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option proposes that additional reductions be made in the personnel strengths of each Service military headquarters staff. The focus would be on those personnel who are unnecessarily duplicating work performed in the Secretariats, elsewhere in the Military De partments, or in other DoD organizations. For example, Chapter 4 dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposes a reduction of about 200 military officers in each Military Department who are assigned either full—or part-time to work on joint issues. In this regard, if the Service Chiefs are removed from the institution that provides unified military advice, the need for the operations, plans, and policy staffs in the military headquarters staffs should be reevaluated.

The Departmental Headquarters Study included a recommendation to reduce the size of the military headquarters staffs:

...Encourage a continuation of the effort already underway to reduce headquarters military staffs by greater dependence on subordinate commands, particularly in the materiel area.

(pages 78 and 79) 3. PROBLEM AREA #3 - INEXPERIENCED POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND

POOR CONTINUITY IN THE SERVICE SECRETARIATS The problem of inexperienced political appointees and poor continuity in senior civilian positions affects all three Military Departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The options developed in Chapter 3 dealing with this problem area in OSD can also be applied to the Service Secretariats. Three options appear to be most appropriate: o, require that political appointees have strong defense manage

ment credentials; o require a longer commitment of service from political appoint

ees; and

o formulate monetary incentives or lessen the monetary disad

vantages for political appointees. As these options are described and evaluated in sufficient detail in Chapter 3, they will not be addressed here.

There is one area where political appointments in the Service Secretaries differ from those in OSD: their generally unfavorable perception. Many of the options proposed for problem area #1 relating to the confusion over the roles of the Service Secretaries would improve understanding of the importance of Secretariat positions, especially the Service Secretary. However, given the seriousness of this deficiency, a specific option is presented here.

A second option is presented that would give each Service Secretary increased authority in the selection of political appointees in his Secretariat. Such a proposal is designed to ensure that the Secretary would be able to insist upon high quality assistants who would be responsive to his leadership. o Option 3A -correct the unfavorable perception of political ap

pointments within the Military Departments Administrations will continue to have difficulty in recruiting talented and experienced civilian officials for appointments in the Military Departments if the perception persists that these positions are not important. This option proposes a concerted effort to correct this negative perception. The best possible means of implementing this option is a change in the behavior patterns of the President, Secretary of Defense, and senior OSD officials. As long as these officials act as if Service appointments are not important, others will share this view. o Option 3B -give the Service Secretaries authority to appoint

their under and assistant secretaries This option is designed to help insulate the selection of political appointees in the Military Departments from excessive political considerations. A Service Secretary could increase the weight given to the qualifications and defense management credentials of various candidates. In addition, the Service Secretary would have a greater capacity to ensure that his principal assistants would be supportive of him and not oriented to a separate agenda. Moreover, the Service Secretary would be more likely to have available the advice and expertise that he believes will be needed in the performance of his duties. 4. PROBLEM AREA #4 - LIMITED UTILITY OF THE CURRENT ASSIGN

MENT OF SERVICE ROLES AND MISSIONS AND ABSENCE OF EFFEC

TIVE MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE As noted in Section D of this chapter, this study has not attempted to conduct a detailed analysis of the present roles and missions assigned to the four Services. However, there have been suggestions that those assignments should be completely reviewed, that effective mechanisms for changes to roles and missions assignments be developed, and that the statutory impediments to the authority of the Secretary of Defense to change those assignments be repealed. Each of these suggestions has been developed into an option. o Option 4A -require the submission by the President to the

Congress of a one-time report on Service roles and missions Given the reluctance of the Services to address roles and missions issues, this option would force a comprehensive review of these assignments. This report would, at a minimum, provide for the updating of the Key West Agreement. o Option 4B -require the JCS Chairman to submit an annual

report to the Secretary of Defense on Service roles and mis

sions This option would seek to institutionalize a continuing review of Service roles and missions that would identify at an early stage needed changes in such assignments. This report may correct the current deficiency of relying solely on the budgetary process as a means of identifying roles and missions changes. In preparing this report, the JCS Chairman should consider the impact of changes in the threat, technology, weapon systems, strategy, and tactics on the assignment of Service roles and missions.

o Option 4C -authorize the Secretary of Defense, with the ap

proval of the President, to alter the assignment of Service roles

and missions This option would revise section 125 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of Defense, following presidential approval, to alter the assignment of roles and missions to the four Services. F. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

This section evaluates the specific options for reforming the Military Departments that were set forth in Section E. No effort will be made here to compare these options with each other or to identify the most promising options for legislative action. Rather, this section seeks to set forth in the most objective way possible the pros and cons of each alternative solution. The options will be identified by the same number and letter combination used in the preceding section. 1. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF CONFUSION CON

CERNING THE ROLES OF SERVICE SECRETARIES The fundamental issue in evaluating options to solve this problem area is whether the Service Secretaries can play a useful role in the management of the U.S. defense effort and, therefore, continue to be needed. In other terms, the issue can be stated as whether the Service Secretaries are assets or liabilities to the Secretary of Defense in his efforts to manage DoD. Too frequently, the Secretary of Defense is likely to have viewed the Service Secretaries more as liabilities. The heavy emphasis that Service Secretaries have placed on their roles as advocates has added to the Secretary of Defense's problems. This has been especially true when Service Secretaries have used their independent political standing to vigorously pursue Service interests in external fora. Often the Secretary of Defense has been confronted with Service Secretaries who have sought to advance their personal agenda. Moreover, Service Secretaries have rarely brought substantial expertise to their positions. As a last point, the Secretaries of the Military Departments have been playing a diminished role in providing civilian control of the military.

