mental Headquarters Study noted: "The study disclosed some evidence of undue involvement by the OSD staff in details better left to Military Department management." (page 34) The General Accounting Office report, "Suggested Improvements in Staffing and Organization of Top Management Headquarters in the Department of Defense," dated April 20, 1976, expressed similar concern:

...The increasing involvement in service program execution at the OSD level reduces the autonomy of the Service Secretaries and thereby reduces their ability to make decisions_on issues which are more relevant to them or on which they often have more expertise....Since the military departments are separately organized and the Service secretaries are resource managers, it is logical that they may be given the authority to manage. They are, in effect, presidents of operating companies. (pages 50 and 51)

In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Graham Claytor said,

...There has been the tendency that I found both as the Secretary of the Navy and as the Deputy Secretary of Defense, for the OSD staff to micromanage the Services with respect to intraservice problems.

Now, the OSD has got to manage interservice problems and problems that involve overall strategic planning. I found that a great many of the staff of the different Assistant Secretaries of Defense were really trying to run the internal affairs of the Services because they thought they knew better than the people in the service about service matters. (Part 3, page 124) In addition, Secretary Claytor explained that once strategic policy and overall planning have been determined, the execution should be left to the Services and not to the staff of the OSD. Secretary Claytor said,

...I found all kinds of small decisions the services are much better able to make in procurement of specific weapons and how you procure them, and that sort of thing was being made by civilian staff in OSD which, frankly, in many cases I didn't think knew as much about it as the people in the services did. (Part 3, page 128)

Dr. James R. Schlesinger, a former Secretary of Defense, also noted OSD micro-management in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

...without question, the OSD staff has occasionally, though too frequently, become involved with micro-management within the individual Services. That seems to me to exceed the appropriate responsibilities of that staff. (Part 5, page 189) a. Human Nature

The primary cause of this problem is human nature: OSD officials -like everyone else -prefer to work on narrower and more manageable issues than the complex issues that should be the primary focus of OSD.

b. Inadequate Supervision

A second cause of OSD micro-management is the failure of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to police OSD micro-management of Service programs. Micro-management is contrary to OSD policies as clearly indicated by Secretary Carlucci's memorandum of March 27, 1981 concerning "Management of the DoD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System". However, issuance of memoranda has limited impact without an active management review of implementation. This is currently lacking.

c. Congressional Micro-Management

OSD micro-management is also caused by congressional shortterm (year-to-year) and microscopic emphasis on program management. In response to congressional micro-management, OSD places an equivalent emphasis on details that could be better left to the Military Departments.

d. Non-Compliance by the Services

A fourth cause of OSD micro-management is that the Services have failed to adhere to OSD guidance in program development and management. In particular, the Service Secretaries appear to have failed to effectively discharge their responsibilities to ensure full Service compliance with the decisions of the Secretary of Defense. Non-compliance by the Services caused OSD to become involved in the details of implementation in order to preserve the decisions of the Secretary of Defense.

e. Large OSD Staff

A fifth cause may be that some OSD staffs, particularly in the research and engineering area, have become too large. Larger staff sizes often result in a weaker focus on principal responsibilities and major issues.

f. Emphasis on Functional Areas

OSD micro-management may also result from limited mission integration mechanisms. In the absence of important mission integration efforts, OSD has emphasized functional integration. This is likely to lead to overinvolvement with Service programs which are also functionally organized.

Paul Hammond in Organizing for Defense identified OSD's functional structure as a cause of OSD's micro-management of the Services:

As the Defense Department continued to grow more centralized in administration, the Office of the Secretary of Defense remained weighted in favor of business administration operations. The services have been expected to perform the major functions of a military establishment at the same time that OSD has been developing duplicate functions. The result has been a growing duplication of staffs and the "re-reviewing", as one Congressional committee put it, of work already adequately reviewed and sufficiently supervised. The point was overstated, for there have been substantial reasons for the "re-reviewing," but it nevertheless has substance. If the secretariat in either OSD or the service departments were primarily concerned with the development of general policies which spanned military and business administration interests, their activities

might be less duplicative. But both are concerned largely with business administration, to the exclusion of the development of a general program; and the supervision by both suffers from the same consequent limitations. (page 313)

5. PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING ARE UNILATERAL, NOT COALITION, ORIENTED

The United States, following World War II, developed a broad network of alliances and mutual defense treaties to protect her interests. The foundation of U.S. national security is a coalition strategy with appropriate coalition policies. However, both the United States and her allies are guilty of what General David C. Jones, USAF (Retired), has called "the sin of unilateralism" in that planning and programming are still approached on essentially a national rather than a multi-national basis. Most coalition-oriented efforts, such as NATO's Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) program, have been tremendous disappointments. Much of the blame for NATO's failures in cooperative efforts lies with the United States as the Alliance's leader.

