enable a superior to supervise a greater number of subordinates.

• sharing supervision -If a superior's subordinates receive some supervision from others, he will be able to effectively supervise a greater number of individuals. (pages 36 and 37)

For key DoD managers, especially the Secretary of Defense, these eleven factors in the aggregate suggest the need for a small span of control. In particular, the Secretary of Defense spends much of his time in non-supervisory activities-managing relations with the White House, other Executive Branch power centers, the Congress, and allies. Moreover, the work of his subordinates is nonroutine, involves a rapid rate of change, requires substantial coordination, and involves dissimilar functions. In addition, some of his subordinates-the unified and specified commanders-are geographically dispersed.

For the Secretary of Defense and other senior DoD managers, six of the above factors can clearly be categorized as favoring a smaller span of control, and two favor a larger span. It was not possible to categorize three factors -ability of subordinates, supervisor's ability, and formalization -due to their more subjective nature.

In general, an analysis of organizational needs in the Department of Defense suggests that smaller spans of control for senior civilian and military officials would enhance organizational performance.

Given that the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary must spend much of their time on relations with external organizations (the White House, the Congress, alliances, etc.), they are too busy to actively manage OSD and those Defense Agencies that report directly to them. Essentially, they manage OSD and subordinate organizations by exception (e.g., only when a problem arises) which fails to provide the desired level of supervision and coordination.

In particular, the Defense Agencies are poorly controlled and supervised by OSD. The Defense Agency Review conducted in 1979 by Major General Theodore Antonelli, USA (Retired), found that overburdened OSD officials are unable to devote the time necessary to adequately oversee the agencies; as a result, the agencies are essentially free of OSD supervision. Apparently, the focus of OSD is on the budgets of the Military Departments and not on the budgets of Defense Agencies. One negative consequence of this inadequate supervision is that the Defense Agencies are more oriented to peace

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time activities and efficiencies than to supporting combat forces in wartime.

The Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel discussed the span of control problem and associated problems:

The expanding parallel organization of OSD has contributed to the excessive span of control of the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense. Twenty-seven major offices of the Department report directly to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary, and of these, twelve are in OSD. No formal mechanism exists to assure proper coordination among the parallel elements of OSD. This unsatisfactory organization structure results in frequent contradictions in policy guidance, frictions between the various elements of OSD, and the necessity for extensive and time-consuming coordination with little assurance that it has achieved its purpose. (page 25)

Similarly, Secretary Brown discussed this problem 8 years later in the fiscal year 1979 Annual Report to the Congress:

The Secretary's span of control was too broad for effective management. At that time, 29 major offices of the Department, plus seven Unified/Specified Commands reported to me. Of these, almost half were within the Office of the Secretary itself. Furthermore, the fragmentation of executive authority among independent offices within the Office of the Secretary, several of which had closely related functions and responsibilities, created the need for excessive and time-consuming coordination and required the elevation of far too many decisions to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary for resolution. Virtually every review of the Department's organization in the past several years concluded that these conditions hampered effective management. (page 349)

As discussed earlier in this chapter, Secretary Brown made an effort in 1977 to reduce the span of control problem. His actions did not go far enough in this direction. Moreover, the problem has been further compounded by the addition since 1977 of other OSD offices reporting directly to the Secretary.

b. Piecemeal Addition of OSD Offices

The second cause of inadequate supervision and coordination of OSD offices is that many OSD offices have been added, especially by the Congress, without restructuring the overall organization. Many of these offices were established and given positions in the hierarchy for political purposes. In particular, the Congress has specified that these newly created offices report directly to the Secretary of Defense. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences are good examples. The problem with this congressional direction is that the Secretary cannot adequately manage these offices, so they, in essence, report to no one. Furthermore, given the specificity of congressional direction, OSD organizational planners

believe that they are inhibited by outside constraints from seeking more streamlined arrangements.

3. INEXPERIENCED POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND POOR CONTINUITY IN SENIOR LEVELS OF OSD

Too often, key positions in OSD are filled by individuals who lack a substantial background in military strategy, operations, budgeting, and the like which are so important if one is to contribute immediately to effective policy formulation and management. DoD can no longer afford to fill senior positions with on-the-job trainees. Equally troublesome is that OSD has poor continuity in its most senior positions. In a field as complex as defense management, this is a fundamental weakness in achieving a sound U.S. national security program. This severe shortcoming must be overcome if civilian control of the military is to remain compatible with the level of organizational effectiveness required by today's complex international security environment.

