tions that find it difficult to adapt to changing conditions because of understandable attachments to the past. The very foundation of each service rests on imbuing its members with pride in its missions, its doctrine and its customs and discipline -all of which are steeped in traditions. While these deepseated service distinctions are important in fostering a fighting spirit, cultivating them engenders tendencies to look inward and to insulate the institutions against outside challenges. The history of our services includes striking examples of ideas and inventions whose time had come, but which were resisted because they did not fit into existing service concepts. The Navy kept building sailing ships long after the advent of steam power. Machine guns and tanks were developed in the United States, but our Army rejected them until long after they were accepted in Europe. The horse cavalry survived essentially unchanged right up until World War II despite evidence that its utility was greatly diminished decades earlier. Even Army Air Corps officers were required to wear spurs until the late 1930's. But the armed services are only part of the problem. The Defense Department has evolved into a grouping of large, rigid bureaucracies -services, agencies, staffs, boards and committees which embrace the past and adapt new technology to fit traditional missions and methods. There is no doubt that the cavalry leaders would have quickly adopted a horse which went farther and faster a high-technology stallion. The result of this rigidity has been an ever-widening gap between the need to adapt to changing conditions and our ability to do so. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 16)

In part, resistance to change in the U.S. military establishment can be attributed to inherent military conservatism. The Steadman Report comments on military conservatism:

There is a natural tendency to be comfortable with what one understands and knows will operate and a natural skepticism to accept theoretical assertions of improvements. This tendency (pejoratively labeled by some "fighting the last war over again") needs to be challenged more often, but challenges are difficult within the existing system which provides many avenues for delay. (pages 55 and 56)

As the Steadman Report suggests, this tendency in the Department of Defense is magnified by systemic problems. Key among these systemic problems are (1) the bureaucratic agreements among the Services -the Key West Agreement on Service roles and missions, the Unified Command Plan, and JCS Publication 2 (Unified Action Armed Forces) being key examples which are "off-limits" even when serious deficiencies are identified; (2) the predominant influence of the Services, particularly when compared to that of joint organizations; (3) inter-Service logrolling on critical issues; and (4) absolute Service control over promotions and assignments of all military officers, including those in joint duty billets. The result of these systemic problems is that DoD does not have effective mechanisms for change.

As this study documents, the Department of Defense suffers from numerous organizational and procedural deficiencies. Of major concern is the frequent inability of DoD to correct these deficiencies on its own. Despite substantial evidence of poor organizational performance, DoD expends its energies on defending the status quo. Citing inaction following the urgent appeals of senior military officers then on active duty-General David C. Jones, USAF and Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN among others -for structural reform, Edward N. Luttwak concludes:

...such is the paralyzing effect of long-decayed military bureaucracies that even the widest consensus on the need for reform does not yield any substantial remedy. (The Pentagon and the Art of War, page 61)

Lawrence and Lorsch cite the "process of self-correcting and selfmodifying" as making organizations "potentially such a flexible and powerful tool." (page 11) The absence of an effective process of self-correction and self-modification has resulted in an undesirable rigidity in DoD organization and procedures. In The Pentagon and the Art of War, Edward N. Luttwak notes the inability of DoD to reform itself:

...the path of self-reform, which a healthy institution would achieve informally by an entire pattern of disinterested [objective, non-parochial] decisions, is rigidly blocked. (page 43) Related to the problem theme of insufficient mechanisms for change is the absence of useful feedback in many organizational activities of DoD. Effective management control is not possible without useful and timely feedback on actual operations and implementation of plans. In Organization and Management, Fremont E. Kast and James E. Rosenzweig discuss the importance of feedback:

Feedback is an essential ingredient in any control process. It provides the information for decisions that adjust the system. As plans are implemented, the system is tracked or monitored in order to ascertain whether or not performance is on target and whether objectives are being met. Feedback is usually obtained with reference to both the ends sought and the means designed to achieve them. (page 509)

Peter F. Drucker notes the importance of feedback to the decisionmaking process:

A feedback has to be built into the decision to provide continuous testing, against actual events, of the expectations that underlie the decision. Few decisions work out the way they are intended to. Even the best decision usually runs into snags, unexpected obstacles, and all kinds of surprises. Even the most effective decision eventually becomes obsolete. Unless there is feedback from the results of a decision, it is unlikely to produce the desired results. (Management, page 480)

Feedback mechanisms in DoD are underdeveloped. This shortcoming denies DoD managers the information required to make necessary changes and adjustments to plans and programs. As a

result, substantial deviations from desired performance remain uncorrected for extended periods.

While inadequate feedback reduces management control of the resource allocation process, it also precludes learning large lessons from poor organizational performance. Past mistakes-whether in the procurement of a weapon system or in the employment of forces during a crisis-often do not receive the critical review that would prevent them from recurring. The lessons go unlearned, and the mistakes are repeated. While there are other factors that contribute to this deficiency, inadequate feedback mechanisms play an important role.

While inadequate feedback results in part from the predominance of the forward-looking programming and budgeting processes, DoD has not established a tradition of comprehensive, critical evaluations of its performance in many areas. Internal investigations have traditionally failed to comprehensively and objectively assess the causes of deficient performance. Edward N. Luttwak notes the absence of critical evaluations in the context of the military failure in Vietnam:

...there was no agonizing reappraisal after Vietnam, no reform of any kind, let alone the drastic reform so obviously needed. (The Pentagon and the Art of War, page 42)

Obviously, these incomplete investigations have often sought to deflect public criticism from DoD and its programs and operations. They may have achieved this objective, but they have denied DoD the critical information which it needs to modify its plans and programs, management procedures, organizational structure, command relationships, and coordination and supervisory arrangements.

