this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." Considering our former opinions, it must now be accepted as settled doctrine that, in consequence of these provisions, Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country. [Cases cited.] And further that, in the absence of some controlling statute, the general maritime law, as accepted by the Federal courts, constitutes part of our national law, applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. (The Lottawanna (Rodd v. Heartt), 21 Wall. 558 [other cases cited].)

By section 9, judiciary act of 1789, the district courts of the United States were given "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,** saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." And this grant has been continued. (Judicial Code, secs. 24 and 256.)

The work of a stevedore, in which the deceased was engaging, is maritime in its nature; his employment was a maritime contract; the injuries which he received were likewise maritime; and the rights and liabilities of the parties in connection therewith were matters clearly within the admiralty jurisdiction. [Cases cited.]

If New York can subject foreign ships coming into her ports to such obligations as those imposed by her compensation statute, other States may do likewise. The necessary consequence would be destruction of the very uniformity in respect to maritime matters which the Constitution was designed to establish; and freedom of navigation between the States and with foreign countries would be seriously hampered and impeded. The legislature exceeded its authority in attempting to extend the statute under consideration to conditions like those here disclosed. So applied, it conflicts with. the Constitution and to that extent is invalid.

Exclusive jurisdiction of all civil cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is vested in the Federal district courts, "saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it." The remedy which the compensation statute attempts to give is of a character wholly unknown to the common law, incapable of enforcement by the ordinary processes of any court, and is not saved to suitors from the grant of exclusive jurisdiction. [Cases cited.] And finally, this remedy is not consistent with the policy of Congress to encourage investments in ships, manifested in the acts of 1851 and 1884, which declare a limitation, upon the liability of their owners.

The judgment of the court below must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Pitney delivered dissenting opinions, the latter presenting considerations additional to those given in the former opinion, while Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Clarke based their dissent upon the grounds expressed by both the others. From Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion the following quotations are taken:

There is no doubt that the saving to suitors of the right of a common-law remedy leaves open the common-law jurisdiction of the State courts, and leaves some power of legislation, at least, to the

States. For the latter I need do no more than refer to State pilotage statutes, and to liens created by State laws in aid of maritime contracts. Nearer to the point, it is decided that a statutory remedy for causing death may be enforced by the State courts, although the death was due to a collision upon the high seas. [Cases cited.]

The

Taking it as established that a State has constitutional power to pass laws giving rights and imposing liabilities for acts done upon the high seas when there were no such rights or liabilities before. what is there to hinder its doing so in the case of a maritime tort? Not the existence of an inconsistent law emanating from a superior source-that is, from the United States. There is no such law. maritime law is not a corpus juris; it is a very limited body of customs and ordinances of the sea. The nearest to anything of the sort in question was the rule that a seaman was entitled to recover the expenses necessary for his cure when the master's negligence caused his hurt. The maritime law gave him no more. (The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 23 Sup. Ct. 483.) One may affirm with the sanction of that case that it is an innovation to allow suits in the admiralty by seamen to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence of the master and to apply the common-law principles of tort.

Now, however, common-law principles have been applied to sustain a libel by a stevedore in personam against the master for personal injuries suffered while unloading a ship. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 34 Sup. Ct. 733, and the Osceola recognizes that in some cases at least seamen may have similar relief.

Such cases as American S. B. Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522; The Ilamilton, 207 U. S. 398, 28 Sup. Ct. 133, and Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, supra, show that it is too late to say that the mere silence of Congress excludes the statute or common law of a State from supplementing the wholly inadequate maritime law of the time of the Constitution, in the regulation of personal rights, and I venture to say that it never has been supposed to do so, or had any such effect.

Mr. Justice Pitney also confined his dissent to the matter of admiralty, and short extracts only are given from the somewhat lengthy opinion:

It should be stated, at the outset, that the case involves no question of penalties imposed by the New York act but affects solely the responsibility of the employer to make compensation to the widow, in accordance with its provisions, which are outlined in New York C. R. Co. v. White.

The argument is that, even in the absence of any act of Congress prescribing the responsibility of a shipowner to his stevedore, the general maritime law, as accepted by the Federal courts when acting in the exercise of their admiralty jurisdiction, must be adopted as the rule of decision by State courts of common law when passing upon any case that might have been brought in the admiralty; and that, just as the absence of an act of Congress regulating interstate commerce in some cases is equivalent to a declaration by Congress that commerce. in that respect shall be free, so nonaction by Congress amounts to an imperative limitation upon the power of the States to interpose where maritime matters are involved.

This view is so entirely unsupported by precedent, and will have such novel and far-reaching consequences, that it ought not to be accepted without the most thorough consideration.

The grant of judicial power in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction never has been construed as excluding the jurisdiction of the courts of common law over civil causes that before the Constitution were subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts of admiralty and the common-law courts.

Nor is the reservation of a common-law remedy limited to such causes of action as were known to the common law at the time of the passage of the judiciary act. It includes statutory changes.1

WORK MEN'S COMPENSATION-BENEFICIARIES-WIFE LIVING APART FROM HUSBAND-LEGAL OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT-LUMP SUM-H. G. Godlitz Co. v. Industrial Board, Supreme Court of Illinois (Apr. 19, 1917), 115 Northeastern Reporter, page 855.-Henry Hunley was killed by an accident in the course of his employment with the company named. The industrial board found that he left surviving him his lawful wife, Florence Hunley, and made an award of $5.20 a week for 416 weeks, which was afterward commuted to the lump sum of $1.925.91. The employing company took the matter to the circuit court, which affirmed the award, but certified the case to the supreme court as one proper to be reviewed by it. It appeared that Hunley had married Florence Taylor in 1885, and a son and daughter were born; that the mother and son were living in Calgary, Canada, at the time of Hunley's death; that for a time between 1893 and 1896 he had lived with another woman. The company contended that Florence Hunley was not dependent upon Hunley and could not recover compensation. Paragraph (a) of section 7 provides that compensation shall be payable for death in a certain amount "if the employee leaves any widow, child, or children whom he was under legal obligation to support at the time of his injury." It was held that under the circumstances the wife was included as a beneficiary, the fact that the son contributed to her support, and that she was the owner of a home, not being material. Judge Carter for the court said in part:

There can be no question, from the evidence, but that the husband was under legal obligation to support his wife.