Despite these shortcomings in past performance, there appears to be substantial potential in the positions of Service Secretary for meaningful contributions to DoD management. As Colonel Daleski has noted:

Compelling as this case against the Service Secretaries may be, it is not conclusive. Several factors suggest a more positive view of the Secretaries and their potential contribution to defense management. Despite frequent DoD reorganizations, which have indeed diminished the Service Secretary's legal authority, it does not necessarily follow that the Secretary's ability to contribute meaningfully to defense management has thereby been irreparably impaired. (Defense Management in

the 1980's, page 17) The Service Secretary can play a useful role in five areas: (1) civilian control of the military; (2) essential link between detailed Serv

ice programs and broader DoD policy and strategy goals; (3) daily management of his Department; (4) political spokesman for the needs of his Department; and (5) salesman within his Department of the decisions of higher civilian authority.

a. civilian control of the military

Efforts to provide for civilian control of the military appear to be most effectively pursued on a decentralized basis. The Service Secretary is uniquely positioned to provide civilian control. Alternative arrangements require a greater degree of centralization which is likely to be less effective. Colonel Daleski supports this view:

...Service Secretaries continue to enhance civilian control because they and their staffs are uniquely situated to exercise civilian oversight on military departmental programs. As heads of departments, Secretaries alone can possess the requisite independence, authority, credentials and intimate knowledge of operating programs to assure that departmental activities are conducted in the public interest. (Defense Management in the

1980s: The Role of the Service Secretary, page 18) John Kester agrees:

...the service secretary also is a unique engine of civilian control-a slippery term that is invariably saluted but seldom defined. If civilian control refers to civilian appointees making the ultimate program and budget decisions, and being the ultimate command authority, we unquestionably have that nowbut it comes from the secretary of defense, and does not require the service secretaries. There is another aspect of civilian control, however, which the secretary of defense, busy and distant as he is, can never hope to provide: it is a qualitative check on the way each service runs itself, and an authority that the service knows will step in if corruption, blundering or excessive zeal start to veer the service off the reasonably wide road that the larger society tolerates. The civilian secretary can provide someone close enough to the service to have some idea what is going on and who in holding the service to external standards can do so with sensitivity to and sympathy for the traditions and values that give the service its identity. It is the service secretaries who help pick up the pieces when the system has gone off the track-cheating at service academies, misconduct in training, corruption in a PX system, mistreatment of recruits, My Lai. At the same time they may be able to hold off short-term press or congressional pressure while the service tries to heal itself. This sort of qualitative control and special monitoring can never adequately come from the Secretary of Defense's office, which is both too distant and too little involved in the unique values and personality of each service

itself. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 156) A report of the House Committee on Government Operations presents a similar view:

It is not sufficient to say that civilian interests are protected by the Secretary of Defense or the President himself. The interests of the country require civilian leadership, including civilian secretaries, at as many key points in the military orga

nization as is possible. (Access of Service Secretaries, page 11) b. essential link between detailed Service programs and broader DoD policy and strategy goals

As the "man in the middle", the Service Secretary has a special perspective that may be of great assistance to the Secretary of Defense in the resource allocation process. The Service Secretary can serve as the essential link between detailed Service programs, with which he is more familiar than the Secretary of Defense and his staff, and broader DoD policy and strategy goals. John Kester speaks about the essential link provided by the Service Secretary when he discusses the role of the Service Secretary in

...making sure that the service's activities fit into the Department of Defense as a whole and the national strategy. ("Do We

Need the Service Secretary?”, page 155) and in being

...able to fit the positions he advocates into the larger defense programs and policies with which the secretary of de

fense is concerned. (page 159) In his article, “The Role of the Service Secretary in the National Security Organization,” Captain Paul R. Schratz, USN (Retired) comments on a role of the Service Secretary during Secretary McNamara's tenure:

... The service secretary emerged not as a special pleader for a service viewpoint, not self-identified with service programs, but with a special perspective in coordinating Defense policy which could not be fulfilled by an Assistant SecDef (Secretary of Defense). He advises the Secretary of Defense and serves as an intelligent advocate of service interests at the Defense [OSD) level...

...the service secretary is able to preserve his own unique perspective, serving as an effective check on both the Defense (OSD) and military [Service] views. (U.S. Naval Institute Pro

ceedings, September 1975, page 24) c. daily departmental management

In addition to enhancing civilian control, the unique position of the Service Secretary enables him to effectively manage the daily activities of his Department. As Eugene M. Zuckert notes:

...the Service Secretary...fulfills a managerial responsibility at precisely that middle level which cannot be discharged as well anywhere else in the Department of Defense as now constituted. (“The Service Secretary: Has He A Useful Role?", For

eign Affairs, April 1966, page 458) The Department of Defense is too large and complex to be managed solely from the top. The details of daily management of the major components are too great to be effectively handled by any central staff. Such management responsibilities must be decentralized. The Service Secretary is the logical official to fulfill this management need.

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