In the Franco-German War, the chief of staff of the Tenth Corps, on the morning of the battle of Gravelotte, detailed one of his subordinates to each division. These officers, accompanied by orderlies, and made acquainted with operations of the day, were instructed to report every important event that transpired. They were not spies on the division commander, but acting on the just theory that the latter would often be too much engaged to communicate intelligence of vital importance, they served as a double line of communication between the corps commander and the troops.

Our Army in 1861, was of course too small to furnish the same number of trained officers as is contemplated in foreign services, but with a little previous preparation, we might have furnished a competent chief of staff to each of the twenty-five corps commanders. Had such an adviser been by the side of General Sigel, to write his instructions for the movements of his divisions, it would scarcely have been possible for his gross misconstruction of orders to have escaped discovery and correction. There was, however, no such officer near him, and, as a consequence, when General McDowell was apprised of his mistake, it was probably too late to correct it.

The left wing having in this manner arrived near Manassas, with no exact knowledge of the enemy's whereabouts, let us see what benefit the country might possibly have derived from having a few competent staff officers at army headquarters. Map in hand, each eager to penetrate the enemy's designs and to suggest the means of circumventing him, they would have asked, on learning of his disappearance from Manassas, the following questions: Will he make a raid around the army with infantry? No; that would be folly. He has reason to believe that our main army is advancing along the railroad; that he might be headed off by troops moving from Fredericksburg, while the main army striking him in flank might cut him in two, if not force him to surrender.

Is he going to move upon Washington? No; that would be equally absurd. He knows that between him and the capital he will encounter. formidable entrenchments and that behind them there is still the Potomac. Moreover, through his spies, he ought now to know that the Army of the Potomac is disembarking at Alexandria. To deceive us, will he make a demonstration on Centreville, and then maneuver to the northwest to open communication with his main body? This course, and this one only, conforms to the principles of strategy and on this supposition we should act.

In the meantime the general, presumably better instructed than his staff, would probably have come to the same conclusion, but had he not, the moment they saw him in doubt or about to order a movement upon Centreville, any one of them by exclaiming, "To the Warrenton pike," might have settled the fate of the Confederacy."

It was now but 1 o'clock. Kearny, followed by Hooker and Reno, was at Manassas, less than 6 miles from the pike, which was Jackson's first line of retreat. Sigel, next on the left, was 4 miles, and Reynolds

a It is related that on one occasion a soldier who was standing near Napoleon, observed a blunder committed by the enemy when he instantly exclaimed: "Send a squadron there and they are ours!"

Napoleon, who heard the remark, inquired for him after the battle, but he was not to be found. It is possible that from the knapsack of this nameless soldier death snatched the baton of a great marshal.

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but 2 miles, from Groveton. Porter, available as a reserve, was awaiting orders at Bristoe, 6 miles from Groveton. King still remained in the immediate vicinity of Gainesville. Ricketts was disputing Longstreet's advance through Thoroughfare Gap. The enemy at the same time had scarcely more than a division at Groveton, the other two being on the march from the east side of Bull Run. Had a movement now been ordered upon Groveton, King, Reynolds, and Sigel would have engaged Talliaferro's division within less than two hours, while the right wing, Kearny, Hooker, and Reno, advancing on the Sudley Spring and parallel roads, would have engaged Ewell and Hill before they could have joined Talliaferro.

Unfortunately for the country this opportunity to crush Jackson was lost, as General Pope had no information and was left to divine the enemy's movements from what he could learn at Manassas. His troops were now converging to no purpose and new combinations had to be made. All the movements of the enemy previously discussed seemed to have passed through the mind of the commander. His first impulse was correct. He ordered the left wing to Gum Spring, and had there been a single adviser near him to strengthen this resolution, a victory, according to the doctrine of chances, must have ensued. The movement would have taken McDowell's two corps to Groveton, and not striking the enemy there, he would have proceeded 8 miles farther to the Little River pike, Jackson's last line of retreat.

At 1.20 p. m., General Pope's purpose to march his whole force to the Warrenton pike was clearly defined. He wrote to General McDowell as follows:

I sent you a despatch a few minutes ago, directing you to move on Gum Spring to intercept Jackson. Since then I have received your note of this morning. I will this evening push forward Reno to Gainesville and follow with Heintzelman, unless there is a large force of the enemy at Centreville, which I do not believe. Ascertain, if you can, about this. I do not wish you to carry out the order to proceed to Gum Spring if you consider it too hazardous, but I will support you in any way you suggest, by pushing forward from Manassas Junction across the turnpike. Jackson has a large train, which should certainly be captured. Give me your views fully. You know the country much better than I do. Come no further in this direction with your command, but call back what has advanced thus far. a

It must be admitted that in default of positive knowledge as to the enemy's position, which the commander had a right to expect from the left wing, no act of reasoning ever promised more brilliant results, but before the above order could be received and put into execution, information from another direction changed the plan of campaign. At 4.15 p. m., General Pope, from Manassas, wrote General McDowell:

The enemy is reported in force on the other side of Bull Run, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, as also near Centreville. I have ordered Sigel to march on Centreville immediately, as also Kearny and Reno. I will advance Hooker as reserve. Please march immediately with your command directly upon Centerville from where you are.

