agement. PPBS, however, is an internal process which, though influenced by outside factors, can be controlled. Consequently, many defense officials turn to PPBS and the broader budget process in search of opportunities to save time and to improve their ability to respond to those events and responsibilities beyond their immediate control. As a result of the dominance of programming and budgeting, the strategic planning process is more frequently shortchanged when the PPB system receives less time and attention from senior DoD officials.

Instability is one of the major problems in the PPB system. With the exception of unrealistic fiscal guidance, the causes of instability are clearly associated with external influences rather than internal deficiencies. The Congress is the primary external source of this instability.

The problem of the length, complexity, and instability of the PPB system represents a general frustration among those who work within the PPB system. There is broad consensus that the cycle is too long and that too many factors, both inside and outside the Pentagon, undermine its effectiveness. Recent evolutionary changes in PPBS, however beneficial, do not go far enough to address the concerns of those who participate in the PPB process. In short, the PPBS bureaucracy is ready for, and will likely be receptive to, broader changes in the Federal budget process (from whatever source) aimed at greater certainty and stability and less congressional interference.

Five of the six PPBS problem areas discussed in preceding subsections have an impact on the length, complexity, and instability of the PPBS cycle. Of these, the absence of realistic fiscal guidance clearly has the greatest negative impact. Beyond these broader problems, there are five other causes of a too long, complex, and unstable PPB system: (1) total annual review of plans, programs, and budgets; (2) sequential nature of the separate planning, programming, and budgeting phases; (3) length and instability of the congressional budget process; (4) conflicting congressional guidance on defense policies and programs; and (5) congressional micro-management of defense programs.

The last three causes involve the Congress. These issues and others associated with the Congress and its political processes are so serious that they are addressed separately in Chapter 9 of this study. This subsection will focus, therefore, only on the first two

causes.

a. Total Annual Review of Plans, Programs, and Budgets

The PPB system completely rewrites all strategic planning documents and conducts reviews of all programs and budgets each year. The workload associated with these tasks is enormous. It does not appear that each planning and resource decision must be reconsidered every year.

b. Sequential Nature of the Separate Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Phases

Presently, the PPB system provides for three distinct phases that await the results of the preceding phase before being initiated. This

sequential nature of the three phases demands a long period of time to be conducted.

F. DESCRIPTION OF SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS

In this section, possible solutions to PPBS problem areas are described. It should be noted that the options presented in this section to solve a problem area may or may not be mutually exclusive. In some instances, only one of the options to solve a problem area could be implemented. In other cases, several options might be complementary.

1. PROBLEM AREA #1-INEFFECTIVE STRATEGIC PLANNING

The thrust of solutions to the problem of ineffective strategic planning is to strengthen and formalize the strategic planning process. Proposals in this regard can be grouped into four categories: (1) lessen the focus on programming and budgeting; (2) strengthen strategic planning skills; (3) create a separate strategic planning office either in OSD or OJCS; and (4) make other changes to strengthen the prospects for improved strategic planning. A total of ten options has been developed within these categories. Three of these options involve formal organizational change which may require legislative action. However, the bulk of the options in this area merely require management attention and initiatives.

a. lessen the focus on programming and budgeting

• Option 1A-diminish OSD's focus on resource programs by lessening the role of OSD resource managers

This might be done by (1) changing the hierarchical structure of OSD; (2) changing the OSD membership on the Defense Resources Board (DRB); (3) substantially reducing the size of the OSD staff; (4) creating mission-oriented offices which would have a more balanced approach to strategic planning and resource decisions; or (5) creating a forum other than the DRB to make strategic planning decisions.

In this last regard, the Department Headquarters Study suggested the reestablishment of the Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC) to offer the Secretary of Defense regular and frequent advice in the formulation of defense policy. While the AFPC is currently active, it is not frequently, if at all, used in the formulation of policy. If the Defense Resources Board were found to be an inappropriate forum for strategic planning decisions, the AFPC could be used to conduct this work. This idea appears to have merit because the AFPC membership includes the principal officials of DoD from whose interaction major strategic planning documents should emerge. Such a use of the AFPC would be consistent with section 171(b) of title 10, United States Code, which provides:

(b) The Armed Forces Policy Council shall advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces and shall consider and report on such other matters as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

Alternatively, an executive committee of the DRB could be formed whose members would be only the most senior DoD managers with broad and important strategic planning inputs.

• Option 1B-lessen congressional interest in program details and increase congressional interest in major planning and policy issues

Implementation of this option would require action by both the Executive and Legislative Branches. DoD must substantially increase its efforts to engage the Congress in an active dialogue on major defense planning and policy issues. Within the Congress, the leadership must attempt to reorient the focus of congressional review from program details to more fundamental and important issues.

b. strengthen strategic planning skills

• Option 1C-appoint senior OSD officials with strong strategic planning interests and skills

In line with the view that ineffective strategic planning is more of a management problem than an organizational problem, skilled managers are critical to solving this deficiency. Only such managers can discipline OSD and other DoD elements to conduct adequate strategic planning and make the strategic planning organizational machinery-whatever it may be-work.

