and experience is not transferable when the personnel are not; the costs of moving a jurisdiction from one military service to another, therefore, become virtually prohibitive. Even when an iron-clad case can be made for the transfer and consolidation of an activity, it is often not worth the political costs. The distinctive nature of the military services thus helps to preclude simple reallocation of established jurisdictions. Duplication, once established and allowed to grow to significant proportions, is very hard to eliminate. (pages 45 and 46)

Given the costs associated with unnecessary duplication, DoD must make every effort to ensure that appropriate jurisdictional boundaries are established. It is not clear that the rigorous analysis required to establish these boundaries has been conducted at any time since enactment of the National Security Act of 1947.

(2) advance of technology

Technology with application to warfare has advanced at an ever increasing rate. The emergence of new technology has posed new jurisdictional issues. Unfortunately, there has been no effective mechanism for resolving them until the costs of duplicative efforts become substantial. Key examples of DoD jurisdictional disputes arising from new technology include the intermediate-range ballistic missile competition between the Army's Jupiter and Air Force's Thor and the guided missile competition between the Army's Nike Hercules and the Air Force's Bomarc and land-based Talos.

Lucas and Dawson discuss duplication in new fields, which they term "pre-emptive duplication," as follows:

Duplication in new fields is usually the result of the absence of jurisdictional boundaries, or of boundaries made obsolete or ambiguous by rapid social or technological change. In areas the organization has not previously entered, no "zoning laws" delimit where a department can and cannot probe. The exploration of new fields is thus a tempting opportunity to establish small activities that may prove fruitful, particularly in view of the natural tendency of organizations to allocate an emerging activity to the department that has already developed some familiarity with it. The leadership of departments is only too well aware of the fact that small decisions awarding jurisdiction over marginal functions to a department may be decisive in future organizational bargaining over that function if and when it has taken on importance. There is, then, a powerful incentive to set up shop in a field before jurisdictional boundaries are established. An activity has only to offer faint promise, and departments will tend to establish some proprietary program. As a consequence, management frequently finds that the departments are already engaged in small-scale duplicative activity in a new field.

Once established, these activities may gradually grow or be maintained at a low level until the goals they serve take on new importance. When that occurs, the central management may find several activities, each arguing that it alone should be the recipient of further organizational growth in the same general area. In each case, managers and specialists have de

veloped expertise in solving the managerial and technical problems associated with that area. Relevant equipment has often already been obtained. The organization finds it has "sunk costs" in fostering more than one department's ability to cope with the given problem area. (page 45)

Lucas and Dawson draw the following analogy to pre-emptive duplication:

...One is reminded of the practice of the explorers of the Age of Discovery, who carried the royal banner onto the beach and claimed all the lands they had discovered in the name of their king. (page 85)

John C. Ries describes the situation:

...the first service to develop a suitable weapon would acquire the mission that went with it. (page 130)

The absence of a continuing review of Service roles and missions has precluded the establishment of jurisdictional lines that would bring duplicative conflict among the Services under control.

(3) artificial constraints

The third area of concern is that the Key West Agreement placed artificial constraints on the development of force capabilities to meet the changing needs of warfare. In their article, "The Key West Key", Morton H. Halperin and David Halperin describe the overriding influence of the Key West Agreement on today's military operations, procurement, and thinking. They conclude that the Key West Agreement and subsequent revisions "have contributed to some of the most glaring failures and shortcomings of American military policy in the postwar era." (Foreign Policy, #53, Winter 1983-84, page 114)

In support of this conclusion, Morton and David Halperin cite:

。 the overreliance of the Army on the helicopter because of limitations on Army aviation;

o the failure of the Air Force to provide adequate close air support for the Army;

o the failures of the Navy to acquire sufficient sealift and the Air Force to acquire sufficient airlift;

• the inability to provide an effective force to conduct the Iranian hostage rescue mission; and

o the inability to consider a sea-based alternative for the MX missile.

The Halperins argue that the constraints of the Key West Agreement have hindered the search for more effective forces and program alternatives. They argue the need for a comprehensive reevaluation of the Key West Agreement in the following terms:

An examination of the agreements and their sometimes disastrous consequences suggests that the Key West approach was fundamentally flawed. If the United States is to continue to defend its interests effectively without wasting vast sums of money, serious revisions of the responsibilities and missions of the armed forces will be needed. (page 116)

d. nature of DoD review of Service roles and missions

In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the three Service Secretaries and four Service Chiefs were questioned on the nature of DoD review of Service roles and missions. Their responses offer supporting evidence of the inadequacy of this review process. Secretary of the Army Marsh stated:

...I know of no present effort within DoD to make a fundamental re-examination of the assignment of Service roles and missions....I'm not aware of any deliberate, periodic effort to examine roles and missions on a regular basis; nor do I believe a need exists to do this at the present time. (Part 6, page 264) Similarly, Secretary of the Air Force Orr stated:

There are no formal efforts within DoD to re-examine roles and missions. (Part 6, page 264)

Secretary of the Navy Lehman had an apparent, although not necessarily, contrary view if considered in the context of the Service Chief statements which follow:

...the assignments of functions, roles, and missions within and among the Services is a subject of almost daily discussion and review. (Part 6, page 264)

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Watkins, stated:

We don't have an annual roles and missions conference...but I have to say in the budget development, the Defense Resources Board procedure, our debate with the Congress and the like, we essentially mold the roles and missions so they do evolve and they do change.

