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ness it tends to direct vision away from results and toward efforts, to obscure the organization's goals, and to sub-optimize decisions. It has high stability but little adaptability. It perpetuates and develops technical and functional skills, that is, middle managers, but it resists new ideas and inhibits topmanagement development and vision. ("New Templates for
Today's Organizations", page 631) These deficiencies of the functional structure are reflected in the organizational problems of DoD, especially OSD. The functional structure serves to: o direct vision away from results and towards efforts - DoD is fo
cused on inputs and not outputs; o obscure the organization's goals-strategic goals and missions
are not the focus of organizational activity within the Wash
ington Headquarters of DoD; o sub-optimize decisions -decisions in DoD are dominated by
Service and functional perspectives and not by benefits to the
goals of the entire organization; o limit adaptability changes in the nature of warfare and the
external environment, primarily the threat, are slow to be re
flected in organizational activity; o develop functional and technical skills - DoD has built great
expertise in these areas, yet there is a lack of a strategic context
for the effective application of these skills; and o resist new ideas and inhibit top-management development and
vision - DoD is unable to conduct effective strategic planning, to clearly articulate strategic goals and concepts, to establish resource priorities, and to adapt readily to changing require
ments and concepts. While the functional structure of DoD results in many shortcomings in organizational performance, its major deficiency is that it inhibits the integration of Service capabilities along mission lines, termed ”mission integration“ in this study. As mission integration is the principal organizational goal of DoD, the predominant functional structure is a major problem.
This problem theme does not suggest that certain portions of DoD organizations should not focus on functions. They will need to do so. The problem arises because they are now excessively focused on functions and are nearly ignoring missions. A more appropriate organizational balance between functional and mission orientations is needed. 2. IMBALANCE OF SERVICE VERSUS JOINT INTERESTS
The Declaration of Policy (Section 2) of the National Security Act of 1947 stated:
In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States, to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an ef
ficient team of land, naval, and air forces. In many respects, the intent of the Congress has not been fulfilled, particularly with respect to providing for "authoritative coordination and unified direction”, for "effective strategic direction,” and for "integration (of the armed forces) into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces."
The failure to implement this policy results from the inability to strike an appropriate balance between Service and joint interests in DoD decision-making. The Services have been able to maintain overwhelming independence and influence. In his book, Reappraising Defense Organization, Archie D. Barrett cites one of the significant organizational problems of DoD as
The overwhelming influence of the four services. The deference accorded their positions on defense issues as a result of the present organization is completely out of proportion to their legally assigned and limited formal responsibilities-in essence, organizing, training, and equipping forces for the com
batant commanders. (pages xix and xx) Barrett supports this conclusion as follows:
...In effect, the services have co-opted the joint structure through the dual roles of the service chiefs, overweening influence on the Joint Staff, participation in CINC (Commander in Chief of a unified or specified command) selection, and predominant control over the component commands.
...the military input into decisionmaking, whether through service secretaries, the JCS, Joint Staff, CINCs, or components, is predoininantly service-oriented. On a broad range of contentious issues, military advice from a national perspective is unavailable to civilian decisionmakers who are forced to provide this perspective themselves, whether or not they are qualified
to do so. (pages 79 and 80) The Chairman's Special Study Group reached a similar conclusion:
The problem is one of balance. A certain amount of Service independence is healthy and desirable, but the balance now favors the parochial interests of the Services too much, and the larger needs of the nation's defenses too little. The military organizations given the responsibility for the planning and execution of Joint activities -notably the JCS, the Joint Staff and its subordinate agencies such as the Joint Deployment Agency, and the various Unified Command headquarters -simply do not have the authority, stature, trained personnel, or support
needed to carry out their jobs effectively. (page 54) Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger cites the same imbalance:
The net effect of the structure that we created in the postwar period was that the balance was tipped toward a preservation of existing institutional [Service] interests and against the efficient design of forces or execution of war plans. (Senate
Committee on Armed Services Hearings, Part 5, page 187) Ambassador Robert W. Komer found the same imbalance in strategy formulation and resource allocation:
... The fact of the matter is that the historical independence and political strength of the services is inconsistent with the goal of coherent unified strategy with clear priorities and better translation of those priorities into resource allocations. Because the JCS system is service-dominated at the expense of any joint perspective, bureaucratic politics has greater influence on JCS and Service planning than systematic strategic
thinking. ("Strategymaking in DoD,” page 24) Samuel P. Huntington terms the predominant influence of Service interests as "servicism" which he cites as "the central malady of the American military establishment.” (“Defense Organization and Military Strategy", The Public Interest, Number 75, Spring 1984, page 24) Huntington discusses "servicism" in the following terms:
...the individual services per se were not supposed to fight wars, to make strategy, or to determine overall force structure. In fact, they continued to exercise a prevailing influence in each of these areas. Instead of developing a system for coherent central strategic planning, the Joint Chiefs continued to give priority to their role as spokesmen for their services, and Joint Staff officers bargain among themselves, each trying to get the most for his service. Instead of rational choices of programs and weapons most needed to serve national purposes, such choices are still largely determined by service needs and service interests, resulting in duplication of some programs, misallocation of resources to others, and, most important, neglect of still others. Instead of the unified command of combat forces, command is often fragmented and the unified commanders (CINCs) almost always find their authority over their forces second to that of the services that supplied those forces.
