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for command relationships, this should be clearly communicated and implemented. No valid disadvantages of this option have been identified.

Option 4B —revise UNAAF to remove obstacles to the creation of additional sub-unified commands and other necessary subor

dinate joint organizations The relative emphasis to be placed on joint organizations versus single-Service organizations at subordinate levels of the unified commands involves the following considerations:

o wartime effectiveness versus peacetime efficiency;
o joint requirements versus Service prerogatives; and
o likelihood of theater-wide campaigns versus lesser crises.

UNAAF's emphasis on a single-Service operational chain of command within the unified commands appears inappropriate in the current environment. As the Commander in Chief of the Readiness Command has stated:

UNAAF's organizational approach, which preserves division by Service and Service components, plus the stated requirement to preserve uni-Service integrity in the organizational structure, needs to be reviewed in terms of today's required levels of integration and employment of modern weapons sys

tems. (Answers to DoD Authorization Report Questions.) The Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command has offered a similar recommendation:

We have now had considerable experience with the unified command system and from my parochial perspective I am not convinced that a federated system is as necessary as it once appeared....I would suggest that we should look closely at this arrangement to ensure that it reflects today's environment in terms of the required integration needed to conduct modern warfare and in terms of current political imperatives. (Answers

to DoD Authorization Report Questions.) Key among the advantages of this option is that it will enable the unified command system to more effectively meet today's crisis management requirements. In those crises in which the President must retain effective control, there may be a requirement to circumvent portions of the military chain of command. The creation of additional joint organizations at subordinate levels of the unified commands may permit more effective military action under the direction of the National Command Authority. o Option 4C -remove the Service component commanders from

the operational chain of command If the single-Service operational chains of command are an impediment to unification, the Service component commanders should be removed from the chain of command. Such an organizational change would have Service organizations at both the operational and policymaking levels of DoD responsible solely for organizing, training, and equipping forces. Operational matters would be handled solely by joint organizations at both the operational and policymaking levels.

There may, however, be instances in which the unified commander may want to place one or more of his Service component commanders in the chain of command. The CSIS recommendation offers greater flexibility in this regard; it would authorize the unified commander to specify his chain of command depending on the situation. This approach may suffer from its ad hoc nature. While the chain of command could be structured to best meet the situation at hand, there may be drawbacks to having different reporting relationships during crises. • Option 4D -place greater emphasis on joint training within

the unified commands This option, by itself, is likely to accomplish little. Increased joint training is likely to result only through changes that augment the influence of the unified commanders on resource allocations. 5. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE ABSENCE OF AN

OBJECTIVE REVIEW OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

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o Option 5A —correct the institutional deficiencies of the JCS

system This option is the principal focus of Chapter 4 dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, therefore, will not be evaluated here. o Option 5B -seek increased attention to the UCP by OSD and

NSC This is essentially a management issue. If the senior leadership of OSD and NSC do not see the need for or validity of civilian oversight of the Unified Command Plan, there is little that can be done. o Option 5C -require the submission by the President to the

Congress of a one-time report on the UCP A one-time Presidential report on the UCP may or may not prove useful. If the civilian officials responsible for preparing or, more likely, reviewing this report devoted sufficient time and critical attention to the relevant issues, the UCP might receive an objective review. If, however, they merely saw this as another congressional reporting requirement to be met with as little energy as possible, nothing would be gained.

This option also poses the potential for undesirable congressional meddling on UCP issues. H. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the unified and specified commands. The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section E (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section G (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions).

Conclusions

Recommendations 1. The Congress is empowered

by the Constitution to specify the chain of command.

2A. Clearly assign to the Secretary 2. The chain of command of Defense the role of command

from the Commander in er of the operational commandChief to the operational ers. commanders is confused, primarily due to uncertain- 2B. Specify in statute the Secretary ty about the roles of the of Defense's authority “to comSecretary of Defense and mand”. the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chain of command is 2C. Specify that the Secretary of further confused by the de Defense is the principal contact facto influence that individ- in the DoD policymaking level ual Service Chiefs retain for the operational commanders. over the operational commands.

2D. Remove the JCS, including the

Chairman, from the chain of command.

2E. Make the JCS Chairman the

principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational matters and the sole command voice of higher authority within the JCS system while ensuring absolute clarity that the JCS Chairman is not part of the chain of command.

3. The concept of unified com

mand, as formulated in the immediate post-World War II period and as articulated by President Eisenhower in 1958, has not been implemented.

4A. Revise UNAAF to make it con

sistent with the concept of unified command.

4. Provisions of JCS Publica

tion 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), are inconsistent with the concept of unified

command.

Conclusions

Recommendations 5. The authority of the unified 5A. Revise UNAAF to lessen the

commanders over their restrictions on the authority of Service component com- the unified commanders. mands is weak.

5B. Authorize the unified com

manders to select and replace their Service component commanders.

5C. Require the Service component

commands to communicate with their Service headquarters on critical resource issues through their unified commander.

6. There is an imbalance be 6A. Increase the stature of the uni

tween the responsibilities fied commanders by making and accountability of the them more senior in order of unified commanders and rank than the Service Chiefs. their influence over resource decisions.

6B. Strengthen the capabilities of

the Joint Staff to do resource analysis.

6C. Have OSD mission-oriented of

fices represent the unified commanders on policy and resource allocation issues.

6D. Approve the use of the CINC

Readiness Fund.

7. The Department of Defense

has taken an ambivalent approach to the concept of unity of command; the congressional recommendation that unity of command is imposed at all military and naval outposts" has not been implemented.

Conclusions

Recommendations 8. There is an absence of uni- 8A. Clarify appropriate command

fication below the level of relationships within the unified the unified commander and commands, especially concerning his staff; as a result, com- the principle of unity of command by mutual coopera- mand. tion-the basic U.S. military doctrine prior to World 8B. Revise UNAAF to remove obWar II-remains the order stacles to the creation of addiof the day at subordinate tional sub-unified commands and levels of the unified com- other necessary subordinate joint mands.

organizations.

8C. Remove the Service component

commanders from the operational chain of command.

9. There is no objective review 9A. Seek increased attention to the

of the Unified Command UCP by OSD and NSC. Plan (UCP).

9B. Require the submission by the

President to the Congress of a one-time report on the UCP.

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