the employee shall not be held to be guilty of contributory negli gence, nor to have assumed the risk, where violation of any statute enacted for his safety contributed to the injury-the reference being, it was assumed, to the Federal Safety Appliance Act. The employee was admittedly in the performance of his duty when injured. He was a switchman, and was on top of one of two standing cars, when an engine and car were backed against five other standing cars near by to couple on to them. Through defect of the coupling apparatus, the connection was not made, but the five cars were set in motion against the car on which he was, throwing him to the track, where his right arm was crushed by the cars. The question disputed was whether the provisions of the Safety Appliance Act relating to couplers is intended for the benefit of all who may be injured through failure to conform to its regulations, or only of those whom such failure compels to go between the cars. The Supreme Court adopted the former view, sustaining the position taken by the court below, saying that while the immediate occasion of the enactment of the laws was the protection of the class of employees who were required by their duties to go between the cars, their benefits were by no means confined to such persons.

COMPANIES-SAFETY

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-RAILROAD APPLIANCES-PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE-FATHER'S RIGHT TO DAMAGES FOR DEATH OF MINOR SON-Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Gotschall, Supreme Court of the United States (May 21, 1917), 37 Supreme Court Reporter, page 598.-Merlin E. Gotschall, 20 years of age, was head brakeman on a freight train transporting merchandise in interstate commerce. He was near the rear end of the train, proceeding over the tops of the cars toward the engine, when the train became separated because of the opening of a coupler on one of the cars, the emergency brakes automatically became set, and the sudden jerk caused thereby threw him off the train and under the wheels, killing him. Nora Gotschall brought suit as administratrix against the railroad company, and the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed a judgment in her favor. Whether the mere fact of the failure of the coupler to hold was sufficient to enable a jury to infer negligence was in dispute, as was also the necessity of evidence of pecuniary loss on the part of the father, in whose interest the action was brought. The judgment was affirmed, Mr. Chief Justice White delivering the opinion, and saying:

The jury, under an instruction of the court, was permitted to infer negligence on the part of the company from the fact that the coupler failed to perform its function, there being no other proof of negligence. It is insisted this was error, since, as there was no other

evidence of negligence on the part of the company, the instruction of the court was erroneous as, from whatever point of view looked at, it was but an application of the principle designated as res ipsa loquitur. We think the contention is without merit because, conceding in the fullest measure the correctness of the ruling announced in the cases relied upon to the effect that negligence may not be inferred from the mere happening of an accident except under the most exceptional circumstances, we are of opinion such principle is here not controlling in view of the positive duty imposed by the statute upon the railroad to furnish safe appliances for the coupling of cars. [Cases cited.]

Again it is insisted that error was committed in submitting the case to the jury because there was no evidence of pecuniary loss resulting to Gotschall's father, on whose behalf the suit was brought. But this disregards the undisputed fact that the deceased was a minor, and as, under the Minnesota law, the father was entitled to the earnings of his son during minority, the question is one not of right to recover, but only of the amount of damages which it was proper to award.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-RAILROAD COMPANIES-STATE AND FEDERAL STATUTES JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL SUPREME COURT-Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Taber, Supreme Court of the United States (May 21, 1917), 37 Supreme Court Reporter, page 522.-Charles L. Small was killed while employed as a switchman by the railway company named, and Margaret L. Taber, the guardian of his minor children, brought suit in their behalf to recover damages. Action was brought under the statutes of the State of Missouri, and no objection was made to this by the company in its answer or at the trial. The company appealed from a judgment in the plaintiff's favor, but the State supreme court refused to consider the contention that, since Small was engaged in interstate commerce, the Federal act should have been relied upon, and affirmed the judgment of the court below. The Supreme Court of the United States also held that it was too late to raise the question. Mr. Justice McReynolds, in delivering the opinion, stated that "Unless some right, privilege, or immunity under the Federal act was duly and especially claimed, we have no jurisdiction," and concluded as follows:

The original action was based upon a State statute; the answer did not set up or rely upon the Federal act; the trial court's attention was not called thereto, and although urged to hold liability dependent upon it, the supreme court declined to pass upon that point because not presented to the trial court. This ruling seems in entire accord with both State statutes and established practice. [Cases cited.]

