buying divisions within the buying commands. The Services not only negotiate contracts for major weapon systems and for the support of such systems, but usually administer the contracts as well. As a result of this Service domination of acquisition, there may be inconsistent policy or contracting practices. There is also a difficulty in establishing effective departmental standards and practices regarding the acquisition work force and the transfer of personnel between the procurement commands of the various Services. It should be emphasized that the observations made here regarding this problem are a summary of the inevitable weaknesses of any decentralized system. There obviously, as is discussed later, would be other weaknesses of a highly centralized system. Many knowledgeable people believe that to the extent inconsistent practices exist among the Service buying commands, they have no tangible adverse impact on the overall performance of the system. The basic challenge in considering DoD organization is to determine whether a centralized or decentralized system offers relatively greater opportunities for effective acquisition, maintenance, and support of weapon systems.

E. DESCRIPTION OF SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS

Possible solutions to the problem areas in the acquisition process are described in this section. The options presented in this section may or may not be mutually exclusive. In some instances, the implementation of one option would preclude the implementation of other options; in other cases, several options could be implemented. 1. PROBLEM AREA #1-INSUFFICIENT ASSURED CONNECTION BETWEEN NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORMULATION OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

• Option 1A -enhance the role of the OJCS in the evaluation of military requirements

Section 141 of title 10, United States Code, assigns the following duties, among others, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

。 prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces; and

o review the major material and personnel requirements of the armed forces in accordance with strategic and logistics plans. Beyond these duties, the JCS system is responsible for overseeing the development of contingency plans. While much of the contingency planning is actually performed by the operational commands, the JCS system sets the framework and reviews operational plans.

These duties for strategic planning (which is part of the resource allocation process) and contingency planning make the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff specially qualified to evaluate military requirements and to determine whether Service-identified requirements are consistent with strategic and operational plans. While military requirements focus on future warfighting needs, the connection that the OJCS provides with current deficiencies -as made evident by contingency plans is important.

This option envisions that there would be a specific staff capability in the OJCS to assess the military requirements for each new major weapon system. This assessment would independently review the threat and the mission for which a military requirement has been established, and would either validate the particular requirement or propose adjustments to it.

For example, if the Navy proposed a new class of attack submarines of a certain size, speed, quietness, and weapons carrying capability, the OJCS under this option would prepare a military requirement assessment that would evaluate the relative appropriateness of the requirement as defined by the Navy, given an independent review by the OJCS of the threat, the Navy mission, the quantity of attack submarines required to perform that mission, the affordability of the new submarine design, and other pertinent factors.

• Option 1B-enhance the role of OSD in the evaluation of military requirements

A second alternative for assuring greater connection between the national military strategy and the establishment and validation of military requirements would be to substantially increase the size and capabilities of the staff of the USDR&E, and to call upon that staff for a more thorough review of military requirements. Presently, notwithstanding substantial criticism of the overall size of OSD, it is clear that the staff of the USDR&E is much smaller than that of the Services performing comparable functions. In fact, the program office alone for some individual weapon systems would exceed the size of the entire staff of USDR&E. Thus, if the Under Secretary seeks to question the validity of a military requirement established by the Services, the Services have far greater staff capability and expertise to justify the established requirement than does OSD to challenge it. If OSD is to be a more effective counterbalance to the Services in evaluating military requirements, then it needs to have more substantial and broader-based staff capability. 2. PROBLEM AREA # 2-FAILURE TO ACHIEVE FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE LEVELS OF EQUIPMENT COMMONALITY

O

Option 2A -create structures to promote communication among users, requirement formulators, and procurers of similar types of weapon systems

As noted earlier, the development of military requirements involves users, those charged specifically with requirements formulation, and the buying commands. Therefore, one means of promoting greater commonality of weapon systems or components would be to require the establishment of inter-Service committees of users, requirements formulators, and acquisition professionals. For example, if commonality in fixed-wing, high performance aircraft were sought, there would be a committee consisting of members of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps wings; another committee consisting of representatives of the requirements formulators in the Tactical Air Command, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, and the Office of the Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation; and another committee consisting of officers assigned to the Aeronautical Systems Division of the

Air Force Systems Command and the Naval Air Systems Command. Such committees are already being established in the acquisition community. For example, in June 1985, the Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group, the Joint Commanders Group for Communications-Electronics, and the Joint Ordnance Commanders Group were established.

It is recognized that the further establishment of structures like those described in this option would not necessarily overcome problems of Service loyalty, since this option does not contemplate anyone having directive authority. Rather, this option simply ensures exchange of information among users, requirements formulators, and procurers, so that commonality can be voluntarily achieved to the extent that any single Service sees value in utilizing the approach of another Service.

• Option 2B-enhance the role of OSD

The same approach suggested earlier for an enhanced staff capability in the office of the USDR&E for the purpose of ensuring the linkage of the national military strategy to the formulation of military requirements could be utilized to promote greater commonality in military equipment. This responsibility already lies with USDR&E; the issue is whether USDR&E has adequate resources to identify and promote all appropriate common utilization opportunities.

