than was asked for was sufficient to sustain a charge of negligence on the part of the defendant. In affirming this judgment, the supreme court said in part:

The evidence in behalf of the defendant was contradictory of that offered by the plaintiff, but taking all the testimony, direct and circumstantial, it can not be said the findings and verdict are without support. The jury found that the defendant had been handling other grades of dynamite than 40 per cent, and had actually sold some of the 60 per cent; that the stick sold to the plaintiff was taken from a box containing 60 per cent grade and was of higher grade than 40 per cent; and that the one who sold the dynamite to the plaintiff had reason to believe it was more than 40 per cent in strength.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-SAFE APPLIANCES WRONGFUL USE-Ten Mile Lumber Co. v. Garner, Supreme Court of Mississippi (June 3, 1918), 78 Southern Reporter, page 776.—Garner was in the employ of the defendant lumber company and was engaged with a track and bridge crew. The crew had use for a tool called a maul. While they were working another crew came and borrowed their maul and left a damaged one which could no longer be used. The crew of the plaintiff had been using a cant hook which had in use become so bent as to become almost useless. Instead of sending the cant hook to the blacksmith, who was the proper person to make repairs, the plaintiff and his coworkers attempted to repair the cant hook themselves by laying it upon the maul and striking it with an ax. While doing this a piece of metal was struck out of the maul and came in contact with Garner's eye, causing an injury for which he sued. Plaintiff recovered damages and defendant appealed. The judgment was reversed, the following being quoted from the opinion of the court:

It appears that the defect was not in the ax or in the cant hook, but that it was in the maul, and that the maul was not being used for the purpose which it was assigned for use by the company, and that the ax was not a proper instrument to use in repairing a peavey, or cant hook. This case is governed by the case of Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Daniels, 19 South. 830, where the court laid down the following rule:

"An employer is not liable in damages to one of its employees where the injury resulted from putting one of the appliances supplied to a use for which it was not intended in an improper manner.

It further appears that whatever defect there was in the cant hook was caused by its being bent in the course of the work, and it does not appear that there was any notice of this defect brought to the attention of the master or any neglect on the part of the master in having it properly repaired. The plaintiff, having undertaken to repair this tool under these circumstances, was not entitled to recover from the master.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-SAFE PLACE-ASSUMPTION OF RISK-INJURY TO IGNORANT SERVANT BY ELECTRICAL SHOCK-Kimberlin v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Kansas City Court of Appeals, Missouri (Nov. 11, 1918), 206 Southwestern Reporter, page 430.-Kimberlin was by trade a plasterer and was in the habit, during slack time. in his work, of taking odd jobs of various kinds. A dangerous and poorly insulated electric wire belonging to the defendant company became broken so that a portion fell across an electric light company's highly charged wire and thence to the ground. Hutton, the company's head lineman, noting the trouble in the connections telephoned over to Grant City where the plaintiff lived and where the broken wire was. Upon being informed of the break and its general locality he asked the lady operator to get a man to fix it and she gave the job to Kimberlin. Kimberlin went to the place where the wire was broken and coiled on the sidewalk. When he grasped the wire he received a severe shock and was knocked unconscious, receiving injuries for which he later recovered damages. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, saying in part:

Now, if the plaintiff was ignorant of the danger in the place where he was sent and such danger was not so glaringly apparent that, as a matter of law, he should have known of it, and the defendant, with knowledge of the dangerous situation, negligently sent the plaintiff to the place without warning him, and plaintiff was injured, then defendant can not escape liability either upon the ground that the doctrine of a safe place to work is inapplicable or that the defendant assumed the risk.

The evidence tends to show negligence on the part of the defendant, both in the maintenance of its wires in dangerous proximity to the electric wires and in sending, without warning, one who was without knowledge of the danger incident to the place.

Hence, we can not say there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant nor that plaintiff, as a matter of law, assumed the risk. The rule in Missouri is that the servant does not assume to bear the consequences of his employer's negligence.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-SAFE PLACE-ASSURANCE OF SAFETYChess & Wymond Co. v. Wallis, Supreme Court of Arkansas (Apr. 29,1918),203 Southwestern Reporter, page 274.-On May 27, 1914. Wallis was engaged in cutting stave bolts for the Chess & Wymond Co. He had been directed to saw a log lying under a hanging limb by one Norman, his foreman. Wallis called the foreman's attention to the hanging limb but was assured by the foreman that there was no danger of the limb falling. Wallis commenced his task and while so employed the limb fell, severely injuring him. Action is brought by Wallis's father as his next friend. The Chess & Wymond Co. contend that the danger was open and obvious and that the foreman could have had no better knowledge than Wallis as to the danger.

The case was submitted to the jury and a verdict rendered in favor of plaintiff, Wallis. Justice Smith, rendering the opinion of the court on appeal, said in part:

It is argued that the danger was open and obvious, and that Norman could not have had any more knowledge of the danger than the appellee himself had, for according to the appellee's testimony the presence of the suspended limb was known alike both to himself and Norman. But it is just here that we think the jury question arises. The master is presumed to know the hazards of the employment, and the servant has a right to rely on the assurance of safety, unless the danger is so open and obvious that its existence is both known to and appreciated by the servant. The rule is stated in 4 Labatt on Master and Servant (2d Ed.) page 3965, as follows:

"But it has been held that the assurance of safety given by the master may be of such a character as to take away all question of assumption of risk, even if the risk is known to the servant. The same effect is reached in a number of cases which hold that the servant may recover if he is injured while relying upon an assurance of safety, unless the danger was so great and imminent that a reasonably prudent man would not have incurred it."

