operator had not delivered. During the period when Menger was off duty the station was closed and train messages were transmitted to the tower operator under an agreement between the Houston & Texas Central Railroad and the defendant. Baker admits all these facts, but claims that the station was only a "day station" and that the facts do not show that it was operated continuously night and day. The court held that the transmission of messages under an agreement with another road during a part of the 24-hour period did not serve to make the station a day station, and a judgment of conviction was entered. The decision is in part as follows:

The question of whether or not the defendant had any control or authority over the operatives of the H. & T. C. who handled the messages pertaining to the receiver's road during the absence of the regular operator is wholly immaterial. The slightest reflection upon the scope and purpose of the act will satisfy any candid mind that the law is concerned not with the method by which messages are accepted and received, but merely with the fact of prohibiting the employment at work for more than 13 hours of any operator at an office operated continuously night and day. If the contention of the defendant that the fact that for a part of the 24-hour period its messages were handled by persons employed not by itself, but by another company, makes the station a daytime station only, were sound, the act could be nullified throughout the length and breadth of the United States wherever conditions of joint operation existed, as at Navasota, by one company running its office 12 hours, the other 12 hours, and interchanging service with each other during the period that the respective operators hired by each were off duty.

Such a result, if reached by design, would not be tolerated; nor does the fact that the result is reached without design in anywise change the legal effect of the situation. What the law is concerned with in this case is not the method by which the receiver provides for the handling and transmission of his messages during the night hours, but with the fact that during some period of the 24 hours he obliges his operator to remain on duty more than 9 hours. What the precise nature of the arrangements the receiver made with the Houston & Texas Central was is wholly immaterial in this case, since the fact is undisputed that the receiver did have arrangements at the place, Navasota, for receiving messages day and night, and did for a part of the time at that place have an operator working more than nine hours.

Judgment for $100 was therefore rendered on each of the 10 counts.

HOURS OF SERVICE-RAILROADS-YARD MOVEMENTS OF TRAINSPennsylvania R. Co. v. United States, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit (May 24, 1920), 265 Federal Reporter, page 609.-Lathero was employed by the railroad company as dropper and as a brakeman. He worked in the company's yards at

a car

Hollidaysburg, Pa., as a car dropper, where he rode cars which were being moved about the yards in the process of distribution to make up full trains. Later in the day he would go to Altoona, where he acted as a brakeman in connection with an engine which was engaged in making up trains in the yards. None of his duties required him to work on the main line of the railroad, but all movements were performed in the yards. These duties occupied more than 16 hours in the aggregate during a 24-hour period. The United States brought action against the railroad for the violation of the hours of service act of March 4, 1907 (34 Stat. 1415, 8 Comp. Stat. 1916, p. 9448), and recovered judgment. In affirming the decision the court said in part:

The railroad company's sole insistment is that the act applies only to movements of trains over main-line tracks, and not to mere yard movements, such as were made in this case. In construing the act it must be borne in mind that its purpose, as expressed in its title, was to promote the safety of employees, as well as travelers, upon railroads. Of course in carrying out this purpose, the mischief sought to be avoided was the mental and physical exhaustion of employees liable to result from permitting or requiring them to remain on duty for excessive lengths of time. The act provides that the term "railroad," as used in the act, shall include "all the road in use by any common carrier operating a railroad.”

As is well pointed out in the opinion of the learned judge of the court below, no train is excluded from the provisions of the act, except wrecking or relief trains, and there is no limitation as respects the kind of movement or the place in which it shall be made. In this situation, bearing in mind the purpose of the legislation and appreciating that men may as easily become exhausted by overwork in the movement of trains in and about yards as they may in so-called main-line movements, and thus imperil their own, as well as the safety and lives of others, we would have no hesitation, even if we considered this a case of first impression, in holding that Lathero, while at work in the Altoona yards, was engaged in or connected with the movement of a train, and hence that the railroad company is subject to the penalty prescribed in the act for a violation thereof. As was said by Mr. Justice Lurton in Chicago, Ind. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 564, 33 Sup. Ct. 581, 584 (57 L. Ed. 966), in construing a statute of Indiana, to hold that yard movements such as were made in the Altoona yard were not movements of a train “ would be to make the act meaningless as to the most dangerous class of work which falls to the lot of railroad employees."

