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• Option 1H -strengthen the role of the Military Departments
in mission integration efforts by formally assigning the Service Under Secretaries responsibilities for cross-Service cooperation
and coordination Chapter 3 dealing with the Office of the Secretary of Defense identifies mission integration as the principal organizational goal of the Department of Defense. In that context, mission integration means the integration of the distinct military capabilities of the four Services to prepare for and to conduct effective unified operations in discharging the major U.S. military missions. Currently, the Military Departments have limited involvement in efforts to provide for effective mission integration.
It would seem useful and appropriate to assign to a senior civilian official in each Military Department formal responsibilities for cross-Service cooperation and coordination. Such assignments would improve the visibility and continuity of cooperative efforts.
This appears to be an assignment that could be effectively discharged by Service Under Secretaries. The Under Secretaries have the same perspective as the Service Secretary but have fewer burdens.
On the other hand, one could argue that a greater level of involvement by Service Under Secretaries would complicate the work of OSD officials who are the principal advisors to the Secretary of Defense on mission integration efforts. While OSD officials would need to remain informed of cross-Service efforts initiated at the Military Department level, it would seem preferable to have as many of these issues as possible resolved at the Service level without continuously forcing OSD into a referee role. o Option 11 -prevent the Service Chiefs from circumventing the
Service Secretaries This option is clearly desirable. Circumvention of the Service Secretaries by the Service Chiefs undermines the Secretaries' authority and weakens many aspects of civilian management, especially effective civilian control of the military. o Option 1J -remove the Service Chiefs from the institution
that provides unified military advice In the context of clarifying and strengthening the role of the Service Secretaries, this option would be advantageous. As members of the JCS, Service Chiefs have the stature and independence to lessen control by the Service Secretaries. 2. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF UNNECESSARY
STAFF LAYERS AND DUPLICATION OF EFFORT o Option 2A —fully integrate the Secretariats and military head
quarters staffs in the Departments of the Army and Air Force and partially integrate the Secretariat and military headquar
ters staffs in the Department of the Navy The creation of a single top management headquarters staff in the Departments of the
Army and Air Force should substantially reduce unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort. The dual levels of staff review would be eliminated and paperwork reduced. In addition, substantial manpower savings would be possible. In terms of senior positions, the illustrative proposals suggest that six civilian positions and one military position could be eliminated in the Department of the Army; and four civilian positions and one military position, in the Department of the Air Force.
Beyond the benefits of staff integration, the streamlining of the top management headquarters proposed as part of the illustrative proposals of Option 2A should permit more effective management hy the Service Secretaries and Chiefs. The integrated Army staff would have only 14 major offices while the integrated Air Force staff would also have only 14 major offices. Presently, the top management headquarters of the Army and Air Force have 35 and 31 major offices respectively.
By far, the greatest advantage of this option is that it provides the Army and Air Force Secretaries the opportunity to exercise effective control over the military component of the headquarters staff. The Secretary and Chief will have equal access to all offices and officials-whether civilian or military. The entire headquarters staff, however, would work under the direction of the Secretary. Civilian control would be particularly enhanced in the financial management and research, development, and acquisition functions through their consolidation under a civilian assistant secretary.
One of the disadvantages of this option is that the authority and responsibilities of the Army and Air Force Secretaries and Chiefs could become confused with an integrated staff. When the Secretary and Chief have their own separate staffs (as they do now), it is easier to delineate the authority and responsibilities of these two officials. In an integrated staff, it must be made absolutely clear that the Service Secretary is the single superior official and the line of authority flows solely from him to every subordinate civilian and military position. The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff will no longer preside over the military headquarters staffs as now authorized in title 10, United States Code.
JCS Publication 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, offers four separate, although not distinct, definitions of the term “chief of staff”':
o the senior or principal member or head of a staff; o the principal assistant in a staff capacity to a person in a com
mand capacity; o the head or controlling member of a staff, for purposes of the
coordination of its work; o a position, which in itself is without inherent power of com
mand by reason of assignment, except that which is invested in such a position by delegation to exercise command in another's
name. (page 64) At present, the Army and Air Force Chiefs have assignments and perform duties that encompass the first, second, and fourth definitions. In the narrow context of the military headquarters staff, they serve as the head of staff (definition 1). In the broader context of the Army and Air Force Departments, they serve as the principal assistant in a staff capacity to the Service Secretary (definition 2) and exercise command delegated by the Secretary (definition 4). In an integrated staff, the Army and Air Force Chief would no longer qualify as the head of the staff (definition 1); the Service Secretary would unquestionably occupy that role. The Service Chief would assume the responsibilities envisioned in definition 3: controlling member of a staff for purposes of the coordination of its work. In essence, the Army and Air Force Chiefs will become the Chief of Staff of the Service Secretary's staff. (In performing these responsibilities, whether the Army and Air Force Chiefs and Vice Chiefs will need the assistance of the Director of the Army Staff and the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff respectively. It is possible that these two positions could be eliminated.) The Army and Air Force Chiefs would continue to fulfill the roles envisioned by definitions 2 and 4.
The partial integration of the Secretariat and military headquarters staffs in the Department of the Navy would have the same advantages and disadvantages as the full integration of the Army and Air Force staffs, but to a lesser extent. o Option 2B -selectively integrate the Service Secretariats and
military headquarters staffs The basic advantage of this option is that it eliminates the dual levels of staff review in four functional areas: manpower, reserve affairs, logistics, and installations. Modest reductions in manpower and paperwork should result.