...This is a roles and missions shift in a sense, but we are doing it not in the context of meeting and discussing it, but getting on with what do we need to fight our forces better and, out of that, roles and missions changes are taking place.

...I believe that if we try to formalize or institutionalize the process, it could be very unwieldy and debilitating. (Part 8, page 353)

The Army Chief of Staff, General Wickham, added:

The DRB [Defense Resources Board] process, I believe, forces a good degree of review of roles and missions through the programmatic dimensions. (Part 8, page 353)

General Gabriel, Air Force Chief of Staff, commented:

In the effort that General Wickham just mentioned-roles and missions are not the driving factor.

It is who can do what, what is the smartest way to do it and the most affordable way to do it. We have really thrown out the roles and missions issues...

It is working well and the more we do this, of course, the more we find out there are other things that we can help each other on without bumping into the parochial problems of the past. (Part 8, page 354)

Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Kelley, stated:

...I don't think the subject is necessarily a change of roles and missions but rather a continued emphasis on this harmonization of capabilities that exist within the Armed Forces of the United States. (Part 8, page 354)

These seven statements reveal the nature of DoD review of Service roles and missions. First, there is no mechanism for formal review of roles and missions assignments. Formal reviews are being avoided apparently because they are expected to be "debilitating given the historical record of roles and missions disputes. Second, the budget, through the Defense Resources Board process, is used as the sole source of roles and missions changes. This is of concern because as the previously quoted conclusion from Lucas and Dawson noted:

...A weakness of using the budget as an instrument of control is that by the time an activity is recognized as duplicative, it may be too late to do much about it.

Third, the central management of DoD appears to be playing a passive role in reexamining roles and missions issues. The major activity appears to be allowing the Services to cooperate as they see fit. e. causes of the problem

The causes of the problem of an absence of a comprehensive and objective review of Service roles and missions are clearer than the source of any other problem. There are two causes: (1) statutory restrictions on changes to the combatant functions of each Service which have served to inhibit central management in this area; and (2) the desire of the Services to avoid reconsideration of these controversial issues.

(1) Statutory Restrictions on Changes to the Combatant Functions of the Services

The present statutory language regarding the authority of the Secretary of Defense to make changes to combatant functions, codified in section 125 of title 10, United States Code, was enacted as part of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which amended the National Security Act of 1947. Under present law, the Secretary of Defense must notify the Congress of a proposed transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or abolition of a major combatant function, power, or duty assigned by law to the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps. Congressional power to block such changes was provided for in a one-House veto. While this congressional obstacle has been rendered constitutionally suspect by recent Supreme Court rulings, it is clear that the Secretary of Defense could anticipate substantial congressional scrutiny and opposition to any such attempted changes.

An historical review of the statutory limitations placed on the the authority of the Secretary of Defense in the assignment of Service roles and missions reveals a clear concern on the part of the Congress not to surrender its constitutional authority in this field. Congressman Carl Vinson elaborated on this concern in the House Armed Services Committee report on the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958:

Congress cannot abdicate the responsibility vested in it by the Constitution. It must continue to reserve to itself decisions as to the basic duties of each of the four services (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps) is to perform. This has the great advantage of insuring that matters of such vital import to the defense of the nation are not left to the Executive alone, but are subject to the collective judgment of the Congress. (page 37) The first explicit statutory limitation on Executive changes to combatant functions was contained in the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act. The National Security Act of 1947 had been silent on this issue. Ironically, one of the main purposes of the 1949 amendments was to clarify and strengthen the powers of the Secretary of Defense. While this goal was achieved in many areas, a direct prohibition was placed on the Secretary of Defense's ability to change combatant functions. Interestingly, a version of this prohibition was part of the Administration's legislative proposal. During the Senate hearings on the 1949 amendments, Secretary of Defense Forrestal told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Administration recognized congressional authority in this area. As part of its legislative proposal for the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the Eisenhower Administration called for the repeal of the restrictions on the authority of the Secretary of Defense to change combatant functions. Secretary of Defense McElroy gave the following explanation to the House Armed Services Committee for this proposal:

The changes in the law which we are proposing do not change the present statement of functions of the armed services. The crux of the discussions, therefore, is the question of the authority of the Secretary of Defense to eliminate overlapping in combat functions as may be required by changing circumstances. This provision is considered necessary because the advent of modern weapons has eliminated the clear distinction which could at one time be made between combat on land, combat at sea, and combat in the air. Thus the advent of modern weapons has led to overlapping which is confusing and wasteful, and has underscored the vital need for unified direction and operational use of combatant forces. (page 6392)

This desire for greater flexibility on the part of the Secretary of Defense in order to avoid duplication and overlapping ran counter to congressional interest in maintaining control over the assignment of Service roles and missions. Congressman Rivers stated the basic issue during the House Armed Services Committee hearings on the 1958 legislation:

The more executive authority we put in one man, the less constitutional-mandated authority we retain for ourselves. (page 6216)

The result of this debate was the compromise embodied in current law. For the first time, the Secretary of Defense was given explicit authority to change combatant functions, but this new authority was made subject to congressional review and veto.

Despite this congressional obstacle, the Secretary of Defense has substantial discretion, in theory, over the assignment of more de