Going beyond the contract relationship of employer and employee, a case (Clayton v. Enterprise Electric Co., p. 102) was passed upon by the Supreme Court of Oregon, which held the company liable for the death of an employee whose employer derived power from the transmission wires of the company. The failure of the company to properly insulate its switches was held to entail a liability upon it under the State statute.

OVERTIME WORK.

The effect of prolonged employment as entailing liability upon the employer for injuries traceable thereto was considered by the Supreme Court in a case before it on appeal from an appellate court of Illinois. (Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Wilson, p. 99.) Over 14 hours had intervened between the excessive work and the time when the injury was received. The jury had found that the injury was due to the strain upon the plaintiff because of the excessive labor. The contention that the injury must be received during the time of excessive work was rejected by the Supreme Court, as well as other contentions, and the defenses of contributory negligence and assumed risks were not allowed, and the judgment was affirmed.

RELATION TO COMPENSATION LAWS.

The compensation laws of a number of States establish alternative systems, providing that where the employer rejects or fails to accept the provisions of the compensation act liability remains with certain defenses abrogated. The Iowa statute is of this nature and declares that where injury occurs it should be presumed that such injury was due to the negligence of the employer as its proximate cause. In Mitchell v. Phillips Mining Co. (p. 104) this presumption was origi nally relied upon by the plaintiff, but on evidence being introduced to overthrow the presumption, both parties brought in additional evidence on this point. The trial court passed upon this evidence without submitting the case to the jury, but the supreme court of the State held this action improper, and remanded it for a jury trial, holding that only thus could the purposes and objects of the act be carried out.

In Shaughnessy v. Northland Steamship Co. (p. 103) the Supreme Court of Washington held that the workmen's compensation law of the State, which was claimed by the company to abolish suits at law for injuries to employees, was not applicable in a case in which a longshoreman was injured while unloading a vessel in Puget Sound. The court held that this abrogation could take effect only where the State laws were operative, and that this, being a maritime case, was outside of State control. Of the same tenor was the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in a case (Morrison

v. Commercial Towboat Co., p. 105) in which the mate of a towboat operating in Boston Harbor was injured while attempting to deliver an article to a seagoing barge. The State law excludes interstate commerce and seamen from its operation, and as the claimant was engaged in the excluded employments no benefits were obtainable under the act.

The status of a minor lawfully permitted to work, but engaged in a prohibited employment, was held by the Supreme Court of Minnesota not to be that of an employee under the compensation act, so that an action for damages was properly brought. (Westerlund v. Kettle River Co., p. 106.)

FEDERAL STATUTE.

Jurisdiction.-Where a suit has been decided under the law of a State without objection from the defendant, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that it was too late to raise the question of interstate commerce and the application of the Federal law on an appeal, and affirmed the judgment of the court below. The Supreme Court of the United States took the same position, holding also that since there was no right or privilege duly claimed under the Federal act it had no jurisdiction, and dismissed the case, leaving the judgment of the State courts undisturbed. (Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Taber, p. 101.)

Limitation.-Involving, like the foregoing, a consideration of State and Federal laws, was a case (Hogarty v. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co., p. 97), passed upon by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The conductor of a shifting crew on a railroad had sued at common law, and the company defended on the ground that he had received benefits from its relief society. On its admission that the injured man was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident, he pointed out that the Federal law did not make this a release from liability. On the company's reply that the action was not brought under Federal law, an attempt was made to amend the pleadings so as to bring the case under that statute, which the trial court refused to allow. The supreme court reversed this ruling, and ordered a new trial, whereupon judgment was given for the employee. An appeal was again taken to the supreme court, which thereupon reversed its previous decision, following the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in a case involving this point, which had in the meantime been handed down. This was to the effect that a new cause of action was introduced by pleading the statute, and since more than two years had elapsed since the injury was received, the limiting provisions of the law prevented the prosecution of the case.

Exclusiveness. By far the most important cases relating to the exclusiveness of the Federal statute will be considered under the

heading "Workmen's Compensation, Interstate Commerce." A decision by the Supreme Court of the United States affecting a phase of this question determined that where a minor had recovered in a suit for damages under the Federal law, no common-law rights survived to the father, since the Federal statute determined the full liability of the company in cases of injury to its employees in interstate commerce (New York Central & Hudson River R. Co. v. Tonsellito, p. 98).

