Army, subject only to the order of the President, it is more than probable that the disasters of the year 1862 might have been avoided. The absence of such a law, during the war of 1812, proved the necessity of having such a military adviser. Four years before it broke out General Dearborn, a Secretary of War, ambitious of military distinction, reported to the President: In the event of war, it will, I presume, be considered necessary to arrange our military force into separate departments, and to have a commander to each department, and, of course, to have no such officer as commander in chief, a The fruits of this fatal advice were soon gathered. Unable to attend in person to the duties of a commander in chief, the President, during the campaign of 1813-14, permitted General Armstrong, the Secretary of War, to control military operations until the enemy approached the capital, when in the face of a great national calamity he was compelled to resume his constitutional functions by directing that no orders for the movement of troops should be issued from the War Department without previously receiving Executive sanction. A few days later the military authority of the Secretary of War had again to be suppressed on the field of Bladensburg, when the President gave him the verbal order "to leave to the military functionaries the discharge of their own duties on their own responsibility." To this confused system, which was productive of nothing but disaster, Mr. Lincoln returned, when he issued the fatal order of March 11, dispensing with the services of a General in Chief and ordering all military commanders to report to the Secretary of War. By this stroke of the pen, the command of our vast armies at the moment they were ready to strike, passed from the hands of an educated soldier, to those of the President and Secretary of War, neither of whom professed any knowledge of the military art. The effect of this joint command soon became apparent. March 12, as the army was returning from Manassas to Alexandria, a council of war, composed of the four corps commanders, was convened at Fairfax Court House to consider the military situation and to provide for the security of Washington, as required by the President's order of March 8. The enemy having retreated behind the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, this council unanimously expressed the opinion that military operations would "be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and the James rivers," provided, (1) that the enemy's vessel, the Merrimac, could be neutralized; (2) that the transportation sufficient for the immediate transfer of the army to the new base should be in readiness at Washington and Alexandria; (3) that an auxiliary naval force should aid in silencing the enemy's batteries at Yorktown; (4) that the force to be left to cover Washington should be such " as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace."b If the foregoing conditions could not be fulfilled "the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment." As to the safety of Washington, Generals Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell expressed the opinion that with the forts on the right 66 a American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. 1, p. 228. Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 1, p. 542, Supplement. bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice." Instead of dividing the troops into an occupying force, General Heintzelman estimated that "a total of 40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice." Upon the conclusion of the council of war, General McClellan telegraphed to the Secretary of War that the commanders of the army corps have "unanimously agreed upon a plan of operations," and that General McDowell would at once proceed to Washington to lay it before him. Assuming the right to exercise military command, the Secretary, without consulting the President, replied: Whatever plan has been agreed upon, proceed to execute at once, without losing an hour for my approval. The same afternoon (March 13) General McDowell laid the plan before the Secretary of War, who at 5.30 p. m. telegraphed General McClellan that there was nothing in the paper indicating that it was his plan, further stating: Will you be pleased to state what plan of operations you propose to execute under the present circumstances? At 6.15 p. m. General McClellan replied: The members of the council, together with myself, were unanimous in forming the plan which was presented to you by General McDowell. Steps have already been taken, so that if the plan meets with your approval the movement can commence early to-morrow morning.c The President was now consulted and at 7.40 p. m. the Secretary of War again replied: The President having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same but gives the following directions as to its execution: First. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication; Second. Leave Washington secure; Third. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe or anywhere between here and there; or at all events move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route.d March 17, Major-General E. A. Hitchcock was placed on special duty in the War Department as a quasi military adviser to the Secretary of War and the President. March 19, in anticipation of a movement up the Peninsula, General McClellan, in a letter to the Secretary of War, designated West Point as the first place to be reached and used as a main depot after leaving Fort Monroe. Two methods for reaching this point were suggested. The first was to move directly from Fort Monroe between the two rivers, and “to reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a siege, in all probability involving a delay of weeks, perhaps." The second was to make a combined naval and land attack upon Yorktown. The Navy should at once concentrate upon Yorktown all their available and most powerful batteries. Its reduction should not, in that case, require many hours. A a Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 1, p. 542, Supplement. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 312. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, pp. 312, 313. d Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 313. strong corps would be pushed up the York River, under cover of the Navy, directly upon West Point, immediately upon the fall of Yorktown, and we could at once establish our new base of operations at a distance of some 25 miles from Richmond, with every facility for developing and bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of the James. It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity of the full cooperation of the Navy as a part of the programme. Without it the operation may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to carry in front several strong positions which by their aid would be turned without serious loss of either time or men. a The army upon which General McClellan relied to carry out this plan, embracing the four corps of McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, numbered, on the 1st of April, present for duty 136,444; present and absent 158,419. Whatever objections the President may have had to the peninsular route while the enemy still blockaded the Potomac, it is manifest that after having assented to the plan recommended by the four corps commanders of his own appointment, he ought to have ordered to the new theater of operations every soldier who was not deemed necessary for the defense of the capital. But