plea that in performing the duties incident to his employment he was also fulfilling a duty to the county.

The award is affirmed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EMPLOYEE-WORKING DIRECTOR OF COMPANY-Miller's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Hoover et al., Court of Civil Appeals of Texas (Nov. 8, 1919), 216 Southwestern Reporter, page 475.-This action was brought by the widow and surviving children of Guy Frank Hoover against the insurer of the G. B. R. Smith Milling Co. for compensation under the workmen's compensation act for the death of the husband and father of the plaintiffs. Guy Frank Hoover was general manager and head miller of the milling company. He was also a director in the corporation. He did not have authority to hire and discharge the employees of the company although occasionally he was permitted to do so, that function being exercised by the president, G. B. R. Smith, who took active part in the management of the business. Hoover was killed while in the performance of his duties as head miller, and upon proceedings being brought therefor the plaintiffs were awarded compensation. The insurer appealed, contending that because Hoover was a director in the corporation he could not at the same time be an employee and therefore recovery was barred under the act by the provisions as amended that "the president, vice presidents, secretary, or other officers and the directors" of corporations which accept the act "shall not be deemed or held to be an employee within the meaning of that term as defined" in the act (article 5246-83, vol. 2. Vernon's 1918 Supp. Civ. & Crim. Stats.). The court affirmed the award, replying to this contention as follows:

* * *

We are unable to agree with the contention. The provisions of the quoted article, which exclude officials of the corporation from participating in the benefits of the act, we are convinced refer to them as such; that is to say, while they are engaged in the performance. of the duties conferred on them by the directors or the by-laws of the corporation. The article purports to deal with them in that respect only. It neither directly nor inferentially denies the right of such officials to have other and different relations with the corporation. Conceivably, and not unnaturally..officers and directors of corporations might be employed in the performance of duties of a character wholly distinct from and unrelated to those ordinarily exercised as such officials. The act as a whole neither denies them the right to serve in the capacity of an ordinary servant or employee, nor denies the corporation the right to engage their services in that particular. If, as matter of fact, they are so otherwise employed, and that the employment is such as to bring them within the definition of "employee" contained in the act, and while so engaged they are injured, they are, in our opinion, entitled to the benefits of the act. What employees or servants are included in the definition, or

what particular test is to be applied to determine that issue, will depend largely upon the facts of each case.

In the present case it is not claimed that Hoover was engaged in the performance of his duties as director when injured. It is, in effect, conceded that his services were such as to raise the ordinary relations of master and servant, as it is also conceded that he was in the employ of the milling company under a contract of hire. Such ' being the facts, and having reached the conclusion that the article excluding corporate officials from the provisions of the act applies to them only as such, it becomes our duty to affirm the judgment of the trial court.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EMPLOYER--"BUSINESS" OWNING AND RENTING HOUSES-Lauzier v. Industrial Accident Commission of California et al., District Court of Appeal of California, Second District (Oct. 22, 1919), 185 Pacific Reporter, page 870.-Clotilde Lauzier was a housekeeper for her son-in-law and daughter, who gave her "board and upkeep" in exchange for her services. She owned four small frame dwellings, the income from which was very meager. The houses were in the care of an agent, who collected the rent and looked after the property. The roof of one of the houses needed repairing, and the agent employed a carpenter to do the work, which consumed one hour and cost 30 cents. While descending from the roof of the house the carpenter fell and sustained injuries, for which the commission awarded him compensation under the act. Mrs. Lauzier claimed that she was not liable under the workmen's compensation act as amended (Stats. 1917, p. 831), and appealed. The award was annulled. The opinion of the court is in part as follows:

It is argued, however, by respondent, in justification of the award made that the amendment to the act made in 1917 worked an extension of the ordinary definition to be applied to the terms “trade or business," and made appropriate the inclusion of conditions which the facts of this case disclose. Particular emphasis is placed upon the amendatory phrases that the words, "trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer," "shall be taken to include any undertaking actually engaged in by him with some degree of regularity. As we interpret that amendment, it is designed to have a clarifying effect only upon the original terms of the enactment. The use of the word "undertaking" we think of itself does not make less applicable the ordinary definition of the word "business," and we believe that that phrase should be read as though the word "business" immediately preceded the word "undertaking." Such seems to us to be the evident and plain meaning. It was no doubt the intention by the amendment to make it clear that the act should cover a business undertaking, whether the same was continually carried on or only engaged in at intervals. We do not intend to intimate it as our opinion that because the principal business of the petitioner was that of housekeeper she might not, still within the meaning of the compensation act, be engaged in other business enterprises. We hold

simply that the mere owning and renting of a house or houses by an individual for purposes of investment, conceding that such owner has no particular or principal business, does not come within the purview of the act.

The findings and award of the respondent commission are annulled. .

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE OF CITY CONTRACTOR-City of Milwaukee v. Fera et al., Supreme Court of Wisconsin (Dec. 2, 1919), 174 Northwestern Reporter, page 926.-The city of Milwaukee contracted with one Boadi for the removal of garbage from the city to the city's incinerator. Boadi was not under the workmen's compensation law. Fera worked for Boadi as a teamster and it was his duty to haul garbage to the incinerator. While he was leaving the incinerator with his team and wagon and the city's garbage box, on his way to the barn to put the equipment away, the horses ran away and the wagon was turned over, throwing Fera to the ground and seriously injuring him. Fera was awarded compensation by the industrial commission against the city of Milwaukee. The city appealed, claiming that Fera was not in its employ within the meaning of the compensation act, but the decision was affirmed and the award upheld. The opinion of the court, as expressed by Chief Justice Winslow, is as follows:

In order to be entitled to compensation under the workmen's compensation act, the claimant must have been, at the time of the accident, (1) an employee of the party of whom compensation is claimed, and (2) performing some service growing out of and incidental to his employment. (Stats., sec. 2394-3.) It seems clear to us that the claimant here answered both requirements.