• Option 1D-reorient war colleges and military academies to strengthen the study of strategy and military history

This proposal responds to the need to strengthen the strategic planning tradition in the U.S. military establishment. Some critics of the current curricula of the war colleges and the academies have argued that there is increasing emphasis being placed upon science and engineering skills, to the detriment of other skills that are more purely military in nature. This viewpoint holds that certain insights and qualities needed by officers cannot be obtained in a typical college curriculum and that much greater emphasis should be placed on the study of military history, strategy, and the like. Obviously, the more military history and strategy that the U.S. officer corps collectively knows, the better off the Nation will be. On the other hand, the war colleges and academies, like all educational institutions, must seek a balance and cannot teach everything. Ultimately, the judgment as to what should be taught in the military colleges and academies is probably one that should be left to the military professionals, since these schools are where the fundamental values, outlook, and skills of the profession are embodied and transmitted.

While this option may be desirable, further study of it is beyond the scope of this effort. For this reason, more detailed discussion and evaluation of this proposal are not presented.

c. create a separate strategic planning office either in OSD or OJCS

• Option 1E-create an OSD strategic planning office

Several studies have proposed the creation of a separate OSD planning staff. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommended that:

A Long-Range Planning Group should be created for the purpose of providing staff support to the Secretary of Defense with responsibility for long-range planning which integrates net assessments, technological projections, fiscal planning, etc. This group should consist of individuals from appropriate units in the Department of Defense, consultants and contract personnel appointed from time to time by the Secretary of Defense, and should report directly to him. (page 7)

Similarly, the Departmental Headquarters Study recommended:

Establish a Planning Office under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, formally linked in liaison to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. (page 56)

The National Military Command Structure Study also recommended that this responsibility be assigned to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy but made no recommendation on organizational arrangements. (page 47)

The exact responsibilities envisioned by these three studies for these planning offices are unclear. There is likely to be substantial resistance to strategic planning performed for the most part by staff planners. Lorange and Vancil argue this case in their Harvard Business Review article, "How to Design a Strategic Planning System":

...Strategic planning is a line management function; a sure route to disaster is to have plans produced by staff planners and then issued to line managers. Strategic planning is essentially a people-interactive process, and the planner is only one in the cast of characters involved. If the process is to function effectively, he must clearly understand his proper role:

...the planner's role initially is that of a catalyst, encouraging line managers to adopt a strategic orientation:

...System maintenance and coordination is the planner's primary function as the planning effort matures.

Options 1B and 1C presented in Chapter 3 include the creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategic Planning) and the elimination of the position of Under Secretary (Policy). Under Option 1A, which proposes an Under Secretary for Policy and Program Integration, and under an option that maintains the status quo with the current Under Secretary for Policy, it might be useful to establish a separate strategic planning office reporting to the under secretary. At what level this office should be organized is uncertain. In all of these options, it is intended that the strategic planning office would serve the catalyst, coordination, and systems maintenance functions. Much of the initial strategic planning work would be accomplished in the policy elements in the offices of mission-oriented assistant or under secretaries (or under the status quo, the policy-oriented assistant secretaries).

The principal purpose of the strategic planning office would be to establish and to maintain a well-designed and highly interactive strategic planning process. It may be necessary, however, to have the strategic planning office prepare the first drafts of major planning papers that would then be further developed through interaction primarily among the mission-oriented or policy-oriented assist

ant or under secretaries, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries and Chiefs, and the JCS Chairman. The strategic planning office should, however, have primary responsibility for scanning the international security environment which is necessary if DoD is to adapt effectively and timely to changes. Having the Net Assessment Office, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency report to the Assistant Secretary (Strategic Planning), as in Options 1B and 1C of Chapter 3, should facilitate the scanning role.

• Option 1F-create a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning

This option proposes that the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning should be established under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This could be done by altering the current position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy or by adding a new position.

• Option 1G-reestablish the Joint Strategic Survey Committee or create a Joint Military Advisory Council

It has been suggested that the Joint Strategic Survey Committee which existed in the early years of the JCS should be recreated. This committee, manned by the best young flag and general rank officers, was charged with advising the JCS on broad strategy matters.

General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Retired), has recommended the creation of a National Military Advisory Council consisting of a distinguished 4-star officer from each of the four Services. In General Meyer's view, this Council would formulate military strategy and translate policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense into programming direction for the Services.

While General Meyer proposed broad responsibilities for this Council, it will be considered here in a much narrower context dealing only with the need for strengthened strategic planning in OJCS. Specifically, this option proposes the creation of a Joint Military Advisory Council which would focus on the formulation of military strategy. The proposal to create a Joint Military Advisory Council with broader responsibilities is addressed in Chapter 4.

d. make other changes to strengthen the prospects for improved strategic planning

• Option 1H-insulate strategic planners from excessive outside demands on their time

One of the major causes contributing to ineffective strategic planning is continuous outside distractions that divert attention away from planning efforts. It is not possible to completely isolate planners from outside pressures. However, senior officials must set aside and protect the time of their planning subordinates. The creation of a separate strategic planning office (Option 1E) to coordinate and maintain the system should produce additional attention to this management issue.

• Option 11-strengthen the mission orientation of organizations that contribute to the strategic planning process