tion to the subject, to ask pardon for intruding an opinion, not only unasked but in some measure repugnant to their resolves. The disadvantages attending the limited enlistment of troops are too apparent to those who are eyewitnesses of them to render any animadversions necessary, but to gentlemen at a distance whose attention is engrossed by a thousand important objects the case may be otherwise. That this cause precipitated the fate of the brave and much to be lamented General Montgomery, and brought on the defeat which followed thereupon, I have not the most distant doubt, for, had he not been apprehensive of the troops leaving him at so important a crisis, but continued to blockade Quebec, a capitulation, from the best accounts I have been able to collect, must inevitably have followed. And that we were not one time obliged to dispute these lines under disadvantageous circumstances proceeding from the same cause, to wit, the troops disbanding of themselves before the militia could be got in, is to me a matter of wonder and astonishment, and proves that General Howe was either unacquainted with our situation or restrained by his instructions from putting anything to hazard till his reinforcements should arrive. The instance of General Montgomery (I mention it because it is a striking one, for a number of others might be adduced) proves that instead of having men to take advantage of circumstances you are in a manner compelled, right or wrong, to make circumstances yield to a secondary consideration. Since the 1st of December I have been devising every means in my power to secure these encampments; and though I am sensible that we never have since that period been able to act upon the offensive and at times not in a condition to defend, yet the cost of marching home one set of men, bringing in another, the havoc and waste occasioned by the first, the repairs necessary for the second, with a thousand incidental charges and inconveniences which have arisen and which it is scarce possible either to recollect or describe, amount to near as much as the keeping up a respectable body of troops the whole time ready for any emergency would have done. To this may be added that you never can have a well-disciplined army. To bring men to be well acquainted with the duties of a soldier requires time. To bring them under proper discipline and subordination not only requires time, but is a work of great difficulty, and in this army, where there is so little distinction between the officers and soldiers, requires an uncommon degree of attention. To expect, then, the same service from raw and undisciplined recruits as from veteran soldiers is to expect what never did and perhaps never will happen. Men who are familiarized to danger meet it without shrinking; whereas troops unused to service often apprehend danger where no danger is. Three things prompt men to regular discharge of their duty in time of action; natural bravery, hope of reward, and fear of punishment. The two first are common to the untutored and the disciplined soldier; but the last most obviously distinguishes the one from the other. A coward, when taught to believe that if he breaks his ranks and abandons his colors, he will be punished with death by his own party, will take his chance against the enemy; but a man who thinks little of the one and is fearful of the other acts from present feelings, regardless of consequences. Again, men of a day's standing will not look forward, and from experience we find that as time approaches for their discharge they grow careless of their arms, ammunition and camp utensils. Nay, even the barracks themselves have felt uncommon marks of wanton depredation, and lay us under fresh trouble and additional expense in providing for every fresh set when we find it next to impossible to procure such articles as are absolutely necessary in the first instance. To this may be added the seasoning which new recruits must have to a camp and the loss consequent thereupon. But this is not all. Men engaged for a short, limited time only have the officers too much in their power, for to obtain a degree of popularity in order to induce a second enlistment, a kind of familiarity takes place which brings on a relaxation of discipline, unlicensed furloughs, and other indulgences incompatible with order and good government; by which means the latter part of the time for which the soldier was engaged is spent in undoing what you were aiming to inculcate in the first. To go into an enumeration of all the evils we have experienced in this late great danger of the army and the expenses incidental to it, to say nothing of the hazard we have run and must run between the discharging of one army and the enlistment of another, unless an enormous expense of militia is incurred, would greatly exceed the bounds of a letter. What I have already taken the liberty of saying will serve to convey a general idea of the matter; and therefore I shall, with all due deference, take the freedom to give it as my opinion that if the Congress have any reason to believe that there will be occasion for troops another year, and consequently for another enlistment, they would save money and have infinitely better troops, if they were, even at a bounty of $20, $30, or more, to engage the men already enlisted, till January next and such others as may be wanted to complete the establishment, for EVACUATION OF BOSTON AND TRANSFER OF OPERATIONS TO NEW YORK. Reenforced by militia, Washington on the 5th of March began to throw up works on Dorchester Heights and take other measures which determined on the 17th the evacuation of Boston. During these operations the militia of the neighborhood were called in for the short space of three days. The total loss of Washington's Army in killed, from the time he took command to the end of the siege of Boston, did not reach 20, while the whole loss in killed from the battle of Lexington was less than 200. No sooner had the British evacuated Boston than Washington, recognizing New York as the next objective point, sent 5 regiments to defend it, and toward the end of April arrived there with nearly all his command. Meantime, so distressing and perilous was the situation of our troops before Quebec, that Congress required him to send first 4, and later 6, additional regiments to Canada. This last detachment of 3,000 men, the sequence of an unfortunate resolution which only served to divide and scatter his Army, reduced the Continentals under his immediate command to 5,300 men, and, as at Boston, again forced him to depend upon militia called out for short periods of service. With this small band of regulars, and such raw troops as he could get together, he was soon to meet a disciplined enemy numbering from 20,000 to 30,000 men. The militia for the defense of New York were at first called out by Washington after consultation with the colonial governors, but so grave was the danger that