• Option 2C-consolidate the buying commands

There has been some discussion about a possible consolidation of all of the buying commands of the Services into a single department-wide acquisition agency. This option is described at greater length under problem area #4. While consolidation of the buying commands would not necessarily promote greater commonality among whole weapon systems, since the buying commands are not responsible for formulating requirements, such consolidation might promote greater commonality among components of weapon systems.

• Option 2D-develop a larger number of joint programs

Though there have been problems with the management of joint programs, the mechanism of joint program development may in certain cases be an effective option for achieving greater commonality. If a program is conducted jointly, then it offers the potential for obtaining commonality of equipment.

A joint program does not ensure complete common use of equipment, since in many cases the mission requirements of each Service will vary and equipment will have to be modified to reflect individual Service mission requirements. This was the case, for example, with the joint cruise missile project. But even with substantial differences in types of cruise missiles, the joint program offered an organizational structure for using common components to the maximum extent possible. The joint program structure also ensured that technical achievements in cruise missiles were readily available to each Service and could be incorporated into all variations of the missiles.

3. PROBLEM AREA #3-WEAK MANAGEMENT OF, AND GENERAL RESISTANCE TO, JOINT PROGRAMS

• Option 3A -let DOD manage all joint programs and assign a program manager

Under this option, OSD —either through USDR&E or through the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition and Logistics would be the direct manager of all joint programs. The responsible official at OSD would appoint the program manager, either a military officer or a civilian, who would then be directly accountable to the appointing OSD official.

Presently, the program manager for a joint program is from the Service with the lead responsibility for the program. Under this option, OSD would assume the management responsibility for joint programs.

• Option 3B-reserve a block of OSD funds to finance the development phases of joint programs

GAO has surfaced as an option in its report on joint programs the possibility of setting aside a block of OSD funds for joint major system development. According to the GAO study, the underlying rationale for this proposal is that the Services might be more willing to maintain a commitment to a joint program if development were "cost free.”

• Option 3C-ensure that OSD protects the funding levels for joint programs

In those instances where joint programs are justified and joint funding is appropriate, OSD should ensure through the budget process that participating Services fully fund their portions of the effort. OSD already has the authority to do this through the established budget preparation procedures. It would simply have to exercise that authority.

4. PROBLEM AREA #4-LACK OF EFFECTIVE DEPARTMENTAL COORDINATION OF ACQUISITION

• Option 4A -consolidate the buying commands

This option has already been mentioned as a possible alternative for dealing with the problem of lack of commonality of military equipment. Under this option, the independent Service buying commands would cease to exist, and there would be a centralized defense procurement agency within the Defense Department, presumably headed by a senior civilian presidential appointee in OSD. This type of centralized procurement has been used by France among other countries.

The creation of a consolidated acquisition agency separate and apart from the Department of Defense has also been suggested. That particular option is not analyzed in this study, since it seems that any agency should appropriately be part of the Department and accountable to the Secretary of Defense.

• Option 4B -have the commanders of the buying commands report directly to a senior official in OSD

Under this option, the buying commands would continue to exist in their present form. However, the military commanders of the

buying commands would no longer report to the Service Chiefs of Staff or to the Service Secretaries. Instead, they would report directly to a senior official in OSD. In other words, OSD would become the line manager for the buying commands under this option. This type of procurement organization is currently used in the United Kingdom.

• Option 4C-strengthen OSD coordination using existing structures

Under this option, there would be no change in the basic departmental structure. Instead, the Secretary would simply be urged to put sufficient support behind USDR&E and the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition and Logistics to assure that the policy initiatives of those individuals and their staffs would be observed by the buying commands. Under the present highly decentralized acquisition system, there is some question about whether centralized direction from OSD has sufficient top-management support to be effective.

Option 4D -consolidate contract administration

Rather than a consolidation of the entire buying commands, another option to address this problem would be the consolidation of the contract administration services only. The Defense Contract Administration Service of the Defense Logistics Agency already represents a consolidated contract administration service for certain contractors. However, the contract administration function for most major weapon systems and major contractors still lies with the Services. Since this results in one Service administering contracts for other Services, and since each Service has its own approach to and policies for contract administration, the suggestion has been made that at least contract administration should be a consolidated activity.

F. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

This section evaluates the specific options for reforming the acquisition process that were set forth in Section E. No effort will be made here to compare these options with each other or to identify the most promising options for legislative action. Rather, this section seeks to set forth in the most objective way possible the pros and cons of each alternative solution. The options will be identified by the same number and letter combination used in the preceding section.

1. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INSUFFICIENT ASSURED CONNECTION BETWEEN NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORMULATION OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

• Option 1A-enhance the role of the OJCS in the evaluation of military requirements

Greater involvement of the OJCS in the assessment of military requirements has substantial potential value. First, the OJCS, together with the unified commands, develops various operational plans.

Second, the OJCS has a major role in formulating national military strategy. Therefore, the OJCS should fully understand the underlying strategy, doctrine, tactics, and approach to various types