7. INADEQUATE QUALITY OF POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND JOINT DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL

Problems with the quality of personnel have been identified in political appointee positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretariats and in joint duty military positions, especially in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the staffs of the unified commanders. Political appointees are a problem because of their relative inexperience and high turnover rates as well as lengthy vacancies in appointed positions. These factors lead to extended periods of on-the-job training and poor continuity. The Senate shares some responsibility for the inadequate quality of political appointees because of its failure to establish more rigorous standards for presidential appointments.

Regarding joint duty military personnel, Hanson W. Baldwin made the following statement in 1949:

One of the tragedies of unification is that there are not, at the top, men who really know enough about each of the services to evaluate all of those services. (The New York Times, October 16, 1949, page 34)

Unfortunately, this statement is nearly as true today as it was in 1949. DoD has given insufficient attention to the development of

military officers capable of effectively performing joint duty assignments. In addition, the substantial disincentives to serving in such assignments have been permitted to persist.

8. FAILURE TO CLARIFY THE DESIRED DIVISION OF WORK

One of the basic mechanisms for enhancing organizational efficiency is to rationally divide the work among the various structural components. In Organization and Management, Fremont E. Kast and James E. Rosenzweig discuss division of work (or division of labor) in the following terms:

A basic concept of traditional management theory is to divide work into specialized tasks and to organize them into distinct departments. Departmentalization with a natural division of labor is emphasized. It is desirable to determine the necessary activities for the accomplishment of overall organizational objectives and then to divide these activities on a logical basis into departments that perform the specialized functions. The organization structure is the primary means for achieving the technical and economic advantages of specialization and division of labor. (pages 238 and 239)

Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, in Principles of Management: An Analysis of Managerial Functions, discuss the principle of division of work in terms of organizational effectiveness and efficiency:

...The more an organization structure reflects a classification of the tasks or activities necessary to attain goals and assists in their coordination, and the more that roles are designed to fit the capabilities and motivations of people available to fill them, the more effective and efficient an organization structure will be. (page 411)

...The point of the principle [of division of work] is that the activities of an enterprise should be so divided and grouped as to contribute most effectively to objectives. (page 412)

Within DoD, the desired division of work has not been adequately clarified in many instances; in others, the assigned division of work is ignored in practice. Congressional micro-management of defense programs and OSD micro-management of Service programs are key examples of this problem theme. Equally relevant is DoD's inability to objectively examine the Unified Command Plan and the Services' roles and missions. This inability precludes a more rational division of work among the operational commands in the first instance and among the Services in the second. In the context of civilian control of the military, there is also a lack of clarity on the division of work between civilian and military officials and organizations. As a last point, many organizations have encroached on the duties of OJCS; both OSD and the Services are performing roles assigned to OJCS.

9. EXCESSIVE SPANS OF CONTROL AND ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURES

At many levels of the Department of Defense, key managers have an excessive number of subordinates reporting to them. For example, the Secretary of Defense has 41 senior military and civil

ian officials (excluding the Deputy Secretary and his immediate staff) who report directly to him. Likewise, the Service Chiefs have unwieldy spans of control. The Army Chief of Staff has 42 officials reporting directly to him; the Chief of Naval Operations, 48 officials; the Air Force Chief of Staff, 35 officials; and the Marine Corps Commandant, 41 officials. As is noted in Chapter 3, an analysis of organizational needs in the Department of Defense suggests that smaller spans of control for senior civilian and military officials would enhance organizational performance. Effective management and coordination of excessive numbers of officials are not possible. As a result, organizational inefficiency is substantial.

In general, excessive spans of control in DoD result from the use of relatively flat organizational structures. Use of more orderly hierarchical structures may help to solve the problems of insufficient supervision and coordination.

At the same time, the existing hierarchy does not clearly define superior-subordinate relationships. This is most notable in the operational chain of command where considerable confusion exists over the actual authority of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. This problem is also found in the relationships between the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries. In discussing mistakes in organizing, Koontz and O'Donnell comment:

The failure to clarify organization relationships, probably more than any other mistake, accounts for friction, politics, and inefficiencies. Since the authority and the responsibility for action are critical in organization, lack of clarity here means lack of knowledge of the part employees are to play on an enterprise team. (page 397)

10. INSUFFICIENT POWER AND INFLUENCE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From the foregoing analyses of this chapter and of preceding chapters, it is evident that the actual power and influence of the Secretary of Defense are not sufficient to enable him to effectively manage the Department of Defense. The problem arises not from his formal statutory authority which provides him a full measure of power. Instead, the problem emanates from powerful organizational forces whose vigorous pursuit of their own agendas has substantial weakened the office of Secretary of Defense. As a result, the Secretary lacks the tools, levers, and organizational channels that he needs to effectively manage the defense bureaucracy. Moreover, his efforts are seriously hampered by the absence of a source of truly independent military advice.

In his paper, "The Office of the Secretary of Defense With a Strengthened Joint Staff System," John G. Kester states:

By statute, the Secretary enjoys "direction, authority and control" of all that goes on in the Defense Department. In reality, his authority is impinged upon from all sides by the Congress, by other Executive Branch power centers, by the parochial subparts of the Department of Defense, sometimes even by some of his own appointees who busily pursue their own agendas. The Secretary, if he does his job, is likely often to be embattled constantly, and even if he does very little still is likely to feel he is less heading a department than sitting atop