d. political spokesman

The Service Secretary also has an important role as political spokesman for his Department. The Secretary of a Military Department can insulate the military Service leaders from politics. As John Kester argues:

...tasks, that reek of politics, are not appropriately imposed on someone in uniform. The civilian secretary can spare his uniformed officers the indignity of having to mix in them. He protects his service from political pressures that without him it is not equipped to handle...("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 154)

The Service Secretary can represent the programs and policies of his Department with the Congress and the public. Given the economic and political dimensions of defending Service positions in these fora, the Secretary is a more appropriate spokesman than the Service Chief. In addition, by fulfilling this role, the Service Secretary removes an enormous burden from the Secretary of Defense. As part of this role, the Service Secretary should absorb outside political heat-especially from the Congress-and barbs from the media and thereby deflect these burdens from the Secretary of Defense. The Service Secretary should also be prepared to handle the majority of congressional investigations, only involving the Secretary of Defense when absolutely necessary.

e. salesman within the Military Department of the decisions of higher civilian authority

As a member of the Service "family", the Service Secretary can be effective salesman of decisions by higher authority. As an insider in the Service system, the Secretary's influence in obtaining a favorable Service response-even to decisions that vary from strongly held Service positions-is likely to be greater than that of any other senior civilian official. If he skillfully performs this duty, the Service Secretary will provide valuable assistance to the Secretary of Defense. John Kester comments on this role:

The secretary of defense is too far removed to press the services to overcome reluctance to adopt or implement necessary new policies; the service secretaries can insist that they follow through. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page

154)

He also discusses another dimension of this role:

...The service secretary is also needed to soothe inevitable service program and budget disappointments; because the Defense budget each year is the resultant of political bargaining as well as of the external threat, the services never will receive as much as they think they should have. The service secretary should be a political buffer to help them swallow it. (page 160) In combination, these five roles suggest a range of potentially important contributions by Service Secretaries. Moreover, it is difficult to envision alternative organizational arrangements that would have greater management potential. As Colonel Daleski notes:

...these contributions are available only through Service Secretaries. There are simply no alternatives to the Service secretarial role in enhancing civilian control and in making defense management more efficient and responsive. (Defense Management in the 1980s, page 17)

• Option 1A -have the four Service Chiefs report directly to the Secretary of Defense

This option has the advantage of eliminating one of the two layers-the Secretariat-in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments. It would also enable senior military officials to more directly and forcefully argue the Service point of view with the Secretary of Defense and his key assistants.

This option, however, has a number of critical drawbacks. Key among these is its adverse impact on civilian control of the military. Under this option, the Secretary of Defense would have sole responsibility for providing civilian control. The breadth of this task is too great to be effectively performed by one official.

The second drawback is the absence of a civilian input in the formulation of Service programs and policies. While military perspectives have an important role, the complexity of defense issues requires broad consideration of economic, political, and diplomatic factors. The absence of a Service Secretary and Secretariat diminish the prospects that this broader perspective would receive the attention that it deserves.

• Option 1B -create Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army, Navy, and Air Force

The principal advantage of this option is that it would likely provide senior civilian officials responsible for Service matters who are substantially attuned to the perspective, agenda, and needs of the Secretary of Defense. Such officials would appear to be more capable of striking a balance between the roles of Service advocate and principal assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

This option also has the apparent advantage of eliminating one of the three layers-OSD, Service Secretariat, and Service military headquarters staff-in DoD management. However, it is not clear that this would be the result. While the Service Secretariat would essentially be transferred to OSD, giving the appearance of one management layer, OSD could in practice continue two separate layers of management activity.

This option has a number of serious deficiencies. Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army, Navy, and Air Force would not be as capable as Service Secretaries in performing the five key roles discussed earlier in this subsection: (1) civilian control; (2) essential link between detailed Service programs and broader DoD policy and strategy goals; (3) daily departmental management; (4) political spokesman; and (5) salesman within the Military Department of decisions by higher civilian authority. In each instance, Under Secretaries of Defense would suffer from their organizational remoteness from the Services. They would be viewed as outsiders, not as members of the Service family. This status would greatly hinder their effectiveness. As Captain Schratz notes:

The military chief enjoys a special relationship with the [Service] secretary which would hardly emerge were his immediate civilian superior on the Defense [OSD] staff. "The system" may make the DoD official too often a natural adversary...("The Role of the Service Secretary in the National Security Organization," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1975, page 24)

Beyond these deficiencies, the transfer of Service Secretaries' responsibilities to Under Secretaries of Defense would be a downgrading of these positions. As a result, it would likely be more difficult to attract highly talented and experienced people to these positions.

• Option 1C-specify in statute the responsibilities of the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense

If the positions of Service Secretary are to be retained, this option appears to be highly desirable. One of the deficiencies that has been perceived in the performance of the Service Secretaries is their failure to recognize and to fulfill their responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense. Specifying these responsibilities in statute may lessen this problem. In any case, no disadvantages of this option have been identified.

• Option 1D-remove inconsistencies in statutory descriptions of roles and authorities of Service Secretaries

At present, there is no clear basis in law for determining the proper roles of Service Secretaries. Moreover, there are conflicting authorities in existing law. The inability to determine what it is that a Service Secretary is to do results partially from the failure of the statutes describing the position to do so clearly. This is compounded further by a failure to update the existing statutes so that the duties and responsibilities of the Service Secretaries are internally consistent. There is no evidence to indicate that the scope of authority of the three Service Secretaries should differ, except as they relate to functions that exist in only one Military Department. This option does not imply the need for a laundry-list of duties. Rather, it recognizes the need for a clear statement of responsibility and for removing inconsistent responsibilities.

