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tailed roles and missions to the Services as long as he does not vio late the general statements of Service roles and missions pre scribed in various sections of title 10, United States Code. In practice, Secretaries of Defense have avoided roles and missions contro versies because they apparently believe that Service opposition will be translated into congressional opposition. In his book, On Watch, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., ÜSN (Retired) confirms that this belief has led to inaction by the Secretary of Defense. Admiral Zumwalt had proposed that at least some Air Force aircraft should be required to be capable of operating from aircraft carriers. He relates the outcome of his effort after failing at the Military Department level:

...I then went to Melvin Laird and his deputy David Packard and urged that they get it done. Both of them thought it was a good idea, yet both declined to touch it. Their reason was probably a good one, that the Congress and its lobbies would not permit it, and a jurisdictional wrangle would hurt the Defense

budget. (page 70) (2) Desire of the Services to Avoid Reconsideration of Controversial

Roles and Missions Issues In the immediate post-World War II period, the Services were unable to reach agreement on the assignment of roles and missions. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal was forced to intercede and forge the necessary (although general) compromises. The intensity of interservice conflict and suspicion during this period was so great that the Services have made every effort to keep roles and missions issues dormant. In The Common Defense, Samuel P. Huntington remarked of this period:

... The years from the beginning of the struggle over unification in 1944 until the beginning of the Korean war in 1950 stand out in American military history as a high-water mark of interservice competition. The issues at stake were vital to the services; the means employed were varied; the intensity

and passion of the debate were unprecedented. (page 369) The Services have been successful in avoiding roles and missions issues. Unless substantial pressure is exerted on the Services to reexamine these assignments, they will not, as a general rule, volunteer to address them. Admiral Zumwalt found this to be the case. During June 1971, he wrote to Admiral Moorer, then JCS Chairman, proposing reconsideration of roles and missions assignments:

... The current fiscal and domestic political climate makes it more and more important that we break away from rigid boundaries established by traditional service roles and missions. To a limited degree, this has already begun. Examples are cooperation in ocean surveillance and the USAF mining role. These represent a beginning-much more can be done; for example, the Air Force can contribute to ASW and to the Navy's sea control requirements (both of which are essential to providing the logistics for deployed tactical AF units). What makes each service avoid this kind of thinking is that if accepted, it may result in de facto alteration of relative funding pro

files. (On Watch, page 71) The outcome, in the words of Admiral Zumwalt, was that:

...the problem was put in the “too hard to” file. (page 71) While this study project has not attempted to conduct an indepth analysis of the present assignment of the roles and missions of the Services, it appears that a comprehensive analysis of present day requirements, capabilities, and roles and missions is as necessary to ensuring an optimal national defense structure as is the study of any other set of relationships in the U.S. military establishment. E. DESCRIPTION OF SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS

Possible solutions to the problem areas of the Military Departments are described in this section. The options presented in this section may or may not be mutually exclusive. In some instances, the implementation of one option would preclude the implementation of other options; in other cases, several options could be implemented. 1. PROBLEM AREA #1-CONFUSION CONCERNING THE ROLES OF

SERVICE SECRETARIES The Service Secretaries currently play a limited and confusing role in the management of the U.S. defense effort. In response to this unsatisfactory situation, two broad approaches are possible: (1) abolish the three Military Departments and three Service Secre tary positions while retaining the four-Service structure of DoD; and (2) clarify the roles of the Service Secretaries and their responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense. Within these two broad categories, a total of ten options have been developed.

a. abolish the three Military Departments and three Service Secretary positions

If one believed that the position of Service Secretary were no longer needed or that its disadvantages were greater than its advantages, two options are possible: (1) make each Service Chief the senior official responsible for organizing, manning, equipping, supplying, and training Service forces and have him report directly to the Secretary of Defense; and (2) create Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. These options are based on the view that integration of Service capabilities cannot be attained so long as three separate Military Departments-each headed by a relatively independent Secretary-continue to exist, or that integration of Service capabilities can only be attained if senior members of the staff of the Secretary of Defense, having an integration mission and owing no duty to the separate Services, exercise direction and control over them. o Option 1A -have the four Service Chiefs report directly to the

Secretary of Defense This option was recommended by the Committee on the Defense Establishment, headed by Senator Stuart Symington, whose report was submitted to President-Elect Kennedy on December 5, 1960. The Symington Committee Report recommended:

...the elimination of the present departmental structure of the Army, Navy and Air Force, but would preserve the military Services as separate organic units within a single Defense Department. Such a step would do away with the present departmental Service Secretaries and their Under and Assistant

Secretaries, fifteen in all. (page 7) In line with this recommendation, this option envisions the abolition of the three Military Departments, Service Secretaries, and Secretariats. The four Service Chiefs would become the senior officials responsible for organizing, manning, equipping, supplying, and training Service forces. The four Service Chiefs would report directly to the Secretary of Defense. o Option 1B -create Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army,

Navy, and Air Force This option envisions the abolition of the three Military Departments and the three Service Secretaries. The three Secretariats would be substantially reduced in size and transferred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Within OSD, these Service-oriented offices would each be headed by an Under Secretary of Defense. This option was studied, although not recommended, by the Departmental Headquarters Study. In commenting on this option, the Departmental Headquarters Study stated:

...Proponents of this concept have more in mind than merely a change in titles; what is intended is a single level of civilian authority with designated civilians in OŠD responsible for

overseeing the operations of the Military Services. (page 39) b. clarify the roles of the Service Secretaries and their responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense

The options developed within this broad category are based upon the premise that the Service Secretaries can make important contributions to defense management if confusion about their roles can be clarified. • Option 1C -specify in statute the responsibilities of the Serv

ice Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense The responsibilities of the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense are stated in very general terms in title 10, United States Code. Each Service Secretary's responsibilities are stated in an identical sentence in three separate sections of law:

... The Secretary (of the Army, Navy, or Air Force) is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of the Department [of the Army, Navy, or Air Force). (sec

tions 3012, 5031, and 8012) Given that Service Secretaries have failed to balance their Service advocate roles with their roles as principal assistants to the Secretary of Defense, it appears that it might be useful to more precisely specify in statute the responsibilities of the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense. This option proposes appropriate revisions to title 10, United States Code, based at least upon the following principles: o beyond their roles of heads of Military Departments, the Serv

ice Secretaries are officials of the Department of Defense as a

whole; o as such, Service Secretaries should ensure that the policies and

programs of their Departments are consistent with broad na

tional security policy and the resource allocation needs of DoD; o the Service Secretaries are the principal assistants of the Sec

retary of Defense in the formulation and execution of the re

source allocation process; o the Service Secretaries are responsible for ensuring that deci

sions of higher civilian authority are implemented by the Mili

tary Departments. o Option 1D -remove inconsistencies in statutory descriptions of

roles and authorities of Service Secretaries This option is based on the belief that the present statutory de scriptions of roles and authorities contain unnecessary distinctions among the Service Secretaries and that such inconsistencies promote uncertainty in terms of their authority and responsibility. In particular, the specific responsibilities of the Secretary of the Navy to the President appear to be an anachronism that would be eliminated under this option. o. Option 1E -repeal the Service Secretaries' authority to submit

matters, on their own initiative, directly to the Congress The three sections of title 10, United States Code, dealing with the powers and duties of the Service Secretaries contain the following provision:

...After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secre tary [of the Army, Navy, or Air Force) may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense

as he may consider appropriate. (sections 3012, 5031, and 8012) This option would repeal this authority. Such action would be based on the belief that this statutory authority contradicts the role of the Service Secretary as a subordinate of the Secretary of Defense and the President, permits the Military Departments to operate outside of the direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and even if not exercised, creates uncertainty about the Secretary of Defense's authority to control the Military Departments. o Option 1F -give the Secretary of Defense the authority to ap

point Service Secretaries Article II of the Constitution of the United States provides authority for the_Congress to vest appointment powers in officials other than the President. The pertinent portion of Article II is:

He [the President]...by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. (emphasis

[graphic]

added) This option would exercise congressional authority to vest appointment power in the Head of a Department, in this instance, the Secretary of Defense.

This option is designed to ensure that the Secretary of Defense, as opposed to other Executive Branch power centers, selects his principal executives and advisors in the Military Departments, the Service Secretaries. This option is based upon the premise that the Secretary of Defense is more knowledgeable than anyone else in evaluating the qualifications of prospective candidates and more capable of identifying his management needs. This option also recognizes the importance of the Secretary of Defense having a "team” management approach comprised of individuals who will owe their loyalty to him. Only in this way can the Secretary of Defense be confident that his policies will be faithfully executed, particularly with the diffused authority that exists in the Department of Defense. As a last point, this option would likely give the Secretary of Defense greater flexibility in the removal of

Service Secretaries who, for whatever reason, were unable to meet the needs of the Secretary of Defense. o Option 16 -strengthen the role of Service Secretaries in DoD

policymaking and other DoD-wide activities If the Secretary of Defense expects to utilize the three Service Secretaries as principal advisors with perspectives and concerns similar to his, he must seek to broaden their vision from relatively narrow Service interests and issues. This option proposes that the Secretary of Defense develop a pattern of involvement of Service Secretaries on broad defense issues. This effort could include (1) participation of the Service Secretaries in the strategic planning process; and (2) occasionally, assignment to the Service Secretaries of DoD-wide issues for study, organization, or resolution. o Option 1H-strengthen the role of the Military Departments

in mission integration efforts by formally assigning the Service Under Secretaries responsibilities for cross-Service cooperation

and coordination This option is an extension of the concept presented in Option 1G. Given the needs of DoD for improved mission integration, it might be useful to assign to the second-ranking civilian official in each Military Department formal responsibilities for cross-Service cooperation and coordination. Among the specific roles that it recommended for Service Under Secretaries, the Departmental Headquarters Study proposed that each Under Secretary serve as “Executive for the Service Secretary for multi-service assignments and initiatives." (page 74) • Option 11 -prevent the Service Chiefs from circumventing the

Service Secretaries The Service Chiefs circumvent the Service Secretaries on topics which the civilian heads of the Military Departments should be involved by raising issues directly with OSD or through the JCS

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