ter is gone into at considerable length, and the opinion concludes as follows:

The errors above noted invalidated the proceedings almost at their very beginning. Moreover, the errors are so numerous, so obvious, and so fatal to the validity of the proceedings that unless they were written into the record as they are, under the seal of the trial court, we could not believe that such things had occurred in the trial of a cause in a court of record.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

SUSPENSION OF MEMBER-INJUNCTIONHolmes et al. v. Brown, Supreme Court of Georgia (Feb. 13, 1917), 91 Southeastern Reporter, page 408.-A. Brown brought action against Martin Holmes, president of the Bricklayers, Plasterers, and Masons' Union of America, and others for an injunction to restrain them from refusing him the rights and privileges of a member of the local union of the organization in the city of Atlanta. He had been a member for about 14 years. He preferred charges against another member which he was not able to sustain, because, as stated in the court's opinion, the members who furnished the information were intimidated by persons outside the union. He in turn was accused of maliciously preferring an unfounded charge against a member, and was tried and found guilty and fined $50 at a meeting at which he was not present. No notice was given him of the preferring of the charges nor of the trial; in fact, he did not learn of the matter until a month later. He then made complaint, and was informed that he must pay the fine to the local union before an appeal could be taken, although the 30-day limit for appeals would be waived. He was unable to pay the fine, and was not allowed to be heard before the local union, nor to attend the meetings or pay his dues, which he tendered. The superior court. of Fulton County entered an interlocutory judgment ordering that he be given the privileges of membership pending a trial, and this judgment was affirmed by the supreme court, Judge Evans delivering the opinion and saying, in part:

The constitution and by-laws of the international union provide that no member shall be tried except upon a written charge stating the specific offense against the accused member, and that the trial shall be had on a stated day; if the member refuse to be present, he shall be notified of the time when the trial shall occur. Upon conviction and sentence the same operates as a suspension of all benefits and privileges until compliance with the terms of the sentence, with a right of appeal to the judiciary board on payment of the fine. The constitution and by-laws further provide for a beneficiary and mortuary fund maintained on a mutual plan, for the benefit of members who have been connected with the union for a period longer than 6 months; for a pension system providing for

a benefit to members who have reached the age of 60 years, and who have been in continuous good standing for a period of 20 years; and for a disability benefit to members of 10 years' standing.

The court found as a conclusion of fact that the evidence authorized an inference that the plaintiff had been illegally tried and sentenced, and that he had tendered all of his dues in arrears; in other words, his status was that of a lawful member of the union. In the court's order the plaintiff was required to pay these dues to the local union, and upon compliance with this condition by him the union was temporarily enjoined from interference with his rights as a member. The order does not finally adjudicate the plaintiff's status as a member, and should not be construed as so doing.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS UNLAWFUL COMBINATIONS-RESTRAINT OF TRADE INJUNCTION-PREVENTION OF COMPETITION-Paine Lumber Co. (Ltd.) et al. v. Neal et al., Supreme Court of the United States (June 11, 1917), 37 Supreme Court Reporter, page 718.—The company named and other corporations of States other than New York brought a bill in equity against Elbridge H. Neal and others, officers and agents of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and its New York branch; union manufacturers who were members of the Manufacturing Woodworkers Association; and master carpenters who were members of the Master Carpenters Association. The bill was dismissed in a Federal district court, and the decree of dismissal was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. (Same case, 214 Fed. 82, Bul. No. 169, p. 164.) The Supreme Court took the same view, four justices dissenting. Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the prevailing opinion, as follows:

In

The bill alleges a conspiracy of the members of the brotherhood and the New York branch to prevent the exercise of the trade of carpenters by anyone not a member of the brotherhood, and to prevent the plaintiffs and all other employers of carpenters not such members from engaging in interstate commerce and selling their goods outside of the State where the goods are manufactured, and it sets out the usual devices of labor unions as exercised to that end. 1909 the master carpenters, coerced by the practical necessities of the case, made an agreement with the New York branch, accepting a previously established joint arbitration plan to avoid strikes and lockouts. This agreement provides that "there shall be no restriction against the use of any manufactured material except nonunion or prison-made;" the arbitration plan is confined to shops that use union labor, and the employers agree to employ union labor only. The unions will not erect material made by nonunion mechanics. Another agreement between the manufacturing Woodworkers' Association, the brotherhood, and the New York branch, also adopts the plan of arbitration; the labor unions agree that "none of their members will erect or install nonunion or prison-made material," and the woodworkers undertake that members of the brotherhood shall "be employed exclusively in the mills of the Manufacturing

Woodworkers' Association." It is found that most of the journeymen carpenters in Manhattan and part of Brooklyn belong to the brotherhood, and that, owing to their refusal to work with nonunion men, and to employers finding it wise to employ union men, it is very generally impracticable to erect carpenter work in those places except by union labor. It also is found that, owing to the above pro visions as to nonunion material, the sale of the plaintiff's goods in those places has been made less. The workmen have adopted the policy complained of without malice toward the plaintiffs, as part of a plan to bring about " A nation-wide unionization in their trade.” An injunction is asked against the defendants (other than the master carpenters) conspiring to refuse to work upon material made by the plaintiff. because not made by union labor; or enforcing bylaws intended to prevent working with or upon what is called unfair material; or inducing persons to refuse to work for persons purchasing such material, or taking other enumerated steps to the same general end; or conspiring to restrain the plaintiffs' interstate business in order to compel them to refuse to employ carpenters not members of the brotherhood. It is prayed further that the provision quoted above from the master carpenters' agreement and another ancillary one be declared void and the parties enjoined from carrying them out. No other or alternative relief is prayed. The ground on which the injunction was refused by the district court was that, although it appeared that the agreements above mentioned were parts of a comprehensive plan to restrain commerce among the States, the conspiracy was not directed specially against the plaintiffs and had caused them no special damage, different from that inflicted on the public at large. The circuit court of appeals, reserving its opinion as to whether any agreement or combination contrary to law was made out, agreed with the judge below on the ground that no acts directed against the plaintiffs personally were shown.