The present inconsistencies and unclear descriptions of the duties and authorities of the Service Secretaries, especially as they relate to the roles of other DoD officials, make the fixing of accountability difficult. Merely bringing the authorizing statutes into conformance with each other will not result in immediate changes in the way the position of Service Secretary is viewed. However, it should remove one impediment to a clear understanding of the roles of the Service Secretary.

No disadvantages of this option have been identified.

• Option 1E -repeal the Service Secretaries' authority to submit matters, on their own initiative, directly to the Congress

The authority of the Service Secretaries to make recommendations to the Congress on their own initiative, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, appears to be wholly inconsistent with the subordinate role of the Service Secretary. This essentially un

limited authority appears to be unlike any other in the Federal Government. The Senate Committee on Armed Services has supported abolition of this authority on two separate occasions, and apparently nothing has changed since either of these attempts. This authority has rarely, if ever, been exercised, and it may not be serving the Congress well. Yet, at the same time, the mere existence of this authority, permitting subordinate officials to bypass the President and the Secretary of Defense, clouds the lines of authority and responsibility.

The time has long passed when the Congress and the public can continue to treat the three parts (the Military Departments) of the whole (the Department of Defense) as independent and non-contiguous institutions, or to permit the senior officials of those parts to operate as plenipotentiaries. It must be recognized that each action by a Military Department or a Service Secretary has some effect on the other Military Departments and the Department of Defense as a whole. It is rarely helpful and virtually never appropriate that subordinate officials be permitted to bypass superiors to go to higher authority when such actions will effect the entire organization for which the superior officer is charged with responsibility. In short, it appears that this authority could be abolished without the Congress losing its ability to get needed information. Such a change should help clarify the relationships of Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense.

• Option 1F -give the Secretary of Defense the authority to appoint Service Secretaries

The Congress has the authority under the Constitution to vest the Secretary of Defense with appointment power for the positions of Service Secretary. This change in appointment power would strengthen the authority of the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the President.

Historically, the process by which Service Secretaries are selected has given limited attention to (1) the qualifications of candidates; (2) the management needs of the Secretary of Defense; and (3) the value of forming a management team of Service Secretaries who are compatible with and loyal to the Secretary of Defense. Inattention to these factors has greatly diminished the assistance that Service Secretaries have provided to the Secretary of Defense in managing DoD.

This option clearly offers the potential for correcting shortcomings in the selection of Service Secretaries. The Secretary of Defense may be able to play a forceful role in the selection of his Service Secretaries.

On the other hand, despite the change in formal authority, there may be no alteration in the location of ultimate decision authority on Service Secretary appointments. Through its personnel office, the White House may continue to dominate the selection process. Given the subordinate position of the Secretary of Defense and his loyalty to the President, it is not likely that the Secretary of Defense could exercise substantial independence in the selection of key political appointees, such as Service Secretaries. Notwithstanding this possibility, this option may increase the influence that the Secretary of Defense could exert in this process.

Presidents are likely to oppose the loss of this appointment power. Their ability to make appointments to serve their interests-whatever they may be-would be constrained. Moreover, Presidents may lose the ability to establish a system of checks and balances within DoD that would prevent any one official-the Secretary of Defense most likely-from gaining too much power. The President would want to avoid a situation in which a Secretary of Defense develops a constituency that makes him unresponsive to presidential leadership.

The most persuasive argument against this option from the congressional perspective is that the requirement of Senate confirmation of Service Secretaries would be foregone if these appointments were vested in the Secretary of Defense. Article II of the Constitution provides for Senate confirmation only for officials appointed by the President and would not apply to non-presidential appointments. In his paper, "Senate Confirmation of Non-Presidential Appointments", Richard C. Ehlke argues:

The explicit terms of Article II with respect to the appointing power and the separation of powers analysis of the Court in Buckley v. Valeo and INS v. Chadha would seem to preclude attaching the requirement of Senate confirmation to appointments vested in the heads of agencies. The Court in Buckley and Chadha strictly interpreted provisions in the Constitution that delineated the respective roles of the Congress and the Executive in important governmental processes -the appointment of officers and the making of law. Deviations from those explicit constitutionally-prescribed procedures have been struck down by the Court in unequivocal terms in both Buckley and Chadha. (page CRS-6)

Given the importance of the Service Secretary positions, it is highly unlikely that the Senate would view the loss of the confirmation requirement for these positions to be in the public interest. In addition, the prestige of these positions might be diminished if they were no longer presidential appointments.

• Option 1G-strengthen the role of Service Secretaries in DoD policymaking and other DoD-wide activities

This option would have the objective of eliminating the common notion that Service Secretaries should simply be advocates of their Services' policies and programs. It may help elevate Service Secretaries to a role of being principal advisors to the Secretary of Defense on a wide range of issues, including those that cross Service lines. This may encourage the perception of the Service Secretaries as DoD managers as well as the heads of the component Military Departments.

On the negative side, if the Service Secretaries were given an expanded role in policymaking and other DoD-wide activities and yet retained a strong orientation to the Service advocate role, they would prove to be obstacles in the search for more effective DoD policies and programs. If Service Secretaries cannot develop a balanced approach to Service and broader DoD interests, then it may be disadvantageous to expand their involvement.

52-314 0-85--16