that the judgment must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PERMANENT INJURY-IMPAIRMENT— INJURY WITHOUT LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY-Hercules Powder Co. v. Morris County Court of Common Pleas, Supreme Court of New Jersey (June 24, 1919), 107 Atlantic Reporter, page 433.—An employee of the powder company was injured by an explosion arising out of and in the course of his employment. The nature of his injury was the loss of one of his testicles. The defendant court granted the employee an award under the workmen's compensation act and the powder company brings certiorari on the ground that an injury of this nature is not a "permanent bodily impairment under the compensation law. In affirming the award in favor of the employee the court said in part:

The statute, section 11, concedes the awarded compensation (1) "where the usefulness of the member is permanently impaired, and (2) "where any physical function is permanently impaired." The lower court found that as a result of the injury, the defendant's morale, courage, and marital efficiency were lessened. Whatever view the medical experts may entertain upon that phase of the case, the indisputable fact remains that the injured defendant has suffered the loss of a portion of his anatomy, which nature implanted in the human organism, as a dual reservoir of complete efficiency equally with eyes, ears, and limbs, and that to deprive him of one of these natural attributes is to take from him a component portion of the perfect genus homo, and to that extent at least impair the physical attributes of his manhood. This impairment may not prove to be so conspicuous in the ability to produce wages, in the industrial world, but there are other spheres for the employment of human energy, talents, and the possession of physical attributes besides the industrial world into the activity of which the defendant is entitled to bring, possess, and enjoy all the physical attributes with which nature endowed him.

In harmony with these considerations, it has been held that the sole criterion of a disability, partial in character and permanent in quality, under the statute, is not limited to the loss of earning power. (De Zeng Co. v. Pressey, 86 N. J. Law, 469, 92 Atl. 278, affirmed 96 Atl. 1102 [see Bul. 169, p. 207]; Burbage v. Lee, 87 N. J. Law, 36, 93 Atl. 859.)

Whether, therefore, we consider the physical status of the injured defendant as lessened by the loss of a physical attribute, which serves to constitute the perfect genus homo, or as possessed of a dual entity which in natural and moral law he had a right to retain, as a reserve factor in the cosmic dispensation, the loss he sustained was a permanent impairment of his physical entity under the provisions of our statute and was properly compensated for as such by the award of the common pleas.

The award will be affirmed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PERMANENT INJURY-IMPAIRMENTINJURY WITHOUT LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY-“ DISABILITY ”. Centlivre Beverage Co. v. Ross, Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2 (Nov. 19, 1919), 125 Northeastern Reporter, page 220.-The claimant, Ross, who was employed by the Centlivre Beverage Co., strained himself when he slipped while piling kegs upon an icy floor. He was disabled and could work only with pain and was not able to do a full share of work. He was examined by a physician supplied by the employer who declared that Ross was suffering from an orchitis involving the left testicle. Not having been relieved by the prescriptions of the employer's physician, Ross later went to a physician of his own selection who told him he had varicocele and that it would be necessary to remove one of his testicles, which was done. The workmen's compensation act (Laws of 1915, ch. 106), section 31, makes provisions for compensation for certain injuries specified in clauses a to i. In the last paragraph of the section provision is made in cases of permanent partial disability not covered by clauses a to i. This section is as follows:

"In all other cases of permanent partial disability, including any disfigurement which may impair the future usefulness or opportunity of the injured employee, compensation in lieu of all other compensation shall be paid when and in the amount determined by the industrial board, not to exceed fifty-five per cent of the average weekly wages per week for a period of two hundred weeks."

Compensation was awarded for 100 weeks at $9.95 per week under this provision and the employer appealed. In reversing the award with directions to modify it the court said in part:

The injury which appellee suffered is not one of the specific injuries provided for in subdivisions a to i of said section 31. The last paragraph of said section, heretofore quoted, dealing as it does with injuries coming within its terms from the standpoint of permanent disability and resulting diminution in earning power, and the legislature not having specifically provided for said injury, the fact of disability and the resulting diminution of earning power must be found as a matter of fact, and that finding must be sustained by the evidence in order to sustain an award.