In the opinion of a majority of the court, if the facts show any violation of the act of July 2, 1890 [Sherman Antitrust Act], a private person can not maintain a suit for an injunction under section 4 of the same (Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U. S. 48, 70, 71, 24 Sup. Ct. 598); and especially such an injunction as is sought even if we should go behind what seems to have been the view of both courts below, that no special damage was shown, and reverse their conclusion of fact. No one would maintain that the injunction should be granted to parties not showing special injury to themselves. Personally, I lay those questions on one side because, while the act of October 15, 1914 [Clayton Act], establishes the right of private parties to an injunction in proper cases, in my opinion it also establishes a policy inconsistent with the granting of one here. I do not go into the reasoning that satisfies me, because upon this point I am in a minority.

As this court is not the final authority concerning the laws of New York, we say but a word about them. We shall not believe that the ordinary action of a labor union can be made the ground of an injunction under those laws until we are so instructed by the New York Court of Appeals. National Protective Asso. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. É. 369 [Bul. No. 42, p. 1118]. Certainly the conduct complained of has no tendency to produce a monopoly of manufacture

or building, since the more successful it is the more competitors are introduced into the trade.

Decree affirmed.

Mr. Justice Pitney wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice McKenna and Mr. Justice Van Devanter concurred, Mr. Justice McReynolds also dissenting. Mr. Justice Pitney disagreed with the view of the majority that a private person can not maintain a suit for an injunction under the fourth section of the Sherman Act, saying that the case cited, Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., is not "an authority against the right of complainants to an injunction to prevent special and irreparable damage to their property rights through a violation of the Sherman Act, the effect of that decision being merely to deny relief by injunction to individuals not directly and specially injured." He held that a right to apply for such injunction is given, not by, any specific provision of the statute, but by the absence of any provision denying it and by the settled principles of equity. The special injury necessary, he thought, was present in this instance. His view of the effect of the provisions of the Clayton Act is shown by the following quotation:

The suggestion, in behalf of defendants, that section 6 of the Clayton Act establishes a policy inconsistent with relief by injunction in such a case as the present, by making legitimate any acts or practices of labor organizations or their members that were unlawful before, is wholly inadmissible. The section prohibits restraining members of such organizations from "lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof." What these are is indicated by the qualifying words: "Instituted for the purpose of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit." But these are protected only when "lawfully carried out." The section safeguards these organizations while pursuing their legitimate objects by lawful means, and prevents them from being considered, merely because organized, to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade. The section, fairly construed, has no other or further intent or meaning. A reference to the legislative history of the measure confirms this view. (House Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 2, 14-16; Senate Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 1, 10, 46.) Neither in the language of the section, nor in the committee reports, is there any indication of a purpose to render lawful or legitimate anything that before the act was unlawful, whether in the objects of such an organization or its members or in the measures adopted for accomplishing them.

It is altogether fallacious, I think, to say that what is being done by the present defendants is done only for the purpose of strengthening the union. Conceding this purpose to be lawful, it does not justify or excuse the resort to unlawful measures for its accomplishment. Ä member of a labor union may refuse to work with nonunion men, but this does not entitle him to threaten manufacturers for whom he is not working, and with whom he has no concern, with loss of trade and a closing of the channels of interstate commerce against their

products if they do not conduct their business in a manner satisfactory to him.

And the suggestion that, before the Clayton Act, unlawful practices of this kind were usually and notoriously resorted to by labor unions, and that for this reason Congress must have intended to describe them as "legitimate objects," and thus render lawful what before was unlawful, is a libel upon the labor organizations and a serious impeachment of Congress.

Nor can I find in section 20 of the Clayton Act anything interfering with the right of complainants to an injunction. It refers only to cases" between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment." These words evidently relate to suits arising from strikes and similar controversies, and the committee reports upon the bill bear out this view of the scope of the section. But this is not such a suit. There is no relation of employer and employee, either present or prospective, between the parties in this case. Defendants who are employees are in one branch of industry in New York City; complainants are employers of labor in another branch of industry in distant States. Nor is there any dispute between them concerning terms or conditions of employment. Section 20 prohibits an injunction restraining any person" from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto."

* * *

Clearly, this provision is limited to the participants in a dispute of the character just indicated. And, quite as clearly, only "lawful" measures are sanctioned-that is, of course, measures that were lawful before the act. There is no grant, in terms or by necessary inference, of immunity in favor of a boycott of traders in interstate commerce, violative of the provisions of the Sherman Act, to which the Clayton Act is supplemental.

MECHANICS' LIENS-ASSIGNMENT BY CONTRACTOR OF AMOUNT DUE HIM-London Bros. et al. v. National Exchange Bank of Roanoke et al., Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia (Sept. 20, 1917), 93 Southeastern Reporter, page 699.-The King Lumber Co. constructed for the city of Roanoke a municipal building, and before the laborers, supply men, and subcontractors had been paid the company assigned $15,000 of the amount due it from the city to the bank named. The city brought a bill of interpleader, praying for a decision directing it as to the distribution of the balance of nearly $21,000 due from it. under the contract. The company having become bankrupt, its trustees were among the claimants made parties defendant. The laborers, etc., made their claim under "An act to protect subcontractors, supply men, and laborers," Code of 1904, section 2482a, pro