Overlooking his, McDowell's, neglect to have Sigel move on Manassas at dawn, it was not till after the order to march on Centreville was received, that the fatal consequences of McDowell's failure to check Sigel's effort, to place his right on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, became fully apparent.

a Report of Military Operations during the Rebellion, vol. 6, p. 222.
b Ibid.,
p. 223.

General Sigel's instructions, received at 3 a. m., required him to march immediately with his whole corps, his right resting on the Manassas Gap Railroad. Had he obeyed them it would not have been possible, as we have seen, for the two corps, Reynolds and King advancing on the left in échelon of columns, to have passed through the interval of 2 miles from Groveton to the railroad, without coming in contact with the enemy. The sound of battle from this direction would have produced an instant change in the movements of the right wing. Kearny and Reno, instead of marching east from Greenwich to Manassas Junction, on learning from the cavalry that the latter point was evacuated, could have turned north and in less than two hours could have arrived on the field of battle. Hooker and Porter following in their footsteps, would have been within easy supporting distance. With all these advantages in our favor it seems incredible that the enemy should have escaped.

As early as 9 a. m. of the 28th, the whole army of Virginia, save Bank's corps, whether moving upon Manassas from Gainesville, Buckland Mills, Greenwich, or Bristoe, were within a circle of less than 6 miles from Groveton, where, with all of McDowell's corps in its rear, but one division of Jackson's force was then posted. Yet, with destruction thus staring it in the face, the faulty use of our cavalry and the movement of the left wing to the south of the Manassas Gap Railroad, permitted Talliaferro's division to remain undiscovered, while passing almost within musket range of its outposts.

After receiving the 4.15 p. m. order, General Sigel states in his report: "I was sure that the enemy must be somewhere between Centreville and Gainesville," and asked permission to march to New Market, a point midway between the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and the Warrenton pike. This speculation, which hours before should have given place to positive information, came too late. Our army had begun the unfortunate march upon Centreville. Its commander, with Kearny, Hooker, and Reno, was already hastening away from the enemy toward the new point of concentration. Sigel's route, from the point where the order of 4.15 p. m. reached him, lay about midway between the Warrenton pike and the road from Manassas to Centreville. On crossing the road from Manassas to New Market, he learned from his advance guard, that the enemy was on the west side of Bull Run, on the roads leading from New Market to Groveton and Sudley Springs. He therefore detached Milroy's and McLean's brigades to advance upon him, and with one brigade and Schurz's division, continued his march till he arrived near the fords of Bull Run. Here, learning that Centreville was evacuated and that his back was toward the enemy, he changed direction to the northwest and moved toward the Warrenton pike to join the two brigades previously detached.

In the meantime, King's division, which in consequence of the delays and mistakes already related, had remained all day in the vicinity of Gainesville, was directed to move upon Centreville by the Warrenton pike. This order speedily brought him into collision with Talliaferro's and Ewell's divisions, about a mile northwest of Groveton, with whom he fought till toward 9 p. m.

Reynolds's division, in its movement upon Manassas, had arrived near the Sudley Church road, when at 5 p. m., it received the order to

a Report of Military Operations during the Rebellion, vol. 6, p. 106.

march by this road to the Warrenton pike and thence to Centreville. Its commander shortly after, hearing firing to his left, west of Groveton, and to his right and front in the presumed direction of General Sigel, went in person to the left, whence after the firing ceased, he arranged with General King to reenforce the latter at daylight. At 1 a. m. of the 29th, however, King having received no orders from his corps commander, took the responsibility of withdrawing, and directed his march upon Manassas.

During the whole afternoon of the 28th, Ricketts disputed the advance of Longstreet's corps through Thoroughfare Gap, but after dark, finding that both of his flanks were in danger of being turned, and receiving no orders, he fell back to Gainesville. There, learning that King's division was moving upon Manassas, he decided to march upon the same point via Bristoe.

