against because he is an interstate employee is answered, if answer be necessary, by the fact that the Supreme Court of Georgia has applied the same rule in Western & Atlantic R. R. et al. v. Smith, 144 Ga. 737, 87 S. E. 1082 (22 Ga. App. 437, 96 S. E. 230), where it refused under the State employers' liability act (Civ. Code 1910, 2782 et seq.) to permit the plaintiff to join with the employer another railroad whose concurrent negligence was alleged to have contributed in producing the injury complained of. If the Supreme Court of Georgia had in this case permitted the joinder, we might have been required to determine whether, in view of the practice prevailing in Georgia, such decision would not impair the employer's opportunity to make the defenses to which it is entitled by the Federal law. For, as stated by its supreme court in this case (147 Ga. 428, 431, 94 S. E. 558, 560):

"If the carrier and its engineer were jointly liable under the conditions stated in the second question, a joint judgment would result against them, and they would be equally bound, regardless of the fact that the duties imposed upon them are not the same. The jury would have no power in such a case to specify the particular damages to be recovered of each, since Civil Code, section 4512 (providing for verdicts in different amounts against the several defendants), is not applicable to personal torts."

But we have no occasion to consider this question. Refusal to permit the joinder did not deny any right of plaintiff conferred by Federal law.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-RAILROAD COMPANIES-FEDERAL STATUTE-SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT-GRAB IRONS ON CARS-Boehmer v. Pennsylvania R. Co., United States Supreme Court (Apr. 19, 1920), 40 Supreme Court Reporter, page 409.-Boehmer was employed by the defendant company as a brakeman. While working about his train at night he became injured. The injury occurred when Boehmer attempted to board a car which had grabirons only on diagonal corners, he having in the darkness reached for a grabiron on a corner of the car where there was none, under the mistaken belief that the car was equipped with grabirons on all four corners. He claimed that the car was improperly equipped and sued under the Federal safety appliance act. In affirming the judgment of the circuit court of appeals in favor of the defendant (252 Fed. 553, 165 C. C. A. 3), Mr. Justice McReynolds, expressing the opinion. of the court, said in part:

Section 4 of the safety appliance act of 1893 (27 Stat., 531 Comp. St. 8608), provides:

"That from and after the first day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-five, until otherwise ordered by the Interstate Commerce Commission, it shall be unlawful for any railroad company to use any car in interstate commerce that is not provided with secure

grabirons or handholds in the ends and sides of each car for greater security to men in coupling and uncoupling cars."

Petitioner insists that the act of 1893 was designed for the safety of employees and specified grabirons or handholds in the end and sides of each car as one of the essential requirements. That while it did not specifically command that these should be placed at all four corners, this was the obvious intent. But the courts below concurred in rejecting that construction, and we can not say they erred in so doing. Section 4 must be interpreted and applied in view of practical railroad opinions; and having considered these the courts below ruled against petitioner's theory.

Likewise, we accept the concurrent judgment of the lower courts, that the carrier was not negligent in failing to give warning concerning the use of cars with handholds only at two diagonal corners. Whether this constituted negligence depended upon an appreciation of the peculiar facts presented, and the rule is well settled that in such circumstances where two courts have agreed we will not enter upon a minute analysis of the evidence. (Chicago Junction Railway Co. v. King 222 U. S. 222, 32 Sup. Ct. 79, 56 L. Ed. 173.)

