system. Without the active support of OSD and the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries do not have an effective means of curtailing this disruptive practice. This option proposes that the Secretary of Defense carefully monitor such efforts and bring them to an end. The Secretary of Defense will need to establish guidelines on actions he finds undesirable. Forceful action against any violations should help end such efforts and restore the authority of Service Secretaries.

• Option 1J-remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice

Chapter 4 concerning the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops two options that would remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice. Arguments for such actions are presented in detail in that chapter. This option is presented here in recognition of its contribution to clarifying and strengthening the role of the Service Secretaries. Specifically, as John Kester notes, removing a Service Chief from the JCS system would "make him and the military staff more dependent on, and therefore more responsive to, the service secretary." ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 163) In essence, this option would seek to restore the Secretary-Chief alliance that provided effective civilian control and management in the War Department prior to and during World War II.

2. PROBLEM AREA #2-UNNECESSARY STAFF LAYERS AND DUPLICATION OF EFFORT

The most forceful options to correct the problem of unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments involve either full or partial integration of the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs. There is also the possibility that this problem could be lessened by unilateral reductions in the size of the military headquarters staffs. • Option 2A-fully integrate the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs in the Departments of the Army and Air Force and partially integrate the Secretariat and military headquarters staffs in the Department of the Navy

This option proposes an across-the-board merger of the Army and Air Force Secretariats and military headquarters staffs. The single integrated staffs would serve both the Secretary and Chief of Staff in the Army and Air Force. The dual-Service structure of the Department of the Navy precludes full integration of the Secretariat and the Navy and Marine Corps headquarters staffs. The Navy Secretariat continues to be necessary as a separate organization providing overall management of the department. Despite the continuing requirement for a Navy Secretariat, there appear to be opportunities for partial integration of the Secretariat and military headquarters staffs.

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel appeared to be proposing this option when it recommended:

...The Secretariats and Service staffs should be integrated to the extent necessary to eliminate duplication...A study of the present staffs indicates that the Secretariats and Service staffs

combined should total no more than 2,000 people for each Department. (page 42)

The Departmental Headquarters Study made three recommendations concerning selective integration of the Service Secretariats and military headquarters staffs. Specifically, it proposed to:

• conduct the manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics functions only in the military headquarters staffs in support of both the Service Secretary and Chief;

• integrate the research and development staffs of the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs under a Service assistant secretary; and

• provide common access for both the Service Secretary and Chief to the systems analysis, inspector general, and audit service capabilities.

While this option includes these three recommendations for the Army and Air Force, it goes beyond the theme of selective integration and proposes fully integrated top management headquarters staffs for these two Military Departments. For the Department of the Navy, only the first of the three recommendations of the Departmental Headquarters Study is included in this option.

Under this proposal, each Military Department would be authorized a civilian secretary and under secretary, two civilian assistant secretaries (one for financial management and one for research, development, and acquisition), and a civilian general counsel. All other functional offices would be headed by a military officer. The Service Secretary and Under Secretary would be assisted by an executive office of not more than 25 personnel to be organized as they deem appropriate.

In the following paragraphs, specific proposals to integrate the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs are presented. These proposals-despite the detail in which they are portrayed-are provided only for illustrative purposes. They represent only one of many possible schemes of integrating these staffs. Accordingly, they should not be considered recommended courses of action. Their purposes are solely to: (1) demonstrate that the concept of an integrated staff is a valid alternative; (2) serve as a starting point for efforts to design a more logical integrated staff; and (3) identify for the Congress the underlying principles to be addressed in legislation.

a. Department of the Army

At present, 13 senior civilian and military officials in the Secretariat report directly to the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Army and 25 senior military officials in the Army Staff report to the Chief of Staff, Vice Chief, and Director of the Army Staff. While integration of the two staffs would eliminate some of these officials, a general streamlining of the integrated staff would be necessary to permit effective management by the Secretary and Chief of Staff.

Chart 6-11 presents an illustrative proposal for integrating the Army Secretariat and military headquarters staff. The major changes reflected in this chart are:

-three Assistant Secretary positions would be eliminated: Civil Works, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and Installations and Logistics;

-the two Deputy Under Secretary positions would be eliminated:

-the position of Administrative Assistant to the Secretary would be eliminated;

-the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition would be eliminated;

-the Comptroller of the Army and the Auditor General would report to the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) instead of the Chief of Staff;

-the Assistant Chief of Staff (Information Management) and Director of the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization would report to the Assistant Secretary (Research, Development, and Acquisition) instead of the Chief of Staff and Secretary respectively;

-the Judge Advocate General would report to the General Counsel instead of the Chief of Staff;

-the Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence) would report to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations and Plans) instead of the Chief of Staff;

-the Surgeon General, the Adjutant General, and the Chief of Chaplains would report to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Personnel) instead of the Chief of Staff;

-the title of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics) would be changed to Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations and Logistics) to reflect sole responsibility for the installations function; and

-a new position of Assistant Chief of Staff (Program Analysis and Evaluation) would be created to replace the Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate in the Office of the Chief of Staff.

b. Department of the Navy

At present, 12 senior civilian and military officials in the Secretariat report directly to the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Navy. Within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 23 senior military officials report to the Chief, Vice Chief, and Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Within Headquarters, Marine Corps, 23 senior civilian and military officials report to the Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and Chief of Staff. Beyond partial integration of the Secretariat and the military headquarters staffs, some streamlining of these organizations will be necessary to permit effective management.