Interstate commerce.-The question of when the Federal law is applicable, and when it can not be availed of because the employee is not in interstate commerce, continues to be a vexing one. The general principle underlying the decisions is that the workman must at the time be engaged in work that is directly connected with or will facilitate interstate commerce. That such a connection existed in the case of a gateman who met his death while undertaking to back a horse and wagon from the track, so that he might close a protecting gate for the passage of an intrastate train, was held by the Supreme Court of California in Southern Pacific Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission (p. 92). This action involved the overruling of an award made by the commission under the State compensation law, the decision being based on a finding that the use of the track for both interstate and intrastate commerce brought within the scope of the Federal statute persons keeping it in suitable condition for use in interstate traffic. The same court reached an identical conclusion in a case involving the same principals (p. 93), the employee in this instance being a lineman engaged in removing a telephone wire which had fallen upon a trolley wire, the latter being a part of the equip ment of an electric railway used in interstate and intrastate commerce. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts (Lynch v. Boston & Maine Railroad, p. 96), likewise held the Federal law applicable in the case of a station agent killed while attempting to secure mail bags delivered by an interstate train; so also of a workman injured while assisting in jacking up a wrecked car to release another employee and to assist in clearing away the wreck (Southern Ry. Co. v. Puckett, p. 92), the decision in this instance being rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States. Another inclusion decided upon by the court of appeals of Missouri (Christy v. Wabash R. Co., p. 94) was that of a switchman killed while shifting cars to be taken to a point a few miles away for loading for interstate commerce. The court held that since the car had been designated for that use the Federal law applied, even though the car had not yet been loaded. Another point involved in this case was as to a violation of the safetyappliance law; the cars were properly equipped with safety couplers, but inasmuch as the method of switching adopted required the employee to take a position between the cars, it was held that the law was violated and liability incurred.

Cases held to be excluded from the operation of the Federal law, the employment not being of the nature of interstate commerce, were decided by the Supreme Court of the United States as follows: In Illinois Central R. Co. v. Peery (p. 91), where a freight conductor injured on a return trip, purely intrastate, claimed damages on the ground that the outgoing trip, in which interstate goods were carried, gave quality to the entire run-a contention which the court rejected; a case (Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Barlow, p. 95) involving the shifting of cars loaded with coal for use in coaling the engines, the coal having been brought from without the State but stored for several days in a yard within the State where the injury occurred, the court in this case holding that the interstate movement had terminated when the coal reached the yards; and a third case (Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Winters, p. 94), in which the work of repairing a locomotive used in both interstate and intrastate commerce was involved. In this case the court distinguished between such repairs and repairs upon a road permanently devoted to commerce among the States, the use of the engine being variable.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION.

While the vast majority of cases arising under the compensation laws receive final adjudication at the hands of the administrative officials, or by agreement between the parties, a considerable number reach the courts of last resort for the determination of contested points.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES.

Charges of unconstitutionality were made in several cases, some being directed against the essential principles of the acts, while others were addressed to specific provisions of law held objectionable by the contestants. Thus in Fassig v. State (p. 212) an objection was raised to provisions of the Ohio law permitting an injured employee to submit to the State commission his claim for redress where the employer has failed to come under the act and has not received permission to become a self-insurer. The right of thus submitting a claim to the commission is made alternative to that of bringing a suit for damages with the common-law defenses barred. The trial court had held that the legislature had exceeded its authority in making such a grant, but the appellate courts sustained the law and affirmed the award of benefits and penalty. Another provision of this same law provided for self-insurance where ability to make the necessary payments was satisfactorily shown. Certain employers, having secured the right to become self-insurers, proceeded to take out insurance for their protection in stock companies, whereupon

the State sought to oust such companies from writing insurance on the ground that the provision of the law authorizing self-insurance was unconstitutional. This the court rejected, and held the action both of the legislature and of the self-insurers to be valid (State ex rel. Turner v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., p. 284). A subsequent amendment debars self-insurers from obtaining such insurance.

Of more general nature were objections raised against the Illinois law (Chicago Rys. Co. v. Industrial Board, p. 215), the appellant contending that the act in question differs so largely from the act of 1911, which had been held constitutional, that the decision with reference thereto was not conclusive. The chief difference charged was that of discriminatory or class legislation, but the court found no merit in this contention and affirmed the constitutionality of the law on the principles laid down in its decision on the earlier law. The contract of the employee to assume the risks of his occupation was held to be void as contrary to the policy of the act. The employer in a case before the Maryland Court of Appeals (Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., p. 216) made various objections to the law on grounds of due process and contravention of the law of the land, but these objections were held answered by decisions of the Supreme Court. The contention that the act created a judicial body in violation of the State constitution was likewise ruled out. In Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co. (p. 217), the unconstitutionality of the law of Oklahoma was maintained by an employee who sought larger benefits in damages than the compensation law allows. A novel contention raised was that the compensation law is so revolutionary in character as to be in effect an amendment to the State constitution and beyond the power of the legislature to enact. The court held, however, that the act was within the police power of the State and valid. Another point involved in this case was as to the payment of damages for serious disfigurement in addition to the benefits allowed by the compensation law for disability; this the court would not allow, holding the act to be exclusive in its operation and not permitting supplementary action of the sort contemplated.

A circuit court of Hawaii had held the compensation law of that Territory unconstitutional as not allowing due process of law, both because of its alleged deficiency in the matter of requiring notice of hearings before the arbitration committees and because it abolished trial by jury; some question was also raised as to classification. The Supreme Court of the Territory rejected all the contentions made and sustained the act in every part. (Anderson v. Hawaii Dredging Co., p. 211.)