INVENTIONS BY EMPLOYEES-"TIME OF EMPLOYMENT"-Moore v. United States, Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 14, 1919), 39 Supreme Court Reporter, page 322.-David F. Moore was employed by the United States as a wood calker in a navy yard, and during the period covered by this employment he perfected an inven

tion known as a reefing iron for use on the decks, sides, and bottoms of vessels where wood calking is done. An act of Congress of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 851, ch. 423), provides that where the Government uses a patent without obtaining a license for such use from the patentee he shall be compensated therefor, but this act does not apply where the device was discovered or invented by an employee of the United States "during the time of his employment or service.”

Moore's invention was extensively used by the United States, and he requested compensation, which was refused. The Court of Claims rejected the claim, so this appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the position taken by the Court of Claims. Moore claimed that he had been at work on his invention for a number of years, from 1903 to 1914; furthermore, that he had expended no time on it during the hours of his employment by the Government, but only while at home during his absence from duty in the navy yard. It was held, however, that the statute clearly covered the full time of his employment, the concluding sentences of the decision rendered by Mr. Justice Clarke being as follows:

No matter what the appellant may have done prior to May, 1914, it was in that month, he avers, that he completed his invention, and during the whole of that month he was in the employment or service of the Government. To give the effect contended for to the allegation that the appellant confined his work on his invention to the hours when he was not actually on duty, but while he was in the Gov-. ernment employ, would be to amend the statute, not to construe or interpret it.

LABOR DISPUTES-INSTIGATION-CONSPIRACY TO RESTRAIN TRADE-SHERMAN ANTITRUST LAW-STRIKES TO RESTRAIN COMMERCE-CLAYTON ACT-Lamar et al. v. United States, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit (June 4, 1919), 260 Federal Reporter, page 561.—This action was a criminal prosecution by the United States against various defendants under the Sherman Act (July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209) for a conspiracy "to restrain foreign trade and commerce" and to "restrain, hinder, and prevent the transportation" of munitions of war manufactured in the United States in said foreign trade and commerce. Three of the defendants. Rintelen, Lamar, and Martin, were found guilty, convicted, and sentenced. Lamar and Martin brought a writ of error to review the judgment.

Rintelen was a German, who came to this country provided with funds to the extent of $500.000, for the purpose of preventing the United States from manufacturing or shipping supplies to the be!ligerent nations at war in Europe in 1915. To accomplish this pur

pose his plan was to instigate strikes and create labor difficulties in the plants and factories manufacturing "munitions of war." Lamar and Martin were associated with him in this endeavor. Although he parted with much of his money for this purpose, he was unsuccessful in producing any results. Circuit Judge Hough in presenting the opinion of the court affirming the judgment of conviction said in part:

So far as the lack of success of the plaintiffs in error is relied on, it is enough to point out what was specifically held in the Nash case, 33 Sup. Ct. 780, that conspiracy under the Sherman Act is proved by proving the forbidden meeting of minds; it is like a common-law conspiracy, not like those denounced by section 37, Criminal Code (act Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1096, Comp. St., p. 10201), where an overt act is a necessary ingredient of crime. Likewise, any lack of intent to violate the statute can not be relied on here. Personal intent usually, and certainly here, means no more than an intention to do what was done; therefore, if (as the jury found) defendants intended to hinder and restain export trade in war munitions, the fact that they had no suspicion of thereby violating the Sherman Act is a matter of no importance, and is immaterial.

