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the absence of a national military strategy. While particularly critical of the absence of grand strategy for naval and national warfare, Admiral Mahan was able to provide the Navy with strategic doctrines. Hammond discusses the absence of a national military strategy in terms of its impact on the War Department:

...without defined strategic objectives, a national military policy of any coherency, or at least a general strategic doctrine such as the Navy had, strategic planning was virtually meaningless...(page 30)

Huntington also noted this problem during the same period:

...Frequently, the military men found themselves forced to work in a vacuum and to guess as to the nature of national policy. Such a situation tended to undermine either civilian control or national security, forcing the military men to make their own policy or give up any serious strategy planning. (The Soldier and the State, page 263)

o the division of civilian and military responsibilities -As many of the preceding issues were debated, the question of appropriate civil and military roles also arose, particularly in the Navy Department. During the period from 1900 to 1930, Hammond notes the central role of this issue in the Navy:

...At stake were fundamental questions concerning the administration of a military establishment: the role of civilian responsibility and of the professionals in the administration of the Navy Department. (page 53)

• General Staff -While the Congress enacted the General Staff Act of 1903 providing a General Staff for the Army, congressional hostility to the concept of a General Staff remained substantial. While many Navy officers pressed for a General Staff for the Navy, the opposition was too great to create it. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels was one of the more outspoken opponents. According to Hammond, Secretary Daniels

...regarded a General Staff not simply as unwise but as undemocratic and "un-American." (page 61)

This brief discussion of the organizational history of the U.S. military establishment serves two purposes: (1) it clearly shows the long-standing nature of current problems; and (2) it demonstrates the complexity of these issues which have remained unresolved despite the serious attention that they have received at regular intervals over the last 85 years. On the whole, the U.S. military establishment has not been able to adapt its organizational arrangements to keep abreast of the evolution of warfare which has required a greater integration of land, air, and sea capabilities. While President Eisenhower declared in 1958 that "separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever," this fact has not been recognized in organizational and command arrangements or in inter-Service cooperation and coordination.

On the administrative side, the sharing of responsibilities between the Executive and Legislative Branches has caused many problems, often obscuring national defense needs. The legitimate role of central authority, whether civilian secretaries or

Staffs, remains undecided. Powerful bureaucratic forces have continued successfully to press for decentralization (despite much evidence of the need for greater unified direction and control) in order to promote narrow interests and greater independence. The preoccupation with technical skills and material resources continues to plague the military establishment; strategy, operational planning, and command the heart of the military profession remain secondary concerns.

D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents conclusions and recommendations based upon the analyses in Sections B and C of this chapter. An effort has been made to avoid the repetition of conclusions and recommendations presented elsewhere in this study. The focus here is on broader judgments that could not be adequately developed in Chapters 2 through 9.

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Conclusions 10. Despite his vast statutory authority, the power and influence of the Secretary of Defense are not sufficient to enable him to effectively manage DoD; the Secretary is confronted by powerful institutional forces that undermine his authority and offer little help in carrying out his vast responsibilities.

11. The conceptual, organizational, and procedural problems currently plaguing DoD-both on administrative and operational matters-are not not new; they have been evident for most of the 20th Century.

Recommendations

10A. Ensure that organizational and procedural changes enhance the management potential of the Secretary of Defense.

APPENDIX A

AGGREGATION OF PROBLEM AREAS INTO MAJOR
PROBLEM THEMES

This appendix identifies the problem areas from Chapter 3 through 9 which were aggregated into the ten major problem themes. Some of the problem areas contributed to the identification of more than one theme.

1. IMBALANCE OF EMPHASIS ON FUNCTIONS VERSUS MISSIONS

This problem theme is based on three problem areas:

• limited mission integration of the overall defense effort (Chapter 3-OSD);

• planning and programming are unilateral, not coalition, oriented (Chapter 3-OSD); and

• failure of the PPBS to emphasize the output side of the defense program (Chapter 7 -PPBS).

2. IMBALANCE OF SERVICE VERSUS JOINT INTERESTS This problem theme is based on nine problem areas:

• inability of the JCS to provide useful and timely unified military advice (Chapter 4 -OJCS);

• weak authority of unified commanders over Service component commanders (Chapter 5 -Unified and Specified Commands); • imbalance between the responsibilities and accountability of the unified commanders and their influence over resource decisions (Chapter 5 -Unified and Specified Commands);

• absence of unification below the level of the unified commander and his staff (Chapter 5 -Unified and Specified Commands); • confusion concerning the roles of the Service Secretaries (Chapter 6-Military Departments);

• inability of the JCS system to make meaningful programmatic inputs (Chapter 7 -PPBS);

• lack of commonality of military equipment (Chapter 8 —Acquisition Process);

• weak management of, and general resistance to, joint programs (Chapter 8 -Acquisition Process); and

• congressional institutions and procedures reinforce divisions in DoD (Chapter 9 -Congressional Review and Oversight).

3. INTER-SERVICE LOGROLLING

This problem theme is based on two problem areas:

• inability of the JCS to provide useful and timely unified military advice (Chapter 4 -OJCS); and

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