In OSD, there are currently 18 Presidential appointees and 51 additional senior political appointees. This number of political appointees becomes a problem only because of their relative inexperience, their high turnover rate, and the lengthy breaks between departures and arrivals of political appointees.

a. Experience Levels of Senior DoD Officials

In his book, U.S. Defense Planning A Critique, John Collins makes the following observation on the experience levels of senior DoD officials:

The U.S. defense planning system installs few leaders who possess first-class credentials before they take defense planning posts. A distinct minority during the last 37 years could be considered professionally qualified to supervise the process and select politico-military alternatives until they had been in office for lengthy periods. (pages 199-200)

Similarly, the Departmental Headquarters Study recommended

. continuing emphasis on the importance of selecting high calibre, well-qualified people for Presidential appointments, and encouraging their service for periods long enough to be effective. (page 27)

Some observers argue that the overriding solution to DoD organizational problems is to improve the caliber of senior officials. General Krulak presented this view in testimony before the Committee on September 20, 1983 when he argued: "Someone once said in referring to an organization chart, it is not the boxes on the chart, it is the blokes in the boxes." (part 2, page 106)

While improving the quality of DoD's senior leadership is an important initiative, it should not, however, be seen as a substitute for necessary organizational reform. Although good people can, to a certain extent, overcome a deficient organizational structure, a well-designed structure will support a higher level of sustained effectiveness than a poor structure will. As Dr. James R. Schlesinger testified before the Committee on November 2, 1983:

I have no wish to exaggerate nor to suggest that structural reform is a panacea that can solve our many military problems. Structural reform is no substitute for capable leadership or for suitable, well-trained and ready forces. Cynics will point out that only a limited amount can be achieved by what is described as "tinkering". Nonetheless, in the absence of structural reform I fear that we shall obtain less than is attainable from our expenditures and from our forces. Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements. Without such reform, I fear that the United States will obtain neither the best military advice, nor the effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defense posture available to the nation. (Part 5, page 186)

Similarly, Peter F. Drucker emphasizes the importance of sound organizational structure:

Few managers seem to recognize that the right organization structure is not performance itself, but rather a prerequisite of performance. The wrong structure is indeed a guarantee of nonperformance; it produces friction and frustration, puts the spotlight on the wrong issues, and makes mountains out of trivia. (Harvard Business Review on Management, page 624)

Paul Hammond in his book, Organizing for Defense, offers the following thoughts:

Formal organization is not all-important. In large-scale organization, however, it is an unavoidable starting point of inquiry. Men are important, too. But men in government-at least in the American government -do not last. The things that last are the institutional arrangements which impart continuity to policy and meaning (however valid) to process, and the modes of thought which make both significant. (page 4)

Nevertheless, structural form cannot compensate for individuals who lack required expertise for the positions they occupy. According to Hammond, "...Organizations are made up of men; there is no substitute for their quality." (page 4)

b. High Turnover Rates

As to turnover rates, Secretaries of Defense have served on the average for only 2.3 years; and Deputy Secretaries, for only 1.8 years. Average longevity in senior OSD positions is considerably less than 3 years. For example, Assistant Secretaries of Defense (International Security Affairs) have served on the average for only 1.6 years since this important position was established in 1953. c. Vacancies

Many positions remain vacant following departures of political appointees. The report of the Chairman's Special Study Group indicates that, among approximately 30 presidential appointee positions in OSD and the Military Departments, extended vacancies

have occurred 146 times since 1960 with an average duration of 5 months. (page 42)

d. Causes

There are two basic causes of the problem of inexperienced political appointees and poor continuity in senior levels of OSD: (1) extensive use of OSD appointments to repay political debts or to provide representation for special interest groups; and (2) substantial financial disincentives for individuals appointed to such positions. (1) extensive use of OSD appointments to repay political debts or to provide representation for special interest groups

The problem of filling key civilian leadership positions in OSD with individuals who lack sufficient qualifications is in no small measure the result of the excessive influence in the selection process of the White House staff in both Republican and Democratic administrations. Key OSD leadership positions have been filled with individuals who have either faithfully served in the campaign of a winning Presidential candidate or who have satisfied the perceived political need for special interest group representation. Often, there is little regard for the qualifications and suitability of these individuals.

(2) substantial financial disincentives

A second cause contributing to this problem is the congressionally imposed limitations on compensation and financial holdings of civilian leaders of the Department of Defense. The annual compensation of senior DoD officials is set at $72,200. Although it has long been recognized that government service necessarily involves some financial sacrifice, if that sacrifice is allowed to become prohibitive, some of the most able people simply will be unable to enter government service.

Another aspect of this cause is the conflict of interest statutes and regulations applicable to senior civilian officials throughout the Federal Government and the special provisions of the Senate Committee on Armed Services relating to divestiture of conflicting assets. In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Richard C. Steadman indicated the Committee's special provisions in this area often result in a prospective appointee being faced with a forced sale of their major assets as a requirement to accepting a Department of Defense position. He further observed that the result, after taxes, of such a forced sale could be an immediate one-third decrease in an individual's assets. There can be little doubt that such a result could be a real impediment to some of the most highly qualified individuals accepting positions in OSD and elsewhere in DoD.

4. OSD MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF SERVICE PROGRAMS

The Military Departments have consistently held the view that OSD has been engaged in extensive micro-management of internal Service programs. The term "micro-management" means the overinvolvement of higher authority in details that can be better managed by subordinate organizations. While observers differ as to whether this exists, the weight of testimony suggests that there is some degree of OSD micro-management. For example, the Depart