Judgment was in the plaintiff's favor in the trial court, but the Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the judgment, finding that the second employer had merely accepted the services of an employee who had left the earlier employment on his own motion.

An implied obligation of the employee is not to disclose trade secrets where learned in confidential relations with his employer. In a case of this nature (Vulcan Detinning Co. . Assman, p. 93) a workman leaving employment was held to trial for disclosure of trade secrets and resultant damages.

The relation of employer and employee was held not to exist in the case of a pupil conductor on a street car for the purpose of receiving instruction with a view to qualifying for employment; but his position was said to be different from that of a mere licensee, and a judg ment in his favor was affirmed where an injury resulted from the company's negligence (Fineberg v. Public Service R. Co., p. 89).

BREACH.

An apprentice agreement in which a father contracted to be liable for the payment of $100 if his son should not live up to the contract was held to be binding in Putnam Machine Co. v. Mustakangas (p. 77), the decision of the court below being modified so as to require payment of the full amount agreed upon. Where a workman had been required to deposit a $50 Liberty bond as security for the performance of a contract to work to the end of the season, and nevertheless struck and left employment, the court held that the performance of the contract was several, so that payment should be made for all services rendered; however, the bond was held forfeited because the full measure of service had not been rendered (Englander v. Abramson-Kaplan Co., p. 78).

Breach by the employer was held to make him liable where a salesman was discharged after working for three months on a two-year contract, the discharge being attributable to the bad state of business necessitating retrenchment (Dunbar v. Orleans Metal Bed Co., p. 79). A like judgment ensued in another case (Lyons v. Pease Piano Co., p. 80), in which a contract was construed to be for a yearly hiring, while the employer claimed that it was terminable at will.

Where a seaman was discharged in violation of an oral contract made in California, where contracts continuing more than a year are void unless in writing, it was held that the maritime law controlled, no services being performed within the State, so that damages would lie for the breach (Union Eish Co. v. Erickson, p. 88).

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS.

The validity of a collective agreement is upheld in Moody v. Model Window Glass Co. (p. 81), where it was shown to be a mutual understanding that waiting time should be compensated where the employer failed to furnish work at the time agreed upon. Like value was attached to an agreement made as to the employment of railroad conductors, guaranteeing seniority rights, etc. In the case in hand the plaintiff was not a member of the union with which the agreement was made, but its terms were held to control all employment of that class by the employer affected (Gregg v. Starks, p. 82).

BLACKLISTING.

A statute of Oklahoma practically reads into the contract of employment a term requiring the granting of a service letter on the termination of employment. The constitutionality of this law was upheld (Dickinson v. Perry, p. 90) and a judgment for damages affirmed where it appeared that the letter granted misstated the facts and amounted to a blacklisting of the employee.

Placed here for lack of a better classification is the case Putnal v. Inman (p. 73), in which it was held that a credit list among the merchants of a town was not libelous, it being a privileged communication.

COMPULSORY WORK LAW.

Delaware was one of a number of States which during the war undertook to secure productive labor from all male residents between fixed ages. The statute was declared constitutional (State . McClure, p. 74). This opinion is in opposition to that of the Supreme Court of West Virginia in discussing a similar law of that State (Ex parte Hudgins, p. 76).

EMPLOYMENT OFFICES.

An ordinance of the city of Denver regulating the activities of private employment agencies was held not to apply to a "Business Exchange Corporation," which placed only persons seeking clerical and technical positions (Wilson v. City and County of Denver, p. 151). A law of South Carolina fixes a license fee of $2,000 per year for persons securing workmen to go outside the State for service of others. This act was held constitutional in State v. Reeves (p. 151), as against the contention that the fee was prohibitive and discriminatory.

WAGES.

MINIMUM WAGES.

A

The Minimum Wage Commission of Minnesota was made the defendant in a case (G. O. Miller Telephone Co. v. Minimum Wage Commission, p. 291) in which the validity of orders issued by it was challenged. The court below granted a temporary injunction restraining the enforcement of orders, but the supreme court, citing its previous decision as to the constitutionality of the act, in the present case sustained the validity of the orders under it.

PAYMENT.

The California law requiring the payment of wages on the termination of employment, and fixing a penalty for noncompliance, was held to be valid as against individual employers (Manford v. Menil Singh, p. 294), as had been previously done with regard to corporate employers. A similar law of Michigan, which provided a penalty of 10 per cent per day of the amount due in case of nonpayment, was held by the supreme court of the State to be unconstitutional as class legislation (Davidow v. Wadsworth Manufacturing Co., p. 300). The seamen's act, authorizing the recovery of one-half of the wages due at any port in the United States, was held applicable and controlling in the circumstances in a case of employment on a British vessel in port at Pensacola, Fla. (Strathearn S. S. Co. . Dillon, p. 297).