The judgment is affirmed.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-RAILROAD COMPANIES-INTERSTATE COM MERCE-REPAIRING LOCOMOTIVE-Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Cronin, Supreme Court of Oklahoma (Dec. 10, 1918), 176 Pacific Reporter, page 919.-Cronin, who was employed as a coach cleaner by the railroad company, was directed to aid in jacking up an engine. He and one other man proceeded to do this, but were unsuccessful owing to the fact that it was too heavy for them. Cronin's assistant let go without notice and the lever came down with a jerk, striking Cronin and injuring him. The engine was one regularly used in interstate commerce, but was at the time in a roundhouse for repairs. The court, in affirming a judgment in favor of Cronin in an action. brought under the State employers' liability act, said in part:

It is contended that the judgment must be reversed for the reason that the trial court tried the cause as governed by the laws of the State and not the Federal liability act; the theory of the company being that Cronin was engaged in interstate commerce because he was working on an engine which, when in service, pulled an interstate passenger train. The engine had been taken out of service and placed in the shop for repairs. It was not being used in commerce of any kind; it was "dead." The fact that the repairs had been made and the engine placed back in service in time to make its regular trip from Sayre, Okla., to Amarillo, Tex., does not necessarily mean that the engine was not out of service in the meantime. We can not agree with the plaintiff in error (railway company) that this broken down engine was in interstate commerce at the time of the accident; indeed, it was not in commerce of any kind. It was dead," undergoing the repairs necessary to placing it in commerce.

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EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-RAILROAD COMPANIES-SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT INTERSTATE COMMERCE EFFECT OF STATE COMPENSATION ACTS-Ross v. Schooley, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit (Jan. 7, 1919), 257 Federal Reporter, page 290.— Schooley, an employee of the defendant (appellant here), met his death in Illinois by reason of defective car couplers. Ross is the receiver for the Toledo, St. Louis & Western Railroad Co. Schooley's administratrix omitted to aver and prove that at the time of the accident he was engaged in interstate commerce. Because of this Ross contends that Schooley's exclusive right and remedy were under the Illinois workmen's compensation act. The railroad on which Schooley was working was an interstate railroad engaged in interstate business, but at the time of the injury Schooley was working on intrastate cars. On the question of the necessity that the plaintiff, in order to recover under the Federal safety appliance act, must have been himself engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the injury, the court, affirming the decision of the lower court in favor of the plaintiff, said in part:

Inasmuch as the Congress has created the liability for damages for injury or death resulting from violation of the safety appliance act, no State legislature can alter or impair the Federal right by passing compensation acts.

It is immaterial whether the injured employee was at the moment engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce, because the congressional power that was called into play was the power to prescribe the equipment of interstate carriers for the protection of all persons upon such roads, both employees and travelers, regardless of their participation in interstate commerce. A State legislature therefore has no more power to curtail the Federal right of an employee than of a traveler.

What effect a State compensation law has upon the right under the safety appliance act of an employee, who was injured through defective appliances while coupling intrastate cars on an interstate railroad, has not been directly involved in any case in the Supreme Court cited by counsel or found by us. But our conclusion, which rejects a result that would make the operativeness of the act dependent upon legislative wills of the several States, and which aligns that act with the employers' liability act in substantive and procedural effect, is supported by our understanding of Schlemmer v. Buffalo etc. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 1, 27 Sup. Ct. 407 [Bul. No. 71, p. 385]; New York etc. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. 546 [Bul. No. 246, p. 260],

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-RAILROAD COMPANIES-SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT-POWER BRAKES-Hodgman v. Sandy River & R. L. R., Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (June 18, 1919), 107 Atlantic Reporter, page 30.-This was an action for damages by the widow of Hodgman for the death of her husband who had been an engineer in

the employ of the defendant. Hodgman's death occurred by the derailment of a locomotive which he was operating. It appears that although the locomotive had been equipped with a device to make it balance more evenly on its springs, the Federal safety appliance act of 1893 (ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531), requiring that locomotives engaged in interstate commerce must be equipped with power driving wheel brakes, had not been complied with. The defendant railroad in appealing claims that it had made a substantial compliance with the safety appliance law and that the deceased had been negligent in running the engine too fast. In deciding the points the court said in part:

The defendant's counsel frankly admits that "technically the defendant was in violation of the safety appliance act" (U. S. Comp. St., secs. 8605-8612) and argues that improvements were made which amount to a substantial compliance with the statute, but we find no warrant for saying that a mechanical contrivance for equalizing the distributing of the weight on the springs, an improvement in no way affecting the speed of any engine, is a substantial compliance with the statute requirement that the engine shall be equipped with a power-driven wheel brake.

