« 上一頁繼續 »
a. The American Forces Information Service (AFIS) was established in 1977 under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). The AFIS mission is to provide information, through print and audiovisual products, to DoD and other appropriate personnel in support of DoD policies and programs.
b. The Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DODDS) was established in 1974. Under the policy guidance of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics), the DODDS is charged with providing quality education, from kindergarten through grade twelve, to eligible minor dependents of military and civilian personnel of the Department of Defense stationed overseas.
c. The Office of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS) was established in 1974 under the policy guidance and operational direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs). The mission of OCHAMPUS is to administer a civilian health and medical care program for spouses and dependent children of active duty, retired, and deceased service members.
d. The Office of Economic Adjustment plans and manages DoD economic adjustment programs and assists Federal, State, and local officials in cooperative efforts to alleviate any serious social and economic side effects resulting from major DoD realignments or other actions.
The Defense Medical Systems Support Center (DMSSC),under the policy guidance and operational direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), was established in 1985. Upon its establishment, DMSSC incorporated the Tri-Service Medical Information System (TRIMIS) which had been established in 1976 as a DoĎ Field Activity. The DMSSC mission is to improve health care delivery by the Military Departments by applying automatic data processing techniques to health care information systems.
f. Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) was established in 1977. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) serves in a dual capacity as the Director, WHS. The WHS mission is to provide administrative and operational support to certain Department of Defense activities in the National Capital region. Such support includes budget and accounting, personnel management, travel, building administration, computer services, information and data systems, voting assistance program, and any other required administrative support.
g. The Defense Technology Security Administration, established in 1985, administers the DoD Technology Security Program to review the international transfer of defense-related technology, goods, services, and munitions consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.
h. The Defense Information Services Activity, established in 1985, implements assigned DoD policies and programs relating to the provision of information to the media, public forums, and the American people.
4. OSD Advisory Committees
The Office of the Secretary of Defense has 18 Advisory Committees comprised of non-government specialists. The majority of these Advisory Committees provide expert opinion on technical research and engineering issues or certain manpower-related issues. Accordingly, eight of these committees report to the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) and seven to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics). These Advisory Committees were created because of a lack of expertise within DoD or the desire to avoid conflicts of interest. Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering)
1. Ada Board (computer language)
8. President's Blue Ribbon Task Group on Nuclear Weapons Pro gram Management Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logis
tics) 9. Board of Visitors, Equal Opportunity Management Institute 10. Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Training 11. Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services 12. DoD Educational Benefits Board of Actuaries 13. DoD Wage Committee 14. DoD Retirement Board of Actuaries
15. Overseas Dependents Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Handicapped Dependents Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
16. Special Operations Policy Advisory Group Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
17. Secretary of Defense Media Advisory Council Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
18. Sizing DoD Medical Treatment Facilities D. PROBLEM AREAS AND CAUSES
Before useful proposals can be put forth to improve organizational arrangements or decision-making procedures, it is critical that a meaningful diagnosis of problem areas and their causes be prepared. This section discusses six problem areas that have been identified within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and presents analyses of the contributing causes. There are other problems associated with the position of Secretary of Defense, most notably his role in the chain of command. As these problems involve his relationships with organizations other than OSD, they are more usefully addressed in subsequent chapters of this study. In particular, the chain of command problem is addressed in Chapter 5 dealing with the unified and specified commands. In addition, there are concerns about the quality of DoD strategic planning for which OSD has major responsibilities. This shortcoming is addressed in Chapter 7 dealing with the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.
1. LIMITED MISSION INTEGRATION OF THE OVERALL DEFENSE EFFORT
This subsection discusses limited mission integration within OSD. As the term "mission" has different applications within DoD, it would be useful to identify the missions which are the focus of this discussion.
In fulfilling U.S. national security objectives and in implementing U.S. defense strategies, the Department of Defense has six major missions, three of which are worldwide in nature and three of which are regional. The major worldwide missions and their goals are:
nuclear deterrence-essential equivalence with the strategic and theater nuclear forces of the Soviet Union;
maritime superiority-controlling the seas when and where needed;
power projection superiority-deploying superior military forces in times of crisis to distant world areas which are pri
marily outside the traditional system of Western alliances. The major regional missions are:
defense of NATO Europe, including both the northern and southern flanks;
defense of East Asia, particularly Northeast Asia; and
defense of Southwest Asia, especially the region's oil re
sources. While DoD has other regional missions (e.g., Western Hemisphere and Africa), these relatively smaller, while important, missions are included in the mission of power projection superiority.
a. Comparing Unification, Centralization, and Mission Integration.
Since the end of World War II, the central issue in proposals to reorganize the U.S. military establishment has been the extent to which the distinct military capabilities of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps need to be integrated to prepare for and conduct effective, joint military operations in times of war. This central issue has been referred to as either unification or centralization. But, in fact, neither term describes the real goal of the search for a more effective and, perhaps, a more efficient U.S. military organization. Mission integration, the ability of the Services to take unified action to discharge the major military missions of the United States, is a more appropriate term. Mission integration was and remains the real goal of proposals to reorganize the U.S. military establishment. In comparing these three terms, unification relates to form; centralization relates to process; and mission integration relates to substance. It would be useful to discuss unification, centralization, and mission integration in more detail in order to understand why the first two are inappropriate terms for describing the principal organizational goal of the Department of Defense.
Since 1789, U.S. armed forces have, in fact, been unified under the President, the Commander-in-Chief. The organizational structure supporting the Commander-in-Chief, however, has changed over time. The National Security Act of 1947, the most dramatic alteration since the establishment of the Department of the Navy in 1798, provided the President with a new deputy for military affairs who would devote his entire efforts to the coordination of the armed forces, whereas the President could spend only limited time on such responsibilities. A unified structure was created to support the President's
new deputy for military affairs. "Unification" under the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent amendments produced the Department of Defense with three Military Departments under a single Executive Department. (It should be noted that unification has never meant abolition of the four separate Services.) Unification also produced statutory authority for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands.
While the term "unification" was used extensively during the debates on reorganization of the U.S. military establishment -a period of more than 25 years —that led to the National Security Act of 1947, it does not accurately describe the organizational arrangements that resulted from this legislation. As Dr. Lawrence J. Korb notes in his paper, “Service Unification: Arena of Fears, Hopes, and Ironies":
The 1947 act did not really unify the national military establishment. Like most pieces of legislation in the American political system, the act was a compromise between those who favored a monolithic structure and those who supported a decentralized organization. It created a confederation rather than a unified or even a federal structure. The act did provide for two central or supra-service organs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). However, it placed so many limitations on the activities of these central organs and reserved so many prerogatives to the separate services that it was difficult for the Secretary of Defense or the JCS to bring about coordinated action.
... Nevertheless, the 1947 act was a significant breakthrough. It established the principle of unification and shifted the terms of the debate about military organization. Since then unification has not been the issue. Rather, the debate has focused upon how to give the central organs of DoD the ability to control the activities of the department and to produce an efficient and effective defense policy without simultaneously eliminating the separate services. (U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
Naval Review 1976, pages 175-176) While unification produced a framework that made mission integration possible, whether the necessary degree of integration has resulted is another question. As Dr. Lawrence J. Legere, Jr. states in Unification of the Armed Forces: