LICENSING OF EMPLOYEES BARBERS-PERIOD OF PREPARATIONCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-People v. Logan, Supreme Court of Illinois (June 20, 1918), 119 Northeastern Reporter, page 913.— W. J. Logan was convicted of violation of a statute enacted in 1909 by employing in his barber shop a man not registered according to its provisions. The law referred to provides for an examining board of three persons, who shall give certificates of registration to persons found qualified. Three years' preparation as an apprentice or as a student in a barber school is required as a preliminary unless one has practiced the trade for three years in other States; and the applicants are required to be possessed of the requisite skill to perform properly all the duties of the trade, and to have sufficient knowledge concerning the common diseases of the face and skin to avoid the aggravation and spreading thereof. Persons actually engaged in the occupation within 90 days after the approval of the act might be registered without examination. The act, it was contended by the respondent, was unconstitutional; but the court held that the regulation of the trade was directly related to the health and safety of the public. The registration of those already in the occupation, though objected to as making them a favored class, was held not unreasonable. As to the requirement of the three years' period of preparation Judge Dunn, who delivered the opinion affirming the conviction, said:

It is argued that the requirement of three years' service as an apprentice or study in a barber school has no direct relation to the public health or safety, but is rather intended to restrict and discourage the public from engaging in this occupation. The intention is to restrict the public from engaging in this occupation to the extent that only those may do so who have learned the trade; know how to prepare, use, and care for the tools; know what sanitary precautions must be taken to avoid the risk of spreading disease; and are acquainted with the sanitary regulations which the board of examiners is authorized by section 11 to adopt. Three years seems a long time to require for learning the trade of a barber, but we can not say that it is so unreasonably long as to constitute an unreasonable restriction upon the right to engage in the trade.

LICENSING OF OCCUPATIONS-CEMENT CONTRACTOR-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCE-State ex rel. Sampson v. City of Sheridan et al., Supreme Court of Wyoming (Jan. 21, 1918), 170 Pacific Reporter, page 1.-The State of Wyoming, on the relation of C. W. Sampson, sued in mandamus to compel the city of Sheridan and its officers to issue to Sampson a cement contractor's license. Sheridan is a city of the first class, having a commission form of government. Under the authority of the State laws relating to the subject of licenses, as

was claimed, an ordinance had been enacted by the city for the licensing of cement contractors, requiring the payment of a fee of $15, and the giving of a bond for $1,000 that the work done would remain in good condition for five years after its completion. The relator showed that he had been engaged in the business for 10 years, and that all the work he had done had been first class; that he had complied with all the requirements except the filing of the bond, which he was unable to procure from a surety company because he could not make a sufficient showing of his financial standing in the absence of the possession of real estate or a substantial bank account. The court found only one case involving a requirement of a bond guaranteeing the durability of the work done, Gray v. Omaha, 80 Neb. 526, 114 N. W. 600. The court, speaking through Judge Blydenburgh, held the ordinance invalid for reasons which are fully discussed after stating the principles applicable to the exercise of the police power, but which are also given in brief form in the following language:

Viewing the ordinance in question in the light of the above principles, we are constrained to hold that it is unconstitutional and void because: First, the vocation of cement contractor is not a proper subject of police regulation not affecting either the health, morals, safety, or welfare of the public generally so as to be a necessary subject of regulation; second, no express power to regulate this vocation is conferred upon the city, and none can necessarily be implied from the powers granted; third, were the power given, the regulations required are unreasonable, especially in requiring a maintenance bond to run five years; fourth, the ordinance is discriminatory and class legislation in that it requires a fee and bond from one laying concrete or cement sidewalks and requires neither from those laying sidewalks composed of asphalt, granite, vitrified brick or any other hard and incombustible material.

PENSIONS-OLD-AGE AND MOTHERS' PENSIONS-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-State Board of Control v. Buckstegge, Supreme Court of Arizona (July 1, 1916), 158 Pacific Reporter, page 837.-L. H. Buckstegge was a taxpayer in the State of Arizona, and brought action against the State Board of Control to restrain the payment of certain sums allowed under an initiated act of November 3, 1914 (Acts of 1915, p. 10). Payment was objected to on the ground that the act in question was invalid. Judgment was granted in favor of Buckstegge in the superior court of Maricopa County, whereupon the board appealed, with the result that the judgment of the superior court was affirmed. The title of the act is "An act providing for an old-age and mothers' pension and making appropriation therefor."

The supreme court recited the law and the facts in the case, saying

that:

It will readily be seen that the purpose and intent of the act is to introduce into the laws of Arizona a pension system for the benefit of certain citizens and persons designated in the act. While the object of the act is easily determinable from its title and context, the lack of a clear statement of the means and methods of its enforcement, we think, must necessarily result in its defeat.

The first section undertakes to abolish all almshouses in the State; the grounds and buildings are to be sold, and the proceeds to be devoted to the purposes of the act. The second section establishes a pension system "in the absence of almshouses."

Two difficulties were pointed out in these sections, one that the constitution directs the establishment and support of various institutions, such" as the public good may require," and as the language of the act under consideration is broad enough to cover both private institutions and State charitable institutions, it comes into conflict with this provision of the constitution. It is also said that existing statutory provisions regulate the sale and disposal of county property, and that this act is an invalid attempt to provide a different method. Again, as the act is to be effective "in the absence of almshouses," it is ruled that until it is made clear that almshouses no longer exist, the act could not come into effect as providing a pension system.