It must be conceded not only that the claimant was in the employ of Boadi at the time of the accident but that he was then engaged in his regular work as such employee. Boadi was not subject to the provisions of the compensation act, and that act provides (Stats., sec. 2394-3) that an employer subject to the provisions of the act shall be liable for compensation to an employee of a contractor or subcontractor under him who is not subject to the act in any case where such employer would have been liable for compensation if such employee had been working directly for such employer.

The city of Milwaukee is subject to the provisions of the act, and this provision plainly made the claimant here the employee of the city while carrying out Boadi's contract with the city to the same extent that he was an employee of Boadi so far as the purposes of the compensation act are concerned. So there can be no doubt of the existence of the relation of employer and employee within the meaning of the compensation act at the time of the accident. That the claimant was then performing service growing out of and incidental to his employment seems equally beyond doubt. He was taking the garbage collection equipment, part of which belonged to the city, to its usual place of storage and care so that it should be ready for the work of the following day.

WORK MEN'S COMPENSATION-EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY FEDERAL STATUTE-CONCURRENT EMPLOYMENTS-LIABILITIES OF JOINT EMPLOYERS-San Francisco-Oakland Terminal Ry. v. Industrial Accident Commission, Supreme Court of California (Mar. 4, 1919), 179 Pacific Reporter, page 386.—One Robinson was employed as a watchman by the Southern Pacific Co. and the plaintiff under an agree ment between the two companies whereby the Southern Pacific Co. was to employ, direct, supervise, and carry him on its pay roll, but the plaintiff was to pay half of his salary. This arrangement arose out of the fact that the Southern Pacific Co. and the plaintiff maintained and operated parallel railway lines and only one watchman was necessary for both. The Southern Pacific Co. did both an interstate and an intrastate business, while the plaintiff did only an intrastate business. While performing his duties upon the simultaneous approach of trains over each of the lines Robinson was killed, and it was held by the commission that the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Robinson's widow executed a release as to the Southern Pacific Co., and proceeded for compensation against the plaintiff and was allowed an award from which the plaintiff appealed on the grounds that Robinson was not its employee and that as he was performing duties of an interstate nature for the Southern Pacific Co., the State commission was excluded from jurisdiction under the Federal employers' liability act. In affirming the award the court said in part:

We are also of the opinion that, upon the facts we have stated, the commission correctly held that the deceased was in the employ of both companies, and that therefore the relation of employer and employee existed between deceased and petitioner. This appears to us to necessarily be the result of the arrangement between the companies and their course of conduct thereunder. The deceased was engaged to perform his service for both companies, and was in reality paid his wages by the two companies, each paying one-half. That he was selected for this service by the Southern Pacific Co., was placed upon its pay roll as its employee, was under its supervision, direction, and control, and was given his wages by it, was simply the result of the arrangement between the two companies as to the method by which the thing contemplated should be done. In all this, including the contract of employment, the Southern Pacific Co. was acting on behalf of the petitioner as well as itself, and in no respect an independent contractor. We can not see, looking at the substance of the transaction, why petitioner and deceased did not fully measure up to the definitions of employer and employee contained in our "workmen's compensation, insurance, and safety act."

With regard to the petitioner's claim that the case came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal employers' liability act because

deceased was, when he was killed, doing interstate work as well as intrastate work, the court said in part:

The claim further loses sight of the fact that the jurisdiction of the State commission is excluded by the Federal employers' liability law only as to such matters as are covered by the act, and necessarily the Federal act can not be held to affect the rights under the State. law of an employee of a common carrier by railroad in no way engaged in interstate commerce, or the rights of his dependents in event of his death, to obtain compensation under such State law on account of injuries or death occurring in the course of his employment by such carrier and arising out of such employment.

It is suggested, though not argued by petitioner in his briefs, that a release given by the claimant to the Southern Pacific Co. had the effect of releasing petitioner. It appears that, prior to the commencement of this proceeding before the commission, the claimant, in consideration of $250 paid her by such company, executed a written release of the company from all claims and causes of action on account of the death of her husband. This amount was credited by the commission to petitioner in its final award, thereby reducing the full compensation of $1,539 by $250. The release did not "provide for the payment of full compensation in accordance with the provisions" of the act, and it was never "approved by the commission." In so far as any claim under the workmen's compensation, insurance, and safety act is concerned, it was therefore invalid (sec. 27), and it is material only in considering any claim that may be asserted against the Southern Pacific Co. under the Federal employers' liability law.

The award is affirmed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EXCLUSIVENESS OF REMEDY-BENEFITS TO FIREMAN UNDER CITY CHARTER-Markley v. City of St. Paul, Supreme Court of Minnesota (May 9, 1919), 172 Northwestern Reporter, page 215.-Markley was in the employ of the city of St. Paul as a fireman when he was injured. His injuries were sustained in the course of his employment, and he demanded, and upon refusal he sued for, six months' full salary while he was disabled. According to the provisions of the city charter of May, 1912, as set forth in section 52, he was entitled to this salary; but the city claims that, as it and the fireman are both subject to the provisions of the workmen's compensation act, Markley can not have the benefit allowed in the charter. Defendant demurred to the complaint, the demurrer being overruled and, upon its refusal to plead further, judgment was entered for plaintiff. In affirming this judgment the court said in part :

That a member of a fire department is an employee within the meaning of the workmen's compensation act was settled in State ex rel. City of Duluth . District Court (134 Minn. 28, 158 N. W. 791 [Bul. No. 224, p. 344]). We are of the opinion that section