(b) In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, in-
cludes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water
transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained,
and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident
to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land
forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as oth-
erwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobiliza-
tion plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the
Army to meet the needs of war.

NAVY (Section 5012)

(a) The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in
general, naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may
be organic therein. The Navy shall be organized, trained, and
equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to
operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval
forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as oth-
erwise assigned and is generally responsible for naval reconnais-
sance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping.

(b) All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service
as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation
consists of combat and service and training forces, and includes
land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval oper-
ations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the oper-
ations and activities of the Navy, and the entire remainder of the
aeronautical organization of the Navy, together with the personnel
necessary therefor.

(c) The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique,
organization, and equipment of naval combat and service elements.
Matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated
between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.

(d) The Navy is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

MARINE CORPS (Section 5013)

(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall
be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions
and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and
other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall
be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces
of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for
service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval
bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essen-
tial to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine
Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on
armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for
the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and
shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. How-
ever, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with
the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.
(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the
Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations
that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by land-
ing forces.

(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrat-
ed joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime compo-
nents of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

AIR FORCE (Section 8062 (c))

(c) In general, the Air Force includes aviation forces both combat
and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained,
and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and de-
fensive air operations. It is responsible for the preparation of the
air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as
otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobili-
zation plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the
Air Force to meet the needs of war.

On July 26, 1947 -the same day that he signed the National Security Act of 1947 -President Truman issued Executive Order 9877 setting forth the more detailed assignment of Service roles and missions. However, differences in language between this executive order and the general statements of Service functions that the Congress decided to include in the National Security Act led to efforts to revise the Executive Order. The key language differences were over Navy and Air Force responsibilities for air missions.

On January 20, 1948, Secretary of Defense Forrestal sent a draft revision of the Executive Order to the JCS for comment. The JCS was unable to reach agreement on a revision. As a result, Secretary Forrestal met with the Service Chiefs at the Key West Naval Base in Florida from March 11-14, 1948. At this conference and a subsequent meeting in Washington on March 20, agreement was negotiated on the assignment of Service roles and missions. President Truman approved this agreement on April 21, 1948, and on the same day, Secretary Forrestal released a paper, entitled "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff", that documented the agreement. This paper has been commonly referred to as the "Key West Agreement." This agreement is now embodied in DoD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components," first promulgated on March 16, 1954.

The Key West Agreement assigns primary and collateral functions to each Service. The use of collateral or secondary functions was the most innovative feature of the Key West Agreement. Where it had been impossible to define Service responsibilities, collateral functions were assigned in an effort to foster joint activity. In summary, the Key West Agreement assigns key primary functions as follows:

Army

• sustained combat operations on land

• Army antiaircraft artillery

primary interest in the development of airborne doctrine, procedures, and equipment

Navy and Marine Corps

• sustained combat operations at sea, including operations of seabased aircraft and their land-based naval air components

o naval forces, including naval close air support forces, for the conduct of joint amphibious operations

。 seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign

Air Force

• sustained combat operations in the air

。 strategic air warfare

o close combat and logistical air support for the Army

。 air transport for the Armed Forces

In their paper, "The Key West Key", Morton H. Halperin and David Halperin characterize this agreement as follows:

The Key West agreement represented a compromise of sorts. The Navy gained many of its goals: retention of the Navybased Marine Corps; the authority to provide close air support for Marine land operations; and the authority to carry out those air operations, including ground-launched missions, which are required for sea battles. The Army and the Air Force, convinced that the services should avoid excessive duplication, were willing to give the Navy control over almost all sea operations. And the Army and Air Force agreed to cooperate with each other as a team on joint missions. Specifically, this meant that the Air Force pledged to provide the Army with airlift and close air support. (Foreign Policy, #53, Winter 1983-84, page 117)

While there have been no major changes to the portions of the Key West Agreement dealing with Service roles and missions, there have been a number of clarifications:

• Memorandum for the Record of the Newport Conference of August 20-22, 1948 -Two roles and missions clarifications resulted from this conference. The first was a clarification of the term "primary mission" so that "the Air Force could not deny the Navy access to atomic weapons or exclude it from planning for strategic air operations." (Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years, page 401) The second was the placement of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project-an interservice organization responsible for the handling and assembly of nuclear weapons-under Air Force control on an "interim" basis. • Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force,, October 2, 1951 This memorandum, known as the Pace-Finletter agreement (after the two Service Secretaries who negotiated it), sought to delineate the meaning of the phrase in the National Security Act of 1947 that specified that the Army shall include land combat and services forces and "such aviation...as may be organic therein." Army organic aviation was defined to consist of aircraft utilized by the Army within the Army combat zone which was defined as not normally exceeding 50 to 75 miles in depth. The functions that could be performed by Army aircraft were specified as were functions for which Army aircraft were not to duplicate Air Force functions.