The disadvantage of this option is that it would continue to permit unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort in all other functional areas. o Option 2C -reduce the size of the Service military headquar
ters staffs Given the absence of attention in this study to field command and activities of the four Services, it is not possible to evaluate a proposal to reduce the military headquarters staffs through greater dependence on subordinate organizations. While useful possibilities in this regard may exist, they cannot be identified within the scope of this study
If proposals to fully or partially integrate the Service Secretariats and military headquarters staffs are not adopted, the only reductions in the military headquarters staffs that are possible within the scope of this study are the elimination or reduction of Service staffs that unnecessarily duplicate or interfere in the work of joint organizations, particularly the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 3. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INEXPERIENCED PO
LITICAL APPOINTEES AND POOR CONTINUITY IN THE SERVICE SEC
RETARIATS • Option 3A —correct the unfavorable perception of political ap
pointments within the Military Departments This option is clearly desirable. There is little that can be done about this in legislation. The President, Secretary of Defense, and other Administration officials must begin to understand the importance of these positions, use these officials more appropriately, and
emphasize the need to have highly qualified and experienced appointees.
The Senate could help change perceptions by insisting on nominees with stronger defense management credentials. However, without a change in the behavior patterns of the President and Secretary of Defense, such congressional action is likely to have little impact. o Option 3B -give the Service Secretaries authority to appoint
their under and assistant secretaries The arguments for and against this option are the same as for Option 1F which would give the Secretary of Defense the authority to appoint Service Secretaries.
In brief, vesting such appointment power in the Service Secretaries would enable them to (1) emphasize the defense management credentials of appointments; (2) select principal assistants who met their management needs; and (3) form a management team of principal assistants who are compatible with and loyal to them.
On the negative side, the loss of this appointment power would diminish the authority of and control by the President. In addition, the requirement for senatorial confirmation would no longer apply to these positions if the appointment power were vested in the Service Secretaries. While the loss of the confirmation requirement for Service under and assistant secretaries would be less critical than for Service Secretaries (as would result from Option 1F), it would have to be carefully weighed by the Congress. 4. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE LIMITED UTILI
TY OF THE CURRENT ASSIGNMENT OF SERVICE ROLES AND MIS-
CHANGE o Option 4A -require the submission by the President to the
Congress of a one-time report on Service roles and missions Since enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, the U.S. military establishment has had considerable difficulty in resolving Service roles and missions disputes. The Key West Agreement laid some basic ground rules, but failed to address the more detailed guidelines for jurisdictional boundaries that are needed. Moreover, mechanisms for change or for addressing new jurisdictional issues arising from new strategies, tactics, or technology have not been available.
This option may or may not force serious study of these long neglected issues. If the officials responsible for preparing and reviewing this report devoted sufficient time and critical attention to the issues, the assignment of Service roles and missions might receive an objective review. If, however, these officials saw this as another congressional reporting requirement to be met with as little energy as possible, nothing would be gained. There is also the possibility that Administration officials would like to avoid the controversy associated with a rigorous review of roles and missions assignments.
o Option 4B -require the JCS Chairman to submit an annual
report to the Secretary of Defense on Service roles and mis
sions The absence of mechanisms, other than the budgetary process, for making changes in Service roles and missions is a serious deficiency in DoD management. The sole use of the budget for this purpose is too costly because of the unnecessary duplication that it permits and too inefficient because it is difficult to eliminate duplication that is entrenched in the budget.
This option would provide for a continuous, high-level, joint military review of roles and missions assignments which might permit earlier identification of unnecessary duplication and of more effective alignments of capabilities. In making recommendations for changes, the JCS Chairman would have to be careful that he does not propose the premature curtailment of useful competition.
The JCS Chairman is the most logical DoD official to submit this report. The multi-Service perspective of his position and his substantial military experience would enable him to better analyze these complex issues. Obviously, the JCS Chairman would be able to perform this responsibility more effectively if his independent authority were enhanced as proposed in several options in Chapter 4.
The Secretary of Defense may or may not seek to forcefully implement the recommendations that he receives from the JCS Chairman. Secretaries of Defense have traditionally been reluctant to enter the controversial arena of Service roles and missions. Armed with the JCS Chairman's report, he may be willing to engage the Services on these issues if his fear of congressional opposition were lessened. The Congress can play a useful role by encouraging the Secretary of Defense to act on roles and missions issues. • Option 4C -authorize the Secretary of Defense, with the ap
proval of the President, to alter the assignment of Service roles
and missions The Executive Branch and the Congress share responsibility for assigning Service roles and missions. For whatever reason, this power-sharing arrangement has inhibited the necessary review and alterations to Service roles and missions. Based upon the actual language, the statutory description of Service functions leaves the Executive Branch with considerable freedom in assigning detailed roles and missions. Yet, the Executive Branch has not taken advantage of this freedom; there has been great reluctance to pursue roles and missions issues. For the most part, Secretaries of Defense have been prepared to live with the duplications and inefficiencies permitted by the Key West Agreement and subsequent clarifications.
The Executive Branch apparently believes that the Congress will become heavily involved in roles and missions disputes whether or not they impinge on functions prescribed in statute. Moreover, the Congress has historically been sympathetic to Service positions on roles and missions issues. For these apparent reasons, reconsideration of controversial roles and missions issues has been avoided by the Executive Branch.