The distress to which our helpless citizens were exposed at this time, may be set down as a necessary sequence to the mistake of leaving the frontier to be wholly defended by undisciplined troops.

In a letter to the Secretary of War, of January 12, 1814, General Cass stated:

I have passed this day the ruins of Buffalo; it exhibits a scene of distress and destruction such as I have never before witnessed. * * * The circumstances attending the destruction of Buffalo you will have learned before this reaches you, but the force of the enemy has been greatly magnified. From the most careful examination, I am satisfied that not more than 650 men, of regulars, militia, and Indians landed at Black Rock. To oppose these we had from 2,500 to 3,000 militia. All, except very few of them, behaved in the most cowardly manner. They fled without discharging a musket, a

MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE CHESAPEAKE.

As early as the 26th of December, 1812, with a view to cripple and destroy our commerce, the British declared the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays in a state of blockade; and on the 20th of March, 1813, extending the blockade to the whole coast of the United States, except that of Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.

On the 4th of March, a British fleet, under Admiral Cockburn, entered the Chesapeake, and, being joined by large reenforcements from Bermuda, under Admiral Warren, began to destroy indiscrimi nately, not only Government stores, but vessels and a great deal of other property belonging to private individuals.

From the 20th of April to the 6th of May, Cockburn, with but slight opposition, successively captured and burned Frenchtown, Havre-deGrace, Georgetown, and Fredericktown.

The defenseless state of the coasts of Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia may be readily inferred, from the fact that the landing party in each of these instances, was composed of but 150 marines and a small detachment of artillery; their opponents consisted of such of the neighboring militia as could be hastily gathered together.

With criminal disregard for the rules of civilized warfare, the futile defense of these towns only increased the distress and sufferings of their patriotic inhabitants. Those who joined the militia in offering resistance, saw their houses and property ruthlessly destroyed, while such as remained peaceably at home, were rewarded by the amplest protection.

This policy speedily demoralized many of the towns exposed to attack. The people, instead of being able to rely for defense on the strong arm of their Government, looked upon its militia as the forerunners of destruction, and to save their property, made haste to throw themselves on the mercy of their enemies.

The extent to which this disposition of our people influenced the movements of the British fleet, can be estimated by a reference to Admiral Cockburn's official report to Admiral Warren, dated Maidstone, May 6, 1813, in which he states:

I then directed the reembarkation of our small force (after having taken and destroyed Georgetown and Fredericktown), and we proceeded down the river again to a town I had observed, situated in a branch of it, about halfway up, and here I had the satisfaction to find that what had passed at Havre, Georgetown, and Fredericktown had its effect, and led these people to understand that they had more to hope for from our generosity, than from erecting batteries and opposing us by means within

a American State Papers, vol. 1, p. 487.

their power, the inhabitants of this place having met me at landing to say that they had not permitted either guns or militia to be stationed there, and that whilst there I should not meet with any opposition whatever.

I also had a deputation from Charlestown, in the northeast river, to assure me that that place is considered by them at your mercy, and that neither guns nor militiamen shall be suffered there; and as I am assured that all the places in the upper part of the Chesapeake have adopted similar resolutions, and that there is now neither public property, vessels, nor warlike stores remaining in this neighborhood, I propose returning to you with the light squadron to-morrow morning. a

In June, Admiral Warren, who had left the Chesapeake and gone to Bermuda, returned with a reenforcement of 2,650 infantry and marines, and again resumed military operations.

On the 20th, in the hope of taking Norfolk and its navy-yard, he attacked Craney Island with some 2,500 men, but was repulsed with a loss of 81 killed, wounded, and missing.c

Our own force, which consisted of 480 militia and 150 sailors and marines, commanded by officers of the Navy, suffered no loss.

The number of militia who hastened to Norfolk before and after the attack was 10,000.d

This repulse was followed on the 25th, by the capture and destruction of the town of Hampton. The British force consisted of 2,000 men; their loss was 48 killed, wounded, and missing. On our side were some 450 militia, who effected their retreat with a loss of 31 killed, wounded, and prisoners.

During the rest of the year the British fleet gave most of its attention to the maintenance of the blockade.

THE CREEK WAR.

On the 30th of August, 1813, 1,000 Creek warriors, supplied with arms and ammunition by the British at Pensacola, surprised Fort Mims, in southern Alabama, and, after a gallant resistance, massacred 400 of the garrison, including more than 100 women and children.