A public agency was required by mandamus to pay a balance due a discharged employee, against its contention that there was no money available from the funds for the fiscal year, where it was shown that the lack of funds was due to an apparently intentional act of the commission to avoid payment (State ex rel. Stephens v. State Corporation Commission, p. 295). A workman discharged from a railroad company because of theft was held nevertheless to be entitled to pay which had accrued prior to the date of his discharge (Kowalski . McAdoo, p. 296).

The prevailing custom was held to control in a contest between employer and employee as to the right of the latter to receive pay for the time spent on vacation, his claim being allowed by the court (Vaile v. Walker Construction Co., p. 302).

Where services were rendered by request without mention as to the amount of compensation, a reasonable amount was said by the court to be presumed in the absence of evidence that the work was to be done gratuitously (Williams v. Jones, p. 300).

Note may be here made of the finding of unconstitutionality of the antitipping law of Iowa, the law being held invalid because not

making proper classifications, employees only being subject to its restrictions, while employers might receive tips without incurring its penalties (Dunahoo v. Huber, p. 289).

SECURITY.

The Massachusetts statute regulating assignments of wages restricts both time and amount; it was held, however, in the instant case (Raulines v. Levi, p. 290) that the termination of the employment affected by the assignment rendered the assignment void regardless of the lapse of time.

Wages of employees carrying on a bankrupt business were held to be entitled to preference as against prior liens against the property of the company for which they were working (Florida Construction & Realty Co. v. Pournell, p. 294). A mechanic's lien was held enforceable under the Massachusetts statute against the owner of a house where a subcontractor's claim included both labor and materials, where the value of the labor could be distinctly shown (Manson & MacPhee v. Flanagan, p. 290).

HOURS OF LABOR.

Hours of labor of city firemen were considered in Danielson v. City of Bakersfield (p. 155), the law of California fixing an eighthour day for "laborers, workmen, or mechanics" on public works being held inapplicable.

A Mississippi statute limits to 10 per day the hours of labor of workmen employed by persons, firms, or corporations engaged in manufacturing or repairing. This was held (Handy v. Mercantile Lumber Co., p. 154) not to affect the status of a laborer unloading lumber from cars outside the planing mill of the defendant company, as his employment was not affected by the machinery.

The constitutionality of a statute limiting the hours of labor of women in hotels, etc., but excepting railroad hotels and eating houses, was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States against the contention that there was an unreasonable classification involved in the law (Dominion Hotel v. State of Arizona, p. 160). The employment of women at collection stations for laundries was held not to be subject to the restriction of an act governing female employees in the District of Columbia employed in mercantile establishments, laundries, etc. (District of Columbia v. Marshall, p. 160). A Texas law limits to 9 per day and 54 per week the hours of labor of women, and a cafe proprietor was convicted for a violation of this law. His contention that an hour per day should have been deducted because that amount of time was used by the employees in eating their meals was denied, as it appeared that while eating the waitresses were subject to call to render service (Haddad v. State, p. 161).

The Adamson law, establishing a basic eight-hour day for certain classes of railroad employment, was held not to apply to switch tenders, the law having been enacted for the purpose of meeting conditions not involving that class of workmen (Coke v. Illinois Central R. Co., p. 158). The Supreme Court also held that the law did not bar an agreement between an insolvent road and its employees to continue the operation of the road under a contract satisfactory to both parties, but not conforming to the law in question (Fort Smith & W. R. Co. v. Mills, p. 156).

The older law limiting hours of service to 16 per day for trainmen was held to apply to employees of a terminal company operating in the State of New York exclusively, but handling commerce for a number of railroads and steamship companies doing an interstate and foreign business (United States v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, p. 162). A like conclusion was reached in another case (Penn. R. R. Co. v. United States, p. 166), the employee working in railroad yards making up trains, none of his duties calling him to work on the main line of the road.

The same statute fixes the hours of labor of telephone operators transmitting train orders to nine per day. A terminal company at Atlanta rendered practically the same service as the Brooklyn company in the case noted above, and a circuit court of appeals applied the same doctrine to the instant case, involving the services of a telegraph operator, reversing a directed verdict for the company in the lower court (United States v. Atlanta Terminal Co., p. 163). That mealtime, during which an employee was subject to call, was not properly time off duty, deductible from the hours of service, was the conclusion in Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. v. United States, p. 164). Another case along this line (United States v. Baker, p. 165) involved the question of continuous operation. Two railroads exchanged service in such a way as to have continuous service by their joint action. This was held to constitute continuous operation so that neither operator could be employed more than nine hours per day.

Not strictly falling under the heading of "hours of labor" is a case involving the right of an inventor to an invention which was perfected during the time of his employment by the United States, the court holding that the law did not exclude any portion of the employee's time from the time "of his employment or service" (Moore v. United States, p. 167).

MUNICIPALITY ENGAGING IN BUSINESS.

Kansas City, Mo., voted for an issue of bonds to enable the city to engage in the business of manufacturing and distributing to its citizens and the city offices a supply of ice. The city comptroller refused