Ambassador Robert W. Komer, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, noted the unilateral perspective of DoD planning and programming in his draft paper, "Strategymaking in DoD":

Nor does the planning/programming process take adequately into account the needs created by our pursuit of a largely coalition policy and strategy, reflecting the broad network of alliances and other commitments entered into after World War II....This is partly because of a lack of organizational focus within the United States or other governments on coalition issues. For example, until the author became Advisor to SecDef [Secretary of Defense] on NATO Affairs in 1977, no single U.S. government official above the level of office director dealt exclusively with NATO matters-our largest single overseas commitment. But this organizational innovation too disappeared when the next administration took over. (pages 25 and 26) There are four causes of this unilateral approach in OSD:

• absence of organizations with major mission orientations; 。 ineffective strategic planning;

• limited influence of unified commanders in planning and programming; and

• limited influence of OSD policy experts on resource decisions. The first three causes are addressed in detail elsewhere in this study. As to the limited influence of OSD policy experts, the basic problem is that the policy experts do not have sufficient expertise on programmatic issues nor sufficient influence to alter the recommendations of OSD and Service resource managers who are, for the most part, oriented to the unilateralist perspective.

6. INADEQUATE OSD REVIEW OF NON-NUCLEAR CONTINGENCY PLANS Currently, only the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense have access to non-nuclear contingency plans prepared by the unified and specified commanders. Nuclear war planning is not an issue because the civilian leadership has long insisted on being reg

ularly briefed on it and on related war games. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary do not, however, have sufficient time to adequately review these important plans for action by conventional forces during crises. The Steadman Report shares this conclusion:

...present arrangements place too great a burden on the Secretary and Deputy Secretary for assuring that there is sufficient continuing policy guidance in these areas [contingency plans]. (page 43)

The cause of the absence of OSD review of non-nuclear contingency plans is that the JCS have jealously guarded non-nuclear contingency plans. The Steadman Report notes:

The JCS are sensitive to the fact that only the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary are in the operational chain of command and, thus, strictly interpreted, only they have a "need to know" regarding operational plans. (page 43)

This posture has been based in part on security grounds, but is more directly linked with the JCS view that OSD review would be an unwarranted civilian intrusion into strictly military mattersan attitude which apparently contradicts the principle of civilian control.

The current Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, believes that contingency plans receive adequate civilian review:

...These [contingency] plans are then briefed to me and the Deputy Secretary of Defense on an annual basis and as changes occur, and these plans are changed if these briefings indicate to me that changes are required.

Thus, the principle of civilian control of the military for nonnuclear contingency planning is preserved by keeping the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense informed of the assumptions, procedures, and results of the overall planning process, and particularly by a final review of the plans themselves by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. (Answers to Authorization Report Questions)

Despite Secretary Weinberger's views, it does not seem possible that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense who share other enormous and demanding responsibilities can effectively review the numerous contingency plans and ensure that they are consistent with national security policy.

Absence of meaningful OSD review of non-nuclear contingency plans is a problem because (1) it is a vital area where civilian control of the military is not properly exercised; (2) the plans may not be realistic in terms of actions that the President may be prepared to take in certain situations; (3) higher authority may lack an understanding of what can be done with existing resources leading to inconsistencies in the strategic planning process during which objectives are linked to resources; and (4) there is no process to ensure that plans are receiving sufficient attention and an exposure to new alternatives at the unified and specified command level.

There is another OSD problem area associated with contingency plans. This relates to inadequate civilian guidance to be used by

military officers in developing contingency plans. This problem area is addressed in Chapter 4 dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

E. DESCRIPTION OF SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS

In this section, possible solutions to OSD problem areas are described. These include previously proposed solutions along with newly developed ones. The list of possible solutions covers those that would require legislative action and those that require only management attention. Because OSD is at the pinnacle of the DoD hierarchy, a number of solutions to OSD problem areas involve structural or management changes in organizations outside of OSD. While these non-OSD solutions are addressed in detail in chapters of the study dealing with other DoD organizations, they are briefly described in this section to draw attention to their potential contribution to improved performance by OSD.

Regarding previously proposed solutions, there have been five major studies since 1970 that address one or more of the OSD problem areas identified in this report:

• the Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel chaired by Gilbert W. Fitzhugh and submitted in July 1970;

。 the Departmental Headquarters Study directed by Paul R. Ignatius and submitted in June 1978;

o the National Military Command Structure Study directed by Richard C. Steadman and submitted in July 1978;

o the Defense Agency Review directed by Major General Theodore Antonelli, USA (Retired) and submitted in March 1979; and

。 the Final Report, entitled Toward a More Effective Defense, of the Defense Organization Project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) chaired by Philip A. Odeen and completed in February 1985.

Relevant recommendations of these studies have been linked to problem areas identified in this study as accurately as possible. Due to the differences in approach as well as the brevity of certain recommendations in these studies, the correlation of problem areas and recommendations required certain interpretations which may not be exact.

It should be noted that the options to solve a problem area presented in this section may or may not be mutually exclusive. In some instances, only one of the options to solve a problem area could be implemented. In other cases, several options might be complementary.

1. PROBLEM AREA #1-LIMITED MISSION INTEGRATION OF THE OVERALL DEFENSE EFFORT

The principal guideline for solving this problem area is to strengthen the integrating staff support for the Secretary of Defense and to strengthen the authority of and the integrating staff support for the JCS Chairman. Proposals that would strengthen the authority of the JCS Chairman are addressed in Chapter 4; this chapter will, therefore, focus only on strengthening the integrating support for the Secretary of Defense and JCS Chairman. With