Counsel further argues that an additional and vital question was, "Did the absence of the driver brakes from the engine contribute in whole or in part to the speed of the train?" and insists that it did not. This, like all the other questions here noted, was the subject of very careful inquiry both in the examination in chief and in crossexamination, and was necessarily, from the very nature of the case, a leading question, and as necessarily associated with all the other questions submitted to the jury. That it was submitted to the jury with proper instruction is apparent.

In our view there can be no such thing as substantial compliance shown to relieve the defendant from strict compliance with the statute.

The judgment was therefore affirmed.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-RELEASE-EFFECT OF RELEASE AS TO SURGEON CHARGED WITH MALPRACTICE-Hooyman v. Reeve, Supreme Court of Wisconsin (Jan. 7, 1919), 170 Northwestern Reporter, page 282.-The plaintiff Hooyman was injured while in the employ of the Appleton Coated Paper Co. and Dr. Reeve was employed as physician and surgeon of the company to attend his injuries. Some time after the injuries were sustained Hooyman executed a release to the Appleton Coated Paper Co. for the consideration of $3,000 by which he acknowledged full satisfaction and discharge of all claims, accrued or to accrue, in respect to all injuries or injurious results, direct or indirect, arising from or to arise from the injuries sustained by him. This action is now brought by Hooyman for the malpractice

of the doctor, Reeve. The defendant Reeve claims that the release to the paper company operates as a release as to him also. The lower court granted the plaintiff judgment. On appeal this court reversed the lower court, speaking in part as follows:

Now it seems clear from the facts stated in the answer including the release that the plaintiff accepted the payment mentioned in the release in full satisfaction for all injuries sustained, including the injuries caused by the alleged malpractice. The plaintiff being paid for all damages which he sustained, has no cause of action against the defendant for the same claim or any part of it.

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The receipt is very broad, and manifestly was intended to cover all damages sustained by plaintiff, as well for the alleged malpractice as for the original injuries. The receipt acknowledges satisfaction and discharge of all claims, accrued or to accrue, in respect to all injuries or injurious results, direct or indirect, arising or to arise from " the accident in question. The plaintiff obtained satisfaction for injuries sustained, and is entitled to but one satisfaction.

We are convinced that the answer set up a good defense, and that the demurrer (to it by plaintiff) should have been overruled.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-RELEASE-EFFECT OF RELEASE AS TO SURGEON GUILTY OF MALPRACTICE-Purchase v. Seelye, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Dec. 30, 1918), 121 Northeastern Reporter, page 413.-Edward R. Purchase was injured while in the employ of the Boston & Albany Railroad. His injury was a rupture in his right groin and he went to the defendant physician for treatment. Dr. Seelye, the defendant surgeon, performed an operation on the plaintiff's left side. When the plaintiff called the surgeon's attention to this fact the surgeon said that he had mistaken him for another patient who had hernia in his left side. Later Purchase, the plaintiff, executed a release to the railroad company "of all claims and demands" he might have against it as a result of the injury sustained while working on the road "arising or which may arise out of said injury." He then brought action for damages against the surgeon for negligent treatment and recovered judgment, which on appeal was affirmed. The defendant surgeon claimed that the release to the railroad company operated as a release to him also. The court below adopted this view, and the plaintiff excepted. The supreme court sustained the exceptions, saying in part:

The railroad company could not be held liable because of his mistaken belief that he was operating upon some other person other than the plaintiff; such a mistake was not an act of negligence which could be found to flow legitimately as a natural and probable consequence of the original injury, and a ruling in effect to the contrary could not properly have been made. The fact that the mistake made