This option seeks to remedy this unfavorable situation by ending the power-sharing arrangement between the Executive and Legislative Branches. The Secretary of Defense would be given broad authority to alter Service roles and missions. The Congress would forego its right to review these changes.

Abdication by the Congress of its role in specifying Service functions is a drastic step that does not appear justified by the circumstances. What appears to be needed is an expression of congressional willingness to objectively consider changes to roles and missions assignments which the Secretary of Defense believes are necessary. Implementation of the preceding Options 4A and 4B would in themselves be strong indications of a more favorable congressional attitude.

G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the Military Departments. The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section D (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section F (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions).

CHAPTER 7

PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM

A. INTRODUCTION

The fundamental purpose of this study of the organization of the Department of Defense (DoD) is to evaluate (1) the civil-civil, civilmilitary, and military-military relationships among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Agencies, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified and specified commands, and Military Departments; and (2) the ability of these organizational arrangements to provide for sound planning, resource management, administration, and force employment. The reviews of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) in this chapter and the acquisition process in Chapter 8 -both of which are internal decision-making processes designed to support the current organization -are intended to be secondary to these larger issues.

Despite this fact, changes to decision-making procedures within DoD can have significant effects on the performance of the organization as a whole. There are three fundamental sources in DoD for improved organizational performance: (1) people; (2) organizational structure; and (3) managerial techniques. PPBS and the acquisition process represent the most important and visible applications of managerial techniques in DoD. Changes in managerial technology can serve as a substitute for changes in the other two areas. In particular, Allen Schick has written about the use of PPBS during Secretary McNamara's tenure as a substitute for reorganization:

PPB and departmental reorganization can be regarded as partial substitutes for one another. When PPB was flourishing in the Defense Department it was utilized to accomplish many of the objectives that had been sought in earlier reorganization attempts. Even though each of the military services retained its separate organizational identity, it was possible for the Secretary of Defense to make cross-cutting decisions by means of the mission-oriented program budget. ("A Death in the Bureaucracy: The Demise of Federal PPB", Public Administration Review, March 1973, pages 151-152)

Beyond these considerations, perceived satisfaction or dissatisfaction with PPBS (with its current strengths and weaknesses) could, itself, be an important measure of the effectiveness of existing organizational relationships. Organizational deficiencies may become evident in the PPB system. In addition, it may be possible for PPBS to serve as one of the supplemental integrating devices discussed in Chapter 3. PPBS is, therefore, an appropriate topic for review while addressing the broad issue of DoD organization.

PPBS is DoD's formal process for arriving at resource allocation decisions. Its purpose is the translation of military strategy and