The case was therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction, leaving the judgment of the State courts undisturbed.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-SAFE PLACE TO WORK-INSPECTION OF PILING-South v. Seattle, Port Angeles & Western Ry. Co., Supreme Court of Washington (Nov. 20, 1917), 168 Pacific Reporter, page 896.-Benjamin R. South was fireman on a locomotive of the company named, when, on January 28, 1916, it was precipitated into the bay at Port Angeles by the giving way of a trestle. He brought suit for damages, and a verdict in his favor for $16,000 was rendered by a jury in the superior court of King County, which sum was. reduced by the court to $10,000. The company contended, that no negligence on its part was shown. The trestle was built for the passage of trains hauling logs to a mill, and was constructed in May or June, 1914. It was claimed by the company that since such piling should last for three years there was no duty, to inspect before the expiration of that time; also that the trestle had been repaired in fulfillment of any duty owed by it, about December 1, 1915. A man of experience testified, on the other hand, that while the life of piling varied in different waters, it was not safe to rely on its being in good condition for more than a year. The repairing referred to was upon the side next the bay, where one or two piles were replaced and fender piles built to prevent damage from floating logs. There was testimony that on the other side, next the shore and the log dump--the side where the engine went off-the piling was soft and spongy under the water from the action of teredos and submarine growths; and that several weeks before the accident a pile was seen to be loose, and to be separated about 2 feet from the cap which should rest on its top, and that some days before the accident it disappeared entirely; it was at this point that the break occurred and the engine went down. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the duty of inspection and attention to the weakness of the trestle was cast upon the company by the conditions shown.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-SAFETY PROVISIONS LIABILITY OF ELECTRIC COMPANY TO EMPLOYEE OF PATRON-Clayton v. Enterprise Electric Co., Supreme Court of Oregon (Dec. 5, 1916), 161 Pacifie Reporter, page 411.-W. S. Clayton was killed by electric shock while turning a switch, and his widow sued the company named for damages, and prevailed. He was in the employ of Carl Roe, the owner of a pumping plant used for purposes of irrigation, power being derived from the transmission wires of the electric company. It was asserted that the company failed to properly insulate its switches and other apparatus, and that it was therefore liable under the provisions of the employers' liability law of the State. On the other side it was claimed that the statute applies only to the relation

of employer and employee, and that the judgment of the court below for the plaintiff was not warranted for this among other reasons. Judge Bean, who delivered the opinion of the supreme court, deciding the points raised in a manner which sustained the decision below, said on the question stated:

From the language of the statute, which makes three special references to the safety of the general public, or the public, it seems there can be no doubt but that the provisions of the law are intended to safeguard members of the public from injury by coming in contact with wires or appliances owned and controlled by an electric company and used in the transmission and application of electricity of a dangerous voltage. The title of the act plainly shows the purpose, more fully set forth in the body of the act, to protect all persons working around high voltage wires, without regard to whether they are employees of the electric company or not. The enactment is for the protection of life and limb, and should be given a fair and liberal construction in the interest of public safety and protection of human life.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-ErFECT APPLICATION TO WORKMAN ON SHIP ON NAVIGABLE WATERSShaughnessy v. Northland Steamship Co., Supreme Court of Washington (Jan. 24, 1917), 162 Pacific Reporter, page 546.-George Shaughnessy recovered a judgment for $3,500 as damages in a common-law action in the superior court of King County for injuries suffered by him in the employ of the company named upon the steamship Aiki, which he was assisting in unloading at a wharf located in the navigable waters of Puget Sound. He was obliged to descend into the hold for his work by a ladder, which was perpendicular and set back under the edge of a hatch a few inches so as not to interfere with the movement of the cargo sling when it was raised and lowered through this hatch. Above the hatch coaming was a rope supported by stanchions so as to form a railing. When he bore his weight upon the rope in order to get a footing upon the ladder one of the stanchions gave way, and he was precipitated into the hold 20 feet below, suffering the injuries complained of. The supreme court first held that there was no reason for disturbing the findings of the jury, which, in rendering a verdict for the plaintiff, necessarily found that the company was negligent in allowing the rope, of which an employee might be expected to take hold in climbing to his work, to be insecure, and also that the employee was not guilty of contributory negligence in relying upon its support.

The important question, it is said, is whether the workmen's compensation act has withdrawn such cases from the consideration of the courts in a common-law suit, as was contended by the defendant company. It is pointed out that the act is compulsory, neither em

ployer nor employee having any option in the matter where the occupation comes within the scope of the act. This, says Judge Parker, who wrote the opinion, “points to a legislative intent to make the act applicable only to those relations of employer and employee which are in the legislative control of the State untrammeled by the laws of the United States and the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States." It would follow, in the view of the court, that contribution is not required to the fund by the company, so far as the maritime service of its employees is concerned, and, though the ship was in the harbor, it was in a position which would subject the matter to the admiralty jurisdiction if the employee saw fit to pursue that remedy. The opinion cites the case, State ex rel. Jarvis v. Daggett, 87 Wash. 253, 151 Pac. 648 (Bul. No. 189, p. 250), in which it was held that such maritime service was not within the act, and an attempt to compel the compensation commission to collect a contribution from the employer and for the fund, in order that the claim might be paid from the fund, was unsuccessfully prosecuted. The decisions in other States are for the most part differentiated because the laws are elective, and it is held that the compensation act does not apply to such cases under the Washington statute. The judgment for the employee was therefore affirmed.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY—WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-EFFECT OF REJECTION-PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE-Mitchell v. Phillips Mining Co., Supreme Court of Iowa (Nov. 16, 1917), 165 Northwestern Reporter, page 108.-This was an action for damages for the death of a miner employed by the company named, who received fatal injuries from the fall of slate from the roof of the mine. The Iowa workmen's compensation law provides:

In actions by an employee against an employer for personal injury sustained, arising out of and in the course of the employment, where the employer has elected to reject the provisions of this act, it shall be presumed that the injury to the employee was the direct result and growing out of the negligence of the employer; and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury; and in such cases the burden of proof shall rest upon the employer to rebut the presumption of negligence.

The plaintiff in this case did not at first introduce evidence of the negligence of the company, but relied upon the presumption created by the paragraph of the law quoted above. The company then introduced evidence which it claimed was sufficient to overthrow the presumption and disprove its negligence. Further evidence was then in turn given by both parties. Without presenting any question to the jury, the court directed a verdict for the company,