The defenders consisted of only 245 volunteers and militia, although no less than 553 souls were gathered within the fatal stockade, many families and slaves from the adjoining plantations, as well as friendly Indians, having sought protection within its enclosures.

As soon as news of the massacre reached Tennessee, the legislature, with commendable promptness, authorized the governor to call out 3,500 volunteers, in addition to 1,500 already in the service of the United States. The State further guaranteed to pay and subsist the troops, in case its action should not be approved by the General Gov

ernment.

By the 11th of October, General Jackson had concentrated at Huntsville a force of 2,500 men, an equal number being assembled in East Tennessee.

On the 25th of October, after several days' detention on account of supplies, he struck boldly into the forests of Alabama, and on the 3d of November, his advance guard fought the battle of Tallasahatchee,

a James's Military Occurrences between Great Britain and the United States, vol. 2, Appendix No. 10, pp. 410, 411.

James gives the attacking force at 1,500, Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 57, 58.

Official reports of Admiral Warren and Sir Sidney Beckwith, QuartermasterGeneral, James's Military Occurrences between Great Britain and the United States, vol. 2, p. 114, appendix No. 13.

d Thompson's Late War, p. 213.

killing 186 Indians and capturing 84 women and children. On the 9th of November, he fell upon 1,000 warriors who were besieging some friendly Creek Indians at Talladega, and after a spirited combat, in which his whole force of 2,000 men were engaged, dispersed the Indians, who lost in killed alone, 290 warriors. The casualties of our own troops in these two engagements were 146 killed and wounded. So great was the moral effect of these victories, that the war might have been speedily ended, had not General Jackson been threatened by mutiny and dissolution of his army.

The extremities to which our military policy may at any moment reduce a patriotic commander, were never more forcibly presented than during this brief campaign.

For want of supplies, due in large degree to the failure of the Government to properly organize the staff departments, until hostilities with Great Britain became imminent, Jackson was forced to lead his troops back to Fort Strother, where for ten days he was doomed to struggle and plead with his hungry and insubordinate soldiers.

After supporting their privations for ten days, the militia regiments resolved to go home, but when they began to move found the volunteers across their path, with orders to prevent their departure, "peaceably if they could, forcibly if they must." This display of physical force restored them temporarily to duty. The same afternoon the volunteers, surprised and disappointed at the success of the device, resolved to imitate the example of their comrades, and accordingly fixed their departure for the following day. To their astonishment they found the militia, whom they had opposed the day before, arrayed in their front, and yielding to the same argument, returned to their camps. The cavalry met with better success, being permitted to retire to Huntsville, on condition that they would return as soon as their famished horses should be fit for service.

In this emergency General Jackson tried persuasion. Calling together the officers, he told them that supplies were on the way to the fort; that he had no intention to starve or deceive them, and promised that "if supplies do not arrive in two days we will all march back together."

At the expiration of this time the men demanded the fulfillment of the General's promise. Determined not to relinquish his position, he exclaimed: "If only two men will remain with me, I will never abandon the post."c "A hundred and nine responded to this appeal, and leaving them as a garrison, Jackson placed himself at the heads of the troops who insisted on going back, with the understanding that should they meet the expected supplies, all would return. Twelve miles from the fort they met a large drove of cattle, by means of which their hunger was soon appeased; but when, as agreed upon, the order to return was given, the General could only enforce obedience, at the risk of his own life, by seizing a musket and barring the path of the homebound mutineers.

Their return to duty was but temporary, as another pretense for mutiny, in the form of short enlistments, immediately suggested itself. The volunteers claimed that their year's enlistment would expire on the 10th of December; the General held that they had not been continuously in the field, and that their engagement was to serve

a Parton's Life of Andrew Jackson, vol. 1, p. 460.
Ibid, vol. 1, p. 461.

Parton's Life of Andrew Jackson, vol. 1, p. 462.

"one year in two." Although this difference of opinion was settled for the moment by another appeal to the militia, who quelled the mutiny with the aid of artillery, the General, finding that nothing could be expected from the volunteers, permitted them to march back to Nashville, where they were disbanded.

Similar difficulties now took place with the militia. Jackson's force, after the departure of the volunteers, consisted of 800 men, who had about three weeks to serve and 600 who had been called out for an indefinite period. These last claimed that all the precedents would entitle them to a discharge at the end of three months, the view of the General being that they were to serve during the Creek war. To add to his embarrassments, the terms of service of the 2,000 militia under General Cocke, who had reenforced him on the 21st of December, were all to expire within a month.