We can not say that the jury did not have the right to take into account appellee's age and experience as contrasted with that of his foreman, and to find therefrom that appellee had a right to rely upon the assurance given, and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence, and did not assume the risk.

The judgment of the court below was therefore affirmed.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-SAFE PLACE-GUARDS FOR DANGEROUS MACHINERY-Scherer v. Danziger, Supreme Court of California (May 8, 1918), 173 Pacific Reporter, page 85.-Scherer was employed by Danziger on the latter's ranch as an engineer to operate a gasoline engine and two pumps. Scherer made some suggestions as to alterations designed to make the conduct of his duties more safe. The alterations were made with the approval of the defendant, Danziger, and included a sheet-iron cover or guard for some exposed cogwheels on one of the pumps. The defendant's foreman, Moebius, who was plaintiff's superior, objected to the guard over the cogwheels and ordered it removed, which order the plaintiff obeyed under pro

test.

The following day, as Scherer was passing the exposed cogwheels, a rag which he was carrying in his hand got caught in the wheels, drawing in his hand and injuring it, for which he recovered damages. The opinion of the court on appeal, affirming the judgment of the court below, is in part as follows:

This evidence fully warranted the jury in finding the defendant had failed in his duty to use ordinary care to furnish his employee a reasonably safe place in which to work. The plaintiff was not obliged to prove that the defendant had personal knowledge

of the removal of the cover.

Moebius was in full control of the plant, and notice to him was, of course, notice to his principal. There is no force in the claim that there would have been no element of danger in the situation if the location of the railing (which had been around the cogwheels) had not theretofore been changed in accordance with the plaintiff's own suggestions. The alterations had the approval of the defendant, and, if carried out according to plaintiff's ideas, would have included the covering of the cogwheels. The dangerous condition was created, not by the adoption of the plaintiff's plan, but by the climination of an important part of that plan.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-SAFE PLACE-NECESSITY TO GIVE WARNING OF IMPENDING BLASTS IN MINES-United Verde Copper Co. v. Kuchan, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (June 3, 1918), 253 Federal Reporter, page 425.-Kuchan was employed as a miner in the copper company's mine. While passing from a place on the 700-foot level, where he was put to work, to another place to eat his lunch, a heavy blast was discharged without warning, resulting in severe and permanent injuries to Kuchan, for which he secured a judgment for damages. The law of Arizona, where the mine is located, expressly requires a warning to be given before discharging blasts, but does not state who should give the warning, and it is the contention of the copper company that the duty rested upon the servant who discharged the blast and not upon the company. After reviewing the provision in the State constitution abrogating the fellow-servant rule the court of appeals, in affirming the judgment of the court below, used in part the following language:

It follows that, if it be conceded that the statute fails to place the duty to give the warning upon the mining company, nevertheless the constitution of the State, construed in the light of the general law, makes the company responsible for the neglect of such duty, and the same result is reached as though the statute had directly placed the duty of giving the warning upon the mining company. The responsibility of the mining company arises under the general law requiring all employers to use ordinary care to furnish a reasonably safe place within which their employees are required to work.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-SAFE PLACE-USE OF GUARD-NEGLIGENCE-Kancevich v. Cudahy Packing Co., Supreme Court of Iowa (Oct. 25, 1918), 169 Northwestern Reporter, page 186.-Kancevich was in the employ of the defendant and it was his duty to load ice from a platform into railroad cars. The platform was so constructed that it was level with the tops of the cars when they stood alongside. Flaintiff was working on one occasion when the cars had been removed from alongside of the platform and in doing his work he

slipped on some ice and fell to the ground. He claims he was not given a safe place to work in because the platform had no rail, although the use of a rail would have rendered the platform useless, and because ice had accumulated on the platform. A board had been provided to put in place when the cars were away from the platform. Plaintiff had put up this board on previous occasions and knew of its use. In affirming the judgment of the lower court in favor of the defendant the court said:

Moreover, the mere putting up of a board that was at hand, which plaintiff knew how to put up, and had seen put up in the past, even if he had not himself done so, would have made as effective a guard as was needed for his safety. His failure to use this means of selfprotection will alone dispose of the complaint of the absence of a permanent guard or rail.

The proximate cause of this injury was a slip on ice. There was no ice when he went to work. It came into existence because some ice would necessarily fall upon the platform as plaintiff worked, and because of his work. He slipped because of ice he knew must accumulate because of the work, work that he had been doing for more than a year. He was hurt because his bodily movements did not take into consideration what he knew to be a necessary incident of his work.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-SAFE PLACE AND APPLIANCES-VICE PRINCIPAL.-Cooper v. Penn Bridge Co., Court of Appeals, District of Columbia (Mar. 4, 1918), 46 Washington Law Reporter, page 164.- The bridge company undertook to replace an underhung bridge span on the Pennsylvania Avenue Bridge with a new overhung span. One Hoffman was sent as foreman to oversee the job. Hoffman had a man under him by the name of Hoover who acted as foreman in his absence and who really directed the work. Hoover directed one Galloway to work on the top of the underhung span, which had been removed to a barge and at the bottom of which other men were working. Galloway went to get a maul, but found only one in the tool box and the handle on this one was loose. Galloway protested that the maul was dangerous and might fall apart. Hoover nevertheless directed Galloway to use it, as there was no other to be had. While using this defective maul the head fell off and struck Cooper, who had been working below, upon the head, severely injuring him, for which injuries Cooper brought action. In reversing the judgment of the lower court in favor of the bridge company this court used in part the following language:

It of course is not denied that it was defendant's duty to provide for the plaintiff a reasonably safe place in which to work, but defendant contends that this duty was performed when proper mauls and proper handles were furnished the men. While there is