(pages 23 and 24) To which, he adds:
...servicism is the doctrine or system that exalts the individual military service and accords it primacy in the military establishment. The individual military services are and will remain indispensable elements in that establishment. Service interests, service needs, and service power, however, have dominated U.S. defense structure, warping and frustrating efforts to establish rational systems of strategic planning, force development, and combat command. The result is, inevitably, an undesirable weakening of the collective military contribu
tion in these areas. (page 45) The predominance of Service influence finds expression in organizational deficiencies in DoD. The Services are able to dominate joint organizations, both those in Washington and in the field. Correcting these organizational imbalances will substantially enhance effective strategic direction and mission integration. Yet, the problem is more deep-seated than can be corrected by mere organizational realignments. The core of this problem is the basic attitudes and orientations of the professional officer corps. As long as the vast majority of military officers at all levels gives highest priority to the interests of their Service or branch while losing sight of broader and more important national security needs—and believes that their behavior is correct-the predominance of Service influence will remain a problem. Whatever changes are made at the top of the DoD organization, powerful resistance to a more unified outlook will continue to be the basic orientation of military officers deeply immersed in the culture of their Services.
This fact is presented here not to argue against organizational realignments which are obviously needed. The utility of this observation is that it is a clear indication that organizational realignments, by themselves, will not be sufficient. They will need to be augmented by major changes in the education and training of military officers of all Services. The objective of these changes should be to produce military officers with a greater commitment to national (instead of Service) security requirements, a genuine multiService perspective, and an improved understanding of the other Services.
The imbalance between Service and joint interests also is a major cause of another imbalance: between modernization and readiness. For the most part, the Washington Headquarters of the Services are focused on future requirements and the modernization of their equipment. The constituency for readiness is the operational commands which are among the joint organizations whose interests are under-represented in senior decision-making councils. The operational commands are the organizations that worry about warfighting or crisis response capabilities today and tomorrow.
The needs of the operational commands are not well represented in the Pentagon. Their geographic separation from Washington makes it impossible for them to exert a continuing influence on decisions. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff —which is expected to articulate their needs -is dominated by the modernization-oriented Services. Moreover, the unified commands must work through their Service component commands on resource issues. These component commands are generally attuned to the resource allocation priorities of the Washington Headquarters of their Services. In addition, the links between the operational commands and the Office of the Secretary of Defense are weak. Even if these links were stronger, the functional organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense does not provide natural allies for operational commanders on the full spectrum of their resource needs.
As a result, those organizations that are modernization-oriented are over-represented in Pentagon decision councils, and those that are readiness-oriented are under-represented. U.S. defense efforts have been continually plagued by the resulting modernizationreadiness imbalance.
3. INTER-SERVICE LOGROLLING
In Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action, Lawrence and Lorsch state:
...effective organizations confront internal conflicts, rather
than smoothing them over... (page 14) By this yardstick, DoD is not an effective organization. The Services have developed a strong inclination to smooth over internal conflict. This smoothing over is accomplished by inter-Service logrolling. In this context, logrolling means the practice of the Services to submerge divergent views on the important issues for mutual parochial gain. This practice has been referred to as backscratching, marriage agreements, negotiated treaties, and truces. The following quote from General David C. Jones, USAF (Retired), previously cited in Chapter 4, provides evidence of inter-Service logrolling. In commenting on the imbalance of Service and joint interests and the JCS desire for unanimity, General Jones stated:
It is commonly accepted that one result of this imbalance is a constant bickering among the services. This is not the case. On the contrary, interactions among the services usually result in "negotiated treaties” which minimize controversy by avoiding challenges to service interests. Such a “truce" has its good points, for it is counterproductive for the services to attack each other. But the lack of adequate questioning by military professionals results in gaps and unwarranted duplications in our defense capabilities. What is lacking is a counterbalancing system, involving officers not so beholden to their services, who can objectively examine strategy, roles, missions, weapons systems, war planning and other contentious issues to offset the influence of the individual services. (Senate Committee on
Armed Services Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 22) This point of view clashes sharply with the long-standing criticism of destructive and disruptive “inter-Service rivalry." For the most part, this intense rivalry was the mark of an earlier era roughly the 20 years following World War II. However, since about the third or fourth year (1963 or 1964) of Secretary McNamara's tenure, “inter-Service logrolling” has been the order of the day.
The intensity of the postwar rivalry among the Services was so great that its continued existence has been assumed. It is true that inter-Service hostility, secretiveness, jealousy, duplication, lack of understanding, and inconsistencies continue to exist. These are found at lower levels of organizational activity where they continue to undermine coordination and cooperation. However, on the central issues of concern to them, the Services logroll in order to provide a united front to the Secretary of Defense and other senior civilian authorities.
Lucas and Dawson comment on this profound change in DoD organizational politics:
... During the McNamara era, however, the defense secretariat (OSD) came to find itself confronted by a Joint Chiefs of Staff which had informally and tacitly moved to a stance of non-competition among themselves. Not that interservice con