With the retirement of King's and Ricketts's divisions of McDowell's corps, vanished the last chance of destroying Jackson. Longstreet's advance was already through Thoroughfare Gap; the Warrenton pike was left open, and now a distance of but 8 miles separated the two wings of the once divided army. While events thus favored the speedy junction of the Confederate army, lack of information caused the Union forces to be scattered more and more. The report of King's engagement reached General Pope at Centreville about 10 p. m., but unaware of the withdrawal of McDowell's two divisions, it only led him into another serious error. At 3 a. m. of the 29th, the following despatch was sent to General Porter at Bristoe:

McDowell has intercepted the retreat of Jackson. Sigel is immediately on the right of McDowell. Kearny and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at early dawn. Major-General Pope directs you to move upon Centreville at the first dawn of day with your whole command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very important that you should be here at a very early hour in the morning. A severe engagement is likely to take place, and your presence is necessary."

This despatch, although dated 3 a. m. on the 29th, may be said to have closed the events of the 28th.

At the beginning of the campaign along the Rappahannock, all the advantages were on the side of the enemy. He had a united army against two disunited armies, whose junction on the line selected was, from the beginning, impossible.

This advantage, in his eagerness to attack the Union line of communications, he threw away. By an unwise movement the position of the contending forces on the morning of the 28th was reversed. The wings of Lee's army were separated and between them lay the whole army of Virginia, 60,000 strong. The force in its rear numbered less than 30,000. At dawn one-third of this scattered force was within 3 miles of McDowell's column of more than 25,000 men. On the night of the 28th, all of Jackson's troops were united and before 3 a. m. of the 29th, the date of Porter's order to march upon Centreville, his communication was fully restored with Longstreet. His escape was miraculous, but was in no sense accomplished by his superior strategy. It was due to the false movements of the left wing, under McDowell, which, within a radius of scarcely 3 miles, circled from the pike west of Gainesville to the pike east of Groveton without discovering till nightfall the enemy's position.

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 2, Supplement.

Corps and division commanders without professional experience, incompetent staff officers, a cavalry broken down and made useless less by long marches, than by inexperienced colonels and captains who did not yet know how to husband the strength of their horses, are some of the lessons conveyed by this lost opportunity to suppress the Rebellion.

The position of the Union troops at the close of the 28th was as follows: Kearny, Hooker, and Reno were near Centreville; Sigel near the Henry House on the Warrenton pike, facing toward Sudley Spring and Groveton; Reynolds's division on Sigel's left, facing west; King's division marching from Gainesville to Manassas; Ricketts's division marching from Thoroughfare Gap via Gainesville to Bristoe; Porter at Bristoe; Banks south of Bristoe guarding the trains.

The position of the enemy on the night of the 28th was: Jackson extending from the vicinity of Groveton to Sudley Church, facing toward Centreville; Longstreet's advance east of Thoroughfare Gap, his main body near its western entrance.

It will be seen from the relative positions of the forces, that the opportunity for decisive action so temptingly offered to the Union troops, on the morning of the 28th, passed to the Confederates, on the morning of the 29th. But in this emergency fortune was strictly impartial. Lack of information saved the Confederates on the 28th and, on the 29th, rendered the same service to the Union.

BOARD OF INQUIRY ON GENERAL FITZ JOHN PORTER.

In regard to the concentration of the Confederates, General Longstreet states:

My command (25,000 in round numbers) was within supporting distance of General Jackson at 9 a. m., August 29, having passed Thoroughfare Gap at early dawn. My command was deployed in double line for attack between 10 a. m. and 12 m. on the 29th, extending from Jackson's right across turnpike and Manassas Gap Railroad. My command was ready to receive any attack after 11 a. m.a

While this evidence should be conclusive as to the hour of the junction of the Confederate forces, the information in the possession of the Union commanders at the time, was sufficient to warn them of what was taking place. Ricketts had fought with the advance guard of Longstreet during the whole afternoon of the 28th, until his right flank was turned through Hopewell Gap, while his left was exposed by an advance through New Baltimore. But more definite information pointed to the exact time of the junction. General Buford notified General McDowell that at 8.45 a. m. on the 29th, seventeen regiments of infantry, a battery of artillery, and some cavalry had marched through Gainesville, on the way to Groveton.

Pending this junction, the dispositions of the Union right wing were as follows: Sigel and Reynolds facing westward attacked Jackson at daylight. Kearny, ordered to march from Centreville at 1 a. m., moved at daylight and came up on Sigel's right between 9 and 10 a. m. Hooker, following Kearny, arrived at 11 a. m., Reno an hour later. To the attack of Sigel and want of correct information, may be ascribed the failure of the enemy to profit at this time by their superior numbers.

a Proceedings and Report of the Board of Army Officers in the case of Fitz John Porter, vol. 1, p.46.