In this wretched state of affairs, the governor of Tennessee advised the General to disband his militia, return to the State, and content himself with the defense of its frontier. Jackson's characteristic reply was: "I will hold the posts I have established until ordered to abandon them by the Commanding General, or die in the struggle;" and foreseeing the inevitable dissolution of his command, he besought the governor to call out a new army, without waiting for the approval of the General Government.

By the 14th of January, 1814, all of the men called out to avenge the massacre of Fort Mims had disappeared, leaving the General in command of 900 new levies, who, though called out for short periods also, were led by officers who had gained experience in his former expeditions. Advancing with this force, he engaged the Indians on the 22d and 24th of January, defeating them with the loss of 189 warriors, his own killed and wounded being 95."

Meantime, the governor of Tennessee had ordered a new levy of 2,500 three-months men to assemble at Fayetteville, and had approved General Jackson's order for the raising of a new division in east Tennessee.

On the 6th of February the Thirty-ninth U. S. Infantry, 600 strong, arrived at Fort Strother, and before the end of the month the General found himself at the head of a new army, part regular and part militia, numbering nearly 5,000 men.

All his preparations being made, he moved forward with 3,000 men, attacked the Indians at the Horse Shoe Bend of the Tallapoosa River, on the 27th of March, and totally defeated them, with a loss of 500 warriors killed and 200 drowned. The savages were 900 strong, not counting 300 women and children. Jackson's casualties in killed and wounded were 201 out of 2,000 men in action. The prolongation of the Creek War to more than twice the necessary length, was the inevitable result of our system of raw troops and short enlistments.

From Georgia and Mississippi, no less than Tennessee, we repeatedly sent against the Indians, dissolving armies which were successively attacked, and might have been massacred in detail, but for the fact that their superiority in arms and numbers more than compensated for their deficiency in training.

If we now turn from the 1,500 or 2,000 Creek warriors, to the preceding pages, and to the figures from the Adjutant-General's Office, it

a Parton's Life of Andrew Jackson, vol. 1, p. 494.

appears that from first to last of this Creek War, we called into the field not less than 15,000 men."

The effect of this policy in destroying human life was not limited to our citizen soldiers. It encouraged the Indians to strive with a superior power, till in the battle of the Horse Shoe, they were nearly annihilated.

OPPERATIONS OF THE NAVY.

The failure of our military operations on land were, as in 1812, partially retrieved by the exploits of the Navy.

In February the Hornet captured the Peacock; in June the Chesapeake was captured by the Shannon; in August, the Argus was captured by the Pelican; after these two reverses, victory again inclined to our side; September 5 the Enterprise captured the Boxer, followed on the 10th by Perry's victory on Lake Erie. In addition, our privateers on every sea carried consternation and destruction to the enemy's commerce. The disaster to the Chesapeake, like so many of our disasters on land, was ascribed to a new and undisciplined crew.

TROOPS EMPLOYED IN 1813.

The false economy of making in time of peace no preparation for war, was made increasingly apparent by our experience in the foregoing campaign.

Exclusive of volunteers and rangers, in reference to whom data for the campaign is wanting, the number of troops called out during the year numbered:

Regulars..
Militia..

Total.

19,036 130, 112

149, 148

Of this number of militia, 66,376 from Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and the District of Columbia were employed from time to time, in observing the 2,600 regulars and mariners on board the British fleets in Chesapeake and Delaware Bays.

The only compensation for the employment of so many troops during the campaign, was the destruction of Proctor's force of 800 regulars, a feat that would have been impossible, but for the victory of Commodore Perry on Lake Erie.

Instead of accomplishing the cherished scheme of conquest, the second year of the war closed with our expulsion from Canada, succeeded by an invasion and burning of the villages, along the whole Niagara frontier.

Calamities apparently so uncalled for could no longer be tolerated, and as our failure was largely ascribed to incompetent and superannuated commanders, Wilkinson and Hampton were soon compelled to

a The actual number of militia called out from Georgia, Tennessee, and the Territory of Mississippi during the years 1813-14, was 25,779 (A. G. O.). During the same period there were also called out from North and South Carolina 18,142 militia, many of whom were employed in garrisoning forts along the frontiers of the Creek Nation.

A. G. O. The number of regulars is taken from the return of the Army for February, 1813.