Congress, by resolution of June 3, authorized a special reenforcement of 13,800 militia, of which Massachusetts was to send 2,000, Connecticut 5,500, New York 3,000, and New Jersey 3,300. The same day Congress also authorized the organization of a flying camp" for the middle colonies, to be located in New Jersey, and to consist of 10,000 militia, of whom Pennsylvania was to furnish 6,000, Maryland 3,400, and Delaware 600. On the 19th of July the flying camp was further increased by 4 battalions of militia from Pennsylvania, 3 from New Jersey, and 2 battalions of Continentals from Virginia. Despite the oft-repeated recommendations of Washington, the terms of service, both of this special militia force and of the men to compose the flying camp, were to expire on the 1st of December. Congress on the 1st of June had called out 6,000 militia to further reenforce the army of Canada, of which number Massachusetts was to furnish 3,000 (4 battalions), Connecticut 1,500 (2 battalions), New York 750 (1 battalion), and New Hampshire 750 (1 battalion). During the first half of 1776 the Continental Army was increased piecemeal. January 4, 10, and 16 an additional battalion was authorized from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and North Carolina, respectively; January 14, 4 battalions were called for from New York; March 25 a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 3, pp. 278, 279, 280, 281. 2 battalions were authorized in South Carolina; May 16, 2 battalions were called for from Massachusetts and Connecticut, respectively, with a term of enlistment for two years, provided the men would consent; May 18, a regiment of rifles was authorized in Virginia; July 24, the regiment of South Carolina Rangers was taken into the Continental establishment; June 27, a regiment of rifles was created, partly composed of independent companies to be enlisted for three years. The slow increase of the Continental Army shows that Congress was committed to a dual military establishment, one class of troops being Continental or regular, the other militia. In the former the gradual extension of enlistments to two and three years enabled the men to acquire the discipline which ultimately proved the salvation of our The natural disposition of men to seek the easiest and shortest service prompted them to enlist in the militia in preference to the Continentalregiments, and thus the only force which could be depended upon to cope with the British, both offensively and defensively, was always from one-third to one-half below its prescribed strength. A very important step was taken on the 12th of June when a resolution was passed appointing a permanent committee of five members of Congress, styled the Board of War and Ordnance. Instead of being referred to special and temporary committees all military questions were now brought before this new board, whose functions were analagous to those of a Secretary of War. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. The legislation of the 12th of June was followed on the 4th of July by the culminating event of the year, the "Declaration of Independ ence. Whatever indecision might have marked hitherto the progress of the war, the time for action was now at hand, and well-digested measures looking to the speedy expulsion of the British from our soil should have been perfected forthwith. As events turned out, the lesson of history that raw levies can not withstand disciplined troops was again to be repeated. When Lord Howe landed on Long Island his force, by his own account, was between 15,000 and 16,000 strong. To this Washington could oppose but 8,000 men, who were beaten in the battle of Long Island, fought on the 27th of August. On the 30th they were forced to fall back on New York. Stung by this defeat, Washington, on the 2d of September, wrote to the President of Congress: Our situation is truly distressing. The check our detachment sustained on the 27th ultimo has dispirited too great a proportion of our troops and filled their minds with apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of calling forth their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition in order to repair our losses, are dismayed, intractable, and impatient to return. Great numbers of them have gone off-in some instances almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies at a time. This circumstance of itself independent of others, when fronted by a well-appointed enemy superior in number to our whole collected force, would be sufficiently disagreeable, but when their example has infected another part of the army, when their want of discipline and refusal of almost every kind of restraint and government have produced a like conduct but too common to the whole, and an entire disregard of that order and subordination necessary to the well-doing of an army and which had been inculcated before, as well as the nature of our military establishment would admit of, our condition becomes still more alarming, and with the deepest concern I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in the generality of the troops. All these circumstances fully confirm the opinion I even entertain, and which 1 more than once in my letters took the liberty of mentioning to Congress, that no dependence could be put in a militia or other troops than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded, and as fully convinced as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defense is left to any but a permanent standing army; I mean one to exist during the war. Nor would the expense incident to the support of such a body of troops as would be competent to almost every exigency far exceed that which is daily incurred by calling in succor and new enlistments, which when effected are not attended with any good consequences. Men who have been free and subject to no control can not be reduced to order in an instant, and the privileges and exemptions which they claim and will have, influence the conduct of others, and the aid derived from them is nearly counterbalanced by the disorder, irregularity, and confusion they occasion. I can not find that the bounty of $10 is likely to produce the desired effect. When men can get double that sum to engage in the militia for a month or two, and that militia frequently called out, it is hardly to be expected. The addition of land might have a considerable influence on a permanent enlistment. Our number of men at present fit for duty is under 20,000; they were so by the last returns and best accounts I could get after the engagement on Long Island, since which numbers have deserted. I have ordered General Mercer to send the men intended for the flying camp to this place, about a thousand in number, and to try with the militia if practicable to make a diversion upon Staten Island. Till of late I had no doubt in my own mind of defending this place, nor should I have yet if the men would do their duty, but