52-314 O STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES OCTOBER 16, 1985 Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1985 LETTER OF SUBMITTAL OCTOBER 16, 1985. Hon. BARRY GOLDWATER, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Hon. SAM NUNN, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, DEAR SENATOR GOLDWATER AND SENATOR NUNN: During June 1983, Senator John Tower and the late Senator Scoop Jackson, then the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, directed the staff of the Committee on Armed Services to prepare a comprehensive study of the organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense. After an initial period of hearings, interviews, and research, a more vigorous study effort was initiated under your direction in January 1985. Additional guidance has been provided by the Task Force on Defense Organization which was formed in May 1985. The staff study, entitled Defense Organization: The Need for Change, has now been completed and is respectfully submitted for the Committee's consideration. In response to the broad tasking given the staff, the study addresses a wide range of issues affecting the performance of the Department of Defense. The Department's four major organizational elements are analyzed: the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified and specified commands, and the Military Departments. Two key decisionmaking and management procedures of the Department of Defense the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System and the acquisition process-are examined. By reason of its impact on the performance of the Department of Defense, congressional review and oversight of defense policies and programs are also addressed. Lastly, the study examines the fundamental principle of civilian control of the military. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger stated: .. in the absence of structural reform I fear that we shall obtain less than is attainable from our expenditures and from our forces. Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements. Without such reform, I fear that the United States will obtain neither the best military advice, nor the effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defense posture available to the Nation. |