The provision of the State constitution limiting laws to the subject matter expressed in the title is also found to be violated, since the title contains no intimation of the purpose to abolish almshouses. The result of such abolition would be to leave unprovided for all other needy adults than those specified in the act under consideration, needy men and women, citizens of five years' residence and above 60 years of age, excepting only widows and the wives of inmates of penal institutions and insane asylums who have children under 16 years of age; so also of all needy children, orphans or others, who had not a mother of the foregoing description. Such a result being in no wise indicated in the title of the act is further evidence of its being in contravention of the constitutional limitation noted. The judgment of the court below was therefore affirmed.

PENSIONS POLICE PENSION FUND-CONDITIONS ENTITLING ΤΟ BENEFITS-Stiles v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund of West Chicago Park, Supreme Court of Illinois (Dec. 19, 1917), 118 Northeastern Reporter, page 202.-Arthur A. Stiles brought suit for mandamus to compel the trustees named to pay him a yearly pension of $900, beginning June 4, 1914. He alleged that he had been a po

liceman for the park commissioners for more than 18 years previous to June 29, 1911, on which date he was made police captain; that he performed the duties of the latter position until June 4, 1914, when he was suspended, and later discharged; that he had served more than 20 years altogether, and was therefore entitled to the pension under the act of 1913 providing for the fund, and that he had not been guilty of a felony or become a habitual drinker or a nonresident of the United States-these being the exceptions to the allowance of the benefits of the act. The defenses relied on were his discharge under the civil-service act for having entered a saloon in uniform, and at other times using vile, profane, and abusive language; and his institution of another proceeding to compel his reinstatement, the claim being that in doing this he had elected to consider himself as still a member of the force, and therefore could not apply for a pension. The case was decided in the superior court of Cook County on a demurrer to the answer, which procedure admitted all the facts alleged, but denied that they constituted a sufficient defense in law. The court sustained this contention, and granted the writ of mandamus directing the pensions to be paid; this judgment was reversed by the appellate court, but the supreme court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Stiles. Judge Craig delivered the opinion, saying that the civil-service commissioners had certain duties in connection with the hiring and discharge of policemen, but nothing to do with the pension system. The following is quoted from this opinion:

The legislature has seen fit, in plain and unmistakable terms, to fix as the only condition and prerequisite for a pension 20 years of service and ceasing from such service. The legislature has further seen fit to provide that the only acts for which a pensioner may be deprived of his pension are conviction of felony, becoming an habitual drunkard or a nonresident of the United States. Accordingly, whether the appellant was properly discharged by the civil-service board, or whether he was discharged at all, has nothing to do with his right to a pension under the statute.

It was further said that if he was successful in being reinstated, he could of course draw no pension for his period of active service; otherwise the other proceeding had no effect.

RELIEF ASSOCIATIONS - RAILROADS ATTEMPTED REPUDIATION OF CONTRACT STATE AND FEDERAL STATUTES-Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Miller, Supreme Court of Indiana (June 6, 1918), 120 Northeastern Reporter, page 706.-The railway company is a member of a relief association together with various other railroads, all of which are engaged in interstate commerce. The law of Indiana ex

pressly declares that any and all contracts providing for the retention of part of the employee's wages by the employer for payment into relief funds are null and void. There is a Federal statute which, although it does not prohibit relief associations and contracts there. under, regulates such contracts to the extent that they are not valid to limit the liability of the employer. Otherwise under the Federal statute such contracts are valid. Miller became employed by the defendant railroad and entered into a contract permitting the railroad company to retain part of his salary for the purposes of the relief fund. He was disabled on one occasion and received $36 as benefits. He now sues for the money retained by the railroad company alleging that the contract was null and void under the statute of Indiana. He recovered in the lower court but this court reversed the decision, rendering a decision which reads in part as follows:

The Constitution of the United States confers upon Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign nations, and the power thus conferred is exclusive. The States, however, possess the power to impose by law on carriers exercising their calling in the State certain restrictions and regulations as to the conduct of their business. Such laws do not in themselves constitute a regulation of interstate commerce, although they control, in some degree, the conduct and liability of those engaged in such commerce. As to regulations of the character mentioned the power of the State to legislate is concurrent with that of Congress; and, so long as Congress does not legislate on the subject, such legislation by the State is regarded as a valid exercise of the police power of the State for the regulation of the relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within its limits; but, when Congress acts in such a way as to manifest a purpose to exercise its conceded authority, the regulating power of the State ceases, and all laws passed by the State on the subject become inoperative.

If the statute of Indiana was rendered inoperative by the act of Congress quoted, the fifth paragraph of the answer states facts sufficient to constitute a defense. Under the act of Congress the contract was valid in all respects, except as to the provisions by which the interstate commerce common carrier attempted to exempt itself from liability for damages.

SABOTAGE-ADVOCACY BY CIRCULATION OF POSTERS-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-PENALTIES-State v. Moilen et al., Supreme Court of Minnesota (Apr. 19, 1918), 167 Northwestern Reporter, page 345.-A statute of Minnesota enacted in 1917 prohibits and penalizes the advocacy of criminal syndicalism, which is defined in the following terms:

Criminal syndicalism is hereby defined as the doctrine which advocates crime, sabotage (this word as used in this bill meaning ma