The evidence on the hearing before the industrial board shows, without contradiction, that the applicant, Florence Hunley, was legally married to the deceased and had never been divorced. Hunley's unfaithfulness to his wife would undoubtedly justify the wife in living separate and apart from him therafter, unless she condoned

1 As a consequence of the decision in this case, the sections of the judicial code referre to by Mr. Justice McReynolds were amended by Congress (Oct. 6, 1917), so as to save to claimants" the rights and remedies under the compensation law of any State" in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, thus adopting by legislative action the position taken by the courts of New York and the minority of the Supreme Court.

the offense. There was no evidence or attempt by counsel to prove that she did condone his unfaithfulness.

The duty to support his wife is imposed by law on the husband. This duty does not depend on the inadequacy of the wife's means, but on the marriage relation. 13 R. C. L. 1188. Some of the statutes as to workmen's compensation in other jurisdictions provide that the wife must be living with the husband at the time of the injury, but our act does not so provide.

The award of a lump sum, however, was overthrown, since the record did not disclose evidence that it was for the best interests of the parties, but contained simply a statement by the attorneys for Mrs. Hunley.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS-LOSS OF EYE ALREADY DEFECTIVE-Purchase v. Grand Rapids Refrigerator Co., Supreme Court of Michigan (Dec. 21, 1916), 160 Northwestern Reporter, page 391.—Clarence C. Purchase became a claimant for compensation, and an award was made against his employer, the company named. On March 17, 1915, Purchase, then 29 years of age, got hot sand in his right eye, and after treatment it was deemed necessary, on April 1, to remove the eye. During his childhood the eye had been severely injured, with the result that thereafter it was only capable of distinguishing light and perceiving the fact that an object was approaching it. He was able to return to work and earn undiminished wages after a few weeks, and the company contended that an award of the schedule rate for the loss of an eye, i. e., 50 per cent of wages for 100 weeks, was not warranted by the circumstances. In an opinion delivered by Judge Ostrander the court held that the law did not warrant the making of any distinction because of the previous impairment of the eye where some degree of usefulness had existed. The concluding portion of the opinion is as follows:

The legislature has not attempted a definition, or made a declaration, applicable to the case at bar, except in terms of the loss of an eye. It has not specified a normal eye, although it may be concluded that the law refers to an eye which performs in some degree the functions of a normal eye. A mere sightless organ might perhaps be considered no eye at all. Claimant has lost an eye, although an infirm one. It was not wholly useless as an eye. On the contrary, the testimony is that he could with it distinguish light and see approaching objects. As a result of the injury, there was disability, and the disability is "deemed to continue for the period specified, and the compensation so paid for such injury shall be as specified.

* *

The conclusion of the board will not be disturbed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-BENEFITS-PARTIAL DISABILITY— EMPLOYEE EARNING MORE THAN BEFORE INJURY-Dennis v. Cafferty et al., Supreme Court of Kansas (Mar. 16, 1917), 163 Pacific Reporter, page 461.-Thomas E. Dennis was injured while employed by W. H. Cafferty and another, doing business as the Kansas City Sand Co. His work was to load cars with sand, moving them with a pinch bar, and on November 28, 1914, while tightening a brake on top of a car, he received an injury to his hand. He wore splints on it for eight weeks, and afterwards a leather strap. The court found that his average earnings at the time of the injury were $13.50 per week, and that his probable weekly earnings would be $12 a week; also that his total disability lasted for 42 weeks and partial disability for 80 weeks. He was allowed $6.75 per week, or one-half his earnings, for 42 weeks, and $3 per week, the minimum compensation, for 80 weeks. It was contended that the finding that his probable earnings would be $12 a week was contrary to the evidence. He went to work at first on a "boy's job" for $10.50 per week for three months. Then he operated a power punch, work which favored the injured hand, for some time up to March 11, 1916, when he was given another job for the same company at $16.50, which he held until about the end of the month, the work still not being of a heavy nature. He resigned to accept a position as an overseer, on the duties of which he entered April 3, 1916, at $36 a week, and was holding this position at the time of the trial, May 23. He testified that this position was temporary, but that he expected to be transferred to another place at the same wages. There was evidence to the effect that the hand was not strong, and that he would not be able to do such work as he was doing when injured. The court said that it was impossible to justify the finding as to the amount of probable earnings, but took the view that the language of the statute provides a minimum for partial disability, and not for partial wage loss. The line of reasoning followed is apparent from the following quotation from the opinion delivered by Judge West:

In framing the present act the legislature was providing for payment on account of death or injury occurring in certain hazardous employments, with the general view of compensation at the ultimate. expense of the public patronizing the industry in which the disaster occurred. Certain boundary lines must needs be fixed to make the act practicable. Instead of 50 per cent any other per cent could have been designated in case of total incapacity. A minimum of $3 a week was prescribed, not because it would in each case be in accord with precise justice, but because as a general thing this was deemed a fair lower rung for the ladder of allowances. While aiming at a thing named compensation, no way was found to avoid in every instance certain inequities, or to provide in advance that judgments of courts might never turn out to be, in the light of subsequent develop

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