• Memorandum of Understanding Relating to Army Organic Aviation, November 4, 1952 -This second Pace-Finletter agreement modified the previous agreement to: (1) redefine the combat zone to normally be 50 to 100 miles in depth; and (2) more importantly, limit Army fixed wing aircraft to an empty weight of not more than 5,000 pounds.

• Memorandum for Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, November 26, 1956 This clarification addressed five subjects:

-use of aircraft by the Army. Specific limitations were placed on the use of aircraft by the Army. Key among these was the reaffirmation of the limitation that Army fixed wing aircraft would have an empty weight not to exceed 5,000 pounds.

-adequacy of airlift -Air Force capability to provide airborne lift was viewed as being adequate “in the light of currently approved strategic concepts."

-air defense -The Army was assigned responsibility for land-based surface-to-air missile systems for point defense (100 nautical miles), and the Air Force was assigned responsibility for such missile systems for area defense.

-Air Force tactical support of the Army -The Army would develop surface-to-surface missiles for use against tactical targets not more than 100 miles beyond the front lines. Other tactical air support functions were to remain the responsibility of the Air Force.

-Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) -Operational employment of the land-based IRBM system was assigned as a sole responsibility of the Air Force, thus removing the Army from this function.

• Department of Defense Directive 5160.22, March 18, 1957 -The Army and Air Force continued to have sharp disagreements over the provision of tactical air support for the Army. This directive, which superceded the Pace-Finletter agreements of 1951 and 1952, sought to clarify these disputes. On March 8, 1971, this directive was cancelled, especially in light of the view that the 5,000-pound limitation on Army fixed-wing aircraft was inappropriate.

• Department of Defense Directive 5160.32, March 6, 1961 -The advent of military satellite and space vehicle systems in the late 1950's created problems of control and coordination within the Department of Defense. This directive assigned responsibility to the Air Force for research, development, test, and engineering of space development programs or projects. This directive was revised on September 8, 1970 to enable the other Services to pursue space development programs related to the major weapon systems for which they had responsibility. • Agreement between Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, Ápril 6, 1966 -This Army-Air Force agreement, known as the Johnson-McConnell agreement (after the two Chiefs of Staff), sought to reach an understanding on the control and employment of certain types of fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Disputes in this area had been intensified by increasing levels of warfare in Southeast Asia. For its part, the Army agreed "to relinquish all claims for CV-2 [CARIBOU] and CV-7 [BUFFALO] aircraft and for future fixed wing aircraft designed for tactical airlift." Under this agreement, all CV-2 and CV-7 aircraft in the Army inventory were transferred to the Air Force. The Air Force agreed "to relinquish all claims for helicopters and follow-on rotary wing aircraft which are designed and operated for intra-theater movement, fire support, supply and resupply of Army forces" and for certain Air Force control elements.

• Navy-Air Force Agreement, May 22, 1974 -This agreement covered the use of B-52 aircraft to provide aerial delivery of Navy sea mines.

• Navy-Air Force Memorandum of Agreement on the Concept of Operations for USAF Forces Collateral Functions Training,

September 2, 1975 -This agreement provided a general concept of operations for Air Force resources training to perform collateral functions in sea control operations. It was envisioned that Air Force capabilities might be employed to perform the following tasks as part of sea control operations:

-search and identification;

-electronic warfare;
-tactical deception;

-attack against surface and air units; and
-aerial minelaying.

• Memorandum of Agreement on U.S. Army -U.S. Air Force Joint Force Development Process, May 22, 1984 -In this agreement-signed by the respective Chiefs of Staff, Generals Wickham and Gabriel-the Army and Air Force affirmed that "they must organize, train, and equip a compatible, complementary and affordable Total Force that will maximize our joint combat capability to execute airland combat operations. The initial agreement contained 31 initiatives for action by the Army and Air Force; this list was later expanded to 34 initiatives. These initiatives addressed several areas where the Army and Air Force have traditionally experienced jurisdictional disputes: air defense, close air support, guided missiles, and intratheater airlift. About half of the initiatives directly addressed these areas. However, initiatives were taken in a number of new areas such as air base ground defense, combat search and rescue, Special Operations Forces, and night combat.

Beyond these specific initiatives, the Army-Air Force agreement of May 1984 sought to institutionalize a joint force development process. With this objective in mind, the agreement provided for:

-establishment of a long-term process that would include an annual update and review of the initiatives for action; -expansion of the agreement to include future initiatives; -annual exchange between the Army and Air Force of a formal priority list of those sister Service programs essential to the support of their conduct of successful airland combat operations, the purpose of which is to ensure the development of complementary systems without duplication; -resolution of joint or complementary system differences prior to program development;

-high priority in the Army and Air Force development and acquisition processes for programs supporting joint airland combat operations; and

-dedication to providing the best combat capability to the unified and specified commanders.

b. Evaluation of the Key West Agreement and Subsequent Clarifications

(1) Key West Agreement

The Key West Agreement and subsequent revisions did little to settle roles and missions disputes among the four Services. It did resolve some of the most fundamental issues raised by unification