the President was by no means the master of his own actions. He could no longer plead a reluctance to interfere with the plans of his subordinates. He had assumed all the personal responsibilities of a military commander, with the further disadvantage that, as the Chief Magistrate, he could not, even in matters of detail, turn a deaf ear to the appeals and representations of his political and military advisers. Whenever a territory was threatened with a real or imaginary invasion, the people felt that they had the right through their repre sentatives to appeal to him for protection. Educated in political life, he could not fail to apply the same system of reasoning to the decision of military as to political questions. Troops could not be ordered from one department, district, or place to another without first paying "a due regard to all points." In this manner strategical principles, involving perhaps the fate of an army, had to give place to political considerations. The first evidence of this fact was presented in a demand made to detach Blenker's division from the Army of the Potomac, and to send it to the Mountain Department, where it was impossible that a great battle should be fought. For days the President resisted the demand, but on the 31st of May, after most of the troops had embarked for Fort Monroe, he was compelled to yield, and wrote General McClellan as follows: This morning I felt constrained to order General Blenker's division to Fremont, and I write this to assure you that I did so with great pain, understanding that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pressure of the case I am confident that you would justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the Commander in Chief may order what he pleases. » This order detached 10,000 troops, and was the beginning of the disintegration of the Army. The next day, after having received the assurance of the President that in no event should any more troops be detached from his command, General McClellan sailed for Fort Monroe. a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, pt. 1, p. 313, 314. Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 1, p. 544, Supplement. CHAPTER XX. REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC FROM THE 1ST OF APRIL TO THE CLOSE OF THE FIRST PERIOD OF 1862. Before sailing from Alexandria for Fort Monroe on the 1st of April, 1862, General McClellan made a written report as to his dispositions for the security of the capital. The troops designated for this purpose were as follows: In the defenses of Washington, Wadsworth's command. At Warrenton.. At Manassas In the valley of the Shenandoah On the lower Potomac... Total..... 18,000 7,780 10,859 35, 467 1,350 73, 456 To understand the confusion introduced by the suppression of the office of General in Chief, we must return to the despatch of the Secretary of War acknowledging the receipt of the proceedings of the council of corps commanders, handed to him by General McDowell. In this despatch, dated 5.20 p. m., March 13, the Secretary, without quoting the President, informed the commander of the Army, that General Wool at Fort Monroe would be relieved from command, whenever the former desired it, and that in case he made Fort Monroe his base (which was approved, or not objected to, by the President two hours later), he should have control over General Burnside's troops in North Carolina. The despatch concluded: All the forces and means of the Government will be at your disposal. Had this wise resolution been adhered to, all blame in the event of failure must have been borne by General McClellan; but from this grave responsibility, involving the prolongation of the war for years, he was largely, if not wholly, relieved by later orders, which materially weakened his army. DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON. The day after McClellan left Alexandria, April 2, General Wadsworth, in charge of the defenses of Washington, reported in writing to the Secretary of War, that he had 19,022 men for duty out of a total present, including the sick, of 20,477, and that from this force he was directed to detach three regiments to join the troops moving to the Peninsula, and a fourth (still available for the defense of Washington) a "There is an apparent discrepancy between these figures and those given by Gen eral McClellan April 1. As General Wadsworth was in immediate command of the defenses of Washington, he is probably correct.-EDITORS. strong corps would be pushed up the York River, under cover of the N It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity The army upon which General McClellan ▾ embracing the four corps of McDowel' Keyes, numbered, on the 1st of April, pr and absent 158,419. .en light ✓ discized con is directed to of the Bull Run nassas Gap, about rength and character ely inadequate to, and d it as very improbable i is based upon the hope not know the number and made by General McClellan, the earthworks constructed for ompleted before the close of the year Whatever objections the Presider route while the enemy still blocks after having assented to the r commanders of his own appoi new theater of operations sary for the defense of th But the President wa He could no longer pl his subordinates. a military comma Magistrate, he the appeals ar Whenever invasion, sentativ Edu of re later by a special commission appointed by they were classified into four groups. First, and terminating with Fort De Kalb, opposite Georgetown; sech of the Potomac, beginning with Fort Lyon, below AlexanEastern Branch; fourth, those east and south of the Eastern Branch, gat Fort Greble, opposite Axexandria. The length of the Bridge; third, those on the north bank of the from above Chain Bridge to the Anacostia, or the Potomac between Forts Greble and Lyon, was 33 this space it was 37 miles. Comprised in the foregoing categories there are 23 forts south of the Potomac, 14 Anacostia, making 48 forts in all. These works varied in size, from Forts Runyon, forts and 3 batteries between the Potomac and Anacostia, and 11 forts beyond the Lyon, and Marcy, of which the perimeters were 1,500, 939, and 736 yards, to Forts greater portion of them were inclosed works of earth, though many, as Forts Craig, Bennett, Haggerty, and Saratoga, with perimeters of 146, 128, and 154 yards. The Tillinghast, Scott, south of the Potomac, and Forts Saratoga and Gaines on the north, were lunettes, with stockaded gorges. The armament was mainly made up siege guns, rifled parrott guns, and guns on field carriages of light caliber. Such of 24 and 32-pounders, on seacoast carriages, with a limited proportion of 24-pounder were the defenses of Washington at the beginning of the year 1862. By destroying the Long Bridge, Aqueduct Bridge, and Chain Bridge, it is manifest that, excepting annoyance from artillery fire, the capital would be safe from any force whatever its size, which might approach from the south. The only points therefore, available for an attack, were to be found on the north bank between Chain Bridge and the Eastern Branch, the latter, like the Potomac, being unfordable to near its intersection with the general line of works. To approach the city from the north, it would first be necessary to cross the Potomac either by one or more of the fords east of the Blue Ridge, or by making a still longer detour by way of the upper Potomac and the Shenandoah Valley. In either case the distance to be marched would prevent a coup de main, or surprise. If the enemy crossed east of a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 317. |