It was said that if the provision made by the city was merely nominal, it was possible that the employee would be allowed to take under the compensation act; but where the provision was in fact a substantial one, it must govern.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT COUNTY

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BUILDING ROAD-Gray v. Board of County Commissioners of Sedgwick County, Supreme Court of Kansas (June 9, 1917), 165 Pacific Reporter, page 867.-G. S. Gray brought suit under the workmen's compensation act against the board mentioned in the title because of an injury suffered by him while employed by the commissioners to haul gravel for use on a county road, which was being graded and surfaced. The court assumed, without deciding, that the employment was within the act as being "on, in, or about a mine or quarry," but held that the act applies, in relation to county or municipal work as well as that of private employers, to employment in the employer's trade or business, in the hazardous occupations mentioned therein, only when "conducted for the purpose of business, trade, or gain." As a county, in its opinion, can not be said to build roads for such a purpose, it held that the county was not liable to the injured employee for compensation.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT-LABORERS, WORKMEN, AND MECHANICS-JANITOR UNDER CIVIL SERVICE-White v. City of Boston, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (May 25, 1917), 116 Northeastern Reporter, page 481.-Compensation was awarded to Agnes White, whose husband, a schoolhouse janitor, fell while washing a window and was killed. On appeal it was contended that White, being an appointee under the civil-service act, was in the "official service," and was therefore not within the class of " laborers, workmen, and mechanics" to whom the compensation law applies. The court through Judge Loring said that the matter of civilservice appointment was not decisive, but rather the nature of the work; that a head janitor of a city hall or large office building, whose duties were those of superintendence and who did not personally work with his hands, might not be a laborer or mechanic, but that this instance presented a different aspect. The decree awarding compensation was affirmed, Judge Loring saying further:

But the janitor here in question was not that kind of a janitor. In the case at bar the fact was or at least evidence warranted a finding that the fact was that the deceased with his own hands did all the work of cleaning, heating, washing windows, care of yards, sidewalks and lawns in case of the two schoolhouses in question, and that

work included everything from keeping the water-closets clean to running the steam boiler in the school building of the Abby W. May School (for which he had to have a fireman's license) and the furnace in the other school building.

Not only was it the duty of the deceased to do all the work, but the evidence warrants a finding that he did it and all of it with his own hands.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT-LABORERS, WORKMEN, AND MECHANICS-TEACHER OF AUTOMOBILE REPAIRING IN VOCATIONAL SCHOOL-Lesuer v. City of Lowell, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (May 25, 1917), 116 Northeastern Reporter, page 483.-Clarence C. Lesuer was accidentally killed while in the employ of the city of Lowell. He was a teacher, among other subjects, of automobile repairing, in the industrial and vocational school conducted by the city, his duty being to show the boys how to do repair work and on occasion to demonstrate methods, his death being caused by some unknown act or omission on the part of one of the boys whom he was instructing. His father and administratrix made claim for compensation, which was denied by the industrial accident board; and the decree entered on that decision was affirmed, on the ground that the employee was not a laborer, workman, or mechanic within the meaning of the law.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT-POLICE OFFICERS-Griswold et al. v. City of Wichita, Supreme Court of Kansas (Jan. 6, 1917), 162 Pacific Reporter, page 276.-Frank Griswold, a police captain of the city named, was killed by a pistol shot from some person who had broken into a store in the nighttime, and whom he was attempting to arrest. Suit was brought under the compensation law for the benefit of his family, and in the district court judgment was for the defendant city, on the ground that a police officer is not a workman and that the compensation provisions do not apply to him. This judgment was affirmed by the supreme court, Judge Porter delivering the opinion, from which the following is quoted:

Many good reasons might be suggested for including within the scope of the act workmen employed in hazardous enterprises by cities engaged in conducting a business for profit, as electric light or waterworks plants, because a city, like any private individual engaged in trade or business, could pass on to the public at large the burden by adding to the cost of the service. But where a city is engaged merely in the exercise of its governmental functions, we think it clear that the workman, no matter how hazardous his employment, would not come within the spirit and purpose of the compensation act.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-RELEASE-MISTAKE AS TO EXTENT OF INJURY-Weathers v. Kansas City Bridge Co., Supreme Court of Kansas (Jan. 18, 1917), 162 Pacific Reporter, page 957.—Judgment was rendered in favor of W. P. Weathers in the district court of Wyandotte County, Kans., in his proceeding under the workmen's compensation act. Two weeks after an injury to this employee he went to the office of the general manager of the bridge company, his employer. They talked over the matter of the amount of compensation and agreed that the employee would probably be able to go to work in two weeks longer, and he was given a check for $24, being $6 per week for four weeks, or 50 per cent of his wages for that time, and signed a release. It appears that a bone in his foot was broken, which fact was not known to either party at the time, and it was actually several months before disability ceased. The judgment for plaintiff was set aside and a new trial ordered because there had been no allegation that the mistake of fact was mutual, and the instruction to the jury had been to the effect that a release could be set aside because of inadequacy of the consideration and a mistake on the part of the signer. The court held, however, that where inadequacy of consideration and mutual mistake of fact concur, a release is not binding. The employee should, therefore, it was said, have an opportunity in another trial to prove these facts, if they existed. The following is quoted from the opinion of Judge Marshall:

That part of the instruction which says, in substance, that the plaintiff can recover if he signed the release under a mistaken belief as to the extent of his injuries is not correct. He can recover when he proves that the agreement and release were executed under a mistake of both the plaintiff and the defendant as to the extent of the plaintiff's injuries, if he also proves that the amount already paid him is not adequate compensation under the law.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REVIEW AFTER LUMP-SUM SETTLEMENT-In re McCarthy, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (April 7, 1917), 115 Northeastern Reporter, page 764.-Patrick McCarthy was injured on December 22, 1913. On April 1, 1915, an agreement, entered into for the settlement of the remaining liability of the insurer by the payment of $500, was affirmed by the industrial accident board. Later, application was made for the loss of sight, which, at the time of making the settlement, was not anticipated. This was denied by the board, and its decision affirmed by the superior court of Suffolk County. The supreme judicial court also affirmed the decree, Judge Carroll, discussing for the court the effect of lump-sum payments in part, as follows:

The workmen's compensation act was intended to compensate employees during the period of incapacity for labor; and, in case of

death, to help their dependents by the payment of a weekly sum during a stated period. Its purpose was not to compensate by the payment of a lump sum unless the case presented features which made it unusual; and this fact was to be found by the industrial accident board. Weekly payments must have continued for six months and the agreement of settlement must be found to be for the best interests of the employee or his dependents. When these findings are once made, the payment is in full settlement for all compensation, general and specific, under the act. Both parties are bound by it. The insurer can not complain if the amount is thought to be too large, nor the employee, if too small.

Even if blindness developed after the six months' period, and it was caused by the injury and was unknown at the time of the settlement, the employee is nevertheless bound by the terms of his agree ment, which state:

*

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"Said payments are received in redemption of the liability for all weekly payments now or in the future due me for all injuries received by me on or about the 22d day of December, 1913.”

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REVIEW BY COURT-EFFECT OF RELEASE Odrowski v. Swift & Co., Supreme Court of Kansas (Nov. 11, 1916), 162 Pacific Reporter, page 268.-Stanley Odrowski was awarded compensation by the district court of Wyandotte County for injury suffered while in the employ of Swift & Co. The company appealed, claiming that a release which had been signed by the employee about four months after his injury and which the district court had set aside was binding. This release was given in consideration of $45 paid him at the time and $103.50 which he had previously received. These sums made a total which, according to the findings of the jury, exactly equalled the amount then due him. It was claimed on his behalf that the release was secured through false statements made by a physician in the employ of the company as to the extent of the injuries. The court said, however, that the employee's own testimony not only did not bear cut the view that he executed the release in reliance on such statements, but, on the other hand, negatived it, since he testified that he signed the paper without reading it or knowing that it was a release. It was pointed out that in the absence of any proof of fraud the mere fact that a person, having every opportunity to do so, does not read a paper which he signs, does not give the court power to permit him to avoid its effect. The specific provision for the setting aside of "agreements for compensation" and "awards" is held not to apply, because by the terms of the act an agreement can only be set aside for fraud or undue influence and because the word "award" is used throughout in the sense of an arbitration. Finally, it is held that the judgment must be reversed and remanded with directions to enter a judgment for the company rather than for a new trial.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REVISION OF AWARDS-MARRIAGE OF DEPENDENT SISTER-Adleman v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. (Ltd.) et al., Court of Appeals of Maryland (June 26, 1917), 101 Atlantic Reporter, page 529.—Morris Brenner, an employee of the Reliable Junk Co., of Hagerstown, Md., died December 5, 1914. as the result of an accidental injury. Compensation was awarded in the sum of $12.50 per week for 4 years and 32 weeks from the date of death, and this sum was apportioned equally between his mother and a sister, Mary Brenner, each receiving $6.25 per week. In June, 1916, the insurer, the company named in the title of the case, filed a petition praying that compensation to the sister be abated as of the date of June 19, 1915, on which date she had married one Adleman, but, as it was alleged, had concealed this fact, so that the company was not aware of it until June 1, 1916. The commission dismissed this petition, but on appeal by the company the circuit court for Washington County ordered the compensation abated. The claimant in turn appealed, and under the present decision she was successful in having the compensation ordered continued according to the original award. The compensation act provides that compensation shall cease on the marriage of a widow, and section 54 provides for modification of awards by the commission in the way of a reapportionment among the beneficiaries. It was argued by the insurance company that this gave the commission power to deprive one beneficiary of compensation altogether, but the court held that the section conferred no power upon the commission to annul the compensation to a beneficiary who was a dependent at the time of the employee's death.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-SELF-INSURANCE - CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-State ex rel. Turner v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. of Baltimore, Md., Supreme Court of Ohio (Apr. 17, 1917), 117 Northeastern Reporter, page 232.—This was a proceeding in quo warranto to oust certain insurance companies from exercising the franchise of writing in Ohio insurance to indemnify employers who, under section 22 of the workmen's compensation act, take upon themselves direct liability to pay compensation to workmen. With the exception of employers who become self-insurers under this section, all employers coming under the act are required to contribute to the State fund by paying premiums for insurance of their compensation liability therein. Certain employers, having satisfied the industrial commission of their financial ability to carry their own risks, secured permission to do so, and then obtained contracts from