It is further contended that, assuming everything covered by the evidence as proven and all the legal rules above adverted to as correct, it still remains true that the only suggested means or method of restraining trade was to strike to induce laborers to peacefully quit work; and such acts are lawful under the statute of October 15, 1914, commonly known as the Clayton Act (38 Stat. 730, ch. 323). It is said to follow that, if doing this lawful act should produce restraint of trade, the later statute prevents the operation of the earlier.

Whether the Clayton Act has to the extent indicated nullified the Sherman Act is a question that need not be discussed; but we do hold it as clear that no change has been wrought in the law of conspiracy as applicable to this case. It may be that, where the intent of those who foment strikes or themselves quit work after and as a result of agreement with their fellow workmen is to advance their own wage interests, or otherwise improve their conditions of life, the Clayton Act produces legality by forbidding legal interference with their doings. This may be admitted for argument's sake, without expressing opinion. But we do hold that where it is charged (as here) that the intent was solely to restrain foreign trade, and where it is proved (as here) that the proposed instigation of strikes bore no relation whatever to the welfare of the strikers, then at most and best the strike becomes nothing more than an instrument or means, legal in itself, but used only for an illegal end.

The argument for plaintiffs in error confounds the means with the end. The end or object of the proven conspiracy was not to call strikes, but to restrain or rather suppress foreign trade. That object is as illegal as ever; the Clayton Act assuredly does not legalize it. If that be granted, the elementary rules of law apply, and legality of means can not excuse illegality of purpose or object.

LABOR DISPUTES-INVESTIGATION AND ADJUSTMENT-COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS-KANSAS-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTEState ex rel. Court of Industrial Relations et al. v. Howat et al., Supreme Court of Kansas (July 19, 1920), 191 Pacific Reporter, page 585.-The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations was investigating conditions existing in the mining industry in Cherokee and Crawford Counties. Howat and three other persons were subpoenaed by the district court to appear before the court of industrial relations and testify as to conditions prevailing in that locality. This they refused to do, whereupon they were adjudged guilty of contempt of court and ordered confined. This action is a proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus designed to secure their release. They argue that the law creating the court of industrial relations is unconstitutional and that they are therefore being unlawfully imprisoned. In upholding the constitutionality of the law and remanding the petitioners to custody the court said in part:

Most of the constitutional objections raised by the defendants are directed to provisions of the act creating the court of industrial relations, the validity or invalidity of which can have no possible bearing upon the disposition of the present case. The statute makes the new body the successor of the Public Utilities Commission, the functions of which are devolved upon it. (Laws 1920, ch. 29, 2.) It therefore has a legal existence, unless that commission was a nullity, which is not suggested. The legislature has undertaken to grant it, among other additional powers, those of investigating certain controversies relating to the operation of various industries, including coal mining, and of taking evidence and making findings thereon. (Section 7.) Its proceedings are required to be reported to the governor. (Section 27.) It is clear that it would be competent for the legislature to authorize an administrative tribunal to make such investigations, findings, and reports even if no further purpose were to be accomplished than to give publicity to existing conditions and provide data upon which subsequent legislation might be based. The act also undertakes to empower the court to make orders with reference to the conduct of the industry-among other things to regulate wages. (Section 8.) Whether or not the legislature could confer all the powers so attempted to be given-for instance, that to which specific reference has just been made-we have no doubt whatever that it could invest the industrial court with some of them. The legislature may, of course, enact statutes designed (for example) to protect the health and safety of miners, and may authorize an administrative body to make rules in that connection having the force of laws. (Richards . Coal Co., 104 Kans. 330, 179 Pac. 380; 12 C. J. 847-853.) Regulations of that kind would be within the scope of the act under consideration. Inasmuch as the police power extends to the protection of the welfare and convenience as well as the health, safety, and morals of the public, it may manifestly be invoked, as in the present instance, to prevent the interruption in the production of a commodity so vitally necessary to the people of this State as coal, so long as the means employed are not for some special reason obnoxious to con