this I despair of. It is painful and extremely grating to me to give such unfavorable accounts, but it would be criminal to conceal the truth at so critical a juncture. a On the 15th of September, the occupation of New York by the British followed the battle of Long Island. Washington reported the conduct of the troops on this occasion to the President of Congress in a letter dated September 16: As soon as I heard the firing, I rode with all possible despatch toward the place of landing, when, to my great surprise and mortification, I found the troops that had been posted in the lines retreating with the utmost precipitation, and those ordered to support them (Parson's and Fellow's brigades) flying in every direction and in the greatest confusion, notwithstanding the exertions of their generals to form them. I used every means in my power to rally and get them into some order, but my attempts were fruitless and ineffectual, and on the appearance of a small party of the enemy, not more than 60 or 70, their disorder increased, and they ran away in the greatest confusion, without firing a shot. Washington's situation at this time was aggravated by his total inability to make head against the enemy and by fears of the breaking up of his own Army. Knowing that the service of the 30,000 militia authorized in June would be over within the year, he wrote to the President of Congress from Harlem Heights on the 24th of September: We are now, as it were, upon the eve of another dissolution of our Army. The remembrance of the difficulties which happened upon the occasion last year, and the consequences which might have followed the change if proper advantages had been taken by the enemy, added to a knowledge of the present temper and situation of the troops, afford but a very gloomy prospect in the appearance of things now and satisfy me beyond the possibility of a doubt that unless some speedy and effectual measures are adopted by Congress our cause will be lost. It is in vain to expect that any or more than a trifling part of this Army will again engage in the service on the encouragement offered by Congress. When men find that their townsmen and companions are receiving $20, $30, and more for a few months' service, which is truly the case, it can not be expected, without using compulsion; and to force them into the service would answer no valuable purpose. When men are irritated and their passions inflamed they fly hastily and cheerfully to arms, but after the first emotions are over, to expect among such people as compose the bulk of aSparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 4, pp. 72, 73, 74. an army that they are influenced by any other principles than those of interest is to look for what never did and I fear never will happen; the Congress will deceive themselves, therefore, if they expect it. To urge upon Congress the importance of a good corps of officers, with a pay corresponding to their merit and sacrifices, he continues: A soldier reasoned with upon the goodness of the cause he is engaged in and the inestimable rights he is contending for, hears you with patience and acknowledges the truth of your observations, but adds that it is of no more importance to him than to others. The officer makes you the same reply, with the further remark, that his pay will not support him, and he can not ruin himself and family to serve his country, where every member of the community is equally interested and benefited by his labors. The few, therefore, who act upon principles of disinterestedness, comparatively speaking, are no more than a drop in the ocean. It becomes evident to me then, that, as this contest is not likely to be the work of a day, as the war must be carried on systematically, and to do it you must have good officers, there are no other possible means to obtain them, but by establishing your army upon a permanent footing and giving your officers good pay. This will induce gentlemen and men of character to engage; and, till the bulk of your officers is composed of such persons as are actuated by principles of honor and a spirit of enterprise, you have little to expect from them. They ought to have such allowances as will enable them to live like and support the character of gentlemen, and not be driven by the scanty pittance to the low and dirty arts which many of them practice to filch from the public, more than the difference of pay would amount to upon an ample allowance. Besides, something is due to the man who puts his life in your hands, hazards his health, and forsakes the sweets of domestic enjoyments. Why a captain in the Continental service should receive no more than 5 s. currency per day for performing the same duties that an officer of the same rank in the British service receives 10 s. for, I never could conceive; especially when the latter is provided with every necessary he requires upon the best terms, and the former can scarce procure them at any rate. There is nothing that gives a man consequence and renders him fit for command like a support that renders him independent of everybody but the State he serves, a Washington also calls attention to the vital importance of selecting officers for known character and intelligence, instead of commissioning them because of their ability to raise men. He urges that If such pay be allowed the officers as will induce gentlemen of character and liberal sentiments to engage, and proper care and precaution are used in the nomination, more regard being had to the character of persons than to the number of men they can enlist, we should in a little time have an army able to cope with any that can be opposed to it, as there are excellent materials to form one out of. But while the only merit an officer possesses is his ability to raise men, while those men consider and treat him as an equal and in the character of an officer regard him no more than a broomstick, being mixed together as one common herd, no order or discipline can prevail, nor will the officer ever meet with that respect which is essentially necessary to due subordination. The little reliance that can be placed upon raw troops, their want of confidence in themselves, their bad health, due to a change of life and habits, their tendency to desert and provoke mutiny, their waste of stores and ammunition, and especially their enormous expense, are next fully described: To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill (which is followed by want of confidence in themselves when opposed by troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge and superior in arms), are timid and ready to fly from their own shadows. Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging, brings on sickness in many, impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes that it not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit in others. Again, men a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 4, p. 112. |